The Library

SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY
AT CLAREMONT

WEST FOOTHILL AT COLLEGE AVENUE
CLAREMONT, CALIFORNIA

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2026

https://archive.org/details/americanpresbyte0000vari

American Presbyterian and Theological Review.

NUMBER XIII.

CONTENTS OF THE JANUARY NUMBER, 1866.

Page

ART. I. MAXIMS FOR SERMONIZING 9
By G. T. SHEDD, D. D., New York.

II. RELATION OF THE OLD TESTAMENT TO THE NEW. 33
By Prof. HENRY HARBAUGH, D. D., Mercersburg, Pa.

III. THE NATURE AND VALIDITY OF INDUCTION 50
By Prof. HENRY N. DAY, New Haven, Conn.

IV. THE WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE, AND THE WAR FOR SECESSION 78
By Rev. WILLIAM ADAMS, D. D., New York.

V. THE PATRISTIC DOCTRINE OF THE SACRAMENTS .. 93
By Prof. PHILIP SCHAFF, D. D., New York.

VI. THE WESTMINSTER CONFESSION IN ENGLAND AND IRELAND 100
By Rev. E. H. GILLETT, D. D., New York.

VII. MILL'S EXAMINATION OF HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY 126
By Prof. HENRY B. SMITH, D. D., New York.

VIII. BUSHNELL ON THE ATONEMENT 162

IX. CRITICAL NOTES ON RECENT BOOKS 172

THEOLOGY: Hurst, History of Rationalism—Schaff, The Person of Christ—Frank, Protestant Theology—Fisher, Essays on Supernatural Origin of Christianity—Reid, Voices of the Soul 172

BIBLICAL LITERATURE: Astié on John's Gospel—Alexander's Isaiah—Smith's Bible Dictionary—Ryle on John—Hengstenberg on John—Keil and Delitzsch on Joshua, etc.—Morgan on 1 John 174

PHILOSOPHY: Mill on Comte—Zeitschrift f. d. Exacte Philosophie—Der Gedanke—Zeitschrift f. d. Philosophie—Masson's British Philosophy 178

HISTORY: Henne, Manethós—Froude, England—Astié, United States—Sherman's March 180

BIOGRAPHY: Dr. Spring's Reminiscences—Van der Palm—Carlyle, Friedrich the Second—Richard Cobden 183

CONTENTS OF JANUARY NUMBER, (CONTINUED).

Page

General Literature: Ruskin's Thoughts—Harkness, Latin Reader—Frieze, Quintilian—The Plymouth Pulpit—Sunday Book of Poetry—Miss Carew-..... 185

Practical Religion: Walks from Eden—Newton's Bible Readings—Macleod's Highland Parish—John Vine Hall—Publications of Am. Tract Society, New York—Publications of Am. S. S. Union—Killen, Society in Heaven—Mrs. Olin's Perfect Light—Prime's Hymn of Jerusalem—Brewster's Work, etc.—Plumer on Vital Godliness—Publications of Am. Tract Society, Boston 186

Miscellany: Gilette's Records—President A. D. Smith's Inaugural—Prof. E. C. Smyth on Congregationalism—Dr. Goodwin's Discourse on Dr. Vaughan..... 188

X. THEOLOGICAL AND LITERARY INTELLIGENCE..... 188

France 188

Germany..... 190

Holland and Belgium..... 193

Russia 193

Italy..... 194

Spain..... 195

England..... 195

United States of America..... 197

BUSINESS NOTICE.

A considerable number of our subscribers are still in arrears to us. The money due is greatly needed to meet the expense of publishing the Review. Will not those who are indebted remit to us without delay?

Our subscribers will note that $3 is received only when subscriptions are paid at the *beginning of the year*. Where they are not we must adhere to our terms.

WANTED.

The January number for 1865; also the first number of the Theological Review. $1 will be paid for a copy of either.

PUBLISHER.

New York, *January* 1, 1866.

Theology Library

SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY
AT CLAREMONT
California

THE

AMERICAN PRESBYTERIAN AND THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

NEW SERIES. No. XIII.—JANUARY, 1866.

Art. I.—MAXIMS FOR SERMONIZING.

By William G. T. Shedd, D. D., Professor in Union Theological Seminary.

Maxims for the composition of sermons are of two classes, *general* and *special*,—those, namely, which relate to the fundamental discipline that prepares for the construction of a sermon, and those which are to be followed in the act of composition itself.

I. Before particular precepts can be given with profit, it is necessary to call attention to some *general* rules, the observance of which greatly facilitates the process of writing a discourse. The sermonizer often loses much time and labor in the season of immediate preparation for the pulpit, because he has made little general preparation for the work. As in mechanics the workman always seeks to increase the efficiency of a force by applying it under all the advantages possible; so the intellectual workman should avail himself of all that can render his direct and immediate efforts more effective and successful. A dead lift should be avoided by the mind, as well as by the body. Power in both the material and mental worlds should be aided by a *purchase*. If the sermonizer goes to the construction of a sermon after he has made preparation of a more general nature, he will be far more successful than if he

begins abruptly, and by a violent or perhaps spasmodic application of his powers.

1. The first of these general maxims is this: *Cultivate a homiletic mental habit.* By this is meant such an habitual training of the mind as will impart a sermonizing tendency to it. The human mind by discipline and practice may be made to work in any given direction, provided it is a legitimate one, with something of the uniformity and precision and rapidity of a machine. It can be so habituated to certain processes that it shall go through them with very little effort, and yet with very great force. We shall, of course, not be understood as advocating a material philosophy, or as affirming that the operations of the mind are really mechanical. We are only directing attention to the fact acknowledged by all philosophers, that certain mental operations,—such as the logical, the imaginative, *e. g.*,—may be so *fixed* by exercise and habit, that the mind may perform them with an ease and a readiness that resembles the operations of an instinct, or a machine. Compare the activity of a mind that has been habituated to the processes of logic, with one that has had little or no exercise in this direction. With what rapidity, and precision, does the former speed through the process; and how slowly and uncertainly does the latter drag along. The former has acquired a logical tendency, and needs only to fasten its grasp upon a subject that possesses a logical structure, that has logic in it, to untie it immediately, and untwist it entirely.

Now, in relation to the purposes of his profession and calling, the preacher ought to acquire and cultivate a homiletical habitude. Preaching is his business. For this he has educated himself, and to this he has consecrated his whole life. It ought therefore to obtain undisputed possession of his mind and his culture. He ought not to pursue any other intellectual calling than that of sermonizing. He may, therefore, properly allow this species of authorship to monopolize all his discipline and acquisitions. It is as proper that the preacher should be characterized by a homiletical tendency, as that the poet should be characterized by a poetical tendency. If it is proper that

the poet should transmute everything that he touches into poetry, it is proper that the preacher should transmute everything that he touches into sermon.

This homiletic habit will appear in a disposition to skeletonize, to construct plans, to examine and criticise discourses with respect to their logical structure. The preacher's mind becomes habitually organific. It is inclined to build. Whenever leading thoughts are brought into the mind, they are straightway disposed and arranged into the unity of a plan, instead of being allowed to lie here and there like scattered bowlders on a field of drift. This homiletic habit will appear, again, in a disposition to render all the argumentative, and illustrative materials which pour in upon the educated mind from the various fields of science, literature, and art, subservient to the purposes of preaching. The sermonizer is, or should be, a student, and an industrious one,—a reader, and a thoughtful one. He will, consequently, in the course of his studies meet with a great variety of information that may be advantageously employed in sermonizing, either as proof or illustration, provided he possesses the proper power to elaborate it, and work it up. Now, if he has acquired this homiletic mental habit, this tendency to sermonize, all this material which would pass through another mind without assimilation, will be instantaneously and constantly taken up by it, and be wrought into the substance and form of his sermons.*

The possession of such an intellectual habitude as this greatly facilitates immediate preparation for the pulpit. It is, virtually, a primary preparation, from which the secondary and more direct preparation derives its precision, thoroughness, rapidity, and effectiveness. Without it, the mind of the preacher must be continually forced up to an unwelcome and ungenial task in the preparation of discourses, instead of finding in this process of composition a grateful vent for the outflow and overflow of its resources.

* These materials will readily overflow, in the form of skeletons, metaphors, illustrations, etc, into the preacher's Common Place Book.

2. The second general maxim for the sermonizer is this: *Form a high ideal of a sermon, and constantly aim at its realization.* There is little danger of setting a standard too high, provided the mind is kept actively at work in attempts to reach it. The influence of a very perfect conception of a thing is sometimes injurious upon a mind whose processes are somewhat morbid and unhealthy. An artist whose *beau ideal* is high, but who has little productive energy and vigor, will dream away his life over his ideal, and accomplish nothing; or else fill up his career, as an artist, with a series of disappointed, baffled efforts. Such a mind should content itself, in the outset at least, with a somewhat lower idea of perfection, and rouse itself up to more vigor and energy of execution. In this way, it would take courage, and would gradually elevate its standard and carry its power of performance up along with its ideal. But if there be a vigorous willingness to work, and a sincere and good motive at the bottom of mental efforts, there is no danger of aiming to high. Though the perfect idea in the mind will never be realized,—for a man's ideal, like his horizon, is constantly receding from him as he advances towards it,—yet the grade of excellence actually attained will be far higher, than if but an inferior, or even a moderate, standard is assumed in the outset.

The preacher's idea of a sermon should, therefore, be as full and perfect as possible. He should not be content with an inferior grade of sermonizing, but should aim to make his discourses as excellent in matter and in manner as his powers, natural and acquired, will possibly allow. And especially should he subject his efforts at sermonizing to the criticism and the discipline of a high ideal, while he is in the *preparatory course* of professional education. It is probably safe to say, that in all theological seminaries too many sermons are written, because the conception of a sermon is too inadequate. A higher standard would diminish the quantity, and improve the quality in this department of authorship. We are well aware of the frequent demands made by the churches upon the theological student before he has entered the pastoral

office. These demands ought to be met, so far as is possible, in view of the lack of preachers in this great and growing country. And yet this very demand calls for great resolution, and great carefulness, on the part of the professional student. He ought not to court, but to discourage this premature draft upon his resources, so far as he can consistently with a wise regard to circumstances. He ought to insist upon the full time in which to prepare for a life-long work,—a work that will task the best discipline and the ripest culture to the utmost. He ought to keep his ideal of a sermon high and bright before his eye, and not allow his mind, by the frequency and insufficiency of its preparations, to become accustomed to inferior performances, because this is the next step to becoming satisfied with them.

It is possible, as we have already remarked, that a high model may, in some instances, discourage efforts, and freeze the genial currents of the soul. But in this age of intense mental action, when all men are thinking, and speaking, and writing, there is little danger in recommending a high standard to the professional man. Where one mind will be injured by it, a thousand will be benefitted. Moreover, if there only be a vigorous and healthy state of mind,—a disposition to act, to think, and to write,—on the part of the clergyman, there is little danger of his becoming unduly fastidious, or morbidly nice. Add to this the fact, that as soon as the clergyman has once entered upon the active duties of his profession, necessity is laid upon him and he *must* compose, *nolens volens*, and we have still another reason why a high ideal is not liable, as it is sometimes in the case of the artist or poet, to hamper and suppress his activity. All disposition to brood morbidly over performances, because they are not close up to the perfect model in the mind, will be broken up and driven to the four winds, by the consideration that on next Lord's day two sermons must be preached at the call of the bell, to that expecting and expectant congregation.

We are also aware that it is possible to expend too much time and labor upon an individual sermon. Some preachers,

and some very celebrated in their day, have had their "favorite sermons," as they are styled,—sermons upon which an undue amount of pains was expended, to the neglect and serious injury of the rest of their sermonizing. A distinguished American preacher is said to have re-written one particular discourse more than ninety times! But this is not the true use of a high ideal. A high conception ought to show its work and its power in *every* sermon. The discourses of a preacher ought uniformily to bear the marks of a lofty aim. Not that one sermon will be as excellent as another; any more than one subject will be as fertile as another. But the course of sermonizing, year after year, ought to show that the preacher is satisfied with no hasty, perfunctory performance of his duties,—that there is constantly floating before him, and beckoning him on, a noble and high idea of what a sermon always should be.

There is little danger, however, of excessive elaboration during the course of professional study. The theological student is more likely to under-estimate the close study of his plans, and the elaborate cultivation of his style and diction, than to overestimate them. He is apt to shrink from that persistent self-denial of the intellect which confines it to long and laborious efforts upon a single discourse, instead of allowing it to expatiate amid a greater variety of themes. The student, in his best estate, is too little disposed to that thorough elaboration to which the ancient orators accustomed themselves in the production of their master pieces, and which exhibits itself equally in the compactness and completeness of the organization, and in the hard finish of the style. "The prose of Demosthenes," says an excellent critic, "is in its kind as perfect and finished as metrical composition. For example, the greatest attention is bestowed by Demosthenes, upon the sequence of long and short syllables, not in order to produce a regularly recurring metre, but in order to express the most diverse emotions of the mind by a suitable and ever varying rhythm, or movement. And as this prose rhythm never passes over into a poetical metre, so the language, as to its elements,

never loses itself in the sphere of poetry, but remains, as the language of oratory ever should, that of ordinary life and cultivated society. And the uncommon charm of this rhetorical prose lies precisely in this,—that these simple elements of speech are treated with the same care which usually only the poet is wont to devote to words. Demosthenes himself was well aware of this study which he bestowed upon his style, and he required it in the orator. It is not enough, said he, that the orator, in order to prepare for delivery in public, write down his thoughts,—he must, as it were, sculpture them in brass [i. e., he must not content himself with that loose use of language which characterizes a thoughtless fluency, but his words must have a precise and exact look, like newly minted coin, with sharply-cut edges and devices.] This comparison of prose composition with sculpture appears to have been a favorite one with the ancient rhetoricians; as Dionysius also says of Demosthenes, Plato, and Socrates, 'their productions were not so much works of writing as of carving and embossing.'"*

This high ideal both of matter and style should, therefore, float constantly before the eye of the student, during his whole preparatory course. In this way, he will habituate himself to intense and careful efforts in composition, so that when he goes out into active professional life he may, when compelled to do so by the stress of circumstances, even relax something of this strain and tension of intellect, and yet throw off with rapidity sermons that will be highly methodical, and highly finished, because this style of sermonizing has become natural to him. By this severe discipline of himself in the begining, he will have acquired the right to be daring, and careless, when compelled to be, by the stress of circumstances; and what is more, he will have acquired the ability to be so, without disgrace to his calling, and with success in it.

3. A third general maxim for the sermonizer is this: *In immediate preparation for the pulpit, make no use of the immediate*

* Theremin: Demosthenes und Massillon.

preparation of other minds, but rely solely upon personal resources. This maxim forbids the use of the skeletons and sermons of other sermonizers, in the process of composition. Such a general preparation as has been described,—such a homiletic mental habit conjoined with a high ideal in the mind,—renders such help unnecessary. Such a sermonizer is strong in himself, and needs no supports or crutches; such a preacher is rich in himself, and does not need to borrow. He prefers to follow the leadings of his own well disciplined and well informed mind, rather than to adjust himself to the movements of another mind, however firm and consecutive they may be.

In this day, when so many aids to sermonizing are being furnished to the preacher, it is well to form a correct estimate of their real value. These collections of skeletons and plans, more or less filled up, which seem to be multiplying along with the general multiplication of books, ought to be entirely neglected and rejected by both the theological student and preacher. As matter of fact, they are neglected by all vigorous and effective sermonizers. They are the resort of the indolent and unfaithful alone.

The only plausible reason that can be urged for using them is, that they furnish material for the study of plans,—that they are necessary to the acquisition of the art of skeletonizing. But a good collection of sermons is of far more worth for this purpose. There is very little discipline in looking over a plan that has been eliminated from a sermon by another mind. But there is very great discipline in taking the sermon itself, and eliminating the plan for ourselves. In the first instance, the mind is passive, in the second it is active. The plan of a truly excellent discourse is so identified with the discourse, is so thoroughly organic and one with the filling up, that it requires great judgment and close examination to dissect it, and separate it from the mass of thought, in which it is lightly, yet strongly imbedded. Why then lose all the benefits of this examination and exertion of judgment, by employing the collector of skeletons to do this work for us? Why not take the living structure to pieces ourselves, and derive the same

knowledge and skill thereby, which the anatomist acquires from a personal dissection of a subject? It is only by actual analysis, that actual synthesis becomes possible. It is only by actual examination of the parts of an oration, and an actual disentanglement of them from the matter of the discourse, that we can acquire the ability of putting parts together, and building up a methodical structure ourselves. Instead, therefore, of buying a collection of skeletons, the student and preacher should buy a collection of sermons, and obtain the discipline which he needs from a close and careful study of their logical structure and rhetorical properties. For in this way he will acquire both a logical and rhetorical discipline. If he studies a skeleton merely, logical discipline is the most he can obtain; and this too, as we have seen, in only an inferior degree. If, on the other hand, he studies a sermon, while the effort to detect and take out the plan that is in it will go to impart a fine logical talent, a fine constructive ability, the attention which will at the same time be given to the style, illustration, and diction of the discourse as a whole will go to impart a fine rhetorical talent also. The method of criticism will correspond to the method of production. As the sermon came into existence in a growth-like way—plan and filling up, skeleton and flesh, all together,—so it will be examined in the same natural method. The skeleton will not be contemplated alone and isolated from the thoughts which it supports; neither will the thoughts be examined in a state of separation from the plan of the whole fabric. The method of criticism, like the method of authorship, will be the method of nature.*

But when these collections of plans are seriously offered to the preacher, as sources from which to derive the foundations of his sermons, nothing can be said in their recommendation either on the score of literature or morality. An English treatise upon the art of sermonizing, which is filled up with very full plans of sermons by various distinguished preachers, con-

* The careful analysis of such sermons as those of South, Barrow, and Saurin, would be a discipline for the young preacher more valuable than to read a hundred treatises upon rhetoric, without it.

tains such remarks as the following: "An immense number of examples, in which passages are laid out in logical order, are to be found in Burkitt on the N. T., and more especially in Henry, and these may often be turned to good account. Some ministers are very cautious of using any of these plans, because the volumes of Burkitt and Henry are possessed by many families; but surely some new casting might easily be devised that would give the air of novelty, and please the fastidious, if they be thought worth the pleasing." Again he says: "I do not wish to draw you from your independent study, and the resources of your own minds; but if at any time you feel indisposed towards mental labor, or time will not allow you to enter upon it, regard it as perfectly lawful to avail yourselves of the materials furnished by such an author as Henry." Again he observes: "As to Burkitt, he is full of both long and short skeletons, that is, skeletons upon long and short passages, which a little pains would so modernize that when our knowing people saw their old friend with a new face, they certainly would not recognize him again. This is, I suppose, what we wish, when we find ourselves out of condition for close study, or have not time for it." The author then goes on to say, with an innocent simplicity that is quite charming, that "it is necessary to obtain a knowledge of Burkitt's keywords, his 'Observe,' his 'Note,' his 'Learn.' When he says 'Observe,' he is about to give you a head or division of the passage in an expository view." &c., &c., &c.*

* Sturtevant: Manual. pp. 57, 58, 59.— The views in the English Church are very indulgent in relation to preparations for the pulpit. Archdeacon Paley, in a sermon to the young clergy of Carlisle, addresses them as follows: "There is another resource by which your time may be occupied, which you have forgot, in urging that your time will hang heavy upon you. I mean the composition of sermons. I am far from refusing you the benefit of other mens' labors; I only require that they be called in, not to flatter laziness, but to assist industry. You find yourself unable to furnish a sermon every week; try to compose one every month."

The English Churchman contains the following announcement:—"A clergyman of experience and moderate views, who distinguished himself during his University course in Divinity and English composition, will furnish original sermons in strict accordance with the Church of England, in a legible hand, at 5s. 6d. each. Only one copy will be given in any diocese. A specimen will be sent if wished for. Sermons made to order on any required subject, on reasonable terms. For further particulars apply," &c.

Now such recommendations as these are both illiterate, and immoral. No scholar,—no preacher who has even a becoming regard for the literary character, to say nothing of the edifying character, of his sermonizing,—could possibly subject his intellect to such copying. A proper estimate of the sermon as a piece of authorship, if nothing more, would lead the sacred orator to despise such servile artifices, from which nothing but an artificial product could result. Upon such a method as this, the whole department of Sacred Eloquence would lose all its freshness and originality, and would die out. "Dull as a sermon" would be a phrase more true and more significant than it is now.

But upon the score of morality, this act of stealing sermons, is utterly indefensible. A preacher ought to be an honest man throughout. Sincerity, godly sincerity, ought to characterize him intellectually, as well as morally. His plans ought to be the genuine work of his own brain. Not that he may not at times present a plan and train of thought similiar to those of other minds; but he ought not to know of it at the time. Such coincidences ought to be undesigned; the result of two minds, each working upon a similar or the same subject, in an independent way, and with no inter-communication. Then the product belongs to both alike, and the coincidence results from the common nature of truth, and the common structure of the human mind; and not from a servile copying of one mind by another.

Beside this critical study of the best sermonizers in the several languages with which the preacher may be acquainted, he should be a dilligent student of the standard theological treatises in them. There are, in each of the leading literatures of the modern world, and also in the patristic Greek and Latin, a few treatises which are so thoroughly scriptural in their matter, and so systematic in their structure, that they can not be outgrown by either the theologian or the sermonizer. Upon these, in connection with a faithful study of the Scriptures themselves, the preacher ought to bestow his time. This method of preparing for the process of composition, unlike

that indolent method of having recourse to the plans and sermons of others, strengthens and enriches the intellect. The preacher daily becomes a more discriminating exegete, a more profound theologian, a more natural rhetorician; and the end of his ministerial career finds him as thoughtful and as rich a sermonizer as ever.

The union of a close critical study of the Scriptures themselves, with a thorough and continuous study of those sterling theological treatises which, because they have grown up out of the Scriptures, partake most of their root and fatness, can not be too earnestly recommended to the sermonizer as the best general preparation for direct and particular preparation for the pulpit. The time and ability of the preacher in this age of innumerable small books, upon innumerable small subjects, is too often expended upon inferior productions. Let him dare to be ignorant of this transitory literature, whether sacred or secular, that he may become acquainted with the Bible itself, and those master-works of master-minds which contain the methodized substance of the Bible, and breathe its warmest, deepest inspiration.

Intimately connected with this study of the Bible, and of theological systems and treatises, is the study of philosophy. This point merits a fuller treatment than is possible within our limits. We would only briefly remark, that the study of philosophy, *rightly pursued*, is a great aid to the theologian and the preacher. If the department of philosophy be employed rather as a means of disciplining the mind, and of furnishing a good *method* of developing and presenting truth, than as a source whence the truth itself is to be taken, it becomes the hand-maid of theology and religion. If, on the contrary, it is regarded as the *source* of truth, and the theologian and preacher seeks his subject-matter from the finite reason of man, instead of from the Supreme Reason as it has revealed itself in the Scriptures, then the influence of philosophical studies is most injurious. But this is not the true idea of philosophy. Bacon called his philosophical system the "novum organum"—the new organ, or instrument, by means of which truth was

to be developed, established, and applied. He did not call it a new *revelation* of truth, but a new *medium* of truth.

If, now, the theologian and preacher adopts this true and rational view of the nature of philosophy; if he regards it as a means whereby his mind obtains the best method of developing, and not of originating truth; if he regards it as a simple key to unlock the casket which contains the treasure, and not as the treasure itself, or even the casket; if the theologian and preacher adopts this sober and rational view of the nature and uses of philosophy, he will find it of great assistance. All that part of rhetoric which treats of plan and invention, all the the *organizing* part of rhetoric, is most intimately connected with philosophy. Moreover, a correct knowledge of the laws of the human mind, a correct idea of the relation of truth to the human mind, and a correct method of enucleating and establishing truth, can not be acquired without the discipline that results from philosophical studies; and without such knowledge, the preacher can neither think profoundly and consecutively, nor discourse clearly and forcibly.*

4. The fourth general direction for the sermonizer is this: *Maintain a spiritual mind.* This direction is a practical one, and while it includes all that is implied in the general direction to all Christians to cultivate personal piety, it is more specific in reference to the necessities of the preacher. By a spiritual mind, in this connection, is meant that solemn and serious mental frame which is naturally and constantly occupied with eternal realities. Some Christians seem to be much more at home in the invisible realm of religion than others. They are characterized by a uniformly earnest and unearthly temper, as if their eye were fixed upon something beyond the horizon of this world,—as if they saw more, and saw further, than thoughtless and unspiritual men about them. Their eye

* Says Dr. John Edwards in his work on Preaching: "As for Metaphysics, it can not be denied that they are useful to the helping us to a clear and distinct apprehension of things, and to the enlarging of our minds, and the cultivating of our thoughts. Whence it is, that unthinking persons, and those that never study for accuracy of conceptions, hate this sort of learning as much as a Deist doth Creeds and Catechisms."—Preface to Pt. I.

is fixed upon something beyond time and sense, and they *do* see more, far more, of "the things unseen and eternal," than even the average of Christians.

Now this temper of mind is of great worth to the preacher. Aside from the fact that one who possesses it is always *in the vein* for writing or speaking upon religious themes, such a one discourses with an earnest sincerity that is always impressive and effectual. He speaks seriously, because he understands the nature of his subject. He speaks clearly and distinctly, because this spiritual-mindedness makes him substantially an eye-witness of eternal realities. He speaks convincingly, because he knows what he says, and whereof he affirms.

Let the preacher, then, maintain a spiritual mind,—a mind that is not dazzled with the glare of earth, that is too solemn to be impressed by the vanities of time,—a mind that is made habitually serious by seeing Him who is invisible. Dwelling among the things that are unseen and eternal, such a preacher, when he comes forth to address volatile and worldly men, will speak with a depth and seriousness of view, and an energy and pungency of statement, that will send them away thoughtful and anxious. Without this abiding sense of the reality and awfulness of eternal things, though the preacher may send men away entertained and dazzled, he can not send them away thinking upon themselves and upon their prospects for eternity. And of what worth is a sermon that does not do this? The principal lack in the current preaching is not so much in matter as in *manner*. There is truth sufficient to save the soul in most of the sermons that are delivered; but it is not so fused with the speaker's personal convictions, and presented in such living contact with the hearer's fears, hopes, and needs, as to make the impression of sober reality. The pulpit must become more intense in manner, or the "form of sound words" will lose all its power.

II. Having thus laid down some rules for the general preparation for sermonizing, we proceed to give some rules for the *immediate* preparation of sermons. If the preacher has fitted

himself for the direct composition of discourses, by acquiring a homiletic mental habit, by forming a high ideal of a sermon, by training himself to self-reliance, and by uniformly maintaining a serious and spiritual mind, he is ready to compose sermons always and everywhere. He is a workman that has learned his craft, and is in possession of a constructive talent which he can use whenever he is called upon. But these general maxims need to be supplemented by some particular rules relating to the process of composition itself, and these we now proceed to specify.

1. *Before beginning the composition of a sermon, bring both the intellect and the heart into a fervid and awakened condition.* Although this general preparation for sermonizing, of which we have spoken, will naturally keep the mind and heart more or less active, still there will be need of more than this ordinary wakefulness, in order that the preacher may do his best work. Such a general preparation, it is true, will prevent the sermonizer from being a dull and lethargic man, but he will need some more immediate stimulation than this, in order that he may compose with the utmost energy and vigor possible. As in the chemical process of crystalization, a smart stroke upon the vessel in which the solution has been slowly preparing for the magical change from a dull fluid to a bright and sparkling solid will accelerate the movement, and render the process seemingly an instantaneous one, so a sort of shock given to the mind, filled as it is with rich stores, and possessed as it is by a homiletic habit, will contribute greatly to the rapid and vigorous construction of a sermon.

Some agitation and concussion is requisite in order to the most efficient exercise of the understanding. The mental powers need to be in an aroused condition.—so to speak, in a state of exaltation,—in order to work with thoroughness, and energy. Hence some very distinguished literary men have been wont to resort to the stimulus of drugs or of alcohol, to produce that inward excitement which is needed in order to the original and powerful action of the intellect. Poets and orators, in particular, feel the need of this intellectual fermen-

tation, and hence the instances of such artificial stimulation of the intellectual powers are most common among these. The preacher is precluded by Christian principle from the use of such means of rousing and kindling his mind, even if the lower prudential motives should not prevail with him. For the mind, like the body, is fearfully injured by artificial and unnatural stimulation. Minds that have been accustomed to it,—that have been forced up in this unnatural way to unnatural efforts,—show the effects of such treatment in premature debility, and commonly in final insanity or idiocy.

The true and proper stimulant for the intellect is *truth*. There is no sin in being excited by truth. There is no mental injury in such excitement. The more thoroughly the intellect is stimulated and kindled by a living verity, the more intensely it is affected and energized by it, the better is it for the mind, and the man. In order, therefore, that the sermonizer may produce within his mind that excitement which is needed in order to original and vigorous composition, let him possess his mind with some single truth adapted to this purpose. And this, from the nature of the case, should be that leading idea which he proposes to embody in his discourse. Every sermon ought to be characterized by unity,—a unity arising from the presence and the presidency within it of some one leading thought. The *theme*, or *proposition* of the sermon should therefore be that particular truth by which the sacred orator should excite his intellect, and awaken his powers to an intenser activity. If the preacher is not able to set his mind into a glow and fervor by his subject, let him not seek other means of excitement, but let him ponder the fact of his apathy, until he is filled with shame and sorrow. Let him remember that if he is not interested in the truth,—if divine truth has no power to quicken and rouse his intellectual powers,—he lacks the first qualification for sermonizing.

But the sermonizer who has made that great general preparation for his work of which we have spoken will find all the stimulation he needs, in his theme. It will be taken from the circle of truths in which he has become most interested both

by the habits of his mind, and by his general culture. It will be suggested to him by his own spiritual wants, and those of his audience. It will have direct reference to the supply of these wants. Let the preacher, then, so far as intellectual excitement is concerned, so fill his mind with the particular idea of the discourse which he is about to prepare, that all inaction and lethargy of intellect shall be banished at once. Let him, before beginning the construction of a sermon, set all his mental powers into a living play, by the single leading truth he would embody in it.

But besides this intellectual awakening, some more than ordinary enlivenment of the *feelings* and *affections* is needed in order to vigorous and eloquent composition. And this is especially true of the composition of sermons,—one main purpose of which is to reach the affections and feelings of the human soul. Without that warm glow which comes from a warm heart, the purely intellectual excitement, of which we have spoken, will fail to influence the hearer, in the way of emotion and action. A purely intellectual force and energy may arrest and interest an audience, but taken by itself it can not persuade their wills, or melt their hearts. The best sermons of a preacher are generally composed under the impulse of a lively state of religious feeling. If preachers should be called to testify, they would state that those discourses which were written when they were in their best mood as Christians constitute the best portion of their authorship.

The sermonizer, therefore, should seek for a more than ordinary quickening of his emotions and affections, as he begins the work of immediate preparation for the pulpit. It is difficult to lay down rules for the attainment of this state of feeling, that will be suited to every one. Each individual Christian is apt to know the best means of rousing his own mind and heart, and hence it is better to leave the person himself to make a choice out of the variety that are at his command. Generally speaking, however, anything that contributes to awaken in the soul a livelier sense of the excellence of divine things, anything that tends to stir and quicken the Christian

affections, will furnish the preacher what he needs in order to vigorous composition. Probably, therefore, no better advice can be given to the sacred orator, in the respect of which we are speaking, than that very same advice which he gives to the common Christian, when he asks for the best means and methods of quickening his religious affections. It has been said by one of the most profound and devout minds in English literature, that "an hour of solitude passed in sincere and earnest prayer, or the conflict with, and conquest over, a single passion or subtle bosom sin, will teach us more of thought, will more effectually awaken the faculty and form the habit of reflection, than a year's study in the schools without them." If prayer and Christian self-discipline do this for the habits of thought, most certainly will they do the same for the habits of feeling. If an hour of serious self-examination and self-mortification,—if an hour of devout meditation and earnest prayer,—does not set the affections of the preacher into a glow, probably nothing in the way of means can. The greatest preachers have, consequently, been in the habit of preparing for composition by a season of prayer and meditation. The maxim of Luther, *bene orasse est bene studuisse*, is familiar to all. Augustine says: "Let our Christian orator who would be understood and heard with pleasure, pray before he speak. Let him lift up his thirsty soul to God, before he pronounce anything." Erasmus,—a man in whom the intellectual was more prominent than the spiritual and devotional,—yet observes, that "it is incredible how much light, how much vigor, how much force and vitality, is imparted to the clergyman by deep earnest supplication." And the pagan Pericles, according to Plutarch, "was accustomed, whenever he was to speak in public, previously to entreat the gods, that he might not utter against his will, any word that should not belong to his subject."

By filling his mind with his theme, and by awakening his religious affections by a season of prayer and devout meditation, the sacred orator will bring his whole inner being into that awakened and exalted condition which prepares for di-

rect and rapid composition. He will become a *roused* man, and will find all his faculties of cognition and feeling, in free and living action.

2. And this brings us to the second maxim for facilitating the process of composition, which is: *Compose continuously.* When the preacher has made all the preparation, general and particular, of which we have spoken, and his mind and heart are ready to work, he should proceed in the composition of a sermon without intermission. The mind works with far the greatest intensity and energy, when it works continuously. It acquires strength by motion, and hence a stop in its action diminishes its force. The mind, especially when a full preparation for its agency has been made, ought to be allowed, or if need be, compelled, to work as hard and as long as is compatible with the physical structure of the individual. Some men are capable of much more protracted mental efforts than others; though in this case the mental processes themselves are apt to be much slower. When the mind moves with rapidity, it is unable to continue in motion so long as when its movements are more dull and heavy. Each man should know himself in these respects, and understand how much his mind and body can endure without injury. Having this knowledge, he ought then to subject himself to as intense and as long continued composition as is possible. Having seated himself at his writing-desk, he ought not to lay down his pen until he has tired himself by the process of original composition. Then let him unbend in good earnest, and allow his mind and his body a real genuine relaxation.

Too many sermons are composed during an intermittent activity of the mind which does not draw upon its deepest resources, and its best power. The sermon is the product of a series of isolated efforts, instead of one long, strong application. It wears, consequently, a fragmentary character and appearance, as if it were written one sentence at a time, or each paragraph by itself. Even if there is a connection of the parts, there is no *fusion* of them. Even if the discourse has method, it has no glow.

"Write with fury, and correct with phlegm" is admirable advice for the sermonizer. But it is impossible to rouse this fury of the mind, except by a continuous application of its energies. If the composer stops for a season, his mind begins to cool again, and much of the energy of his succeeding effort is absorbed in bringing his mind up to the same degree of ardor at which it stood at the close of the preceding effort. It is as if the smith should every moment withdraw his iron from the fire, instead of letting it stay until it has acquired a white heat. The same amount of mental application condensed into a single continuous effort will accomplish far more than if it is scattered in portions over a long space of time. "Divide up the thunder," says Schiller, "into separate notes, and it becomes a lullaby for children, but pour it forth in one continuous peal, and its royal sound shall shake the heavens."

One principal reason why the pulpit ministrations of the clergy do not, as they should, exhibit their utmost possibility of effort, lies in the fact that too many sermons are composed scatteringly all along through the week. They are the products of the desultory efforts of the clergyman. He allows himself to be interrupted during the season of composition, or else he has no fixed and stated season. The consequence is, that the sermon, instead of being produced by one uninterrupted gush of soul, or at least by a few gushes and outpourings that form a true connection with each other, and so are virtually a single continuous effort, is the patched and fragmentary collection of odd hours, and of ungenial moods. The discourse, in this way, drags its slow length along through the whole week, and the entire mental labor expended upon it, though apparently so much, is not equal in true productive force, in real originant and influential power, to three hours of continuous glowing composition.

Let the sermonizer, then, proceed upon the maxim of writing continuously, when he writes at all. Let him have his set season for composition. Let him fix the time of writing, and the length of effort, in accordance with his physical strength, and then let him go through with the process of com-

position with all the abstraction, absorption, and devotedness of prayer itself. In this way, the very best power of the man, the theologian, and the Christian, will be evolved, and will appear in a discourse that will be fresh, energetic, and impressive. In this way, the sermon would become a more uniformly vivid production, and a more generally vital species of authorship, than it now is.

It must be remembered, however, that this injunction to write continuously and furiously is a maxim only for one who has obeyed the other maxims, general and special, that have been laid down for sermonizing. It is no maxim for one who has not. It is one of a series, and pre-supposes obedience to what precedes, and also to what succeeds. If the preacher has formed a homiletic habit of mind, if his ideal of a sermon is high, if he has trained himself to self-reliance, if he has acquired a spiritual way of thinking, and if he has roused his mind by his subject and his heart by prayer,—if he has done all this, then what he does in the hour of composition, let him do quickly, and continuously.

3. The third maxim to be followed by the sermonizer in actual composition is this: *Avoid prolixity.* By prolixity, is meant a tiresome length which arises from an excessive treatment of a subject,—as excessive explanation, or excessive illustration, or excessive argumentation. Theremin, in his treatise upon Rhetoric,* enunciates the important distinction between the philosophical and the rhetorical presentation of truth. The former is that exhaustive and detailed development of a subject which is proper in the scientific treatise. The latter is that rapid and condensed, yet methodical, exhibition of thought which is required of the orator by the circumstances in which he is placed. Recurring to this distinction, the maxim: Avoid prolixity, is equivalent to the rule: Exhibit truth rhetorically, in distinction from exhibiting it philosophically or poetically.

The orator, of all men, should know when he is through, and

* Book I. chap. x, xi; Book II. chap. iv.

should stop when he is through. The preacher should perceive when he has subjected a subject, or a portion of a subject, to a treatment that is sufficient for the purposes of oratory, and should act accordingly. As soon as his presentation has reached the due limits of rhetoric, he should bring it to an end, instantaneously, lest it pass over into a mode of representation that is foreign to the orator, and is inimical to all the aims of an orator. Prolixity, or excessive treatment, arises when the sermonizer continues to dwell upon any part of his discourse, after he has already sufficiently developed it. A plan is prolix, when it is filled up with sub-divisions which are so evidently contained in the principal divisions that the mind of the auditor feels itself undervalued by their formal enunciation. An argument is prolix, when, from the employment of the philosophical instead of the rhetorical mode of demonstration, it is made tedious by syllogisms instead of enthymemes, and by trains of ratiocination instead of bold and direct appeals to consciousness. An illustration is prolix, when the short and rapid metaphor is converted into the long and detailed simile, or allegory.

Without, however, entering upon these particulars of plan, proof, and illustration, we would briefly call attention to that prolixity, or excessive and tedious treatment of a subject, which arises from an imperfect mastery of it. Suppose the sermonizer has not made that general and special preparation for composition which we have described, and yet attempts the production of a sermon. In the first place, his manner of presentation will inevitably be confused; in the second place, it will inevitably be prolix, because it it is confused; and in the third place, it will inevitably be tedious, because it is prolix and confused. Instead of handling his theme with that strong yet easy grasp which is natural to a mind that is master of itself and of the truth, he handles it irresolutely, hesitatingly, and awkwardly. Instead of a clear downright statement, because he *knows* whereof he affirms, he expresses himself obscurely and doubtfully, because he does not certainly and positively know. Statement follows statement, and

yet there is little or no progress towards a final statement. Conscious that he has not done justice to the topic, he dares not let it drop, and take up another. Conscious that he has not lodged the truth fairly and surely in the mind of the auditor, he does not leave it, but continues to hover about it, and work at it, in hope of better success in the end. The result is, that instead of crowding the greatest possible amount of matter into the smallest possible form, the preacher spreads the least possible amount of truth over the widest possible surface. He hammers out his lead very thin. For in this process the truth itself suffers. Instead of appearing in the sermon, as it is in its own nature, bright, dense, and gem-like, under the manipulations of such a workman, it becomes dull, and porous. The sacred oration instead of being a swift, brief, and strong movement of thought, becomes a slow, long, and feeble one.

But prolixity may arise, also, from another cause besides ignorance of the subject. There may be prolixity from too much information. The preacher may have stored his memory with a multifarious knowledge, and not having acquired that thoroughly organizing habit of mind which, like life in nature, sloughs off all that is not needed, this knowledge inundates the sermon. It comes pouring in upon him by a merely passive effort of the memory, while the judgment is unawakened and unemployed, and borne along upon this general deluge of materials, the preacher becomes the most prolix and tedious of mortals. Long after the topic under consideration has been sufficiently explained to the understanding, he continues to explain. Long after the topic has been sufficiently illustrated to the imagination, he continues to illustrate. Copiousness of information, unless it is under the regulation and guidance of a strongly methodizing ability, and true rhetorical talent, leads to prolixity as inevitably as sheer ignorance.

While the preacher is on his guard against this fault, he is at the same time to remember that he is dealing with the common mind, and must not be so brief as to be obscure. A cer-

tain degree of repetition, even, is required in the sermon, especially if it is highly doctrinal, in order to convey the truth completely. This trait should be managed with great care, however; for even the common mind is less offended at a nakedness of statement which leaves it something to do, even if it is in the way of supplying ellipses and deficiences, than it is at an excessive repetition, which tires and tantalizes it. It is impossible to lay down a general rule for the length of a sermon. It will not do to say that it should be thirty minutes in length, or forty-five minutes, or one hour. The length of a discourse will vary with the nature of the subject, and the peculiarities of time and place. And no stiff rule is needed, provided the sermonizer possesses that good judgment, that tact, which discerns when the subject, as a whole, or in its parts, has received a sufficient treatment. It is, in reality, a sort of instinctive feeling which comes in the course of a good rhetorical training and practice, rather than any outward rule, that must decide when the devlopement of truth has reached that point where it must stop. Hence the remark so often made in praise of a skillful orator: "He knows when he is done." In fact, it is not the item of length, but the item of prolixity, which wearies an audience. An auditory will listen with increasing interest to a sermon of an hour's length, provided their attention is kept upon the stretch by a sermonizer who says just enough, and no more, upon each point, and who passes from topic to topic with rapidity, and yet with a due treatment and exhaustion of each, while they will go to sleep under a sermon of a half-hour's length, in which there is none of the excitement that comes from a skillful management of the heads, and none of the exhilaration of a forward motion. There is less fatigue and weariness in shooting through two hundred miles of space in a rail-car, than in lumbering over ten miles of space in a slow coach.

The importance of avoiding prolixity is very apparent when we consider the relation of the sermon to the feelings and affections of the hearer. The feelings of the human soul are often very shy, and apparently capricious. The preacher some-

times succeeds in awakening a very deep feeling,—say that of conviction of sin,—but he is not satisfied with having said just enough, or perhaps he is destitute of that tact of which we have spoken, and does not *know* that he has, and continues to enlarge and amplify. The feeling of conviction in the hearer, which ought to have been left to itself, begins to be weakened by the unnecessary repetition or prolixity of the discourse, and perhaps is ultimately dissipated by it. If the preacher had stopped when he was really through, and had left the mind of the hearer to its own workings and those of the Holy Spirit in it, a work would have been done in the soul which all this labor of supererogation on his part only serves to hinder and suppress.

Let the preacher acquire this nice discernment, by acquiring a good rhetorical discipline, by making all the general and special preparation for sermonizing, and by studying the capacities of his congregation, and then he will, instinctively and inevitably, avoid all polixity in the discussion of truth. Then his sermons, whether they are longer or shorter, will all of them exhibit that just proportion,—that roundness of form, and that absence of all superfluity,—which we see in the works of nature, and which appears in the productions of every wise and cunning workman who imitates nature.

Art. II.—RELATION OF THE OLD TESTAMENT TO THE NEW.

By Henry Harbaugh, D. D. Prof. in Mercersburg Theological Seminary.

The essential nature of the Old Testament dispensation—how it fundamentally differs from the Christian dispensation, and the substantial relation of Judaism to Christianity—is a subject which may be denominated a living one in theological inquiry, and one which only the more earnestly asks for better settlement as the study of the essential nature of Christianity be-

comes more earnest and profound. Any systematic theological inquirer who does not meet a most formidable difficulty at this point, may be sure that his system is weak at more than one other point, if not wholly untenable in its principle and ruling scheme. Whoever, therefore, has, or thinks he has, an earnest word to speak on this subject ought to be patiently heard; and if he speak well, he deserves the thanks of the whole church.

A work has lately fallen into our hands in which some phases of this question are discussed.* This work of Mr. Lord, though it has no doubt been read and examined in a private way, has not as yet received that earnest public attention which it deserves. We see from a very complimentary notice of the work in the "Quarterly Journal of Prophecy," that it has attracted the attention of its learned editor, Rev. Andrew Bonar, who says of it: "This a truly admirable work; and its elaborate preface is one of the best introductions to the Psalms that we ever read. We hope the volume will be reprinted on this side of the Atlantic."† He also gives copious extracts in a commendatory tone.

The author of this work evidently does not write from a mere love of making books, but with a deep and earnest conviction that something ought to be said on the subject in hand; though, we believe, no clergyman, he gives evidence of having searched and thought extensively in the sphere of theology. Feeling that he has a subject before him that has not been satisfactorily settled, and conscious that he has something to offer in regard to it that has not been said before, the author does not adhere to the beaten track, but at times strikes out boldly into new paths. For this reason precisely his work, though it may not always convince, is fresh, suggestive, and profitable to the thoughtful reader.

In regard to the arrangement of the Psalms, Mr. Lord, very

---

* The Psalter Reäljusted in its relations to the Temple Services and the Ancient Jewish Faith. By Eleazar Lord. New York; Anson D. F. Randolph, 1860, pp., 280.

† No LI., April, 1861, p., 184.

correctly, no doubt, supposes "it quite certain that the Psalms are not now arranged in the order of their original composition." They were, he holds, originally composed on special occasions and for special purposes in the service of the temple, in consequence of which they stood, in substance and form, in natural adjustment to the whole of the public service, but existed only as "written on separate slips of parchment," and were thus used by the singers; and "when the temple was destroyed, the system of which they formed so conspicuous a part was broken up, the Jehovah formally withdrew from the sanctuary prior to its demolition (Ezk. xi. 23, and context.) In the new structure, the ark of the covenant and mercy-seat, the Shechinah of Jehovah's personal presence, and the holy fire on the altar were wholly wanting. The system could be but partially reproduced, and it would seem to have been without reference to it that the Psalms were collected into a distinct volume and handed down to us in the Hebrew Psalter." (pp. 46, 47.)

The theory on which the author proceeds in his re-adjustment of them, is fully discussed and set forth in the Introduction of the work. The results at which he arrives are best given briefly in his own words. "The most natural and obvious method of re-arranging the series is that of following the routine of the temple services to which, as chanted in concert with instrumental melody, they were an accompaniment. As lyrics, this use of them plainly controlled their structure and their relative significance, insomuch that certain of them only were adapted to each peculiar stage of the service, and would have been wholly incongruous and out of place at any other stage."

According to this scheme, the Psalms, in this re-adjustment, are made to cluster around different and successive parts of the temple service—their character, contents, and peculiar spirit determining their place. Following out this view, the author arranges the whole Psalter in seven parts or clusters. The *first* includes those Psalms which are "supposed to have been sung by the worshipers when ascending the steps of

the temple to attend the ritual and typical services." Eighteen Psalms fall into this cluster. The *second* contains those which are supposed to have been "chanted when the worshipers, having entered the gate of the temple, were in full view of the ritual and typical acts and objects to which successively their attention was directed." Under this head we have thirty-three Psalms. The *third* comprises those Psalms "appropriate to be chanted in the temple during the immolation of the lamb, and the sacrifice of burnt-offering; and to be repeated by the Messiah on the cross; and by his people in remembrance of his death." These are Ps. 142, 70, 69, 22, 40. The *fourth* part comprises nineteen Psalms "appropriate to be sung in the temple, after the close of the typical routine, and under the full impression of its doctrinal and prophetic import and references, and suitable to the Messiah at and after his resurrection, under the consciousness of his triumph and in view of the exaltation, kingdom, and glory he had secured for himself and his people: Suitable, therefore, in the same view, to be sung by his people." The *fifth* part includes fifteen Psalms "appropriate to be sung by the worshiper in the temple after the ritual and typical services had ceased, relating to the Messiah's conflict, triumph, ascension, kingdom, and regal glory; and to be sung in the Christian church in view of the same subjects." The *sixth* part comprises eleven Psalms "appropriate to be chanted after the close of the typical service in celebration of the mighty acts of the Jehovah in his prior administration over his chosen people, and prospectively concerning his exaltation, kingdom, and reign as Messiah." The *seventh* part comprises forty-nine Psalms in which "the writer personates individual believers in some instances, and the church in others. The Messiah, as man identified with them, speaks through the Psalmist."

The author does not, of course, claim that, in this classification, he has succeeded in assigning to each Psalm its proper place. "It may be impossible now perfectly to trace and designate the counterparts of that routine so as to decide which Psalms, to the exclusion of all the rest, were sung at the open-

ing, and which at each advancing stage or transition of the ritual. . . . But this is of minor consequence if the supposed method and significance of the initiatory and most solemn portions of the service are granted, and if the consistency, grandeur, and magnificence of the entire scene are duly considered."

The author has a profound sense of the sublimity and impressiveness of that service into which these Psalms fall according to the classification given, and of the different stages of which they originally constituted an important part. This leads him to seek for the basis--the underlying divine reality and substance, of the Old Testament worship. This is the real burden of his able Introduction, of the various heads of parts and chapters, and the notes interspersed; and is to us the most interesting part of the work.

Mr. Lord very properly finds the substance and the object of the Old Testament worship in the presence of the Jehovah, whom he regards identical with the Logos who became incarnate. "They worshiped that divine person as locally present in his official character, dwelling in the tabernacle." "It was the Second Person of the Godhead, in his delegated and officially subordinate character, the Logos in the beginning, who came forth from the invisible to the visible, and in his official character manifested the infinite under the conditions of the finite."

That the Second Person in the adorable Trinity was in some way present in the Old Testament is evident, and the earnest manner in which the author of this work variously insists on this point is worthy of all praise. In his view, however, of the *mode* or character of that presence and work, he is not, we think, so successful as in other features of his discussion. This is *the* problem. Though his personal presence is held, his work of mediation is regarded as having been "official" and "delegated"--his relation to man was a "representative relation." A real personal union with man in the fullest sense, required of course the Incarnation, which was as yet future. But this fact only the more forcibly brings back the question:

"How can we hold the essential connection and oneness of the patriarchal and Levitical typology with the Christian system of doctrine and worship, founded on the same covenant, and prescribed and administered by the same, the only mediator?"—that "the system was *one*!" that "his person as mediator was the same before as after he took another nature into union with his person!"—and that the Old Testament worshipers are identified with, united to him, as members of his mystical body?"

Holding, as we must, that Christianity has as its essential basis the union of God the Son with our humanity; that by virtue of this union we are united with him, not in doctrine or by moral conformity merely, but in life; and that the foundation of his mediation is not to be found merely in his representative, delegated, or official character, but in his divine-human person, we are compelled to see a great gulf between the essential nature of the Old Testament religion and that of the New, unless we find a higher basis for the Old Testament grace than the one indicated. Holding, moreover, as we also must, that the two religions must be, at bottom, one remedial system of God, we are forced to seek in the Old economy a deeper and more real presence and work of the Mediator, Christ, than is covered by the words representative, delegated, and official. We can feel, in reading this work, that the author is in reality wrestling with this problem. He actually finds a deep meaning in the Old Testament, and gives abundant evidence that he feels more than he finds. He is in earnest with the problem in hand. It is this, as well as a sense of the importance of the question, that makes us anxious, not to solve it for him, but to study it with him.

Though Christ was always expected and desired, throughout the whole history of the Old Testament, by prophets and kings (Luke x. 24) yet his actual birth, and real union with our nature was delayed for four thousand years. Why was it delayed? and what meanwhile was the existing divinely inaugurated system of religion adequate, and designed, to accomplish for the salvation of man? How was the Old Testa-

ment economy of salvation related to Christ and Christianity? This, as we have said, is one of the most difficult subjects in whole range of theology.

Some hold that the substance of Judaism, or its saving contents, was the same in *kind* with Christianity, and that the two differ only in *degree*. This solves the problem in an easy way. But is not this substantially the old Ebionitic heresy, which refused to see the *new* in Christianity, and proposed, by Christianity merely to continue Judaism, and to complete it on its own plane? This theory, in the sphere of theology, is precisely analogous to that scheme in physics which regards the cosmogony as presenting a process of development in which the highest order of plant passes into the lowest animal, and the highest order of animal is developed into the lowest order of man. As this view of the genesis of the world is found to be at war with the ruling facts of the world, as well as with the truths of revelation, so this kindred theory in the sphere of revelation strikes at the root of Christianity itself, requiring it to be reduced from its high and peculiar substance to a lower plane.

To say that Judaism was a preparation for Christianity, is most true. So is it true that in the cosmogony the lower orders are ever a preparation for the higher; but this is not to admit that the lower pass over into the higher in their own nature and character. When man appeared at the head of creation, he did not there appear as a development out of the lower, but as a new creature of God. (Gen. i. 26, 27; ii. 7.) So when Christianity appears, it appears, it is true, as that toward which Judaism struggled in its inmost life, but it appears at the same time as a new creation in Christ Jesus. To say that Judaism was a preparation for the coming of the Saviour, does not explain how the Old Testament believers could be saved *before* the Saviour came. How can a hungry man be really satisfied by a prospective feast?

If we take the view that our salvation rests ultimately only on a moral union with Christ, then we can easily see how the Old Testament believers, instructed by the prophets and the

law, could be led to an endeavor to conform their lives to the same precepts which Christ afterwards taught, only in a clearer manner; but this requires us to hold that Christianity itself was, and continues to be, only a moral system. Then we are upon ground on which no orthodox Christian is content to stand.

The New Testament clearly teaches that salvation is only possible where there is a union with the divine-human life of Christ—that salvation has its ground, and only ground, in his union with our humanity—that by his own divine-human perfecting in our nature he "*became* the author of eternal salvation" (Heb. iv. 8, 9.)—and that that union with him which is the foundation of our salvation is effected by the Holy Ghost, who only came after Christ's glorification (John vii. 39.) and by means of the sacraments and ordinances instituted by him. (Col. ii, 12; 1 Cor. x. 16; John vi. 48–58.)

Does not this seem to shut out the Old Testament believers from positive, *actual* Christian salvation, at least until Christ actually united himself with our nature, in it obtained victory over sin, death and hell, was himself glorified, and secured the advent of the Holy Ghost (John vii. 39), so that we might realize "the mystery which hath been hid from ages, and from generations, but now is made manifest to his saints: . . . which is Christ in you, the hope of glory." (Col. i. 26, 27.)

Not only do these ruling principles in the peculiar nature of Christianity involve this vast difference between the two systems of Judaism and Christianity, but the clear teachings of the New Testament likewise make this difference marked and broad. John the Baptist, the last of the Old Testament prophets, and the greatest then born of woman, is less than the least in the New Testament kingdom. (Matth. xi. 11; Luke vii. 28.) The entire inadequacy of the old economy for the ends of salvation is plainly stated in 2 Cor. iii. 6-11; and Heb. viii. 6–13. To the Galatians, who had been "bewitched" to believe that they must become Jews first in order to become Christians, St. Paul shows that the Old Testament itself looked forward to find its own saving substance in the

New. "Before faith *came*, we were kept under the law, shut up unto the faith which should *afterwards be revealed*. Wherefore the law was our schoolmaster to bring us unto Christ, that we *might be* justified by faith." (Gal. iii. 23, 24.) So again: "The law made *nothing perfect*, but the *bringing in of a better hope did*." (Heb. vii. 19.) "For there is verily disannulling of the commandant going before, for the weakness and unprofitableness thereof." (v. 18) If possible, still stronger is the passage Heb. x. 1–4, 14, 19. Of the Old Testament worthies it is said: "These all, having obtained a good report through faith, received not the promise: God having provided some *better things* for us, that they *without us* should not be made perfect." (Heb. xi. 39, 40.) If this passage looks, as some hold, to the second coming of Christ, and contains the sense that the Old Testament believers can not come to their final state of redemption and glory till the whole body of the church is consummated, it only for that reason the more strongly includes the sense, that they could not come into that fellowship with Christ which has its ground in his first coming in the flesh till he had actually come; and that thus they could "not be made perfect" until that "better thing," which came to us in his incarnation, had been "provided" by God.

It is generally held, even by those who claim that the old economy afforded salvation to its believers alike in kind with that at once attained unto by believers under Christianity, that the former dispensation stood related to the latter as *shadow* and substance. But is it well considered what this involves? Shadow and substance are not the same in kind, nor is the one merely a higher degree of the other; though they go together they are essentially different things. The shadow, produced by the substance, is at best only a witness that the substance exists, and that it is near by; but it can not possibly furnish that which the substance is adapted to bestow.

So far as we can see, the problem as to the salvation of the Old Testament believers can only be solved in one of two ways—either we must solve it in connection with eschatology or by a deeper Christology.

The greater number of those who have earnestly wrestled with the problem in the latest theological inquiries, have been disposed to find an eschatological solution. It is held that Christ's redeeming work extended into Hades, so far as those are concerned who previous to his incarnation believed on him, and sincerely sought to know him—that while his body laid under the power of death during three days, he still pursued the curse of sin unto the place of departed spirits, triumphing there over the utmost of this death as the penalty of sin, releasing the Old Testament believers from the power of death, effecting their full union with his resurrection life, and securing their glorification with him. It is held that passages like the following demand such a view, and that their apparent obscurity is all removed when this truth is admitted to lie in them as their true sense and meaning. (Matth. xxvii. 52;* 1 Pet. iii. 20; iv. 6; Eph. iv. 8–10; Acts ii. 26–34; Rev. i. 18; 1 Cor. xv. 20; Col. i. 18; Heb. xi. 19, 20.†) It is worthy of profound consideration, whether the crass eschatology which has been developed in the Roman church has not had a tendency to lead Protestant theologians to swing to the opposite extreme, so that in rooting out the tares of error some of the wheat of truth has been carried away with it. At any rate, it must be admitted, in no part of the general system has theology as yet furnished less satisfactory results than in the department of eschatology. The field is still open to earnest inquiries; and though it is a difficult one to till, as involving much of what is still future, yet the seeds of the harvest of interesting truth it must some day yield to the church, must already lie in the soil of the divinely inspired record. Nor would it be at all strange, but in full accordance with the nature of revelation, if the *future* of redemption should be found in this particular also to illumine its *past*.

We are inclined to think, however, that a deeper Christology alone will illumine eschatology itself; and that, therefore,

* See Lange's Commentary *in loco*.

† See Dr. Ebrard in Olshausen's Commentary. Kendrick's Ed. vol. vi. pp. 555, 556.

the problem under discussion must primarily find its solution in Christology.

We would humbly suggest whether there must not have been more than a merely outward, official, delegated, representative relation—more than a merely ethical union—of the Son of God with humanity before his actual incarnation? Is there a relation of the Second Person in the Trinity to our nature *deeper* than this, and which was actual before his incarnation—one which would furnish ground for a real, if not a full, union of him as Saviour with the believing in the bosom of Judaism? On this point we would reverently present some thoughts.

Did he, the divine Son of God, by his incarnation become anything *substantially* different from what he was as the second hypostasis in the Godhead? Was his assumption of our nature an essential change in his previous form and character of being? This, of course, can not be predicated; because it would involve a change in divinity itself.

Then, we state further, it can not be conceived that the Second Person in the Trinity united himself, in his incarnation, with a nature absolutely *foreign* to his own peculiar eternal being, but rather with a nature allied to his own, though of course, a created one, and infinitely beneath himself. For such a thought the divine record affords us clear data. Man, with whose nature he united, was made in the "image" and "likeness" of God, which was also the image of the Son; for he "is the image of the invisible God, the first born of every creature." (Col. i. 15.) Thus, as the Son of God, the begotten of the Father before all worlds, he had that image which was the same image in which man was made. As "the first-born" he was the archetype of man. Hence in his image, as it was that image once the image of God and the image of man, he was eternally allied to the nature of man.

This nature of man, therefore, is not something foreign to the Eternal Son. He is its ideal. To actualize this ideal in himself, as he did in his incarnation, therefore, involves no change in his primal divine being, but is a free and natural

manifestation of it in its own proper, eternal, and divine character.

Hence his manifestation in our nature was not a mere phenomenal, avatar-like, epiphany, but a true and real manifestation of the eternal Son of God. Therefore he did not, after his redeeming work on earth and among men was done, cast off again his human nature, as if it had been a mere unnatural mask, and return to a purely divine condition and state, but he retained the human nature, and glorified it in his own eternal and heavenly glory. Does not this eternal glory of Christ's human nature—this, his permanent union with it in heaven—prove, or at least clearly point, to its eternal ideal character in him? He keeps, and glorifies, after the work of salvation is completed, what was eternally native to him as ideal before he actualized it in full form by his incarnation.

This being so, we must further state, that the incarnation is not properly apprehended when it is conceived as an abrupt event, confined in all its vast comprehensiveness to that certain point of time which witnessed its actualization. It was consummated in the "fullness of time;" but that very expression indicates that that fullness of time itself came by a preparation—that it was a point toward which pre-working and preluding factors wrought and tended. It became full, because the processes which looked toward it then flowered.

Then we may ask, did all history tend toward that point by a mere fortuitous play of powers and events?—or by a mere extra-Christological decretal determination? Who was in the world before but the Son, who made it, and *in* whom it consists, or stands together in one—*τὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ συνέστηκε*. (Col. i. 17.) "He was in the world, and the world was made by him." (John i. 10.) Who was in history before that "fullness of time," but he whose manifestations are the principle and life-current of all history? The incarnation was the result of endless pre-mediations, and not an abrupt, unmediated event. The Christological roots strike back, not only through all pre-history, but also through all processes of creation, back to where the incarnate mystery finds its principle in

the second hypostasis in the Godhead, the Eternal Son, "by whom he made the worlds." (Heb. i. 2; John i. 3; Col. i. 16.) He who was born at Bethlehem was also "the first-born of every creature." (Col. i. 15.) He was the *root* as well as the *offspring* of David. (Rev. xxii. 16.) Even in the Old Testament Isaiah speaks of him as the *root* of Jesse. (Ps. xi. 10); and St. Paul quotes the same passage (Rom. xv. 12), to show his relation to the Gentiles as well as to the circumcision (v. 8). Thus he is not merely the offspring of humanity, but its root. His relation to humanity back of Judaism is also recognized by Micah v. 23; "But thou Bethlehem Ephrata, though thou be little among the thousands of Judah, yet *out of thee* shall he *come forth* unto me that is to be the Ruler in Israel; whose *goings forth have been from of old, from everlasting*. Therefore, will he give them up, until the time that she which travaileth hath brought forth: then *the remnant of his brethren* shall return to *Israel*." Here he comes out of Bethlehem, but his goings (the plural is significant) are of old, even back in eternity. Whether the travailing is designed to refer to Zion as a whole, or whether the Prophet has more specific reference to that daughter of Israel who had the honor of being mother of our Lord, is not material; in either case he sees Judaism travailing toward the birth of him who was its substance as well as its fruit.

All this is sufficient to show that the Advent of Christ comprehends far more than his birth in Bethlehem. It goes far back of that event through the inner constitution of humanity. Truly and profoundly has Dr. Lange said, that the Advent of Christ through the Old Testament economy was certainly not an advent "that runs through the *Books* merely, but an advent that runs through *blood and life*." We have it represented to us in the books, because it was the life in humanity of which the books are the historical record.

Hence—how strangely on any other view!—the New Testament begins with a genealogical table! Hence also his genealogy is traced by St. Matthew back to Abraham, but by St. Luke back to Adam and God. He came forth from God, as

God; but he came through Adam, Abraham, and the generations following, down to her who was so "highly favored" as to be "blessed among women." By a process that passed through a long series of mediations he actualized the eternal ideal in humanity by becoming man himself—and when he appeared in the fullness of time in man's nature, he so appeared as flower and fruit of Judaism of which he was himself the root—appeared as the end of its mediations—not only as the glorious scion of the stock of David and Abraham, but also as the Son of Adam, and the Son of God.

Thus at Bethlehem was only consummated what was preparing before. Christ's actual birth in our nature was premediated through the entire Old Testament history. From Judaism as a whole, as well as from the virgin, sprang Christ as by a birth. Judaism was the wider womb for the realization of his divine-human life. Out of it, "as concerning the flesh, Christ came." (Rom. ix. 5). This pre-mediation was not merely his being announced and promised in prophecy, or his being typified as coming in the sacrificial ritual, but was a premediation in the inmost life of humanity itself. He comes in Judaism not merely as the child of the virgin, but also as the "seed" of the first mother, and as the "seed of Abraham."

Nothing less than this can adequately account for the prominence given in the Old Testament and the New to the succession of genealogical life as connected continually with the coming of Christ. Why the careful separation of the holy seed—the guarding of the holy people by circumcision from all mixture of blood with the uncovenanted—like restrictions in regard to mixed marriages—the ceaseless purifications and consecrations of individuals, families, tribes, and the whole people, all looking forward to the birth of THE SEED? What does all this mean, if it does not indicate a sanctifying process going on, as from him, in the generations out of which he was ultimately to spring, so that there might at last be a culmination and convergence of all sanctifying forces in one human daughter of the holy people, who should be sufficiently ennobled to become the mother of the Lord—one who, though

herself neither semi-divine nor sinless, might yet be truly hailed by the angel as the "*highly favored*, and blessed *among* women," (Luke i. 28,)—the flower of Judaism; a flower in whose blooming bosom should grow and ripen the true seed—from the second Adam by true human genealogy out of the first—the divine-human head of humanity coming to actual birth by processes of a supernatural character carried forward truly and really in the generative bosom and life of that same humanity which, in the collapse resulting in the fall of Adam, had lost its first head. It is just in this wonderful peculiarity of Christianity that we find its infinite separation from the heathen conception, in which the new god springs with abrupt completeness from the head of the old.

This Christological view gives us a presence of Christ in the old economy, and a union of him with his ancient people, that has its basis far deeper than the merely ethical and representative; for through all his vast ancestry run the veins and blood, and in every member, family, and generation, beats the pulse of Christological life.

It is certain, as Mr. Lord has so ably shown in his Introduction, that the Jehovah of the Old Testament is the second person in the Godhead, the angel of the covenant, and the angel of the presence. (Ex. xxxii. 14, 15; Is. lxiii. 9.) He dwelt among them as their peculiar treasure and portion, and was coming, as we have seen, in them. What should hinder him from communicating his life to the human for elevation and sanctification, and from effecting such elevation not merely in the way of laws, prophecy and ritual influences, but in the way of a certain preparatory union of the divine with the human, and that in the deepest substance of human nature and life?

As touching this point, it has been well said: "In virtue of his eternal counsel of grace, he appeared from the commencement as the guardian and guide of man, and as such he condescended and adapted himself to the wants of man's childhood. He, as it were, grows with him, and so draws him to himself. When, by an abuse of his liberty, man had fallen into sin and misery, he opened up before him the salvation provided in that

counsel, and continued it, by a progressive *communication of himself*, and condescending to man, until its fullness was attained by the incarnation of God. This divine manifestation, in virtue of which he is not merely enthroned *above* history as the Ruler of the world, but is also present in it, works in it, and, during its progress, more and more *unfolds himself*, by *increasingly communicating of himself* we designate Revelation in the narrower sense of the term." (KURTZ's *History of the Old Covenant*, Eng. Ed. Vol. I., p. 17.)

In this view we do not sink the New Testament religion, as those find it necessary to do who make the two like in kind, and different only in degree; but we raise the old economy to a higher character. We bring it nearer to that of the New, by showing that it was fundamentally based in him who is the principle of the New. We show that there was in it, not merely an abstract and general presence of the divine, but that there was also operative in it a higher human potence than what belonged to the existing fallen humanity.

Yet, after all this is shown, the fact remains that in Judaism the gracious condescension of God *had not yet come to an actual union with humanity*, which the substance of the New Testament demands as the only ground of full salvation. Christianity still appears as a *new* thing, but a new thing of such character that it had *real*,—though *not full*,—lodgement in that history of human life which preceded its actualization; which made it natural and possible for the divine-human life of Christ that came into actuality in his incarnation to take up at once, by retrospective action, and complete what had been prepared and had waited for his coming. Thus, as the author of the epistle to the Hebrews expresses it, God provided a "better thing for us" than had been enjoyed by them; and they could not separately from us be carried forward to the end—ἵνα μὴ χωρὶς ἡμῶν τελειωθῶσι—of full salvation. But they *could* now be taken up and so carried forward because, before the mystery of the incarnation had been actualized, they were really and truly in the draught of that Christological life which, though actualized, as it were, in the con-

ter of human history, had nevertheless laid hold of humanity in its central development in Judaism, making it the womb of this mystery, and preparing all who saw his coming day (John viii. 56) with such spiritual aptitudes, that they needed, for full salvation, only the actualization of the glorious divine-human fact.

In the light of the Christology we have now briefly and very imperfectly set forth, we see the only way in which the relation of the essential substance of the Old Testament economy to the essential substance of Christianity may be consistently apprehended, without either substantially ruling the old economy wholly out of Christ, or so reducing the new from its high character as to ignore its essential newness, and its fundamental principle in the person and work of the God-man.

Yet, holding this view, we are still required by the force of theological consistency, as we have intimated, so to adjust our eschatology as to do justice to the venerable truth which the ancient church at least professes to have drawn from the inspired word, and which it has embodied in an article of that grand symbol known as the Apostles' Creed: "He descended into Hades."

Whilst we may, and must, stop far short of that course extreme to which the Roman Church has carried its eschatology—and whilst we may not be prepared to find scripture warrant for any actual probation after death for those who are guilty of grace neglected or grace rejected—we must nevertheless allow that in some way, and for some end, he, at whose name every knee is to bow "of things in heaven, and things on earth, and things under the earth" (Phil. ii. 10)—who is the head of the whole body of saints, "the beginning, the first-born from the dead" (Col. i. 18)—and who himself says, "I have the keys of hell (ἅδου) and of death" (Rev. i. 18)—in entering the state of the dead and triumphing over it in his resurrection, has not left his victory without fruits to those "many prophets and righteous men" who, through the ages preceding his actual coming, "desired" to see his day and our day, but saw it not, and who, *without us*, could "not be made perfect."

Recurring once more to the work which has occasioned this article, we add, that the view herein set forth does not abate, but enhances our estimation of that sublime ritual of which the Psalms constitute such a beautiful, touching and important part. It deepens our sense of what the ancients would call its tremendous sacramental mystery. It furnishes a true substratum for the messianic character of the Psalms; for if he was truly coming in and through the flesh and blood of the faithful, he was only in a still higher sense coming also in that lofty lyric inspiration, which gave birth to these inimitable songs of the sanctuary.

On the same ground, too, and for the same reason, may we claim—as Mr. Lord so properly does—for these hymns of the temple a truly catholic character, which renders them as suitable to express the devout spirit of a Christian heart as they were to inspire and bear the devotions of those who were saved only in hope. Their substance is life from the same central source of life—light from the same central sun—and incense of praise from the same mystic censer, which presents its acceptable odors perpetually upon the golden altar before Immanuel's throne.*

Art. III.—THE NATURE AND VALIDITY OF INDUCTION.

By Prof. Henry N. Day, New Haven, Conn.

In 1833, in his famous article in the April number of the Edinburgh Review of that year, Sir William Hamilton uttered this oracular declaration: "We do not know the logician who has clearly defined the proper character of dialectical induction, and there are few who have not in the attempt been

* [We admit the preceding discussion, not because we agree with its special theories, but because these are presented in a candid and able manner, and are worthy of a thoughtful consideration. Even if a theory be not entirely satisfactory, it may suggest new aspects of old truths.—Eds.]

guilty of the grossest blunders." In his Lectures on Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh, the first course of which was delivered during the college session of 1836–37, he reiterated: "The account given of induction in all works of Logic is utterly erroneous." And in his Lectures on Logic, the first course of which was given during the college session of 1837–38, he still repeated: "All you will find in logical works of the character of logical induction is utterly erroneous." For twenty years, till his death, in 1856, in the one or the other of these last two forms, he continued, it would seem, from year to year, to repeat this sweeping criticism on the logical doctrine of induction. If his earlier conviction of this erroneous character of all previous logical teachings, which seems in fact to have possessed the intensity and positiveness that marks his philosophical writings generally,—if his earlier conviction had been weak, this reiteration, year after year, for twenty years, must of itself have wrought into it a rigidity and fixedness worthy of a Scotch dialectician. A theory of his own, correcting, as he should suppose, this universal error, was a matter of course. Unfortunately, this theory is so meagerly developed and applied by him, and promises of itself so little of utility, whether to science or to discipline, that the promulgation of it has awakened hardly an echo in the world of thinkers. So far as it is but a repetition of the supposed teaching of Aristotle, it is adopted without modification by Dr. Thomson in his Laws of Thought. By Dr. Mansel, it is, as would be expected, accepted not only thus far, but, also, in respect to what appears as new in Hamilton's system, viz., that Logical Induction differs essentially from Material Induction. This view has also been taken up into some of our popular compendiums of knowledge, as the Penny Cyclopedia; and has been adopted likewise by Professor Bowen in his recent treatise on Logic. But the doctrine has elicited, so far as is known, no thorough investigation, while, yet, hitherto it has produced little effect on opinion or science. It is, nevertheless, a doctrine of far-reaching consequences, and, if correct, must unsettle the very foundations of all material science;

as it removes it entirely from the sphere of thought, and denies to it the applicability of the laws of thought. All physical science is thus left for the human intelligence, utterly baseless; without guidance in the principles of intelligence for its investigations, without criteria in those principles for its results. If, as Hamilton says, Deduction is possible only through Induction, and if all material or philosophical induction is, as he insists, entirely extra-logical, that is, out of the domain of the laws of thought, and if that process which is generally regarded as induction, viz. illation from some of the parts to the whole, is equally illogical, then there is no true science in natural things; no true science anywhere, except, perhaps, in the purest abstractions of logic, and there limited to a few formulastic skeletons; for even in mathematical science, according to these authorities, there is no deduction except upon previous induction.*

It is believed that all this teaching is founded in error; that it originated, in all probability, in a hasty acceptance of imperfectly expressed, and imperfectly understood doctrines of the father of the European systems of Logic; and that the advances recently made in psychological and logical science have brought speculation to a point, from which it can correct the error of the past in this particular and present a doctrine that shall abide the tests of truth. At all events, it is due to the interests of thought and of science to resist with all possible energy, and by all the means of truth and reason, a doctrine subversive of all science worthy of the name, and leading inevitably to universal skepticism. By the principle

* In the appendix to Sir William Hamilton's Lectures on Logic, Boston Ed. p. 597, his editors have given a brief paper found among his manuscripts on Material or Philosophical Induction, in which the process is exhibited as complex, and consisting of two Deductive Syllogisms, one of which is an Epicheirema. The paper is a striking instance of the confounding of thought itself with the proper *datum* to thought; perhaps it would be more accurate to say it is a striking instance of the burying of the thought in the gross matter of thought, so that the parity and validity of the thought-process are lost from view, and the whole procedure is regarded as tainted with the contingency of the matter. It is precisely paralleled by a denial of the validity and necessary certainty of all arithmetical computation, because of the contingency that attaches to the real objects to which it may be applied

of self-preservation, discursive thought is bound at least to make the attempt to save itself from threatened destruction. It would seem, also, that material science itself has some interest in the questions, whether there be any basis at all for its elaborations; and, if so, how it can validate them to the intelligence of man.

In the prosecution of this attempt, the best method would seem to be to seek out, at the first, the true import of the term, Induction, and the precise nature of the process which it designates.

We have in Cicero's writings a clear and succinct exposition of the origin and import of the term. In the first of his remaining books on Invention, after saying that every argumentation is by induction or by ratiocination, which, by the way, he afterwards expounds to be what is generally accepted by logicians as the deductive or syllogistic argumentation, he proceeds to define induction as "an expressed reasoning-*oratio*, which seizes upon the assent of the opponents to instances that are not in doubt, and, by these assents, effects the proof of a matter in doubt through its resemblance to what had been assented to." In his Topics, he first exemplifies the process thus: "If a guardian should be faithful, if a companion, if a depositary, if a trustee; a steward should also;" and adds: "This procedure from several to the conclusion, is called induction; which is denominated in Greek ἐπαγωγή, and was generally employed by Socrates in his discussions." This exposition of the import of the term and of the nature of the process is professedly derived by Cicero from Aristotle. Obscure and meagre as Aristotle's expositions of this process are, we shall not fail to see on examination of his writings that Cicero has correctly rendered his master.

The general teaching of Aristotle is comprehensively contained in the first paragraph of his Posterior Analytics, where he says: "All doctrine and all learning that is dianoëtic, proceeds from pre-existing knowledge. This is manifest as we look over the whole range of the sciences. For the mathe-

matical sciences proceed in this way and every other system of knowledge. The same holds in regard to reasonings, both syllogistic, and inductive ; for both effect their teaching through what is previously known ; the former taking its premises as from those who already know, and the latter showing the universal through the singular that is already manifest. In the same way, moreover, rhetorical arguments effect belief ; for it is either through examples, which is induction, or through enthymemes, which is syllogism." So, elsewhere, in his Prior Analytics,* his Topics,† and his Rhetoric.‡ The syllogism and induction are recognized as the two coördinate modes of argumentation, and Induction he describes as a process from the singular to the universal. In the Topics he exemplifies his definition thus : "Induction is a procedure from singulars to universals ; as, if the intelligent pilot is to be preferred, so also the intelligent charioteer, and universally he who is intelligent, is to be preferred in respect to everything." Were this all that Aristotle had said in regard to the nature of induction, we should have been left in no doubt as to his meaning. Induction in his view, we should unhesitatingly conclude, is a kind of reasoning coördinate with the syllogism, differing from it in this, that it proceeds from the singular to the universal, while the syllogism proceeds in the reverse order, from the universal to the singular. In the Prior Analytics,§ however, he seems to teach, that in induction, which proves the agreement of one of two terms with a middle through the other term, this last-named term must consist of all the singulars making up the universals. And in the following chapter he adduces another kind of demonstrative reasoning, which he calls Example, and distinguishes it from induction in this, that example is from the part to the part, while induction proceeds from all the individuals, and concludes with the universal. Moreover, in his Rhetoric,‖ he identifies Example with Induction. Logicians and interpreters have expended unavailing toil in the endeavor to reconcile these seeming contra-

* Book i. 24 ; ii. 25. † *Ibid.*, i. 10. ‡ *Ibid.*, i. 2.
§ *Ibid.*, ii. c. 25. ‖ *Ibid.*, i. 1.

dictions. Errors in the text have been supposed; and the interpretation has been warped to suit the peculiar logical theories of interpreters. As logicians have generally held that all reasoning is syllogistic, they have of course endeavored to reconcile Aristotle's doctrine with this theory; and it would seem that their difficulties in the interpretation are mainly attributable to this; for Aristotle expressly distinguishes induction from the syllogism, and to attempt an interpretation which should subvert this distinction would legitimately lead to confusion and error. With this distinction of Aristotle's in mind, and keeping in view, also, that Aristotle in his explanation of induction in the perplexing chapters in the Prior Analytics, connects induction with the "syllogism founded on induction," we find a solution of the whole difficulty that seems satisfactory.

The passage in the Prior Analytics, Book ii. chap. xxv. Leipsic Ed., is as follows: "All belief is either through syllogism or from induction. Induction, and the syllogism from induction, is concluding one extreme with the middle through the other; as, if B be the middle of A and C, showing through C that A is B, for it is in this way we form inductions [syllogisms from induction]. As, let A be *long-lived*; B *bileless*; C the singular long-lived, as man, and horse, and mule. Now all C is A, for every bileless is long-lived; but all C is also B, bileless. If therefore C is convertible with B and does not transcend the middle, it is necessary that B be A. For it has been before shown, that if any two predicates belong to the same thing, and the extreme be convertible with either, either of these predicates will belong to the term so convertible with them. But it is necessary to think the C as composed of all the singulars; for the induction [the syllogism from induction] is through all. Now such a syllogism has for its premise an original and immediate proposition. For where there is a middle, the syllogism is through the middle; but where not, it is through induction. And in a certain respect, the induction [i. e. the syllogism from induction] is contrasted with the syllogism; for the latter shows the extreme to belong to the

third through the middle, while the former shows the extreme to belong to the middle through the third. Naturally the syllogism through the middle is earlier and more cognizable, but that through induction is clearer to us."

It should be borne in mind that it was not, as it would seem, within the scope of Aristotle's design in composing those treatises which collectively have obtained the name of Organon, to treat of induction except in passing and in mere subserviency to his exposition of the syllogism. This fact suggests the belief that, when treating of induction, especially in his Analytics which he professedly limits to syllogistic reasoning, he had in view the syllogism from induction rather than induction itself. This supposition, at least, makes out a consistent interpretation of the passages in question, otherwise contradictory and unintelligible. In this way all the teachings of Aristotle are reconciled; and they are seen to accord perfectly with Cicero's exposition as already given. Induction, then, in the view of Aristotle, proceeds from the singular or, in more general and exact terms, from the part. Whether from one or more or all the parts did not, as it would seem, affect the essential nature of the process in the view of either Aristotle or Cicero. They both exemplify the process as from one part. It concludes to the singular, or to the part, or, through that to the whole. Whether to the one or to the other, to the part or to the whole, does not affect the nature of the process. In all cases the reasoning so far as properly inductive is to the part; the whole is reached simply by a synthesis of the parts. Thus from one part of a class we reason to the complementary part; and having thus found something true of the parts, each or separately, we conclude that it is true of all the parts taken together. Aristotle and Cicero, however, both exemplify in processes terminating with the part.

It is hardly necessary to add, that such has been the general acceptation of the import of the term—induction, and of the essential character of the process. Away from the interests of logical theory, *to induce* has everywhere been regarded as

meaning to infer from the individual or singular, from the particular or the part, to another individual or part, or to all the individuals or the parts of the given whole.

If now we turn and scrutinize the process itself in order to find out its true nature, and hence its validity as a ground or source of knowledge, we shall not only see that Sir William Hamilton is himself involved in radical error in his exposition, equally with all the previous logicians whom he so unqualifiedly condemns; but we shall, also, detect the source of his error, and be able to apprehend the exact relationship of the so called material philosophical induction to formal or logical induction.

We assume at the outset that Induction is a process of thought; of thought in its limited technical import as a product of the so called discursive, comparative, or elaborative faculty; the faculty of relations, or of relative cognitions. This faculty is a dependent faculty. It acts only as something is given to it through some previous operation of the mind, an act either of some other faculty, as of sense, perception, self-consciousness, intuition, or its own. Its object, its *datum* is ever a cognition, or rather a plurality of cognitions. This truth, taught explicitly by Aristotle in the passage already quoted from his Posterior Analytics, has been more recently brought out into full light from the deep obscurity in which it had lain, and may now be taken as universally accepted by psychologists and logicians. With this object given it, its peculiar, single, characteristic function is to recognize the same and the different in the *datum*. The discursive faculty, the faculty of thought is thus purely a faculty of identifying; all its most complex and most variously modified operations, its analysis and its synthesis, its generalizations and its abstractions, its judgments, its concepts and its reasonings, may be resolved into this one operation of identifying. Its one law, hence, is that of identity. By this one law all its processes are to be guided and to be tested, so far as they are merely processes of thought. This will be apparent from a moment's examination

of consciousness in any act of thought. In the primitive, radical thought, the thought involved in all other thoughts.—the judgment *I am, I exist, ego sum,* in which I predicate existence, being of the I—the *ego,* what else do I do than to identify the *ego* with being; or in any most ordinary judgment, as that "This orange is sweet," what else than to identify sweetness as one of the qualities or properties of the orange? When any object is thus given to me, so soon and just so far as I think the object, I put forth a judgment in which and by which I identify two things.

So every concept is the product of a purely identifying process. Thus the concept "orange" is but the synthesis either of several properties, or of several individual objects; it is either the thought complement of these attributes, or the thought complement of certain existing things, according as we use the word in its intensive or its extensive quantity. But what is this synthesis, this aggregation of properties or of things, but the identifying of the many into the one, of cognizing this unit and that unit as two units, or to express it more exactly, as a present unity in the thought,—a duad thought as one? All generalizations are thus, but identifying, *saming* operations; and the single law of identity is the governing law in all. A genus, a class, is but a thought totality of same things. Only as we offend against the law of identity, do we err in our generalizations. We can not synthesize *man* and *monkey,* as of the order *bi-mana,* simply because they are not the same in respect of the particular that we have taken to characterize the order; just as we can not synthesize a bushel and a dollar, or multiply bushels by dollars, that is, repeat bushels dollar times.

Now identity implies non-identity, or difference. Or, if any prefer to place the act of identification on the same footing as to primitiveness with differentation, we may say; judging, thinking is the act of relative cognition, embracing the two coördinate operations of identifying and differencing. The necessary condition of the act is a *datum* in the intelligence, in which identifying or differencing, or rather both, may be effected.

Now that relation of this *datum* to the thought, under which thought can identify or difference, is that of whole and part. We can identify only on condition of a plurality in the intelligence; and the product of every such identification is a whole of which the diversity identified furnishes the parts. This relationship, of whole and part, which is thus the foundation relationship in which all thought proceeds, and which itself is the immediate evolution of the principle of identity—the same and the different,—the identical and the non-identical, is obviously of a two-fold nature. There is the relationship of whole to part, and the relationship of part to part; every whole contains parts; the converse of which is, every part is contained in a whole; this is the first relationship. The second is: every part has its complementary part. These two relations are equally fundamental. Neither can be said to be prior to, or conditioned by the other. They are both equally original. Each implies the other. But the whole is not before the part; nor the part before the whole; nor the relation of whole to part before that of part to part; or this relation before the other.

The deductive process is founded on the first of these relations. Its fundamental principle is: The part of a part is a part of the whole. The whole doctrine of the deductive syllogism, and consequently of all deductive reasoning, is but the evolution of this principle, and its application. The inductive process is founded on the other of these relations. And it is the grand mistake of Hamilton that he has utterly overlooked this relation, and has sought to found induction on the first in its converted form of part to whole; as it is the grand mistake of the logicians whom he criticizes that they have not only overlooked this relation in thought, but have denied any other process in thought but the syllogistic or deductive.

That this movement in thought from the part to part is as natural, as legitimate, as valid every way, as the other movement from whole to part which has been so universally and yet so exclusively regarded by logicians, would seem to follow

from the indication that we have given of the origin and ground of the relation. It is a necessity of thought, that if a part be given, it accept a complementary part; that a part necessarily leads in, induces, its complementary part. Not only this, but it necessarily accepts this complementary part both as same and also as different in respect to the part to which it is complementary. It must be the same; otherwise it could not participate in the common whole; it must be different; otherwise it could not be complementary, and could not be distinguishable in thought. It is the same in some respect; it is different in some respect. In the relation of whole to part, in positive thought, we necessarily affirm either a total identity between the whole and all its parts; or a partial identity between the whole and one of its parts. In the relation of part to part, in positive thought, we can not affirm a total identity between one part and another part, but only a partial identity—a sameness in some respect with a difference in some respect. Given a part, therefore, thought is competent to induce these three things:

1. There is another, a complementary part.

2. That complementary part is identical with it in some respect; that is, in so far as they participate in the common whole.

3. That complementary part is different from the first, in some respect.

Such inductions are just as valid, just as legitimate, just as independent, just as necessary, as any deductions. It is worse than idle to attempt to validate them by bringing in the whole to which the parts belong, as most logicians have virtually done in their expositions of induction; it is not only needless, but is injurious to thought. It were just as fit to attempt to legitimate deduction by resolving it into induction, or reasoning in the relation of part to part, and just as easy.

It remains now only to adduce some applications of the inductive principle, to show more fully the correctness of the view that has been presented, and, at the same time, to illus-

trate the extent and importance of this process of thought. It will be seen, as we proceed, how utterly gratuitous and erroneous is the assumption of Hamilton, that material or philosophical induction is in any respect as to its essential nature different from formal induction; how all induction in physical science must conform to this principle of thought in order to be valid; how necessarily binding it is upon our convictions, if it proceed under the guidance and sanction of this principle; and how induction has as free range as thought itself in all the departments of human science, whether physical or spiritual, whether ontological or mathematical.

As all thought proceeds under the relationship of whole and part, the natural method to be pursued in illustrating the nature of induction as it has now been expounded, will be by taking up the several possible kinds of whole in order, and applying the inductive principle to each successively.

We distinguish, then, at once two different kinds of whole, and consequently two kinds of relationships in wholes and parts—the first being that founded more directly in the object matter, the proper *datum* of thought; the other being the proper product of thought itself.

Beginning with the first class, those founded in the matter of thought, we will take up, first, what is called an integrate whole,—a whole in respect of the forms in which being enters into our experience, a whole, the parts of which lie out of each other, otherwise called a mathematical whole. Let the *datum* of thought be one part of a square bisected by a diagonal. It is evident that, this being known, we may induce much in regard to the other part. We may induce the *same;* as that its position is along the same straight line as hypothenuse; that it must be in the same plane; and of equal surface; that it must be a triangle; rectangular and isosceles. We may induce the *different* also; as that in reference to the line of bisection it is opposed to the given part, so that if the latter be taken as positive, the other must be taken as negative; that its sides run in directions not the same, but perpendicular to those of

the given part ; that its angles open also in different directions, but yet determinate from those of the given part. If the *datum* were the third part of a square cut by a line parallel to one of its sides ; we could in a similar way induce much in relation to the complementary part, both same and different. Here in fact we may induce almost everything that can be known of the complementary part, and the inference is directly from part to part, not through the common whole. It is not a process of analysis at all. The inference, too, is from the known to the unknown. It is true that we can make an inference only as we know the part as part, and thus impliedly the whole ; or more exactly, we must have the *datum* as part, which can not be known but as a relative, in its relation to a whole. The part, thus, in a certain respect implies the whole. But we do not yet think through the whole, as the condition of our thinking from part to part. This is clear from the fact that much that we infer could not be known from the whole alone.

Farther, we may not only infer to the whole complementary part, but we may, with equal facility and validity, infer to each of the two other third parts ; that is from the given part to any like part. And by like part, here, we understand, a part given by the same principle of section.

To take another instance, lying partly in the same species of integrate wholes—the special, and partly in another to be named in the sequel. Let the *datum* of thought be a certain ruin, an artistically wrought stone found in the débris of an ancient town, known as part,—the base, of an architectural column. From this *datum* as such part, we may infer much in regard to the other parts,—much that is the same, much that is different ; we may infer that the whole column was of a given material ; that it was of a figure, and of dimensions both same in some respects and different in some ; that it was of a determinate height and circumference ; of a certain order of architecture ; of a certain kind and degree of decoration, and the like. We may infer, here as before, either to the entire complementary part making up with the given part the whole column ; or we may infer to any component part. The pro-

cess is essentially the same. It is the use intended in the process that determines whether we proceed to the complementary part, or a part of that complementary part. Finding the *datum*, the base, to be of a certain order, we infer that the whole column, or the rest of the column, or the shaft, or the capital is of that order, and so in respect to every same character; and, also, in perfectly analogous ways, to every different character in the whole or any part. We may be in doubt in regard to the *datum* itself in some respect, and so far thought is disabled; since its necessary condition is a known as given. We may be unable to determine the exact height of the base, for instance, from the single *datum*, at least with absolute assurance; and we may seek to remove this doubt by the examination of another specimen lying near. This, however, does not enter into the process of thought at all. So it is a part of the *datum*, that the whole column was originally designed as of one single order, in an induction from the given architectural order of the base to the order of the shaft. Otherwise thought could not proceed in such an inference. But the process of verifying this is foreign from the inductive process. Thought accepts the *datum* as a known. It can not go behind that. From the *datum* assumed as known, it proceeds from the known part to the unknown complementary part or parts with absolute certainty.

The first instance we have taken, is in what is called formal, and hence, necessary matter; the second, in what is called contingent matter. But that distinction does not affect the nature of the process in thought at all. It accepts the *datum* in each case, as a known, and is unable to go behind that. It accepts it as a whole or as a part; in induction as a part; and from the *datum* simply as part it moves on, inferring the same or the different, or both, in reference to the whole of the complementary part, or any part of it. Its movements are characterized with equal absoluteness of certainty in both instances. All proper necessity lies, indeed, in thought, and all proper product of pure thought is necessary. The *datum* to thought, the cognition which is its object, thought itself can not vali-

date, can not characterize as necessary ; and all such cognition being thus contingent or problematical, the results from the application of thought to it, are just so far contingent, problematical ; no farther. This is, in fact, the true and only tenable distinction between necessary and contingent matter—all necessary, being of thought ; all contingent, being not of thought, but of the *datum* to thought.

So in the other species of integrate whole, the numerical, with a part given, we may induce the other part, or part of such complementary part. Let it be given or known that two men have marketed equal quantities of wheat, each at the same price, and that the one has received a hundred dollars, we infer that the other has received the same ; and in the same way, if there be any number of parts. If one hundred be a one half part of a whole, we infer that the other part is the same in amount, and is of the same kind of objects ; that the second part is in reference to the first characterized by all that characterizes a complementary numerical part,—that is, is a different in some respect ; so that, for instance, if the first be a positive in respect to the point of separation, the other is a negative, and the like.

In like manner of the numerical whole of intensity, or of whatever may be viewed as of degrees, we induce from one part to its complement. A part of the scale or measure of intensity being known as a certain definite part of the whole, the other part or parts are induced with absolute certainty.

Passing now from wholes lying only in the forms in which being comes into thought, to such as are peculiar to being itself, we take first the whole of being, so far as it is regarded as substance—the substantial whole. The whole here is that of substance and attribute. It may be premised here that thought as thought has nothing to do with the reality of being, or the modes by which being comes into the intelligence, by what faculties or on what conditions, or even with the reality or the character of an act of intelligence. These questions belong to ontology and psychology, and are foreign

to logic. Thought, and logic as the science of the laws of thought, begin with the consciousness as already modified by the presence in it of the being as known, together with the perception, or intuition, or whatever it may be,—begin with a cognition. And ever, the whole with which thought deals is a whole in the intelligence—is a state of consciousness, a modification of mental activity. When objective being enters the mind, it finds, in co-occupancy there, ideas of the reason, as of space, time, substance, cause, identity, beauty, rectitude, goodness, potentially at least, so that it comes at once into relationship with these ideas, as also with the entire mental activity, however diversely modified from experience. It is not simply the object perceived, it is not simply the perception itself, that necessarily constitutes the whole of thought; it is the perception combined with the entire mental state. By its power of concentrating attention on any part of its complex activity to the temporary depression, not destruction, of the rest—for mental activity once awakened, never dies, the mind carves out a whole, greater or less, combined in this way or that, to which it then turns, predominantly, its faculty of thought. We suppose now, then, that its apprehension of being simply as substance is made such a whole for thought. If substance be thought at all, it must be thought either as a whole, containing parts, or as a part in relation to other part or parts. These parts we call attributes. Now, as before, it is important to bear in mind that thought, in dealing with this whole, has nothing to do with its being a reality—nothing to do with the question, whether there be actual substance or not—corresponding with the mental apprehension. Thought begins with the apprehension itself, as given, and simply assumes that. By the necessities of its nature, it views this *datum* as a whole containing parts, which parts, in the whole of substance, as already stated, we call attributes. Now in its inductive process, if we have rightly exposed its nature, it should be able from some parts known, to induce to other parts not known. It should be able to infer in some respects the same; it should also be able

to infer in some respects the different, with absolute certainty, and thus advance the mind to entirely new knowledge. Let me take for exemplification the substantial whole *Socrates*, apprehended in respect of one of its attributes, we will say, as *rational*. Now this attribute, so far as part, must subsist in connection with some other part or attribute. Thought necessitates this. Further, this other part must be congruent with the first part, that is capable of making up a whole with it. Still further, if the whole Socrates is given as *sentient*, then the unknown complementary part must not only be not hindrance of all sense, but if the part *rational* be known as incompetent in itself alone to sense, this unknown part must be auxiliary to sense. If the whole Socrates be known as *oral teacher*, and the part *rational* be known as *incompetent to audible articulation*, then the unknown complementary part must have the character or property of being *instrumental to sound;* in other words, of *having voice*. In this way may be induced from the given part *rational*, much if not most of what we know as the part *animal* in Socrates, and the induction is in absolute certainty. The cognitions thus attained are necessary cognitions, the assumed whole being given and the assumed part being a part of that whole. And they are new cognitions. They are not already known in the given whole *Socrates*, nor in the given part, *rational*, in any other sense than that thought can elaborate them from these *data*. They are as really new cognitions, attained only through this inductive process of thought, as is the value, ascertained by computation, of a promissory note bearing interest for any period of time. The *data*—the principal, the rate of interest, the time, —these do not of themselves give the cognition of the present value. Thought elaborates it from them; it is its product.

The other mode in which we apprehend being is that of cause. We waive here as not necessarily relevant to the present issue, all the ontological considerations of the nature and reality of what we call *cause*, assuming only this *datum* of the reason, that there is a relation subsisting in being which gives

us the correlatives of antecedent and consequent, such that the two make up a whole for thought, every antecedent necessarily implying its consequent, every consequent necessarily implying its antecedent; the whole antecedent re-appearing in the whole consequent, the whole consequent given in the whole antecedent. The antecedent as one part and the consequent as the other part, make up what may be called the causal whole. Induction, now, with one part given infers the other part as complementary. It infers here, as before, the same and also the different. If the antecedent be of a certain nature, the consequent is of the same. If the antecedent in combustion, for instance, be in its essential nature, real and material, the consequent is likewise real and material. If the antecedent stand in certain relations to space and time, the consequent will stand in certain relations the same, in others, different. Given thus either part of a causal whole, either the antecedent or the consequent, and we can infer much with absolute certainty as to the complementary part—as that it is actual, that it is of such or such a nature, that it is so and so conditioned. Further than this, we may infer from a part of either of these primary parts much in relation to its complementary part. As for instance, we may take the consequent, and recognizing it as consequent or effect, we may take any part of it and infer much in relation to its complementary part. As for instance, we may take the consequent, the effect in living organism, of heat as the antecedent or cause. If pain be a part of this consequent, that is, if pain in a certain portion of sensitive organism be part of that effect, then we infer the complementary effect in other sensitive organisms, within the sphere of the same causal whole, with absolute certainty. If any contingency enter into the reasoning it flows from the *datum*—the principle of causality, the relation of the cause, the antecedent, to its complement—the effect, the consequent, not from the process of thought. With the reality of the *datum*, thought as thought has nothing to do. It begins with accepting that as given, *datum*. Ontology must decide the reality of cause; perception, it may

be, or at least some presentative faculty, must determine the causal sphere, in order that thought may take its causal whole, with its complementary parts of antecedent and consequent. With these given as true cognitions, thought then proceeds to a world of new cognitions; which must be as true as the *data* with which it starts, and the legitimacy and validity of its procedure lie exclusively in the necessary relationships of part to part.

For all the purposes of thought, one part is as good as many. Not at all any interest of thought as thought imposes the necessity in any case of multiplied observations. This necessity arises out of the insufficiency of the *datum* to determine the whole,—the causal sphere, the range of the antecedent, the nature of the consequent. If we know heat as expansive cause, and know iron to constitute its sphere in part or whole, and there also be given one piece of iron as expanded by heat, thought can proceed from these *data* to induce expansion in respect to every other like complementary part, or piece of iron. If heat of a certain intensity expand a certain degree one piece of iron, it will expand every piece to the same degree. Now it may be necessary that many observations should be previously made to verify the fact that heat is the sole cause; that the effect is in iron as iron. But this is not to eke out any imperfection in the thought. The presentative part of the procedure, and the thought process, should be kept entirely distinct, in order that the correctness of the complex procedure may be verified and the result assured. The distinction is as obtrusive and as thorough as that between the observations of the leveler and the measurer in the field, and the subsequent computations of the engineer at the desk; and the importance of keeping the distinction in view is as great in the one case as in the other, in order to verification and assurance of correct results. There is this wide difference between the two parts of the complex operation; that the eye, or the presentative organ, in any department is ever more subject to error, or at least more subject to error that can not be easily detected, than mathematical computation, than pure

thought. At all events, absolute accuracy is attainable in the latter, while it is not in the former.

In a causal whole, the primary cleavage is into the two parts of cause or antecedent, and effect or consequent. We may induce from one to the other, with equal validity. But the reasoning is just as natural and just as valid between any two parts of either antecedent or consequent. If *twinkling* be one part—the consequent, and radiation through a dense medium the other part—the antecedent, of a causal whole ; then, given either part of this, the other may be induced ; as given the *radiation*, the *dense medium* may be inferred ; or from the *dense medium* being given, the *radiation* may be induced. So a *saturated solution of a salt* and *reduction of heat* being known, as the antecedent part of a causal whole, and *crystallization* as the consequent part, then, the *crystallization* and the *saturated solution* being given, we can infer the complementary part of the antecedent, the *reduction of heat*. In like manner, any two parts of the consequent in a known causal whole may be induced, the one from the other. If one part of the consequent, *crystallization*, be in cubes, any other part standing in the same relations to the causal whole will be in cubes. So if a causal whole in vegetable being be known, with one part of its antecedent or consequent part, the other part may be induced : as if the causal sphere of *endogenous plants* be known, and *reticulated leafage* be also given as part of the consequent in that causal whole, then another part, an *embryo of double or manifold leaves*, may be induced. The observation of a single part, a part of a part to an extreme degree, as of a small section of the stem, enables the botanist, knowing the causal whole, to induce the leaf, the flower, the embryo,—the class generally of the plant.

In like manner in spiritual being, if virtue and general health of rational spirit make up a causal whole, then, from perfect intellectual health as consequent of virtue we may induce perfect emotional health; from virtuous intelligence, also virtuous refinement of feeling. Whatever doubt attaches to the conclusion flows from the contingencies of the *datum*

which is here the causal whole. If virtue be not sole and efficient cause of health, the conclusion fails; for on this assumption, the reasoning rests.

Passing now to the other class of wholes that should be distinguished in thought in order to assured truth, those which are the pure product of thought itself—logical wholes as they may be called, it will be necessary in order to illustrate the nature, the extent, and the importance, as also the validity of induction in them, to premise a brief reference to the mode of their genesis, and to their proper character.

Logical wholes are technically known as *concepts*—a term which is by its very etymology indicated to be significant of a whole. They are known as of two species, extensive, and intensive or comprehensive wholes. They are both derived from a plurality of judgments: the former, the extensive, species, by the combination or synthesis of the subjects of two or more judgments having a common predicate; the latter, the intensive species, by the synthesis of the predicates of judgments having a common subject. This common predicate in the former case, and this common subject in the latter case, we will call the base of the concept. It is the identifying principle in the concept, and the necessary condition of its formation. The process of forming may be thus exemplified. To form an extensive whole or concept with the predicate base, *wise*, as from the following judgments, which are the *data* to the process of thought: *Socrates is wise*; *Plato is wise*; *Aristotle is wise*,—we synthesize, unite, the subjects *Socrates*, *Plato*, *Aristotle*, into one whole or class, and signalize the union or synthesis by the one word *sage*. We have now an extensive whole or concept, the parts of which are identical units—each being *wise*. So in forming a comprehensive whole on a subject base, say, Socrates: from the judgments *Socrates observes*; *Socrates thinks*; *Socrates systematizes*; *Socrates teaches*,—we may form the comprehensive whole or concept *philosopher*, as signalizing under one word the synthesis of the predicates of observing, thinking, systematizing,

teaching,—this being, it may be observed by the way, in a causal, the other in a substantial whole. It is obvious, that the nature of the process admits of an indefinite number of terms, whether subjects or predicates, being gathered into the synthesis—the only condition being that the base be preserved unalterable as the one identifying principle.

Now it is manifest from this genesis of the concept, that the base belongs as truly to any one part as to any other. If *wise* belongs to Socrates so far as *sage*, it belongs to Plato also, as complementary part of Socrates in the concept. If the concept has been formed in accordance with its law, my induction of the base, *wise*, from Socrates to Plato as such part, has the character of absolute truth, of necessary certainty. But more, on the same principle, I may induce in the same way any part of the base, *wise*, as belonging to Socrates, to any complementary part of the concept-whole. If *wise* contain the characters of *spiritual*, of *intelligent*, or any other character whatever, then, finding any one in Socrates as *sage*, I can induce the same of Plato, and the induction is still characterized by the same necessary certainty. If any contingency attaches to the result, it is derived from the *data* exclusively. The thought process gives as necessary results as any mathematical computation whatever. Its absolute validity is thus beyond impeachment.

But it may be thought from the extreme simplicity of the particular instance by which we have exemplified the general process of induction, that, even if valid, the process is of extremely limited reach, and therefore unworthy of serious consideration and study. A few words will suffice to show the groundlessness of this supposition; to demonstrate that the activity of the human mind in originating and in attaining knowledge is, chiefly, in precisely this way. The primitive conditions of all human knowledge are found, indeed, in the activity of the proper originative faculties of the intelligence—those of perception external and internal, and those of intuition so called, or of the regulative faculty, as it is inadequately denominated by Hamilton. These furnish the original *data* to

thought, and as necessary conditions of all knowledge have a prime importance. But in relative amount in the origination and attainment of knowledge, they are as the puny life-force of the acorn-germ to the full life of the tree. That germinal force, continuing on as we are obliged to believe from the enduring constancy of being, and never dying out, as determined in relation to the force of the developed tree, measures truly the proportion of mental force in the original perception continued, or in the form which we call memory, to that of our mature knowledge. The great body is thought—pure thought taken in the stricter sense, as the opération of the discursive faculty. No learner, no investigator begins, at this age of the race at least, with an original observation. He begins with a thought already attained, with a concept formed as we have seen by the conspiring and unintermitting energy of the race. Far up above the deep foundations of the great coral-reef of human knowledge, each new builder stands to add his particle to the huge mass beneath. He starts with a concept that generations have been industriously forming, individual after individual adding a little, each scrutinizing, testing, verifying the addition of every other, so far as interworked with his own labor; and all laboring by a necessary instinct under a sure and perfect law of their common being. He starts with a concept embodied in a word. If the first man began, none can now begin, with a perception. DesCartes tried it; and every line of the record in which he narrated his attempt belied the endeavor and proved it an absurdity and a cheat. He might as easily have made himself another Adam. The bud on the distant spray of an ancient oak might as well seek to be original acorn-germ. All subject words, all predicate words in human speech are concepts formed, as we have described, by the conspiring labors of the race. No man can now start in the pursuit of knowledge, but as he begins with these; for he must begin with *data;* and these *data* are now concepts mainly. Further, no man living, it is no extravagance to say, can bring up into his consciousness, every element that has been garnered up in the long harvesting of

thought since the beginning, into any one of those concepts. To do this he would need to trace up its formation from the very first, recognizing every particle of new matter deposited by every contributor during the progress of the race. To know what it contains in respect of any part, therefore, he must induce. He may know part; from that part he can induce to any complementary part. He knows Socrates and Plato to be complementary parts of each other; he knows Socrates to be *intelligent*, he induces the same to Plato. He knows *intelligent*, to contain *active*, *observing*, *testing*, *verifying*, *patient*, *hopeful*, and indefinite other characters; he induces the same to Plato. He knows Socrates to be *animal*, that has a circulatory system, a part of which is arterial, that itself has certain properties, each of which has, likewise, its own properties involved in it, and so on; he induces each of these characters to Plato,—to every like complementary of Socrates. Acquisition of knowledge is mainly inductive. And we rest in it simply because both the process of forming concepts and that of inducing others, are valid processes; the contingency introduced in the original perception having been reduced to its minimum through the verifying labor of the race, and the possible error in the proper thought-process having in the same verifying labor been eliminated.

It is not otherwise in the advancement of knowledge. Its accretions are chiefly by induction. One observation made on a single object of investigation adds to the contents of the concept—whether subject-concept or predicate-concept; and at once what is thus added is induced to every complementary part. The discovery of the mode in which two fluids of unequal affinities for the walls of a tube move through it, imparts through a valid induction a new character to the circulation of sap in all vegetable life, and of blood in all animal life. So, universally, it is by induction that the knowledge of what pertains to one or a part is extended over the many or the whole.

It may be supposed that the unintermitting fluctuations in the values or imports of these concepts, as evinced in the ever-

changing meanings of the words in which they are embodied, must fatally corrupt any pure thought-process mediated through them. These fluctuations, these changes in concepts, it must be admitted, are actual; they are the condition of all true intellectual life, of all advancing knowledge, bearing the same relation to the living body of human thought, that the perpetual motion in the blood-corpuscles bears to the physical body. Concepts being, as we have seen from their genesis, but quantities, can change only by augmentation or by diminution. They are ever undergoing these two changes. On the one hand, every new observation adds to their contents, their freightage, their proper import; and on the other, both the occasions of science, facility of discrimination and of comprehension, and, also, the very augmentation in one quantity from its essential correlation to the other, are effecting a perpetual narrowing of the import of concepts and terms. But although this may render it necessary to assured science, that the nature, the mode, and the extent of these fluctuations should be well understood, they do not at all affect the nature of the movement of the thought itself nor impair its validity. Nor are these changes, although it must be admitted they are the abundant occasion of error and of dissension in the progress of knowledge, to be deprecated as wholly evil. Indeed, as indispensable conditions of all living, growing thought, they should be accepted with a cordial welcome, and their rich ministry to intellectual life intelligently turned to account.

But, still further, the question may occur, are not all these concepts illusory, but mocking images of the real, with no assured correspondencies in the world of being around us? It is a question of most momentous concernment; but the discussion of it does not belong here, and it may legitimately be dismissed with only a glance at the point where it touches our present theme. The matter in question to us here is not the veracity of our originating perceptive faculties; but only the correspondence of our mere thought-products, our concepts in which we have hoarded up our fruits of knowledge as they have ripened to our hands, ever varying in their actual con-

tents,—the correspondence of these with the actual around us. Now it is enough to say in this place, that while skepticism here has no ground whatever to stand upon, not even enough to enable it to issue the demand for positive proof of the affirmative of a question, in which the burden of proof lies on the negative, for the very terms of any such demand import the truth of the concepts in which the skeptic must embody his demand,—every radiant of evidence to us,—reason, experience, analogy, and revelation, demonstrates the certainty of the correspondence. Reason postulates one universe, one creator, one principle of creation, unity in the wondrous diversity, harmony in the infinity of parts, sameness in endless difference. All experience, all analogy urges along the same track of assurance; and inspiration opens upon us with the teaching which must be accepted in all science as its very beginning condition, that every created thing is created "after his *kind*." This principle of *kind*, of identity in creation, stamped upon it at its origin, and never contradicted in the continuing agency of the creator in his maintenance and rule of his created work, is the fundamental principle in the universe of things, the only type and counterpart of the one principle of thought. There is a true *kind*, a species in things that never perishes, any more than substance or force, forbidding transformation of kinds, and commingling of kinds, so that if such appear we instinctively and truly recognize them as monstrosities, which we forbear to account for, till we attain a higher point of view from which to look out on the orderly arrangement of things that appear around us;—a higher, purer light in which to survey and study the well-ordered universe of God. Language, as shaped by the most cultivated portions of the human race, attests the general acquiescence of men in the correlativeness of thought and specific identity in nature. The words, *genus*, *kind*, *kin*, *can*, *knows*, and numerous others, all of the same stock, and similar in the different dialects of the Indo-European family, connect causative power, intelligence, and specific identity in clearest and closest relationship. Things are alike because the creatures of the same causative power; things

correspond to our thoughts, because we and they are products of the same power, and all are akin to it. In this fundamental truth are grounded alike the necessary objective condition of all science, and also the universal instinct of science in man. Without this correspondence between thought and being, science is an empty form ; and the innate aspiration for science in man is a cheat and a lie. Accepting this correspondence with a natural faith, man, through the identities cognizable and validated in thought, rises surely and successfully along the identities of creation upwards into the unity of the single creative power in the universe and attains perfect science.

These several illustrations of the inductive process, as applied to the more generic kinds of wholes in which thought may proceed, will suffice to show the nature of the process as also its legitimacy and importance. They confirm our *a priori* presumption, that the relation of part to part is ground of inference in itself as primitive, as valid, as that of part to whole. We have no need to resort to any such unphilosophical expedient of helping out a supposed impotency in the procedure, as that of Dr. Whately, who would bring all reasoning under the deductive syllogism. Nor is there any occasion for removing, with Sir William Hamilton, physical discovery and proof from the field of proper thought, thereby annihilating all its claims to science. This separation of material or philosophical from logical induction is manifestly the result of a defective view of the relations in thought, in which one coördinate part of these relations, that of part to complementary part, is wholly overlooked, and of a consequent attempt to validate all thought on the other. These illustrations are sufficient to show the practicability, and likewise the necessity to accurate results, of distinguishing between the two parts of the procedure in all our thinking ; the conditions of thought, on the one hand, as furnished by the presentative faculties of the intelligence, or, as the case may be, cognitions of some previous process of thought, and, on the other, the movements of thought on those conditions. Thorough-going verification of our thinking is

possible only on the condition of our being able to separate the *data*, and so the means of clearing them from error, from the thought-process itself as applied to those *data*. They will suffice, still further, to show the importance of determining in all our thinking the kind of whole in which our thought is to proceed. To a certain extent, no error may arise from overlooking these distinctions; so long, for instance, as the process of thought involves no relationships that differ in the several kinds of whole. So soon, however, as those relationships that are peculiar to the respective kinds, and that are characteristic of them, become involved, then error unavoidably comes in if the different kinds of whole are confounded. This confusion is a source of endless mistake, and the extrication of truth becomes well nigh impossible; for never did Bacon utter a more important truth for investigators in science, than when he said: "Citius emergit veritas ex errore quam ex confusione." So long as only lines, surfaces, solids come into a mathematical process as wholes, with none of the peculiar relationships in the parts by which one kind of dimension is distinguished from the other, so long error may be excluded; but when the parts of a lineal foot become confounded with the parts of a superficial or of a solid foot, then the procedure plunges into inextricable confusion, and truth can never emerge. It is just so with the confusion of the wholes given in the conditionary objects of thought with those produced by thought, or of integrate, substantial, and causal wholes with one another in our thought. Our thinking is more commonly complicated of all. The distinctions are but feebly recognized even among thinkers, among men of science. The precise nature and characteristics of a causal whole are hardly recognized at all. Indeed the nature of thought, as a procedure necessarily in the relations of whole and part, is hardly recognized by metaphysicians. Logic has been so exiled from our schools of learning, that the fundamental laws of thought are known to but few among the professed thinkers. What wonder is it that error so commonly pervades our scientific systems; that antagonisms attend so swarmingly on every advance of knowledge;

that truth emerges so slowly and amid such rocking throes from the chaos and confusion of complicated thought! What promise to the rapid and peaceful progress of knowledge would open from the clear determination of the the nature of thought, as the faculty of all proper scientific knowledge; of its laws; of the conditions of its movements; of the modes of its operation; of the validity of its results; with the clear discrimination of its procedure from those of the other faculties of the intelligence, to which it looks for the supply of all the material for its diversified fabrics!

Art. IV.—THE WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE, AND THE WAR FOR SECESSION.

By Rev. William Adams, D. D., New York.

It is common to celebrate the birth of our national independence with every demonstration of popular joy. So, it was predicted by one of the authors of the immortal Declaration, it would always be celebrated with bonfires, and illuminations, ringing of bells, and salvos of artillery.

Special reasons gave to this anniversary, the past year, an extraordinary zest and importance. We have reached a new epoch in our national existence. We have passed through a second birth. Delivered from great perils and pains we are just entering a new period of our history. Not less important is the termination of our great civil war, than was the beginning of our independent nationality. Separated by an interval of a century—lacking eleven years—the two events are immediately related. They have their resemblances and their contrasts. Both are parts of one great historic development. "Deep answers unto deep at the noise of God's water-spouts." Our nation's birth, and our nation's vindication are connected directly with human rights, liberty, and welfare; and are im-

portant acts in the progress of the kingdom of our Lord on the earth.

As such, they deserve to be celebrated, most devoutly, by an intelligent and religious people. They demand something more of us than holiday amusements, and noise, and pageantry, and exuberance of animal spirits. There should be a thoughtful consideration of causes, and principles, and divine laws. There should be a wise looking at the past, and the future. Above all, there should be a most devout study of divine providence—its unfoldings and intentions in connection with our history. We can not adjust ourselves wisely and vigorously to our duties as citizens in this Christian Republic, if we are not well-informed as to the principles of divine jurisprudence which are to be acknowledged in our peculiar nationality.

While Washington commanded that the manifesto of national independence should be read at the head of every division of the army, the clergy, of their own impulse, performed the same office, with a very general unanimity, from their pulpits.

Those who aided and abetted the recent rebellion, at home and abroad, claimed that it had, for its origin and defence, the same rights and principles as those which were involved in that revolution, which secured to us independence from the Old World, and which is now universally celebrated as an act of wisdom, and righteousness, and honor. Was the one event right because it was successful? Is the other to be branded as crime merely because it was defeated? Or, did the one succeed because it was right, and did the other fail only because it was wrong? What are the laws of right and wrong as applicable to such subjects? What are the principles, in the code of Christian ethics, which make one revolution rightful and obligatory, and another, criminal and unjustifiable? Surely, we are in a most forlorn condition if we are not able to render a good and sufficient answer to questions like these. Such matters should not be left to caprice, to prejudice, to passion. They come within the range of divine laws. These laws are capable of exact statement. We cheerfully undertake to define

them. We hold that what is generally known in history as the American Revolution — the act of separation from the British Government, was right—not because it succeeded, but that it succeeded because it was right—right in itself, right in accordance with divine laws—and therefore, it deserves to be commemorated with gratitude, and all who accomplished it with immortal honor. We hold that the recent attempt to revolutionize the government of this country was wrong, criminal, unjustifiable, notwithstanding the numbers even of good men who were involved in it—that in its inception, and in its progress, it was at variance with the revealed law of God :—and that it has been overtaken by defeat, and will be remembered as an offence because it was gratuitous, and against the statutes of the Almighty. Such language might pass for mere breath, if unsupported by proof. Proof we propose to furnish. It will be our object, in this article, to verify the statements which we have now made ; presenting, in form, the contrasts between the two great events in our history, the first and the latest—with the reasons which crowned the one with success and glory, and doomed the other to defeat and ignominy. Sad for us and for the world will it be, if we do not rightly interpret the lesson which has been uttered in the terrific voices of war, and written, large and distinct, in human blood.

We begin what we have to propose on this subject, with the inspired affirmation that government is a divine ordinance. "The powers that be are ordained of God." We are all aware of the manner in which this doctrine of revelation has been perverted and abused. Despots have cited it as the basis of their authority. Nothing is here said or implied as to the *form of government.* The expression is very general. The reference is simply to government. Civil government is a power for human protection. The authority for such a power proceeds from the Almighty, who has ordained that society could not exist without it. It does not spring, therefore, in an ultimate sense from the consent of the governed. Surely the right of parental government does not proceed from the consent of the child, who is born under domestic authority.

It results from the will and ordinance of God. The object of government is, not the aggrandizement of those who administer it—but the welfare of those over whom it is extended. It is an agent for human protection, security, and well-being. Divine benevolence being its authorship, human happiness is its object and end.

From these premises we infer, *first*, the duty of obeying, and conserving, and honoring civil government so long as it is administered with reference to its prescribed object: and *secondly*, the right and the duty of modifying and changing government when it is perverted from its ordained uses into an instrument of wrong and oppression; and organizing a new and better form of administration which will conform to the legitimate intentions of civil government. These premises and inferences cover the whole ground pertaining to our subject. They prove the right of revolution in certain circumstances. They define the circumstances in which alone revolution is right. They inform us when attempts at revolution are wrong, a crime against society and against God.

The right to revolutionize government inheres in the very purpose of government. Mark the word:—to *revolutionize* government,—not to abolish government—not to destroy all government—since the necessity of some government is a divine ordinance for human welfare—but to change its form, its method of jurisdiction—removing one and substituting in its place another which is better.

When is it right to revolutionize government? We answer: *when the existing government has so far failed of its legitimate object as to be an instrument of wrong, unrighteousness, and suffering.* Then, and then only, is it right and proper, in accordance with the divine law of benevolence, that it should be altered and set aside, and another form of government organized, which will the better promote the protection, safety, and happiness of the people. The process of change may require suffering. It may involve an appeal to arms, and the shedding of blood, but the result contemplated, —redress of wrong, the removal of evils, the increase of happi-

ness, the greater good of the whole,—justifies the stern and violent proceeding. Christain Benevolence smiles on an act which, proceeding from such a motive, tends to such an issue, and honors it with her blessing and sanction.

Such, we hold, were the circumstances which justified the American Revolution; and shed immortal renown upon those who conducted and accomplished it. It did not spring from mere passion. It had a better basis than a simple preference. Our fathers did not rebel against the mother country because they did not like a monarchy, and because they thought they should like another form of government. Many of them were strongly attached to the ancient traditions of the ancestral land. They had no desire to inaugurate a new and independent government, provided the evils from which they suffered could be redressed. They began with protesting against those evils. They desired that they should be reformed and abolished. They remonstrated against abuses. They expostulated with the British Parliament and king. They were not wild and malignant insurgents. They were reformers, in the best sense. They knew not when they began how far their protestations would lead. They petitioned, they entreated. They sought for relief. They were subject to wrongs which amounted to oppression. There were those in the British Parliament who themselves protested against the wrongs inflicted upon the American Colonies. The eloquence with which Chatham plead the cause of our fathers, insisting on their rights, still echoes in the annals of the British Senate. But all these remonstrances and expostulations were in vain. Redress was denied. At length the evils complained of reached such an enormity, that the duty and wisdom of resistance were revolved by our fathers. They did not precipitate revolution. They weighed well the cost. In their immortal manifesto they acknowledged that "existing governments should not be changed for light and transient causes." They regarded it as better to suffer wrong, while the wrong was tolerable, than to expose the country to all the sufferings and woes of revolution. But when abuses and usurpations were so multiplied, as to

prove that the government which originated them was perverted into an instrument of oppression, they could not evade the conviction, that it was their duty to set it aside, and provide other methods and agencies for their security. Then was it that they made their appeal to God, and to the "judgment of mankind." They made an expression of the reasons which justified their resistance to the long established government, and their purpose to provide another. This was the design of the Declaration of Independence—to assign the reasons which impelled them to make this painful and violent separation. Those reasons, as they are recorded in the immortal document, are *twenty-seven in number*. We hold that they were good and sufficient. They are of such a character as indicate a radical perversion of civil government. They prove that the government by which those wrongs were perpetrated, instead of being an agency to protect, and to bless, was itself an instrument of tremendous mischief. Its perversion was so complete and incurable, that nothing remained for good men and true, but to set it aside, and adopt what was better. Their action was prompted by no antipathy of races, by no prejudice of classes, by no impulse of passion, by no ambition of power. It was a calm, intelligent, rational conviction on their part that the government under which they had lived had so far failed of the object for which government was instituted, that the common welfare, benevolence itself, demanded, that a change should be made, by a revolution, which might cost sacrifice, suffering, and blood. We do not propose to repeat, compare, and weigh, the several reasons assigned by our fathers, for the assertion of their independence. They are all on record. The wrongs of which they complained were not superficial. They imply a total subversion of the divine ends of government. Instead of being an organized power to protect, to bless, it was an armed power to irritate, annoy, oppress, and curse. And for those radical mischiefs, there was only one radical and efficient cure. The government itself must be thrown aside, and another, just, and benignant, be organized in its stead. This was what our

fathers undertook and accomplished in the American Revolution. Their acts stand approved by the divine law of love. It is justified by the legislation of Him who is the ordainer of governments for man's welfare. That which is the end and design of government, was the warrant for the change of government. The men who inaugurated the revolution were called by the parent government—rebels. We regard them as reformers; righteous and heroic; and applaud their doing, not for its success, but for the great principles and laws of benevolence which prompted and conducted the achievement in the interest of human rights, and human happiness.

We pass now over an interval of four score years, to the recent attempt to revolutionize the government of this nation, from which we have so recently emerged. That the government founded by the people of this country, nearly a century ago, was absolutely perfect, it would be false to affirm. That it was good, perhaps the best which in the circumstances could have been constructed; that it was just, and liberal, and benignant; that its aim was to promote the general welfare; that it was, in fact, administered through a series of years, in the spirit with which it was organized; that through all changes of party and organs, it looked to the rights and security, and good of the country, in the general tone of its action; these are facts which we affirm to be true, beyond all question or contradiction. These are the things which have made our government the theme of general panegyric. We will not now compare it with other governments. We will not expose ourselves to the imputation of lauding it with indiscriminate eulogy. It is enough that we take these facts for our premises; that the American Government was to be regarded as the divine ordinance for the good of the American people; that it actually accomplished the end for which it was instituted; and that therefore, it was the religious duty of all to conserve and honor it, until it could be demonstrated that it was so perverted in spirit and acts, that the law of benevolence demanded that it should be revolutionized and overthrown.

It is from these premises that we start in our religious reasoning. Was the American Government an instrument of wrong and oppression? Did it fail of the object for which civil government is ordained of God? Who ever pretended that it did? Dissatisfaction has frequently arisen in view of particular measures. Parties and sections have been disaffected by the failure of favorite projects. When majorities rule, minorities will always grumble and complain. But who has ever alleged that the Federal Government of this great nation, was an instrument of mischief, of oppression, and of wrong! To prove to the satisfaction of all that no such necessity existed, as did exist in that original revolution we commemorate, we confine ourselves to a few witnesses, whose testimony can not be ascribed to prejudice.

The first of these is Mr. Jefferson Davis, who, in the Senate of the United States, in the year 1860, used these words: "This is the best Government ever instituted by man, unexceptionally administered, and under which the people have been prosperous beyond comparison with any other people whose career has been recorded in history."

The second is Mr. Alexander H. Stephens, of Georgia, who, in the year 1861, expressed himself, in the convention of his own state, as follows: "I must declare here, as I have often before, what has been repeated by the greatest and wisest of statesmen and patriots in this and other lands, that the American government is the best and purest, the most equal in its rights, the most just in its decisions, the most lenient in its measures, and most aspiring in its principles to elevate the race of men, that the sun of heaven has ever shone upon. Now for you to attempt to overthrow such a government as this, under which we have lived for more than three quarters of a century, in which we have gained our wealth, our standing as a nation, our domestic safety while the elements of peril are around us, with peace and tranquillity, accompanied with unbounded prosperity and rights unassailed, is the heighth of madness, folly, and wickedness."

The third is Henry A. Wise, then governor of Virginia, who,

in the year 1859, sending this sentiment to a public gathering in Richmond: "The Union and the Constitution of the United States as they are—the country, the whole country"—descants, even to rhapsody, on the magnificence of the idea thus embodied, which made "him an unit the possessor of the whole Union with its pride, and its greatness, and its immortal annals," concluding with these words: "If any would not love such a country, let him have no country to love; and if any would array this country's parts against each other in sectional division and strife, let him have no inheritance in the whole—the grand great whole—but let them selfishly have a single small space for their safe keeping, a house made for treason, felony, or mania, a prison or a mad-house."

This is testimony from the right quarter and of the right quality. It might be re-inforced in the same line, to any degree. But it would be superfluous. Whatever was the reason alleged for the recent attempt at revolution, it was not this—that the American government was so perverted from the proper use and end of government, that duty required that it should be changed and set aside. If this reason did not exist, then the endeavor at revolution, we will not say on political, but on Christian grounds, was unjustifiable and criminal. No one to our knowledge has pretended to prove that such a reason existed. There was any amount of exasperation because of other things. Recriminations based on other grounds were hurled to and fro through the air:—but who, in any part of this country, or of the world, ever undertook to show that the Government of the United States was so despotic, so wicked, so cruel, that a regard for the general welfare—which is another expression for benevolence—re-required that it should be overthrown? We plant ourselves firmly on this ground. For the present, we hold in abeyance every other consideration. We confine ourselves strictly for the moment, to this one. It is a ground on which all believers in the Bible, and all sincere friends of order, of law, of good government, and well-regulated liberty throughout the world should stand together. It is the ground on which we justify, on

our part, the war in which we have been engaged, in defence of the national life. Just now, we hold ourselves to this single issue. We endeavored to preserve that government which we knew deserved to be upheld, both for ourselves and for all mankind against the assaults of men who sought to destroy it. Reasonably did we anticipate the sympathy and support of all friends of good government throughout the world in this righteous struggle. We did not expect the sympathy, either of despots or anarchists. It would not have disappointed us if the Emperor of the French had withheld his sympathy from our purpose to maintain, at any cost, our constitutional government. The world at large may have forgotten in the brilliant success of the man, his art, his policy, the tremendous crimes, by which he vaulted to his present position at the head of the Empire. But there are those, on both sides of the sea, who will never forget the scenes which occurred in Paris between the 2d and the 4th days of December, 1851, when he who was the President of the Republic, by a deliberate plot, called a *coup d'état*, drenched the Boulevards with innocent blood, and stained his own name with the infamy of perjury, that he might wear, for a season, the title of Emperor. No reason was there, why we should have expected the sympathy of such a man, who had revolutionized the government of his own country with criminal ambition to exalt himself, in our upright purpose to maintain our own good and lawful government; but reason enough there was why we should expect no qualified sympathy from our ancestral land, whose traditions and history are so intimately related to good government to true liberty and pure religion. Religious assemblies and Parliamentary debates have assigned as a reason, why England stood aloof from our defensive struggle that it was not designed nor prosecuted on our part with the intention of overthrowing slavery. That is true. This war, so far as the loyal states are concerned, was not begun nor prosecuted with that motive; however true it was, that slavery ere long became involved in the sweep of the whirlwind. It is true that the inhabitants of the Northern states did not rush to arms for the purpose of

destroying slavery. They could not have been united on that issue. They were united in the solemn purpose to defend and perpetuate the National Government. On that issue, they had right to expect the good wishes and the blessing of all right-minded men throughout the world. For the moment we keep to this issue and to no other. What would the friends of human society, the friends of good government,—men who believe neither in anarchy nor despotism—friends of order, of law, of liberty, of religion, what would they have had us to do, in the interest of the human race, but resolutely to resist all attempts to overthrow a government so good and genial as our own? The end has not come as yet to this great strife, so far as its issues are sure to affect and involve the future of other nations; but woeful would it have been for all the prospects of the world, had this gratuitous and unjustifiable attempt at revolution been successful. We had reason to expect that all candid minds—freed from jealousy and from fear—purified from all sympathy with the two extremes of tyranny and agrarianism—would have cheered, with one voice of approval and of prayer, this noble intent to uphold, at any expense of treasure and blood, this great ordinance of God for human welfare—a government which by universal consent, was true to its benevolent intent. Where was the spirit of Hampden and Russell and Milton at that critical hour? Why was it not given out as in the sound of many waters in aid of a cause which, sure as any truth, involves the welfare of the world. By what spell was it that in public life, even in that Britain, whose history and literature are so affluent in apostrophes to constitutional law, those who advocated our cause with full-voiced sympathy, were so few, and those who looked at it askant, with suspicion, with ill concealed disapprobation were so many and so strong? These are questions which one day will demand an answer. We are not disposed to impute what is evil and ungenerous. We forbear to speak all which we believe. But we intend to have it known that we are true to our ancestral traditions; that we have not forgotten the lessons of British history; that we have not parted

with all faith in the teachings of Providence and Revelation; that we threw off one government and undertook one revolution because that government was perverted into an instrument of cruelty and oppression, and that we have defended another government and defeated another revolution because the government was just and good and lenient, and that revolution aimed to destroy what God has ordained that we should honor and conserve.

In regard to other reasons alleged for the recent attempt at revolution, it would be useless to attempt their refutation, so long as that which alone is sufficient was wanting. The right of secession is the right of social dissolution, and so is absurd. Allow what has been claimed in behalf of some of the states, that they were independent and sovereign: the question simply changes to this: Have states of original sovereignty after forming a national government a right to dissolve that government at will? Are compacts of no more account than this, that they may be annulled by the passionate whim of either party? If all the marriages, and partnerships, and contracts of human society may be dissolved in an instant, by the mere assertion of the original independency of the parties by whom they were formed, then society has no laws for its preservation, and God has ordained no statutes for the government of man in communities. Here we are content to rest this whole plea.

No one familiar with the history of this country can question, that in one way or another, slavery was the cause of this recent commotion. To write out this history; to define the position assumed by extreme men, on either side; to describe the measures and acts by which feeling became exasperated and inflamed, would be superfluous. We content ourselves with repeating the remark—that the destruction of slavery was not the motive which united the loyal states of the country to commence and prosecute that expensive war which God has crowned with success; but, inasmuch as they who inaugurated armed rebellion against the National Government, risked this institution of slavery on the issue of the war, by

a series of events, which were foreseen by none at the beginning, but which now appear to all as the special interposition of Providence, that system which was the root of all our public calamities, has been, by universal belief and consent, utterly abolished, and the whole land, North, South, East, West, admitting it now, will rejoice in it with universal gladness. God has wrought more that man had devised.

The completeness, the thoroughness of this victory in behalf of good government, is amazing. Nothing like it is to be found in history, when we consider the extent of our territory and the numbers arrayed on either side. Of one thing now, we are assured--the respect, the honor, the gratitude of all liberal minds, and all friends of free government throughout the world. Our cause is their cause. None have occasion to regret the issue of this war, but those who were apprehensive of the growth of liberal ideas, and just principles in reference to civil government. Charles Louis Napoleon Bonaparte regrets it. The aristocracy of England regret it. The common people throughout the whole of the Eastern hemisphere earnest for governments which will protect and bless them, heard of it gladly. The great leaders of religious and civil liberty throughout the world have made it the occasion of eulogy and of thanks. None are more certain to rejoice in it, as a measure looking to the permanent peace and prosperity of the country, after the exasperations of the hour have passed away, than those who were deluded into the vain attempt to revolutionize the government and destroy our nationality in the interest of human slavery.

The result we have reached has been at a vast expense. We can not say, even when we compute the number of graves or the hosts of crippled and mutilated men who demand our respect and honor in the streets, that the price has been too great. All great achievements in the interest of the human race, are accomplished through suffering. Our fathers suffered, but not in vain. We have suffered, but not in vain.

The sentiments appropriate to the times are not pride, insolence, and ambition, but gratitude, faith in God, faith in our

institutions, and a resolute purpose to keep that faith with ourselves, and with the world, in the interest of law, liberty, and all goodness. We are entering upon a new historic epoch. It is with us as with the world emerging from the flood. That flood had enriched the earth with its vast deposits—to be improved by a better culture. We are not the same nation, in many respects, now that we have come out of this war, as when we went into it. We have no fear that such a war will ever be repeated, so long as the sun and moon endure. We rejoice that this has been decided in our own day. We have proved and settled it that liberty does not mean the absence of law; that the best and largest freedom does not imply the destruction of government. If we have had great deliverances, we must now meet great responsibilities. With victories in the field there must be the greater, and sublimer victories of peace. We must conquer the resentments of the defeated, by conquering our own. We must be careful that constitutional law is not weakened nor dishonored by the hands of those who have achieved its vindication. The *will* of those who have triumphed is not to be law; but is itself, in the very flush of triumph, to be subject to law. Grave questions are on our hands, demanding wisdom, humanity, moderation, religious patriotism. If many of us are prone to think that mistakes have been made in our country, by the allowance of *universal suffrage*, the most they can be expected to concede is that its exercise should henceforth be impartial. We like the expression *impartial* suffrage better than *universal* suffrage. Whatever qualifications may be thought proper for the high and solemn duties of a voter, let those qualifications be allowed to work, impartially, without regard to color. Those qualifications existing, let none be denied the right of voting, because of the complexion of the skin; and on the other hand we may well hesitate to confer that right on any, because they are black, when wanting the qualifications which are expected of others. The interests of the whole country, of our posterity, of free government throughout the world, are involved in the issues which are now before us. Let them be met calmly, dispassionately, intelligently, *impar-*

tially. Let us put away all wrath, all bitterness, all party willfulness, and devise the things which look to the good of the whole country.

Some questions which are destined to convulse the nations of Europe we have already settled. The relations of church and state, the relations of governments to people—we do not say that we are free from all apprehensions of future conflict, in regard to them—but should any conflict ever arise in regard to religious rights on our shores, it would proceed from our liberty, and not from attempts to smother it; while, in the Old World, the initial question is yet to be decided, of religious liberties, without regard to majorities, and that continent will rock yet in the conflict of great and antagonistic forces. The time is certain to come when our sympathies will be looked for and valued. They will never be witheld from what is good through any spirit of retaliation.

The sympathies of the American people will always be with free institutions, with liberal governments, with the rights of the people in church and state, and never will they be given to any class of men, who, under whatever name, agree in thinking that the many are to be held subservient to the few: and that the object of government is to aggrandize the oligarchy by whom it is administered. Government is for the good of all the people; and a religious people will always conserve it as God's ordinance for the happiness, and not the harm of society. Thoroughly imbued with this conviction, mindful of our history; knowing well the sublime events out of which it sprung, and those yet sublimer events which it foreshadows; grateful to the Almighty for our earlier and our latter deliverances, we pledge ourselves to the great work of educating and Christianizing this ever increasing population; before the world we pledge our sympathy and aid to the great cause of liberty, of good laws, of humanity, of good morals, of true religion, of universal brotherhood and peace.

Whoever may doubt, whoever may falter, whoever may oppose, we, as individuals, and as a nation, are identified with that kingdom of God among men, which is righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost.

Art. V.—THE PATRISTIC DOCTRINE OF THE SACRAMENTS.*

By Philip Schaff, D. D., New York.

Modern German scholarship has furnished us with several complete and valuable histories of the doctrine of the Lord's Supper. The works of the Reformed Ebrard, the Lutheran Kahnis, the Roman Catholic Döllinger, and the Rationalist Rückert represent as many confessional and doctrinal standpoints from which the eucharistic controversies may be viewed. But there was no good book on the historical development of the general doctrine of the sacraments, and the necessary information on this subject had to be gathered from works on Doctrinal History, and Symbolics. This demand has now been supplied by Professor Hahn, Jr. of Breslau, in a scholarly and careful treatise, entitled "The Doctrine of the Sacraments in its Historical Development within the Occidental Church to the Council of Trent." In the present article we confine ourselves to the doctrine of the Fathers on this subject.

The use of the word *sacramentum* in the church continued for a long time very indefinite. It embraced every mystical and sacred thing (*omne mysticum sacrumque signum*): Tertullian, Ambrose, Hilary, Leo, Chrysostom, and other Fathers, apply it even to mysterious doctrines and facts, like the Trinity, the divinity of Christ, the incarnation, the crucifixion, and the resurrection. But after the fifth century it denotes chiefly sacred forms of worship, which were instituted by Christ and by which divine blessings are mystically represented, sealed and applied to men. This catholic theological conception has substantially passed into the evangelical churches, though with important changes as to the number and operation of the sacraments.

* Die Lehre von den Sacramenten in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung innerhalb der abendländischen Kirche bis zum Concil von Trient. Von G. L. Hahn. Breslau, 1864. 447 pages.

The word *sacramentum* bears among the Fathers the following senses: (1) The *oath* in general, as in the Roman profane writers; and particularly the *soldier's oath*. (2) The *baptisnal vow*, by which the candidate bound himself to the perpetual service of Christ, as *miles Christi*, against sin, the world, and the devil. (3) The *baptismal confession*, which was regarded as a spiritual oath. (4) *Baptism* itself, which therefore was often styled *sacramentum fidei, s. salutis*, also *pignus salutis*. (5) It became almost synonymous with *mystery*, by reason of an inaccurate translation of the Greek *μυστήριον* in the Vulgate (comp. Eph. 5. 32), and was accordingly applied to the facts, truths, and precepts of the gospel which were concealed from those not Christians, and to the Christian revelation in general. (6) The *eucharist*, and other holy ordinances and usages of the church. (7) After the 12th century the *seven* well-known *sacraments* of the Catholic church.

Augustine was the first to substitute a clear doctrine of the *nature* of the sacraments for a vague notion and rhetorical exaggerations. He defines a sacrament to be a visible sign of an invisible grace or divine blessing.* Two constituents therefore belong to such a holy act, the outward symbol or sensible element, (the *signum*, also *sacramentum* in the stricter sense), which is visible to the eye, and the inward grace or divine virtue (the *res* or *virtus sacramenti*), which is an object of faith.† The

---

* Signum visible, or forma visibilis gratiæ invisibilis. Augustine calls the sacraments also verba visibilia, signacula corporalia, signa rerum spiritualium, signacula rerum divinarum visibilia, etc. See Hahn, l. c. p. 11 sqq. This definition is not adequate. At least a third mark must be added, not distinctly mentioned by Augustine, viz. the divina institutio, or, more precisely, a mandatum Christi. This is the point of difference between the Catholic and Protestant conceptions of the sacrament. The Roman and Greek churches take the divine institution in a much broader sense, while Protestantism understands by it an express command of Christ in the New Testament, and consequently limits the number of sacraments to Baptism and the Lord's Supper, since for the other five sacraments the Catholic church can show no such command. Yet confirmation, ordination, and marriage have practically acquired a sacramental import in Protestantism, especially in the Lutheran and Anglican churches.

† Augustine, De Catechiz Rudibus, §. 50: "Sacramenta signacula quidem rerum divinarum esse visibilia sed res ipsas invisibiles in eis honorari." Serm. ad pop. 292 (tom. V. p. 770): "Dicuntur sacramenta, quia in eis alind videtur, alind intelligitur: quod videtur, speciem habet corporalem, quod intelligitur, fructum habet spiritalem."

two, the sign, and the thing signified, are united by the word of consecration.* From the general spirit of Augustine's doctrine, and several of his expressions, we must infer that he considered divine institution by Christ to be also a mark of such holy ordinance.† But subsequently this important point retired from the consciousness of the church, and admitted the widening of the idea and the increase of the number of the sacraments.

Augustine was also the first to frame a distinct doctrine of the *operation* of the sacraments. In his view the sacraments work grace or condemnation, blessing or curse, according to the condition of the receiver. They operate, therefore, not immediately and magically, but mediately and ethically, not *ex opere operato*, in the later scholastic language, but through the medium of the active faith of the receiver.‡ They certainly have, as divine institutions, an objective meaning in themselves, like the life-principle of a seed, and do not depend on the subjective condition of the one who administers them (as the Donatists taught); but they reach with blessing only those who seize the blessing, or take it from the ordinance, in faith; they bring curse to those who unworthily administer or receive them. Faith is necessary not as the efficient cause, but as the subjective condition, of the saving operation of the offered grace.§ Augustine also makes a distinction between a transient and a permanent effect of the sacrament, and thereby prepares the way for the later scholastic doctrine of the *character indelebilis*. Baptism and ordination impress an indelible character, and therefore can not be repeated. He is fond of

---

* Augustine, In Joann. Evang. tract. 80: "Detrahe verbum, et quid est aqua [the baptismal water] nisi aqua? *Accedit verbum ad elementum et fit sacramentum*, etiam ipsum tamquam visibile verbum."

† Comp. Epist. 82, §. 14 and 15; Ep. 138, §. 7; De Vera Relig. c. 16, §. 33; Hahn, p. 154.

‡ Comp. the proof passages in Hahn, p. 279 sqq. Thus Augustine says, e. g., De Bapt. contra. Donat. l. III, c. 10 (tom. IX, p. 76): "Sacramento suo divina virtus adsistit sive ad salutem bene utentium, sive ad perniciem male utentium." De Unit Eccl c. 21 (IX, p. 256): "Facile potestis intelligere et in bonis esse et in malis sacramenta divina, sed in illis ad salutem, in malis ad damnationem."

§ Hence the later formula: Fides non facit ut *sit* sacramentum, sed ut *prosit*. Faith does not produce, but subjectively receives and appropriates it.

comparing baptism with the badge of the imperial service,* which the soldier always retains either to his honor or to his shame. Hence the Catholic doctrine is: Once baptized, always baptized; once a priest, always a priest. Nevertheless a baptized person, or an ordained person, can be excommunicated and eternally lost. The popular opinion in the church already inclined strongly towards the superstitious view of the magical operation of the sacrament, which afterwards found scholastic expression in the *opus operatum* theory.

The church fathers with one accord assert a relative (not absolute) *necessity* of the sacraments to salvation.† They saw in them, especially in baptism and the eucharist, the divinely appointed means of appropriating the forgiveness of sins and the grace of God. Yet with this view they firmly held that, not the want of the sacraments, but only the contempt of them, was damning.‡ In favor of this they appealed to Moses, Jeremiah, John the Baptist, the thief on the cross,—who all however belonged to the Old Testament economy; and to many Christian martyrs, who sealed their faith in Christ with their blood, before they had opportunity to be baptized and to commune. The Virgin Mary also, and the apostles, belong in some sense to this class, who, since Christ himself did not

* Stigma militare, character militaris. To this the expression *character indelebilis* certainly attaches itself easily, though the doctrine concerning it can not be traced with certainty before the 13th century. Comp. Hahn, l. c. p. 298 sqq., where it is referred to the time of Pope Innocent III.

† Even Augustine, De peccat. merit. et remiss. lib. I, c. 24, §. 34: "Praeter baptismum et participationem mensae dominicae non solum ad regnum Dei, sed nec ad salutem et vitam aeternam posse quemquam hominem pervenire." This would, strictly considered, exclude all Quakers and unbaptized infants from salvation; but Augustine admits, as an exception, the possibility of a conversion of the heart without baptism. See below. The scholastics distinguished more accurately a threefold necessity: (1) absolute: *simpliciter necessarium;* (2) teleological: *in ordine ad finem;* (3) hypothetical or relative: *necessarium ex suppositione, quae est necessitas consequentiae.* To the sacraments belongs only the last sort of necessity, because now, under existing circumstances, God will not ordinarily save any one without these means which he has appointed. Comp. Hahn, l. c. p. 26 sqq. According to Thomas Aquinas, only three sacraments are perfectly necessary, viz. baptism and penance for the individual, and ordination for the whole church.

‡ "Non defectus, sed contemptus sacramenti damnat." Comp. Augustine, De bapt. contra Donat. l. IV, c. 25, §. 32: "Conversio cordis potest quidem inesse non percepto baptismo, sed contemto non potest. Neque enim ullo modo dicenda est conversio cordis ad Deum, cum Dei sacramentum contemnitur."

baptize, received not the Christian baptism of water, but were instead, on the day of Pentecost, baptized with Spirit and with fire. Thus Cornelius also received through Peter the gift of the Holy Ghost before baptism; but nevertheless submitted himself afterwards to the outward sacrament. In agreement with this view, sincere repentance and true faith, and above all the blood-baptism of martyrdom,* were regarded as a kind of compensation for the sacraments.

The *number* of the sacraments remained yet for a long time indefinite; though among the church fathers of our period, baptism and the Lord's Supper were regarded either as the only sacraments, or as the pre-eminent ones.

Augustine considered it in general a superiority of the New Testament over the Old, that the number of the sacraments was diminished, but their import enhanced,† and calls Baptism and the Supper, with reference to the water and the blood which flowed from the side of the Lord, the genuine or chief sacraments, on which the church subsists.‡ But he includes under the wider conception of the sacrament other mysterious and holy usages, which were commended in the Scriptures,§ naming expressly, confirmation,¶ marriage,‖ and ordination.** Thus he already recognizes five Christian sacraments, to which the Roman church has since added penance and extreme unction.

---

* Baptismus sanguinis.

† Contra Faust. XIX, 13: "Prima sacramenta praenunciativa erant Christi venturi: quae cum suo adventu Christus implevisset, ablata sunt, et alia sunt instituta, *virtute majora, numero perciora.*

‡ De symb. ad Catech. c. 6: "Quomodo Eva facta est ex latere Adam, ita ecclesia formatur ex latere Christi. Percussum est ejus latus et statim manavit *sanguis* et *aqua*, quae sunt ecclesiae *genuina sacramenta.*" De ordine baptismi, c. 5 (Bibl. Max. tom. XIV, p. 11): "Profluxerunt ex ejus latere *sanguis et aqua, duo sanctae ecclesia praecipua sacramenta.*" Serm. 218: "Sacramenta, quibus formatur ecclesia." Comp. Chrysostom, Homil. 85, in Joh. *ἀμφοτέρων ἡ ἐκκλησία συνέστηκε.* Tertullian called baptism and the eucharist "sacramenta propria;" Adv. Marc. I, 14.

§ "Et si quid aliud in divinis literis commendatur;" or: "omne mysticum sacrumque signum."

¶ "Sacramentum chrismatis," Contr. lit. Petiliani, II, 104. So even Cyprian, Ep. 72.

‖ "Sacramentum nuptiasum:" De nuptiis et concupisc. I, 2.

** "Sacramentum dandi baptisnum:" De bapt. ad Donat. I, 2; Epist. Parm. II. 13.

Cyril of Jerusalem, in his Mystagogic Catechism, and Ambrose of Milan, in the six books *De Sacramentis* ascribed to him, mention only three sacraments: baptism, confirmation, and the Lord's Supper; and Gregory of Nyssa likewise mentions three, but puts ordination in the place of confirmation. For in the Eastern church, confirmation, or the laying on of hands, was less prominent and formed a part of the sacrament of baptism; while in the Western church it gradually established itself in the rank of an independent sacrament.

The unknown Greek author of the pseudo-Dionysian writings of the sixth century enumerates six sacraments (*μυστήρια*):* (1.) baptism or illumination; (2.) the eucharist, or the consecration of consecrations; (3.) the consecration with anointing oil, or confirmation; (4.) the consecration of priests; (5.) the consecration of monks; (6.) the consecration of the dead, or extreme unction. Here marriage and penance are wanting; in place of them appears the consecration of monks, which, however, was afterwards excluded from the number of the sacraments.

In the North African, the Milanese, and the Gallican churches, the washing of feet also long maintained the place of a distinct sacrament.† Ambrose asserted its sacramental character against the church of Rome, and even declared it to be as necessary as baptism, because it was instituted by Christ, and delivered men from original sin, as baptism from the guilt of actual transgression; a view which rightly found but little acceptance.

This uncertainty as to the number of the sacraments continued till the twelfth century. Beda Venerabilis (d. 735), Ratramnus of Corbie (d. 868), Ratherius of Verona (d. 974), in enumerating the sacraments, name only baptism and the Lord's Supper, and even Alexander of Hales (d. 1245) expressly says (Summa P. iv., Qu. 8, membr. 2, art. 1); "Christus duo sacramenta instituit per se ipsum, sacramentum baptismi et sacra-

* De Hierarch. eccles. c. 2 sq.

† According to the testimony of Ambrose, Augustine, and the Missale Gallicum vetus. Comp. Hahn, l. c. p. 84 sq.

mentum eucharistiæ." Damiani (d. 1072), on the other hand, mentions twelve sacraments, viz: baptism, confirmation, anointing of the sick, consecration of bishops, consecration of kings, consecration of churches, penance, consecration of canons, monks, hermits, and nuns, and marriage. Opp. tom. II., 372 (ed. C. Cajet.). Bernard of Clairvaux (d. 1151) names ten sacraments. Confirmation was usually reckoned among the sacraments. Comp. Hahn, l. c. 88 sqq. Yet the usage of the church from the fifth century downward, in the East and in the West, appears to have inclined silently to the number seven, which was commended by its mystical sacredness. This is shown at least by the agreement of the Greek and Roman churches in this point, and even of the Nestorians and Monophysites, who split off in the fifth century from the orthodox Greek church. No plain trace, however, of such a definite number appears in the earliest monuments of the faith of these Oriental sects, or even in the orthodox theologian John of Damascus.

In the West, the number seven was first introduced, as is usually supposed, by the bishop Otto of Bamberg (1124); more correctly by Peter Lombard (d. 1164), the Master of Sentences; rationally and rhetorically justified by Thomas Aquinas and other scholastics (as recently by Möhler) from the seven chief religious wants of human life and human society;* and finally publicly sanctioned by the council of Florence in 1439, with the concurrence of the Greek church, and established by the council of Trent with an anathema against all who think otherwise. The Council of Trent pronounces the anathema upon all who deny the number of seven sacraments and its institution by Christ (Sess. VII. de sacr. can. 1); "Si quis dixerit, sacramenta novæ legis non fuisse omnia a

* Usually; Birth—baptism; growth—confirmation; nourishment—the Supper; healing of sickness—penance; perfect restoration—extreme unction; propagation of society—marriage; government of society—orders. Others compare the sacraments with the four cardinal natural virtues: prudence, courage, justice, and temperance, and the three theological virtues: faith, love, and hope; but vary in their assignments of the several sacraments to the several virtues respectively. All these comparisons are of course more or less arbitrary and fanciful.

Christo instituta, aut esse plura vel pauciora quam septem, anathema sit." In default of a historical proof of the seven sacraments from the writings of the church fathers, Roman divines, like Bremner and Perrone, find themselves compelled to resort to the *disciplina arcani;* but this related only to the *celebration* of the sacraments, and disappeared in the fourth century upon the universal adoption of Christianity. The Reformation of the sixteenth century, returned, in this point as in others, to the New Tesaament; retained none but Baptism and the Lord's Supper as proper sacraments, instituted and enjoined by Christ himself; entirely rejected extreme unction (and at first confirmation); consigned penance to the province of the inward life, and confirmation, marriage, and orders to the more general province of sacred acts and usages, to which a more or less sacramental character may be ascribed, but by no means an equality in other respects with baptism and the holy supper.

Art. VI.—THE WESTMINSTER CONFESSION IN ENGLAND AND IRELAND.

By E. H. Gillett, D. D., New York.

In 1729 the Synod of Philadelphia passed the well known Adopting Act. It disclaimed all "authority of imposing our faith upon other men's consciences." It professed "abhorrence of such imposition;" yet that the faith once delivered to the saints might be kept pure and uncorrupt, the Synod declared their "agreement in, and approbation of, the Confession of Faith, etc.," directing also that every candidate for the ministry should declare "his agreement in opinion with all the essential and necessary articles of said Confession, either by subscribing, etc., or by a verbal declaration of his assent thereto, as such minister or candidate should think best." Provision was made in favor of scruples or mistakes which did not

concern articles "essential and necessary in doctrine, worship or government."

The act bore upon its face the features of compromise. It was so unlike the practice of the church of Scotland* that Wodrow declared, "I know not well what to make of it." He very justly suspected half the truth. "I doubt it's some of those that have come from Ireland, that have carried their heats, which had well nigh consumed them at home, to the Synod of Pennsylvania." Andrews' letter to Colman shows how reluctantly a portion of the Synod was brought to consent to the measure. The well-known views of Jonathan Dickinson would have classed him with the Non-Subscribers in London or Ireland, and yet the Act was passed with the most surprising unanimity.

The action of the Synod had a Transatlantic origin. A large proportion of the membership of the body was from Ireland, and in Ireland the subscription of the ministers to the confession had been urged forward largely by the apprehensions of the laity. Non-subscribers there had excited a well-grounded alarm by the errors which some of them were reputed to favor. Security against these errors, and the popular feeling of the churches, demanding some measure analogous to that adopted in Ireland, required of the Synod action of some kind. But this action must necessarily be so shaped as not to offend the principles of the large number of England and New En-

* In Scotland in 1709 there was a reference to the Assembly from the Synod of Dumfries, anent all ministers and elders, their subscribing the Directory and Covenants. Wodrow's Cor. I. 6. In the same year some few (commissions) were passed as informal for want of subscribing the Confession of Faith, and such were ordered to do it. Ib. 18. Warner in a letter to Wodrow (123) speaks of "the Westminster Confession which we own and press." In 1710 there was "an act passed for uniformity of doctrine" (151). In 1713 the Committee on Overtures passed an overture that "Presbyteries be censured that send ruling elders who do not subscribe the confession of faith" (452). In 1722, (II. 655) "there was a motion came from one of our Synods to the Assembly, that all ministers who are suspected of declining from our standards should be called upon to renew their adherence to our confession of faith." Other matters crushed it out and "there was no time to ripen it." Wodrow speaks of it as "a distinct question from subscribing, which none among us were opposed to that I know of, and they would soon be taken up if they did." In 1725, he says, "the act appointing the confession to be signed by all intrants, ministers, elders and deacons, is like to carry in the Assembly." At a later date, it had been approved by all but two Presbyteries. (III. 212.

gland members, who, like Jonathan Dickinson, resented the imposition of human forms of faith upon the consciences of men. Otherwise a lamentable division, like that which had occurred in London, as well as to some extent in Ireland, would inevitably ensue.

The English Dissenters, both Presbyterians and Independents, had strong and invincible prejudices against the authoritative imposition of human forms of belief on the consciences of men. They had a traditional aversion to ecclesiastical tyranny in any shape. Among their venerated ancestors and predecessors in the ministry, not a few had been made transgressors for a word. Episcopal canons had elevated things indifferent to the rank of essentials. The Act of Uniformity had made the very term of subscription well-nigh hateful. Conformity had been the price of benefices and ecclesiastical honors, and sacramental tests had become the passports to civil office or emolument. Persecution had taught them also to hold in light esteem their differences among themselves, and the celebrated John Howe, who was spared, till 1705, to transmit to a new generation the traditions of his own, said, with his own great authority, as well as with the concurrence of his ablest contemporaries, "then shall we be in happy circumstances, when once we shall have learned to distinguish between the essentials of Christianity, and accidental appendages; and between accidents of Christ's appointing and of our devising. Much more, when every truth or duty contained in the Bible can not be counted essential or necessary; when we shall have learned not only not to add inventions of our own to that sacred frame, but much more not to presume to insert them into the order of essentials or necessaries, and treat men as no Christians for wanting them."

There can be no doubt that in some minds the reaction in this direction had been excessive. Baxter's "refined Arminianism," as Dr. McCrie calls it, and John Howe's liberality help us to trace the progress of dissenting doctrinal opinion till it was ripe for the engrafting upon it of non-subscribing notions; and the Whistons, Clarkes, and Hoadlys found within

the ranks of dissent an echo to their own errors. We shall have occasion as we proceed to note the extensive sympathy and correspondence which prevailed between the English dissenters and the Presbyterians in Dublin and the North of Ireland.* Indeed the pious fund of the latter owed not a little to Drs. Reynolds and Evans of London, who also interested themselves in behalf of the feeble churches in this country, just then struggling into existence ; and there was scarcely a question which commanded attention at London which was not discussed at Belfast, or a difficulty in which the Irish church was involved for which counsellors were not invoked across the channel.

The doctrine of the Trinity became a subject of controversy about the year 1695. Several divines of the church of England participated in the discussion, especially Sherlock and South. Public attention was still directed toward the subject, when Thomas Emlyn, pastor of a church in Dublin, was found (1702) to have adopted Arian views, while an intimate friend of his in England had already gone over to Socinianism. Emlyn relinquished his pastoral charge, but published a work in vindication of his views. For this he was indicted for blasphemy, and was imprisoned for two years in a London jail.

It was shortly after this that William Whiston, then mathematical professor at Cambridge, embraced Arian views,† for which, in 1710, he was expelled from the university. Some years before he had been on intimate terms with Rev. James Pierce, who, says Whiston, "was really the most learned of all

---

* As early as 1710, Wodrow says (Cor. I. 19) "if my information fail me not, there is a general laxness of principles among too many of the new intrants to the ministry, even in the North of Ireland, and a mighty inclination to a conformity in everything to the English Dissenters and ministers of Dublin." In 1712 p. 255) he says, "many are very much inclinable to new schemes, and the methods of the English Dissenters, and very much off the bottom of their mother church of Scotland." In the next year : "I am sorry for what you assert, but fear it is too true, that there are Presbyterians in Ireland who will not allow themselves to be of the same principles with the church of Scotland in government. I wish they would coin some other name for themselves, whereby we might be distinguished from them."

† Life of Whiston I. 178.

the dissenting preachers that I had known, but was at this time (1708) a preacher at Newbury in Berkshire." Pierce wrote to Whiston with some alarm at what he regarded at first as groundless reports, and remonstrated with him on the folly of his Unitarian notions. Three years later the two men met accidentally in a London theatre. Whiston asked Pierce if he had read the volumes which he (Whiston) had recently published. Upon replying that he had not, Whiston laid the matter before him so earnestly that he procured the volumes, read them, and became a Unitarian.* In 1713, he accepted a call as colleague pastor, with Rev. Joseph Hallet, of a large congregation in the city of Exeter.† With Mr. Hallet, Whiston had been some years previously in correspondence, and in his school, several of the pupils had embraced, as early as 1710, the Arian system. "We were about five or six of us," says one of their number, "who understood one another in this affair, but we conversed with great caution and secresy." Mr. Pierce in his own vindication says, "Dr. Clarke, Mr. Whiston and other writers who differ from the common notion had been read here before my coming."

But the matter could not long be kept secret. In 1715, it began to be talked of in public and in private. The Deity of Christ was often disputed, particularly in the house of a layman who boarded some of Mr. Hallet's pupils. Rumors that three of the four dissenting ministers of Exeter had rejected, and now secretly opposed the doctrine, were rife. Mr. Pierce's orthodoxy was suspected, 1717, and he was requested by some of his most influential friends to preach on the subject of the Satisfaction of Christ. He complied with the request; but the peace that ensued was only temporary. The advocates of the new opinions began to boast their strength, asserting the sympathy of the ministers, and even defying the Assembly, representing the churches of the West of England, to take cognizance of the matter.

Again Mr. Pierce—in common with the other ministers—

* Life of Whiston, 144. † Murch's Presbyterians in the West of England. 386.

was requested to preach a sermon which would embody his views on the disputed points (Jan. 1718). Somewhat reluctantly as well as tardily, he complied. Some few only were satisfied, but several months passed by, and the Assembly (May, 1718) dispersed without adverting to the subject. But within a few weeks attention was called to it anew, and it was evident that the next Assembly, called to meet in September, would be compelled to consider it. At a preliminary meeting it was proposed, that on account of the rumors of the spread of Arianism, the ministers should take measures to purge themselves from suspicion. The Exeter ministers did not encourage the plan. By some it was earnestly opposed.

On the following day, the ministers declared their views. Mr. Pierce denied that he held the views of Sabellius, Arius, Socinus, or Sherlock. He believed the Son and Holy Spirit to be divine persons, but subordinate to the Father. Some gave their views in Scripture language, and some in the words of the Assembly's Catechism. Only three members refused to make any declaration at all, disowning any authority which claimed the right to demand their opinion. It was then recorded by the clerk as the general sense of the Assembly, "that there is but one living and true God; and that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are that one God."

But those who favored the new opinions were not thus to be silenced. The Exeter press teemed with pamphlets on the controversy, and publications were sent down from London to fan the flame. Some of these were denounced as blasphemous, and gave occasion for fierce invectives. By the members of the Establishment, the dissenters, on whom indiscriminately the odium of heresy was cast, were held up as objects of contempt and horror. They could not appear in the public markets without being told, "you have denied your church first, and now you are denying your Saviour."* To many of the citizens of Exeter this state of things was intolerable. They sent to some of the leading London ministers for ad-

* Bennet's Dissenters, II. 171.

vice, and the counsel they received was to select some of the neighboring ministers who could judge of the matters in question more intelligently than those who were so distant.

This advice was followed. Seven neighboring ministers were consulted, and their conclusions, formed after careful deliberation, were adopted by the Committee of Thirteen who acted virtually as the body of elders and trustees of all the Exeter churches. The ministers were applied to by them with the request that they would give them satisfaction in regard to their views on the Divinity of Christ. Messrs. Pierce and Hallet refused; and the committee at once closed their church doors against them.

Meanwhile the London ministers had become involved in the controversy through the request presented from Exeter for their advice. Some of them drew up a paper such as they conceived appropriate in the circumstances, and laid it before the general committee representing the Presbyterian, Independent and Baptist denominations of London and vicinity. To secure more full deliberation, and give more weight to the advice, all the ministers were called together. They met Feb. 19th, 1719. Over one hundred were present. No conclusion was arrived at, and the meeting was adjourned to the 24th. On that day Thomas Bradbury proposed that to give more weight to their advice, they should accompany it with a declaration of their own belief in the Trinity. On this point the Independents were almost unanimous, yet it was rejected by a vote of of 57 to 53.*

This vote gave alarm to the laity, and such was the state of feeling that when the Assembly met again (March 3d), the dissatisfaction at the interpretation given to the votes found free expression. It was replied, that all grounds of suspicion might be at once removed by an immediate declaration of the sentiments of members, and a subscription to the doctrine in question. To this, strong objection was made, although some opposed it only as inopportune and setting aside the order of

* Wilson's Dissenting Churches, III. 518. Bennet, II. 176.

the day. The matter was insisted upon; and when the moderator refused to put it to vote, sixty ministers who favored a declaration withdrew to the gallery of the house, while fifty remained below to consider the "advice." The former subscribed the first article of the church of England, and the answers to the fifth and sixth questions of the Assembly's Catechism, while each party adopted "advices" of its own, and forwarded them to Exeter.

Several ministers, as Calamy, Watts, Neal, Price, Marryat Hall, Bays, and others, refused to be identified with either party, and withdrew from a scene of so much tumult and noise. Some idea of the bitterness which prevailed may be gathered from a single incident. Bradbury was the leading man among the subscribers. As he closed his speech to withdraw to the gallery, he was hissed. He retorted that it was the voice of the serpent, and it might be expected against a zeal for him who is the seed of the woman.

The "advices" from both parties did not reach Exeter until after the committee had adopted decisive measures. The Exeter Assembly, which convened in May, felt that something more should be done to vindicate their orthodoxy. No measure seemed to them more proper than to affix their names to the first article of the English church. Fifty-six ministers of Devon and Cornwall accordingly subscribed, while nineteen, professing to act on the principles of the London Non-Subscribers, refused to do so. The names of Pierce and Hallet stood at the head of the list.

The London Non-Subscribers disclaimed heterodox views with respect to the Divinity of Christ, but no declarations which they could make could prevent the prevalence far and near of suspicions of their soundness in the faith. Old friendships were rent in sunder. Lasting alienations were produced. Congregations were divided. Men seemed to breathe the atmosphere of distrust. The writings of Emlyn, Whiston, Clarke, Pierce and others were widely read. In Scotland there was reason for alarm when Professor Simpson was not only suspected of favoring the new opinions, but was publicly

charged with heterodox views. In Ireland friends of Simpson, some of them his pupils, were to be found. But suspicion was especially directed against what was known as the "Belfast Society," from the fact that several of the ministers in that place and vicinity held frequent meetings for conference, and were reported to have adopted some of the views of the non-subscribers. Yet the Society had been in existence for several years, and numbered among its members some of the ablest ministers of the Irish church. As late as 1716, when it was proposed to apply to the government for a legal toleration, the members of the society expressed themselves ready, in conjunction with their brethren, to sign the Westminster Confession as the symbol of their faith.

Nor was this all. Previous to the restoration of Charles II. in 1660, every candidate for licensure or ordination was expected to subscribe to the National League and Covenant. After that, the Westminster Confession was usually subscribed. This was made necessary by an act of the Irish Synod in 1698, and the same act substantially was renewed in 1705. According to all we are able to gather from contemporary testimony, this subscription did not exclude such explanations or exceptions as the Presbytery judged consistent with general soundness in the faith, but it did most effectually bar the subscriber, by his own act, from objecting to the principle of subscription itself.* It was, therefore, with no little surprise and pain that the Synod of 1719 heard from the lips of Rev. John Abernethy, one of its most honored and able members, the avowals which he made, and the views which he presented, in a discourse which derived peculiar significance from the juncture at which it was delivered.

The Sermon of Mr. Abernethy, preached at Belfast, Decem-

* The proposal of a brief formula in 1716, as the basis on which a toleration might be sought, gave great dissatisfaction in Ireland. It was regarded in Scotland as "quitting our Confession of Faith, and coming into a loose uncertain formula anybody almost may subscribe, as the terms of their legal toleration they are seeking." Some of the people protested against it, and a Quarterly Synod at Belfast, "to quiet the people, resolved that they would declare that they would not go on with the toleration unless the Confession of Faith be recovered to us."

ber 9th, 1719, was based on Rom. xiv. 5, and entitled "Religious Obedience founded on Personal Persuasion." Many of his positions would at this day be accounted truisms, and much which he says of the rights of conscience as against mere authority or intolerance would pass unquestioned. He speaks for instance against making "arbitrary inclosures within the Church of Christ," and remarks that "such as we can not know to be unworthy of God's acceptance, we should not judge unworthy of our fellowship, but receive them as brethren into Christian communion, and not exclude them by the rigid test of an exact agreement in doubtful and disputable points." There are also, he contends, things which to some are matters of conscience, which yet "are not essential to Christianity;" nor are we to suppose that God "requires of us, as the condition of pleasing him, an infallible certainty in understanding his word, and the strict conformity of our sentiments to the truth." If in inferior matters we can not be accepted without persuasion, much more is this the case with respect to the fundamental doctrines and precepts of Christianity. The latter should be enforced only by persuasion, and the former should not be rigidly imposed. Human jurisdiction does not extend to matters of conscience, and no man is to be determined by the decisions of men. Each must judge for himself what is matter of conscience, he is not amenable for this judgment to any power on earth, nor is he safe in "a blind submission to others, whatever authority they may have, or in whatever stations they are placed." Moreover, there is no ecclesiastical authority which has any dominion over the faith of Christians, or consequently any over their consciences. Hence are to be seen "the just limits of church-power." "Its decisions bind the conscience as far as men are *convinced*, and no farther," and any higher claim of authority is inconsistent with edification. "If a decision of men binds any person, 'tis in matters wherein *he thinks* they have power; when they carry their pretensions farther, determine things wherein his judgment does not allow their authority, their decrees must be regarded by him as void." From Christ's will revealed in the

Gospel, men are to "learn what to believe and what to practice, and without submitting implicitly to human declarations and decisions in any point of faith or duty, may, by following impartially their own light, obtain his approbation." The author closes with the exhortation, "let us stand fast in the liberty wherewith he has made us free; let us call no man or society of men our masters, for one is our master, even Christ, and all we are brethren."*

It is easy to see that these positions, taken in connection with the express declaration that all doctrines were non-essential, on which "human reason and Christian sincerity permitted men to differ," were intended to apply not only to Christian communion, but to ministerial fellowship, and that they really tended to the dissolution of all ecclesiastical order or doctrinal unity. The Belfast Society, shortly after, at a conference with some of their brethren, who were anxious to prevent such divisions as had occurred in England, freely announced their opposition to subscribing confessions of faith as tests of orthodoxy. Some of the Presbyteries also, it was found, had sanctioned what was accounted "a lax mode of subscription." It is not strange that alarm was excited by such facts as these. Attention was called to them by one of the ministers, and the reply of the Belfast Society, entitled "The Good Old Way, or a Vindication of Some Important Scripture Truths, and all who preach them, from the Imputation of Novelty"—only aggravated the suspicions already excited.

It was at this very juncture that a translation of the "Nubes Testium," by the younger Turretine, was published in London.† It was a very forcible plea for Christian unity and for-

* Abernethy's Tracts. London, 1751. p. 217-353.

† A Discourse concerning Fundamental Articles, etc. London. 1720. A correspondent of Wodrow in 1715 speaks of "Mr. Turretine at Geneva, who is much reflected against by the people:" and the gradual corruption of the Geneva church is imputed "to a triumvirate of their ministers who have a correspondence with the church of England." In 1717 Wodrow inquires "how far Arminianism is crept in among them," and refers to suspicions that Turretine and others were venting new schemes of doctrine, and quitting many of Calvin's tenets. "I am told that young Turretine hath taken a great deal of the English education thither."

bearance, in which we seem to see reflected the views of Calamy, Watts, and others who sided neither with the subscribers or non-subscribers. On some points it favored one party, and on other points the other. It maintained that some articles were fundamental, and others not, although no attempt, except in a very general way, was made to distinguish one from another. In opposition to Dr. Evans, and almost in the very words of his opponent, Dr. Cumming, it declared that "besides those points which are expressly, and in so many words, declared to be necessary, those things likewise which flow from those principles, by *plain and necessary consequence*, must be added to the Catalogue of Fundamentals, or things necessary." Yet these fundamentals are "plain," "few in number," "often repeated and inculcated in Scripture," and "to impose upon Christians," anything beside these is to "act tyranically, and in an impious manner arrogantly to claim that authority which belongs to God only." It is thus shown to be a duty to "endeavor to secure the essence of religion, and then patiently to bear with one another in all the rest," while "persons who differ in things not fundamental should regard each other as brethren, and maintain Christian communion together, etc."

The Apostle Paul also "shows that Christians who had right sentiments, ought not only to be patiently borne with, but that others ought to accommodate themselves to their weakness," and though "he so sharply inveighs against false teachers, he is very large in recommending charity and forbearance, even in so great a diversity of opinions as this was." Again, we are told that "communion ought to be maintained with all those whom we do not know to be unworthy the name of Christians; and certainly they can not be accounted unworthy of it, who hold all the fundamentals, and differ from us only in things which are not fundamental"—"things not considerable enough to disturb their peace, and to separate them from one another." The argument for mutual forbearance is then powerfully enforced by various considerations, and every reader of that day could perceive the bearing of the argu-

ment, on the one side against the position of the non-subscribers who (as Dr. Evans) denied the binding obligation of "plain and necessary consequences" from texts of Scripture, unless expressed in Scripture words, and the subscribers on the other hand, whose zeal seemed like to swallow up their charity. Turretine declared expressly that "some things are of so great moment, that he who errs in them, and departs from the doctrine of Christ, is not only to be sharply rebuked, but to be removed from the communion of the church." This would meet the views of the subscribers. He held, however, that "it may oftentimes be justly questioned, whether any particular doctrine ought to be placed among fundamentals, as a consequence drawn from an important place of Scripture, or a particular exposition of some general doctrines, and thus seemed to favor one of the special pleas of the non subscribers.

The publication of this translation of the treatise at such a juncture was doubtless intended to quiet animosity and lead to a compromise of differences. Its special value to us is that it indicates the position occupied by the middle party, who refused to side either with the subscribers or non-subscribers. The latter, however, seem to have been least satisfied with it. Dr. Evans, in a letter to Rev. Dr. John Cumming, of the Scotch Church, London, contended that "care must be taken that such a stress be not laid upon *Scripture consequences* as will reflect upon the perfection of the Scriptures themselves, and their plainness and sufficiency etc., or that shall countenance the impositions of fallible men, and place their deductions from Scripture on a level with the sacred oracles themselves," etc.

Dr. Cumming in his reply, assuming that the main difference between the subscribers and the non-subscribers was in reference to the Trinity, disclaims all disposition to impose anything, by mere human or church authority, upon others, and proceeds to vindicate the position taken by him in a discourse to which Dr. Evans objected, viz. "that *manifest and necessary consequences of plain Scriptural propositions* are as much a divine revelation, and so to be regarded, as the princi-

ples from which they naturally and necessarily flow." Here was the point both of attack and defense. A non-subscriber in the "Occasional Paper," Vol. 3. No. II., had maintained that "*all consequences* and decisions, in themselves considered, are no other than human reasonings, in which there may be sophistry as well as right reasoning; and therefore there may be uncertainty and error, as well as security and truth;" and these consequences must be always distinguished from the authority of the Holy Scriptures themselves; and how useful soever they may be for instruction or persuasion, they can never have authority to determine men's faith." In reply, Dr. Cumming argues that "plain Scripture *consequences* are matters of revelation, and have the authority of Scripture, in determining articles of faith." "The truths, or things contained in Revelation," he says, "and not the arbitrary signs of conveying or representing them, are the proper and ultimate object of our understandings." "A proposition in the *English* tongue, that *truly* expresses the sense of Scripture, is as much a divine revelation, and so to be regarded, as the same proposition in the Greek or Hebrew originals."

"The dispute," says Dr. Cumming, "is not about *words*, but *things;* not what *phrases* are canonical, but what doctrines are truly divine." "If we may not," he adds, "with an undoubted confidence, build our faith upon plain inferences from Scripture, *because there is a mixture of human reasonings in the collection of them*, neither can we with a firm persuasion found our faith upon express declarations, because it is by our *rational faculties* that we *search out* and apprehend their sense and meaning. So that if this objection proves anything, it proves too much." "It destroys all certainty in matters of faith." Thus it is seen that the notions of the non-subscribers —though the author disclaims the intention of fixing the charge of Arianism against them generally—are calculated to demolish all distinction between heresy and sound doctrine, for Arians would accept the express *words* of Scripture.

After discussing prevalent views concerning the Trinity, Dr. Cumming presents considerations on the proposed agree-

ment of the subscribers and non-subscribers. Here he claims that the conduct of the subscribers in their stand against "the encroaching errors of the day" was due simply to "a hearty and well-governed zeal for that great and distinguishing doctrine of the Gospel which must determine the fate of Christianity itself." They were no bigots, or sticklers for mere words. Dr. Cumming himself remarks, that if the Assemby at Exeter, "had peremptorily resolved to admit of none who should refuse subscription to one certain form, this might be thought a hardship; but when men are left at liberty to use their own words, . . for human creatures to complain of this as an imposition, . . is an imposition on the sense and reason of all the world." He adds, "nor did we ever say that it was absolutely the duty of ministers to declare their faith in such human words, as others might prescribe to them." The non-subscribers held that nothing more could reasonably be required of a minister than that he should declare his belief of what the Scripture makes a part of the Christian faith, as to any matter in question, and that he be willing upon every proper occasion to give his sense of those parts of Scripture, in which these points are delivered, in such words as he thinks proper to convey his sense." Dr. Cumming claims that the resolution of the subscribers at the Exeter Assembly amounted to no more than this. He would not have it considered as a thing intolerable, "to require of young students, that before their admission into the ministerial office, they do, in some human words or other, sufficiently express the soundness of their faith in the ever blessed Trinity." To discern in such views as these the traces of bigotry, or a disposition to make every phrase of a confession of fundamental importance, would certainly seem to require an extraordinary keenness of vision.

Without lingering to notice the less important publications on both sides, which the controversy evolved in England,* we

* It is perhaps impossible to form anything like a complete list of the publications produced by this controversy among the English Dissenters. One of the most important on the part of the subscribers was entitled, "The Doctrine of the Blessed Trinity stated and defended, 1719." Long, the friend of Matthew Henry, wrote

return to affairs in Ireland, where these publications doubtless had an important influence. We trace, at least in connection with the Irish Synod at its meeting in June, 1720, the same spirit which we have seen displayed among the London ministers. The meeting was opened with a sermon by the late moderator, Rev. Robert Craighead, of Dublin, who favored a temporizing policy, corresponding to that urged in Turretine's volume. He based this policy principally "on the ground that the views of the members of the Belfast Society, even if erroneous, involved only points of inferior importance, and that they ought to be freely tolerated in the church, so long as they held, as he was convinced they did, the doctrine of the Trinity and the other leading doctrines of the gospel."* His discourse was entitled, in accordance with its design, "A Plea for Peace; or the Nature, Causes, Mischief, and Remedy of Church Divisions."

The result of the synodical discussions was the adoption of what was known as the "Pacific Act," which reflects plainly

---

the Introduction. Jeremiah Smith, successor of John Howe, Benjamin Robinson, and Thomas Reynolds, united to write the body of the work. Dr. Thomas Ridgley wrote "The unreasonableness of the charge of Imposition exhibited against several Dissenting ministers in and about London considered etc. 1719." Emlyn in the same year published a reply to Reynolds and his three brethren. Thomas Bradbury published several sermons bearing on the controversy, and in 1719, "An answer to the reproaches cast on the dissenting ministers who subscribed their belief of the Eternal Trinity." This was in answer to a pamphlet, "An account of the late Proceedings of the dissenting ministers at Salter's Hall, etc." Bradbury's sermons appeared in 1720, and in 1723. Rev. Joshua Oldfield who presided at the meetings of the non-subscribers, published in 1719, "A pacific discourse upon the subject of the Trinity, with a view to heal the differences, etc." In 1720, Dr. Z. Marryat published a volume of sermons, entitled "The Exalted Saviour; or Jesus Christ the Lord and God of True Believers." In the same year, Dr. James Foster, commended as a preacher by Pope, published an "Essay on Fundamentals, with a particular regard to the Doctrine of the Ever Blessed Trinity," designed to check the prevalent censorious spirit. In 1721, Dr. Ridgley published "An Essay concerning truth and charity, in two parts. 1. containing an inquiry concerning fundamental articles of faith, and the necessity of adhering to them in order to church communion. 2. Some remarks on the behaviour of the Jews and primitive Christians, toward those who had either departed from the faith, or by any other means rendered themselves liable to excommunication." In 1722, Rev. Simon Brown wrote a keen pamphlet against Dr. Thomas Reynolds, and in the same year Dr. Watts brought out his "Christian Doctrine of the Trinity," for which he was charged by T. Bradbury, with making the Divinity of Christ to evaporate into a mere attribute. These are some of the more important publications not mentioned in the text.

*Reid. III. 167.

enough the moderate spirit of the Synod.* It disclaimed any design, which might have been suspected, of laying aside the Westminster Confession and Catechisms; forbade any disrespectful expressions concerning them in future; recommended the Confession as being a very good abridgment of the Christian doctrines contained in the Sacred Scriptures; and expressed approval of the plan "now practiced by the presbyteries, that if any person called upon to subscribe, shall scruple any phrase or phrases in the Confession, he shall have leave to use his own expressions, which the Presbytery shall accept of, providing they judge such a person sound in the faith, and that such expressions are consistent with *the substance of doctrine*." The significance of this language is made more evident by another act of the Synod, directing ministers to insist in their preaching, "on the great and fundamental truths of Christianity according to the Westminster Confession of Faith." Of these a brief summary was given, not unlike that which individual churches have of late years in many instances adopted as the confession of their faith.

To give more effect to the "Pacific Act," it was recommended that no further publications on controverted points should be issued by the ministers, and that all parties be on their guard against hasty suspicions. A committee, likewise, of which the members of the Belfast Society were leading members, was appointed to recommend peace and mutual charity to the contending ministers in London, informing them that the Synod had fallen into such peaceful measures as they hoped would perpetuate and strengthen their own good agreement.†

The healing measure adopted by the Synod proved insufficient. Within a month, Mr. Halliday, who had been called to Belfast, declined to subscribe the Confession in any form. He insisted that no church had any right to demand any fuller confession than the one he offered, which was to the effect,

* Wodrow, speaking of the Pacific Act, says, "it has given a larger door there than we allow in this church, at least by any direct act of Assembly, and is as large a concession as, I think, could well be made to intrants." (Cor. II. 635).

† Reid. III. 172, 173.

that the Scriptures were the only rule of revealed religion, a sufficient test of orthodoxy, settling all terms of ministerial and Christian communion, to which nothing might be added by any synod or assembly; that he found all the essential articles of the Christian doctrine to be contained in the Westminster Confession, and that he received these upon the sole authority of the Holy Scriptures. The confession was accepted by the presbytery as satisfactory, although four members protested against accepting it.

Mr. Halliday had been previously suspected of unsound views on the subject of the Trinity, and now the Belfast Society, which had composed the majority of the Presbytery, had manifested their disposition to set aside the Confession altogether. It was natural that the alarm should be quickly taken and widely spread. The Belfast brethren were advised to disband their society. They resented the counsel, and published a letter in their own defence, a copy of which was sent to each of the Presbyteries. They claimed that they had not violated the constitution, or disturbed the peace of the church, nor were they enemies to the Confession.

But it was impossible thus to quiet the alarm. Moderate members of the Synod had, as they thought, reason to apprehend that both Arian and Arminian errors had taken root within its bounds, and the laity especially were filled with apprehensions.* Still, out of regard for peace, as well as respect for the Belfast brethren, nothing of a controversial character was published.

The Synod of the following year was largely attended. Memorials from seventeen congregations, asked, that in order to silence the aspersion of enemies that the church had deserted her standards, and quiet the apprehensions of her friends, the members of the Synod and of the Presbyteries might be re-

* "We have (1721) lamentable accounts of the Dissenters in the North of Ireland. The Bishop of Bangor's loose principles and the notions of Non-Subscribers at London, have got in among too many." (Wodrow's Cor. II. 597.) "However it be as to Arianism, I am pretty sure that several ministers incline to the Arminian principles." (p. 632.)

quired to subscribe the Westminster Confession as the confession of their faith. Instead, however, of granting this request, the Synod passed a resolution declaring their adherence to the Divinity of Christ as an essential doctrine of the Christian faith, and that its rejection or denial should be a ground of process against offenders. The ministers of Dublin approved the resolution; but the Belfast brethren declined to vote for it, not, as they said, because they did not hold the doctrine in question, but because they were opposed to all authoritative human decisions as tests of orthodoxy, and because they judged such decisions unseasonable at that time.

Another measure was proposed—the voluntary subscription of such members of the Synod, as saw fit, to the Confession. This was opposed by the Belfast brethren in a warm discussion that continued for several hours. It was, however, carried by a large majority, two of the party of the subscribers only opposing it as an unprecedented and unauthorized method of issuing scandals or offences. A large number consequently subscribed the Confession, yet such was the moderate and kindly spirit of the Synod, that they adopted a resolution in which they declared that they insinuated nothing against the non-subscribing brethren, as if they were unsound in the faith, and in which they recommended to the congregations not to entertain jealousies against their ministers because they did not subscribe. Even the case of Mr. Halliday, which had occasioned a protest, and claimed the attention of the Synod, was passed over in the easiest way possible, and with but slight regard to the authority or acts of the Synod itself.

In the ensuing months some controversial pamphlets were published, but the one which claimed the largest measure of attention was on the side of the non-subscribers. It was from the pen of Mr. Abernethy, and was entitled "Seasonable Advice to the Protestant Dissenters in the North of Ireland, being a defence of the late General Synod's charitable declarations." The manuscript of it was put into the hands of the Dublin ministers, Rev. Messrs. Choppin, Bayle and Weld, to be published under their eye, with a recommendatory preface by

themselves, but without any mention of the author's name. This pamphlet, not merely for its ability, but on account of the light which it throws upon the whole controversy, is worthy of special notice.

The aim of this large pamphlet was to vindicate the course pursued by the non-subscribers, and to show that the difference between them and their opponents was by no means fundamental. The argument of course, although presented in a mild and persuasive tone, is a special plea, but the facts embodied in it, endorsed by Rev. Messrs Bayle, Choppin and Weld, and never, so far as we are aware, called in question, show beyond mistake the spirit of the subscribers.

The Dublin ministers say in their preface: "that pious ministers themselves should differ in their sentiments about matters of expediency, and particularly about that of 'the expediency of subscription to human composures, that descend to the decision of many particular points which are comparatively of small moment, and about which the wisest and best divines may disagree, is not to be wondered at." They propose, in order to obviate the difficulty, the "allowing the intrant his choice, either to subscribe according to the Pacific Act, or to make a declaration of his faith in his own words, in which, if any thing be found contrary to sound doctrine and the wholesome words of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Presbyters that are to concur in his ordination may refuse to admit him." This, they think "will no way derogate from the honor of the Westminster Confession, which is justly esteemed by all the Protestant churches both in England and the South of Ireland as an excellent and useful summary of the Christian doctrine, though they never insisted on a subscription to it as necessary to the admission of persons into the ministry among them."

Mr. Abernethy himself says, "If any one thinks (*though I can scarcely believe any minister in Ireland thinks so*) that the explicit profession of every single proposition in the Westminster Confession is necessary to qualify a man for the ministry, he must act according to his judgment, etc." Again he

says, "according to present rules, every presbytery (the only assembly that ordains, and consequently which in particular cases judges of qualifications for the ministry) must judge for themselves what profession of an intrant is to be accounted a sufficient proof of soundness in the faith, or agreeable to the *substance of the doctrine* contained in the Westminster Confession, or in other words, what propositions are necessary to be professed, and what are not."

In presenting a summary of the views of the two parties, he represents the subscribers as holding that "a bare profession of the Bible can not be sufficient, as not distinguishing between the sound and the unsound;" that there is no inconvenience in the adoption of a formula of sound doctrine, especially "when such charitable allowance is made to a person called to subscribe, or otherwise declare his assent, in case there appear to him any difficult or obscure expressions, to explain them, which will be accepted if he does not explain away *the substance of the doctrine*." This certainly—and it is from the pen of a non-subscriber—shows plainly enough in what sort of a spirit subscription was required of intrants and candidates.

On the other hand, the non-subscribers are represented as regarding "the Westminster Confession as a valuable abridgment of Christian doctrine, and as such very useful both for ministers and people. A voluntary subscription to it they will esteem a satisfactory profession of faith, so far as to qualify a person for the ministry, but they can not agree to make it an invariable standard, even with the allowance of explaining any scrupled phrase or phrases. For when phrases in it, which a serious and orthodox Christian may except against, are laid aside, even the remainder ought not to be made a test, and a wise and good man, whom no church has a right to exclude out of the ministry, and who agrees to the substance of the doctrine, may conscientiously scruple subscribing to the human form, when enjoined as a term of communion."

"Both parties," adds Mr. Abernethy, "I believe will own

I have done them justice in representing their opinions fairly."*

In speaking of the Westminster Confession, he says: "In that excellent system, we all acknowledge the most essential truths of religion are contained, as well as some principles which are unessential." He remarks of "the Presbyterian ministers in the North," that "they understand their principles, and will not give them up. They have acted agreeably to them in their late excellent charitable declaration." Still there were, among the laity especially, "zealots" who "raise a vehement cry for Presbyterian principles and constitution, which yet they must desert before they can obtain their end."

But Abernethy's pamphlet did not quiet matters. On both sides were to be found men who declined to comply with his terms or accept his concessions. The asking of a minister to confess his faith in the essential doctrines of the gospel was characterized as a tyranny equaled only by the Romish inquisition. The Westminster Confession was denounced as full of inconsistencies, and as containing unscriptural propositions. The minds of the subscribers were shocked by the latitudinarian views boldly avowed, and the bearing of the principles professed by the non-subscribers. At a loss what to do, some of them resolved to take advice of the Scotish ministers. Several of these met in a private capacity, and the result of their deliberations was that the Irish church should still maintain subscription to the Confession; that if the non-subscribers can not, in consistency with their known principles, consent to this, they ought, as a minority of the whole body, to withdraw, and manage the affairs of their own congregations apart; yet that in this case they should still be entitled to Christian and ministerial communion, so long as they taught nothing contrary to the received Protestant doctrine.

In the Synod of 1722, it was evident that a considerable

* In the course of his pamphlet, Mr. Abernethy remarks that "one of the principal objections (or suspicions rather) against the non-subscribing ministers is, that they are not sufficiently attached to the Presbyterian form of church government."

number of the subscribers had become satisfied that a separation of some kind was inevitable. By the influence of their more moderate brethren, however, the crisis was adjourned, and a series of compromise resolutions was passed, in which the necessity of some doctrinal formula, and adherence to the confession and Presbyterian government were asserted, while Christian forbearance toward the non-subscribers was recommended.

Before the close of the year new causes of difference arose. The dissatisfied portion of the congregations at Belfast determined to establish a new congregation, and called as their minister a Mr. Masterton, a strong opponent of non-subscribing principles. They sought aid for the erection of an edifice form the churches in Scotland, and in this matter were opposed by the non-subscribers. They were charged, also, in open presbytery, with having slandered them; and Col. Upton, a subscribing elder, retorted upon them, that what they accounted slander was the simple truth. They *did* hold principles which opened a door by which error and heresy might enter the church. A keen debate ensued. The withdrawal of subscribers to return to their homes, left the non-subscribers in the majority, and they carried a resolution to the effect that Col. Upton had not sustained his charge.

Upon his appeal, the case went up to the Synod of 1723. The controversy had meanwhile been carried on in pamphlet form, and both sides had become more bitter. All eyes were now directed to the issue of Col. Upton's case. Nine days were occupied with the trial of his appeal, when it was arrested by the claim of the non-subscribers that proof should be adduced that the works in which they had for three years allowed their views to go abroad without question or complaint, were indeed theirs. The matter was therefore necessarily deferred to the next meeting, but the Synod did not separate without indicating the position they were prepared to take.* They affirmed the principle maintained by Col. Up-

*Reid. III. 205.

ton, that "the condemning of all creeds and confessions, and declarations of faith in human words, as tests of orthodoxy, opens a door to let in errors and heresies into this church," and they declared, that though it was possible for candidates to declare their faith in words of their own to the satisfaction of their ordainers, yet it was far too great a trust and extremely dangerous to the church, to commit to a few ordaining ministers the sole power of judging what must be satisfactory to the entire body.*

There was no longer any truce to the war of controversial pamphlets. The Belfast ministers denounced the Synod. Masterton replied to Abernethy's pamphlet. Mr. Halliday, in behalf of the Belfast ministers, published "Reasons against Subscription," which provoked a sharp reply. One of the non-subscribers, a Mr. Nevin, was reported to have denied the proper divinity of the Lord Jesus Christ, and his case, together with that of Col. Upton, came before the Synod in 1724. There was a large attendance, unprecedentedly such, 123 ministers, and 106 elders. Col. Upton's necessary absence prevented the issuing of his case. The zeal against Mr. Nevin led the Synod to adopt the rash measure of cutting him off from the communion of the Synod, while some of the articles against him were referred to his presbytery to be investigated and issued. The non-subscribers resenting the injustice, as they considered it, declared that they would still persist in holding communion with Mr. Nevin. The division was extended to the congregations. Several separations took place, and some of the ministers declined to hold intercommunion with others. A young man, a Mr. Colville, whom one of the Presbyteries refused to ordain, crossed over to England, was ordained by the London dissenting ministers, and returned to claim installation over a church to which he had been called. It is scarcely surprising that his claim was rejected;

* In 1723, says Masterton (Wodrow's Cor. III. 73), "there seemed to be a disposition toward a rupture with the non-subscribing ministers; but by want of time, and the influence of menacing letters from Dr. Calamy in London, and Mr. Bayle in Dublin, the Synod came to no conclusion about it."

but it contributed not a little to increase the mutual exasperation of feeling.

In these circumstances the Synod of 1725 met. Colville had appealed to them from the Presbytery, but the Synod suspended him for a limited time from the exercise of his ministry, and in spite of the opposition of the non-subscribers, resolved to inflict the penalty of suspension on every member of their body who should hold ministerial communion with him, till his suspension was removed. They gave full liberty also to those persons "who scrupled communion with ministers of non-subscribing or non-declaring principles, to follow the light of their own consciences therein." They interpreted the Pacific Act as not warranting the questioning of any of the *doctrines* contained in the Westminster Confession, but only the *phrases* in which they were expressed. If any intrant declined assent to any doctrine of the confession, the presbytery should proceed no further with his case till the General Synod should decide upon it, his objections being transmitted meanwhile to other presbyteries to be considered. Another measure of the Synod was a new arrangement of the presbyteries, by which, for peace sake, all the non-subscribing ministers were placed by themselves, composing the Presbytery of Antrim.

The measure was effectual—although offered by the non-subscribers—in preventing the confusions which had hitherto prevailed, while it reduced greatly the influence of the non-subscribers, who were left to differ with none except themselves. But in other quarters, the excitement was by no means allayed. The Presbytery of Dublin interfered in the case of Mr. Colville, who had disregarded this Synod's order, and settled him by a committee of their body over his congregation. Pamphlets on both sides were issued, and the presbyteries were engaged in vain discussions on expedients to promote peace.

The Synod of 1726 had a difficult task before them. They felt that longer ministerial communion with the non-subscribers would put them more and more in a false position. The

manifesto of the Belfast brethren, which was read in full Synod, was quite unsatisfactory. "Moderate men had hoped,* that while the non-subscribers would still have objected to subscribe any invariable creed, and the Westminster Confession in particular, they would have specified in their expedients some leading truths of the gospel as a substitute for the latter, and would have joined in requiring all future candidates for the ministry to declare in their own words their assent to these truths—a proposal which would not have contradicted any principle which they had hitherto professed to hold."† But no such offer was made; and it was plain that the very basis of any proper ministerial communion was wanting. The Synod, therefore, declared their adherence to their own principles, and their deep concern that, by the course of the non-subscribers, it was no longer possible to maintain ministerial communion with them in church judicatories as formerly, consistently with the faithful discharge of their ministerial office, and the peace of their own consciences. On the final vote, there were thirty-six ministers in favor of it, and thirty-four against it.

Almost immediately the subject of subscription began to be agitated in this country. It was discussed, however, in a friendly spirit, and with the warning beacon of Transatlantic divisions in full view. Some compromise was necessary on both sides, and it was, after a period of judicious delay, fully secured. This delay had doubtless satisfied the ministers that something must be done in order to afford satisfaction to the members of the churches, as well as to preserve them from the danger to which they would naturally be exposed in case any of the Irish non-subscribing ministers emigrated to this country. Its proper significance is only apprehended when

* "I wish they would speak out," (said Wodrow in 1721), "and not trifle in generals, and talk of imposition, and such thread-bare things, and frankly own the passages they stumble at." In 1723, a letter of Mr. Kennedy of Ireland makes him "fear the non-subscribers have somewhat at bottom against some of the articles of our Confession. And if they would speak out, this would be much more generous and fair, and like honest men."

† Reid, III. 244.

we take into consideration the several elements of which the Synod was composed, together with their varied shades of opinion, as well as the historical antecedents of this action, both in England and Ireland.

Art. VII.—MILL'S EXAMINATION OF HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY.*

By Henry B. Smith, D. D.

England seems to be fairly waking up from its metaphysical slumbers. The seeds sown by Coleridge, Bentham, and Hamilton, are fast bearing fruit. Thirty years ago John Stuart Mill wrote that "out of the narrow bounds of mathematical and physical science, there is not in England a vestige of a reading and thinking public, engaged in the investigation of truth as truth, in the prosecution of thought for the sake of thought." Ten years later he published his Logic, based on the inductive method. Hamilton's Discussions and Lectures awakened new interest in the highest themes of speculation. And now Mr. Mill publishes an extended and penetrating criticism upon all the main questions involved in the Hamiltonian philosophy. The best trained and clearest utilitarian intellect of the century enters into an unsparing criticism of the ablest representative of the modified Scottish philosophy. The contest is animating, even though the result be not decisive.

The combatants, too, are well matched; though Mr. Mill has the advantage of controverting books rather than contending with a person; his blows strike only the massive armor of his great foe. But he is a candid and chivalrous opponent; he says, "it would have been worth far more, even to myself, than any polemical success, to have known with cer-

* An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, and of the Principal Philosophical Questions Discussed in his Writings. By John Stuart Mill. 2 vols. Boston. W. V. Spencer. 1865.

tainty in what manner he would have met the objections raised in the present volume." It would indeed be worth while to see how the sturdy and wary Scotchman would have met the frank and astute Englishman; it would be like reading a reply of Plato to Aristotle, of Locke to Leibnitz, of Kant to Hegel. For Hamilton had "the perfervid genius" of his country, and never shrank from a stout affray: his sledge-hammer would have been a formidable weapon against the polished rapier of his antagonist. Mill combines English common sense with a clear quality of exposition, akin to that of the best French philosophers; Hamilton is more erudite, more analytic, more exhaustive; less consistent in the use of single terms, because he is more sensitive to their varying import. The former defines his words on the basis of a clear, though narrow, system of thought; the latter, clinging fast to intuitive and mysterious beliefs as the very ground-work of knowledge, is more fluctuating, because so sensible (from the depth of his moral and spiritual convictions) of the vast issues at stake; and, also, because he could never fully reconcile his beliefs with his metaphysics. Mill adjusts the superficies of our knowledge; Hamilton tried to sound its depths. The former veils or avoids—alas! that he must—the inevitable inferences as to the objects of religious belief which are enveloped in his prime postulates; the latter clung fast to faith, amid all the contradictions of metaphysics. As to the real underlying questions between the two, the Northern warrior, with his resolute arm, and intent eye, would not have been the first to cry: "Hold, enough," if brought face to face with the shrewd, clear-eyed, courteous Southern knight, who now walks the lists with such high polemic bearing, and assurance of victory. Hamilton would never have allowed the solid articles of his creed to have been transformed into the thin abstractions of Mill's metaphysics, without such warfare as strong and true men must wage for their hearth-stones and their altars.

But, after all, it is the questions that are of moment, rather than the men. And it is an advantage, which we owe in part to Mr. Mill's recent work, that these questions are get-

ting to be more sharply defined, and put into good English. An imported transcendental phraseology never has found, and ought not to find, much favor among men of Anglo-Saxon descent. Transcendental terminology awakens suspicion about the quality and force of the thought. On the score of seeming perspicuity the empirical school has had an advantage, especially with the unmetaphysical public, who do not like to learn a new language after they have left off going to school. John Stuart Mill gives to these formidable speculations about being and knowing an English cast and type. His style is the direct and manly style of Hobbes and Locke, of Berkeley and Hartley. No writer translates transcendental verbiage with more effect into the language in which we were born, and says more definitely: "This can only mean so and so." Thus he influences many, who make clearness of statement to be the prime test of truth, forgetful that language can only suggest, but can not compass or confine, the weightiest and profoundest subjects of thought. The empirical school is clear to the sense and the understanding, precisely because it has to do only with the outside of our knowledge; the letter is always easier to grasp than the spirit. But still, in contest with them, the warfare must be waged on some common grounds, some clearly defined principles, equally admitted by both sides. Thus the questions will be brought to a sharper issue and the conflict shortened. And this is the more important, because the real issues are vital and not abstract, religious and not metaphysical, concerning our destiny and not our mere speculations, involving the reality of our faith as well as the scope of our knowledge. The advocates of a more spiritual philosophy ought not to allow, even in a tournament, their adversaries to have their armor more compact and burnished, and their weapons more flexible, and sharp and fit for use.

Mr. Mill has done what he could to sharpen the questions to their keenest edge. He seems bent upon establishing the finality and supremacy of his own system; and so he has taken in hand the preliminary task of showing the defects of the sys-

tems of his compeers ; aut Cæsar, aut nullus. His immediate English predecessors, such as Coleridge and Bentham, he has criticised in previous essays. With Comte's system he has set himself to rights in two elaborate articles in the *Westminster Review*. But Hamilton was his most formidable antagonist ; and he has paid to him the highest compliment he could by subjecting his works to a prolonged and unflinching criticism, rightly judging that this is the only way of coming to decisive results. Of the German philosophers, excepting an occasional allusion to Kant, he does not seem to know or care much ; nor yet for the ancient classical and the scholastic schools of thought. He is writing in the nineteenth century, on the basis of the inductive philosophy, for Englishmen. In Political Economy he has had pretty much his own way ; in the inductive Logic he has no superior. Of Utilitarianism he has given the most plausible defence of the century. And now in Metaphysics and Psychology he is following up his plan and following out his method. Unlike Comte, he concedes (p. 10), that "a true Psychology is the indispensable scientific basis of Morals, of Politics, of the science and art of Education ; the difficulties of metaphysics lie at the root of all sciences ; these difficulties can only be quieted by being resolved ; and until they are resolved, positively if possible, but at any rate negatively, we are never assured that any human knowledge, even physical, stands on solid foundations." And though "the negative solution" is the one he seeks, declining all proper "metaphysical aid," yet in doing this he has shown a higher aptitude for such speculations than in any of his previous works ; his study of Hamilton seems to have quickened his own powers of psychological analysis. Most readers of his works will be led by this new exposition of his views to some modifications of their judgment as to his general system of philosophy. Coinciding with the materialists in deriving all our knowledge from sensible experience, he yet avoids the prime assumptions of strict materialism about matter and our knowledge thereof. Agreeing with the subjective idealists, that all we directly know is certain states of mind, he yet de-

rives these from an external, even if unknown cause. He deduces all our knowledge from sensations or feelings, and inseparable associations. Thus he reduces to its lowest terms the controversy between sensationalism (or "experientialism") and intuitionalism; or, as we should prefer to say, between the empirical and the intuitive (or rational) modes of investigation. Here hinges the debate. Can all that we know of mind and matter, all ideas, all laws of thought, all that we know of being and its laws, be fairly deduced from experience, understanding by experience the sensations and feelings of which we are directly conscious, conjoined by the laws of inseparable association? This is the state of the controversy.

Though Mr. Mill's criticism takes the form of an examination of the Hamiltonian philosophy, yet its scope is wider and its intent is more definite. In Hamilton he assails the whole philosophy of intuitive belief and of *a priori* knowledge. He agrees with him in saying that all our knowledge is relative; he opposes his affirmation, that we have, or can attain to, universal and necessary truths, superior to experience. With Hamilton he decries German transcendentalism; against Hamilton he denies that there are any necessary laws of thought conditioning our knowledge. He uses Hamilton's dogma of relative knowledge to refute his dogma of native and invincible beliefs. Magnifying the "philosophy of the conditioned" on all the points where it is most suspicious, he opposes it where it still leaves room for a faith which is above reason. Reducing consciousness to the bare knowledge of internal states, he cuts us off from all direct perception either of mind or matter, of either the subject or the object; and in the bare "possibilities" of sensation and feeling he finds the formula for all we know of the nature of either self or not-self. His criticism of Hamilton's definition of logic, as an account of "the necessary laws of thought," turns upon his denial that there is any such necessity (for to all "necessity," excepting moral, he is invincibly opposed); and he attempts to derive as well the laws of logic as the very data of mathematical demonstrations from our experience alone. Even his em-

phatic, and in some respects just, protest against the Scotch philosopher's views on causation is made in the interest of a theory which effectually excludes all efficient and final causes from the sphere of strict thought. The central questions, on which alone we can now follow him, are the metaphysical (or ontological) one, concerning our ultimate knowledge, whether it be of the relative alone, or also of the absolute; and the psychological inquiries as to the nature of consciousness, and the origin of our ideas. He also examines Hamilton's theories of causation, of freedom, of pleasure and pain, and the chief points in his logic. On all these he is acute; but the pith of his scrutiny is on the above fundamental points, where hinges the great debate between the two counter schools of thought. The question between the empirical and rational systems is put into a shape, in which it can neither be ignored nor dogmatically decided.

The first article which Mr. Mill dissects is Hamilton's theory of the Relativity of Human Knowledge. On several points relating to the indefiniteness and inconsistency of Hamilton's idea of "relative knowledge," and the impossibility of finding in his various utterances any one consistent scheme, we quite agree with the critic, and have already in the pages of this REVIEW* expressed in full our reasons for doubting the position, that all our knowledge is only relative or only concerns the relations of things. But Mr. Mill is as ardent an advocate of this relativity as is Hamilton himself, and, we think, a more consistent one. One of the chief points, however, which he makes against Hamilton is, that the latter is inconsistent with his theory of relative knowledge, when he affirms that we have a direct consciousness (intuition) of the primary qualities of matter, such as extension and impenetrability; and here we can not but think that the critic is more ingenious than successful. Mill's theory is, that not only our knowledge of all the qualities of matter (primary as well as secondary) is

* See the American Theological Review. 1861. pp. 124 161 on Hamilton's Theory of Knowledge.

given through and by sensation alone; but also that the ideas of "Place, Extension, Substance and Cause," by which we construct the relations of matter, are simply "conceptions put together out of ideas of sensation by the known laws of association." All this knowledge is not merely relative, but relative in the sense of being derived from the phenomena of sensation (which alone we directly know); bating, perhaps, an objective relation, which we discover by the law of causation, to the unknown cause or causes of these sensations. He denies any a priori laws or forms of thought, such as Kant and Hamilton insist upon, by means of which we environ and construct the phenomena given in sensation. Hamilton, on the other hand, says, we are conscious of the external world; "we know the primary qualities of matter immediately as objects of perception;" these are known "immediately in themselves," "as modes of a not-self." "The Primary Qualities may be deduced *a priori*, the bare notion of matter being given; they being in fact only evolutions of the conditions which that notion evidently implies." (Dissertations on Reid, p. 846.)

Mr. Mill, now, finds a flat contradiction between Sir William's main doctrine, that all our knowledge is relative, and these statements about our direct knowledge (consciousness) of external realities or matter. But the latter, though not always consistent in his phraseology, distinctly disclaims the interpretation Mr. Mill puts upon him (p. 866): "In saying that a thing is known in itself, I do not mean that the object is known in its *absolute* existence, that is, *out of relation to us*. This is impossible, for our knowledge is only of the relative. To know a thing in itself or immediately, is an expression I use merely in contrast to the knowledge of a thing in representation or mediately." This does not satisfy his critic (Mill, i., p. 32), who claims that the question is, "whether the knowledge so acquired is of the objects as they are in themselves, or only as they are relatively to us," and that, as Hamilton asserts over and over, it is not a knowledge of matter merely "in its effects on us," he can not consistently hold, that it is a merely relative knowledge.

What, then, is meant by "relative knowledge?" Hamilton is both varied and perplexing in his usage and interpretation of the phrase; and in his theory, that we are directly conscious of external realities, there undoubtedly lurks an element (viz.: that the mind can directly know what is different from itself), which ought to have modified his statements about our possible knowledge of Infinite and Absolute being. But, still, he does not mean to say, that we have an absolute knowledge of matter, that we know its essence; he never in fact supposed that we could find the absolute in the outward world. The doctrine of relative knowledge, so far as it here comes into account, may mean: (1.) That we know only what is in relation to our knowing faculties—which nobody doubts: (2.) that we know external things only so far forth as they affect our senses—an application to the case in hand of the general theory, that all our knowledge is subjective; or, (3.) that we know only the relative in distinction from the absolute. Hamilton, now, affirms the last and denies the second; Mill affirms both, saying, that our knowledge of the external world is relative, under the restriction, that it all comes through and by sensations alone. But Hamilton says, we are cognizant (are conscious) of external modes of being, not merely through the senses, but also by a direct act; that there is, in short, a *relation* between matter and the knowing mind, other than and distinguishable from its mere affections upon our senses; or, that the affections of the senses are the *occasion* of our knowing much more than the senses alone could give. The mind has the power of knowing what is entirely different from, "in contrariety to," itself. This is the virtual, and the consistent Hamiltonian doctrine, though it is not stated so definitely as it might be in his writings; it is the doctrine about knowledge intermediate, and equally opposed, to both the pantheistic (or absolute) and the empirical theory of knowing, which may be summed up in the formula, *quod sumus, scimus*—a theory assumed without any sufficient warrant either in reason or facts. Our direct perception of matter, in its idea and primary qualities, is a rational act; the senses give the occasion, but not

the substance or reality of our knowledge. And why may there not be a direct relation between the object (matter) and the knowing mind, as well as between the matter and the senses? Who can prove the position, that the senses are the only source of our knowledge of external realities? According to Mill's hypothesis, a purely spiritual being could not know matter at all. On his theory, as we shall see further on, it is logically impossible to get out of the charmed circle of a subjective idealism in its sensational type. The assumption that relative knowledge is, in the first instance, equivalent to a knowledge of sensations alone, begs the question between the rational and empirical schools. There is nothing in the nature or idea of relative knowledge to justify the restriction. One may hold that all our positive knowledge is relative, and also hold, that reason (as well as the senses) may give us knowledge of what it is related to: may give us even, so far as the senses are concerned, *a priori* elements of knowledge.

In no part of Mr. Mill's elaborate examination does his fairness as an interpreter of a hostile system appear to better advantage, than in his fourth and sixth chapters on the relation of the Philosophy of the Conditioned to the Philosophy of the Absolute. For while he is here on the side of Hamilton, he yet analyzes his arguments with untiring patience, and clearly exposes the nullity of many of his objections to Cousin and the Germans. His criticism of the different usages of the terms, "Infinite" and "Absolute," is valuable. In particular, he justly insists upon it, that the alleged difficulties and contradictions vanish so soon as we cease to talk about the Infinite and Absolute as entities, and consider them simply as modes or predicates of real existences. And, in fact, that abstract Infinite which is supposed to include all modes of being (even the finite), and yet allow of no predicates being applied to it, is the very ghost of thought as well as of being; it can not be *in re*. "It is," says Mr. Mill, "these unmeaning abstractions, these muddles of self-contradiction, which alone our author has proved, against Cousin and others, to be unknowable. He

has shown without difficulty that we can not know the Infinite and the Absolute. He has not shown that we can not know a concrete reality as infinite or as absolute. Applied to the latter thesis, his reasoning breaks down." As to the dogma of Hamilton and Mansel, that our idea of the infinite is merely negative, he pertinently asks: "Would Sir W. Hamilton have said that the idea of God is but 'a fasciculus of negations?' As having nothing greater than himself, he is indeed conceived negatively. But as himself greater than all other real or imaginable existences, the conception of him is positive." Hamilton confounded a knowledge of the absolute and infinite with absolute and infinite knowledge. He and Mansel both virtually conceded, that the pantheistic sense of these terms is the only real sense, and then tried to get rid of the pantheistic inferences by denying that we have any positive knowledge of them at all, thus subverting the very basis of our knowledge of God.

This Hamiltonian dogma may now be regarded as fairly and fully discredited. The most opposite schools reject it, though on different grounds; Herbert Spencer and Mr. Mill, equally with the advocates of an intuitional philosophy. It was a rash, metaphysical venture, subversive of all rational faith. It sacrificed the cause it was intended to prop up. Mr. Mill's criticisms will have weight in this controversy, although we do not suppose that he would admit the reality of these ideas in the sense of the intuitional philosophy. His positive conception is rather that of the mathematical infinite (or indefinite—viz: that which never can be completed) than of the strict infinite, as absolved from all the limitations of space and time, in which latter sense alone it fully expresses the modes of the divine existence and agency.

Our author is substantially correct in his position (chapter fifth), that "what is rejected as knowledge by Hamilton is brought back under the name of *belief;*" as when the latter says (Letter to Calderwood), that "the sphere of our belief is much more extensive than the sphere of our knowledge; and therefore, when I deny that the Infinite can by us be *known*, I

am far from denying that by us it is, must, and ought to be, *believed.*" And this is the same Infinite, of which he says, that it expresses a mere "impotence of the mind," and involves us in inextricable contradictions! What, then, is the relation of belief to knowledge? This cardinal question is unanswered by either Hamilton or Mansel; while many of the arguments they use against the conceivability of the Infinite are equally subversive of the possibility of believing it (*e. g.* that we are finite and relative and the like). Hamilton sums up our knowledge of all intuitive truth under the name "Beliefs or Trusts;" all the original data of reasoning, and the fundamental facts of religion and morality, belong here; we must accept, though we can not grasp them. In many cases, "belief" takes the same place in his system, that "the practical reason" does in Kant; both save themselves from skepticism or nihilism on this ground; and neither reconciles the theoretical with the practical part of his system. But Mr. Mill, as we read him, makes no such reservation. He never uses the word "belief" in any but a minor sense, as signifying "a conviction short of complete." His psychology leaves no room for such an act of faith as is vital in all religion; all the belief he recognizes would make religion less certain than knowledge. It can not mean, on his theory, an ultimate act in relation to ultimate truth or being.

The "Philosophy of the Conditioned" is the subject discussed in the sixth chapter. Mr. Mill here enters into a preliminary examination of the different senses in which the word "inconceivable" is used, defending, as earnestly as Hamilton, the position, that "we can not affirm anything to be impossible" merely because we can not "conceive" its possibility. What is inconceivable is not therefore incredible; this is true. But Mr. Mill goes further and seems to maintain, that in no instances is inconceivability a decisive test of truth or untruth. To understand this point, we must distinguish the different usages of "inconceivable." Mr. Mill discriminates three senses; (1.) cases in which we can frame no representation, because the given attributes are incompatible, as, a round

square (he also includes the *Noumena* in this class, as having no assignable attributes); (2.) what we can not consider, or realize, as actual, though we may form a mental image of it; (3.) what we can not explicate by prior grounds or reasons. The latter is a very common usage in Hamilton, concerning all our primitive beliefs; but Mr. Mill justly "declines to receive" such cases as denoting any proper inconceivability. That inconceivability in the second sense is not a sure test of untruth will be conceded. But Mr. Mill claims the same as to the first sense; he does not recognize any "necessity of thought" which is final, except in a single instance, viz.: that the same thing should at once be and not be. All other cases of "inconceivability" he refers simply to experience and inseparable associations. We might, he thinks, have an experience which would enable us to say, that two and two make five, and that two straight lines enclose a space, and that space comes to an end. Consequently, inconceivability is no test of truth or untruth! We may have occasion to refer to this again, and dismiss it for the present with the single remark, that if this be so, Mr. Mill ought himself to be more cautious than to affirm, as a final truth, that all our ideas are derived from sensation, and all our knowledge from experience, and that induction is the only legitimate method of philosophizing. How can he affirm any proposition as true or final? Can constant uncertainty lead to certainty?

But while suggesting these exceptions, we entirely agree with our author, that Sir William's "great law" of the conditioned breaks down in both its parts; that neither does he show "that the conditioned lies between two inconceivable and contradictory hypotheses; nor, that one of these hypotheses must still be accepted as true." These points we have elsewhere examined.*

A special chapter is given up to Professor Mansel's application of the Philosophy of the Conditioned to religious truth; and it is written in the author's sharpest vein. Some skepti-

* American Theological Review. 1861. pp. 151–159.

cal writers have used Mansel's premises to enforce their irreligious conclusions; saying, that if we can have no positive thought about God's attributes as distinguished from man's, and if morality in God must differ "in kind" as well as "in degree" from human morality, that there is no basis left for religious obligation and belief. But Mr. Mill subjects those doctrines to a trenchant criticism, not in the interest of theology, but of the common sense and reason of mankind. With indignant fervor he protests against them. One memorable passage, more remarkable for its moral intensity than for its reverence, was extensively quoted in the late Westminster canvass as evidence of the author's "atheism." But, whether Mr. Mill be theist or atheist, this outburst of feeling only implies, that if a man believe in God at all, it must be in a God who is just and good, in the general sense in which we use those terms in relation to man, though of course in an absolute and perfect mode such as man can not attain unto. He is here so fervent and emphatic, that we can hardly believe that such illimitable faith in the absolute nature of moral truth can come from a philosophy, which makes shifting experience the source of all truth, and utility the basis and test of all ethics. When he wrote that passage he could hardly have thought that "a different experience" could ever lead him or anybody else to say, that what he now calls just, might become unjust, as he has said, that a different experience might lead us to see that two and two could make five. But we are glad to find him agreeing with the opinion, that Mr. Mansel's positions undermine the basis of all reasonable theology. They really banish reason and conscience from the religious sphere; and then religion becomes a matter of submission to some external and superhuman power, such as we find in the infancy or decrepitude of faith, but not in its manly ripeness.

The subsequent chapters of the first volume have less directly to do with Hamilton's system; they are devoted to a searching attack upon the whole Scotch philosophy, so far as it recognizes any intuitive beliefs or *a priori* laws of thought.

Philosophically they are the ablest parts of the work, and show its purpose and upshot. The philosophy of experience is put in full array against the philosophy of intuitions. Mr. Mill says, that all our knowledge of mind, matter and truth, that mathematical axioms and logical laws, and also that all valid methods in quest of truth, are derived from experience and from experience alone. "Sensations" and "inseparable associations" are the data; all that we know follows. Here is the core of the discussion.

Mr. Mill calls his method "the psychological," and the counter method, "the introspective." We will not quarrel about the terms, though we can not see why the intuitionalist's method is not as "psychological" as his own; or why his own is not quite as "introspective" as the other, seeing that he starts from and reasons solely about "sensations," which are certainly in his view internal phenomena alone, known by introspection. But the main question is as to the sense he assigns to the respective methods. He accuses Hamilton and others of virtually begging the question, because "instead of proving a belief to be an original fact of consciousness by showing that it could not have been acquired, they conclude that it could not have been acquired, for the reason, often false, and never sufficiently substantiated, that our consciousness can not get rid of it now." (Vol. i., p. 188.) Against Cousin, he makes the question of the origin of our ideas to be "the first" in a rational order of investigation. (i., p. 182.) But how can we separate these two questions in such a marked way? Suppose we start the inquiry as to the origin of our idea of space; we must manifestly first know what that idea is, as we now have and hold it; this is the pre-condition of the investigation. Otherwise, we might come to some partial conception and call that the whole. We may begin, as Mr. Mill does, with sensations, and from them get at some sort of a notion about space; but if that notion is eviscerated of any vital element contained in our present idea of space, the process is not worth much either in the way of proof or disproof. The empirical philosopher is bound to account by experience

for all the elements of our knowledge as we now have it. If he can not derive these from sensation, he has lost his case. If he anywhere slips in an *a priori* element or condition, he has lost his case. If there is a present necessity of thinking it, this must be explained from and by phenomenal facts, or he has lost his case. If there is universality in a given belief, this universality must be deducible from the facts of sensible experience, or the "experiential" philosopher has lost his case. He must not presuppose a single *a priori* truth or law. His philosophy must be consistent. He affirms a universal law or fact about knowledge, and an exception disproves it. And it is a fair question, whether this very affirmation of a universal law, with which he starts, is not in complete contradiction with his own principles and methods. Is this principle derived from reason or from experience? If from reason, then there is at least one truth higher than experience, and so the principle itself is untrue; if from experience, how can it be universal, since all experience is fleeting and contingent? Some future experience might change the whole matter. At any rate, the principle here enounced is just as dogmatic as that of the intuitional school. But though we object to the assumption, we are quite willing to follow Mr. Mill in his own track and see if he can make out his case.

The main question between the two schools may as well be tested by the case which Mr. Mill so elaborately and ingeniously presents as by any other; that is, the origin of our idea of the external world. It makes no difference here, whether, with Hamilton, we speak of a "consciousness of external realities," or whether it be called an intuition, or intuitive belief. The word consciousness is unhappily used in English in a purely subjective sense, which is arbitrary, and owing to that subjective idealism, developed by Berkeley, which has affected the philosophical speech even of the English materialists. But this is irrelevant to the main issue, which is this: Have we an immediate (intuitive) knowledge of external reality? or, is this knowledge acquired, by inference or induction, from a purely subjective state, or sensation? We

now know that there is an external world; is this knowledge an intuition or a deduction?

This question is investigated by Mr. Mill in his eleventh chapter with such care and subtlety, that it is manifest he here finds "the Lydian stone" of his whole system. In reading his acute and involved analysis, the first impression is one of surprise that we had to go through such an ingenious and intricate process, without being aware of it, in order to arrive at so simple a conclusion; but if a strict analysis shows us its validity and necessity, we need not be balked by this preliminary difficulty. He tells us that his theory postulates "the following psychological truths: 1st. That the human mind is capable of expectation;" having had certain sensations, it can expect other possible sensations, etc. "It postulates, secondly, the laws of the association of ideas." He then enumerates the usual laws, by virtue of which associations may become "inseparable." And when the associations become inseparable, "the facts or phenomena from which they take their rise come themselves to seem inseparable." All this, now, is presupposed at the start. There are not only sensations, but there is a mind (or being) capable of "expectation," and binding together its fleeting sensations by laws which make them seem "inseparable." In other words, he takes for granted certain *a priori* conditions; at any rate, a law of invariable sequence, regulating the phenomena. This is implied in the principle of "expectation." Whence, too, comes the "inseparability" of the associated ideas? Here is a mental judgment about the facts; a certain law of thought binding the facts together. The "associations," are said to be those of "contiguity," "simultaneity," and the like; which imply ideas of space and time, at least of time. All this is presupposed in the postulates, before coming to the process. A mind that has so much, and can do so much, will be very likely to be able to do something more. "Sensations" are manifestly not the only factors we have to deal with. But let us follow out this method, which was to presuppose no idea or law, but deduce all from "experience." All thus far may be supposed to be purely internal; how, now, do we come to the external?

We must here first agree on what is meant by externality, or the external world. It is, says Mr. Mill, "something which exists when we are not thinking of it, which existed before we had ever thought of it, and would exist if we were annihilated: and further, that there exist things which we never saw, touched, or otherwise perceived, and things which never have been perceived by man." In contrast with "our fleeting impressions" it has, "in Kantian language, the character of Perdurability." Matter, in short, he defines as "a Permanent Possibility of Sensations." Though this be a somewhat idealistic and tenuous definition, we will accept it provisionally, and will call matter, in distinction from sensations, "the Permanent Possibility of sensations,"—this possibility being of course conceived (or perceived) as something different from, outside of, ourselves. The question now is, How is this idea begotten in us? Is it an intuition or acquired from sensation? Mr. Mill says, "that there are associations naturally, and even necessarily, generated by the order of our sensations and of our reminiscences of sensations, which, *supposing no intuition of an external world to have existed in consciousness, would inevitably generate the belief*, and would cause it to be regarded as an intuition." And this is an admirable statement of just what is to be done. It could not be better put. Let us stand by and see this empirical operation. Let us see if an idea can be born of matter.

The process runs in this wise: Sensations, Reminiscences of the same, Expectation of other possible sensations, and the Laws of Association are of course presupposed. This is the apparatus, and now for the work. Some of our sensations are fleeting (all present ones are so); but besides these, (by virtue of the laws of association) we also come to know that there are "certified or guaranteed posibilities of sensation" which have the characteristic of "permanence;" and this conviction of permanency is what mainly distinguishes "our idea of substance or matter from our notion of sensation." These permanent possibilities appear likewise in "groups," giving the possibility of a great variety of sensations; "a kind of perma-

nent substratum." There is also "a fixed Order in our sensations," a constancy of antecedence and sequence. "But the constant antecedence and sequence do not generally exist between one actual sensation and another," but rather between "the groups of sensations." Nature, is "this group of possibilities," which "comes to stand to our actual sensations *in the relation of a cause to its effect*." (vol. i. p. 241.) Thus far of course, whatever the language may seem to imply, the process must have been wholly internal: the "possibilities," the "groups," the "permanencies," are all within us: they have not yet (if we may use the word) been "located;" they are simply ideas; for if they are even imagined as being in space, and as distinct from ourselves, the very idea of externality we are hunting for has somehow slipped in unawares, which would subject the deduction to the damaging suspicion of begging the question.

Mr. Mill continues: "When this point has been reached," (that is, when these "groups" are found to stand to our actual sensations "in the relation of a cause to its effects,") "the permanent possibilities in question have assumed such unlikeness of aspect, and such *difference of position relatively to us* from any sensations, that it would be contrary to all we know of the constitution of human nature that they should not be conceived as, and believed to be, at least as different from sensations as sensations are from one another. Their ground-work in sensation is forgotten, and they are *supposed* to be something *intrinsically distinct from it*." "We find, too, that they [these "Permanent Possibilities"] belong as much to *other human sentient beings* as to ourselves." Everybody else thinks and acts about them just as we do. "This puts the *final seal* to our perception of the groups of possibilities as the fundamental reality in *Nature*." "The world of Possible Sensations succeeding one another according to laws, is *as much in other beings as it is in me*, it has THEREFORE an existence *outside me*; it is an *External World*."

Such is Mr. Mill's deduction of the idea of the external world; and the history of philosophical speculation, we think, hard-

ly offers a more conspicuous instance of an illusive theory and of an illicit inference, than that here so confidently presented as deciding the test question between "experientialism" and "intuitionalism." The whole chapter is, in fact, in its essence and force, rather an explication of the author's idea of matter than an explanation of the origin of the idea of externality. The very forms of statement, all the illustrative instances, presuppose ideas and relations, that beg the whole question. The "groups" imply spacial relations, and external ones to boot; the "successions" imply time, as already known; the "order" means antecedence and sequence, in both space and time. How is it that these groups come to assume such "a difference of *position* relatively to us," when we do not yet know anything about "*position?*" How ingeniously it is intimated, that they are "*supposed*" to be "intrinsically different" from sensation." But by what warrant? This is a transmigration, or rather a transformation. of the sensations, that is wholly destitute of logical force. When the "permanent possibilities" have "come to assume *such difference of position relatively to us*," they are already conceived as external, and any further statement, or supposed inference, is entirely superfluous. Taking for granted such "groups," such "successions," such "order," such causes and effects, such "difference of position," such obliviscence of "the ground-work in sensation," and such perception of these things as being "intrinsically different" from sensation—taking all this for granted, we can undoubtedly see, not that the idea of an external world follows, but that it is already there. Kant affirmed that all the so-called proofs of the Being of God take for granted the idea they propose to establish; and the external world, which Mr. Mill was to deduce, haunts all his deductions, and shapes all his propositions. In the Cogito ergo sum of Des Cartes, the Ego is already in the cogito—the self to be proved is presupposed; and so it is in this argument, which not even the author of the Inductive Logic can put into a syllogistic form. And after all this, to bring in "*other human sentient beings*" to help us in putting the "final seal" to our "perception of these

groups," so that we can say that this perception is found "as much in other beings as it is in me," and that, "THEREFORE it is outside me," "an External World:"—this certainly looks like logical legerdemain, or a kind of theatrical shift (in a philosophical form) for producing a striking inference. Where did these "other sentient beings" come from? Are they internal or external phenomena? If I perceive them, and know that they think and act just as I do about "Permanent Possibilities of Sensation," have I not already a pretty good idea of externality? What need, then, of a "therefore?" If these "other human beings" are not external to me, there is no argument; if they are, there is no proof.

But this transition from the internal to the external is so momentous for the whole of psychology and philosophy, the character of the system we adopt is so completely determined by it, and Mr. Mill argues it with such a conviction that his whole general theory is here at stake—that we must enter into a more detailed criticism of the assumptions, principles and method which are here involved. Let us do this, keeping ever in mind the precise state of the question as our author puts it (vol. i., p. 236). "*supposing no intuition of an external world to have existed in consciousness,*" the belief may be, and is, "acquired" by and through sensations, plus the laws of association, plus the idea of invariable antecedence and consequence. And Mr. Mill will not object to being held to a strict use of terms and a definite method. There must be no assumption for which there is not proof, and no inferences which do not logically follow from the precise facts of the case. All the causes assigned must, on Mr. Mill's own ground, be simply observed antecedents of phenomena; for this is demanded by the inductive philosophy, of which he is the ablest advocate. All generalizations, too, are to be made on the basis of carefully defined facts, and they must not transcend the sphere or order of the facts which they group together in a general statement. No statement, no illustration, must presuppose the externality which is to be sought for. Beginning

with the purely subjective, no phraseology is allowable which implies or assumes the objective, until the objective has been fairly deduced. The chief terms, too, ought to be unambiguous and clearly defined, and defined in the first instance in a purely internal sense. And here is one initial difficulty, which also runs through the whole argument. For how can a statement be made about ideas, impressions, etc., which does not imply an object as well as a subject of thought; and how easily and insensibly the object is viewed as an external reality! Such phrases, too, as "sensations," "groups," "certified possibilities of sensations," "associations of ideas," are difficult to define, and difficult to handle strictly, especially in a purely internal signification. In their minimum sense they may seem to mean little; in their maximum sense they are very broad; and in both their minimum and maximum senses they are vague. Premising these cautions, we now proceed to a series of criticisms and statements upon the principles and method of Mr. Mill in his deduction of the reality of the External World as "an acquired idea."

1. His prime postulate is, that all our ideas (including that of externality) are derived from what he calls "experience." This "experience," now, is a vague and shifting word. Our personal experience rests upon, and is the result of, all the laws of mind and matter; it presupposes the universe and its laws, man and nature and their co-working. It comprehends all the facts of consciousness as well as observed external phenomena. In this broad sense, it is but an idle truism to say, that all our ideas are derivable from experience alone; it is like saying, that all the laws of nature are derivable from nature. Our total experience must of course contain all the ideas we have or can have. We can not know what we have not had some experience of; even necessary truths must be known in order to be known. But Mr. Mill at the start cribs and cabins what he calls "experience;" he means by it, what is derivable from sensations or direct feelings, in contrast with intuitions or necessary ideas. He allows the mind only the function of working up its sensations into a decent order;

though he speaks scornfully of Condillac's "transformed sensations," we can not see any radical difference between the two theories. The problem he has got to work out is then this: to show how from the contents of our sensations all other ideas may be evolved, especially the idea of an external world. He must not add anything to the sensations, but simply group and associate them, and see what will come of it. The sensation must be taken in its strictest logical "comprehension," as connoting certain states or acts, nothing more or less; and as applied in logical "extension," it must not surreptitiously be held as denoting anything more. The method he here employs must be strictly inductive, which allows no generalizations outside of the scope of the observed phenomena; for this is his chosen "psychological" method in distinction from the "introspective," which first analyzes the ideas themselves, in order to see if they contain elements that can not have their groundwork in sensation alone. But of course no intuitional philosopher will object to following him on his own chosen way, only insisting that the ideas shall not be mutilated to conform to a partial theory.

2. Are sensations the most simple and indubitable phenomena of our internal experience? This is assumed by Mr. Mill; but upon what ground? Sensations, in fact, express the most obscure and infantile state of but a small part of our knowledge. And when the question is about the *origin* of our knowledge, all we can do is to try and *imagine* what these sensations may have been at the start of our conscious being; for we can not look into any infant's mind, nor recall our own first impressions. This primal assumption of the sensationalist school is a philosophical fiction, and not a statement of a well established fact. Sensations are in fact among the most difficult of our mental states to grasp and master. They are among the most concrete phenomena of our experience, requiring the most careful analysis; they are of a mixed mode and an indefinite nature, hovering in the border land, the very twilight, between mind and matter, midway between the subjective and objective, and conveniently suggesting self or not-

self, as the occasion may serve. Mr. Mill does not anywhere distinctly define what a sensation is; he does not tell us what are its precise contents in distinction from other states of the mind. How, then, can we know whether his deductions from sensations are valid or not; for nothing must be found in the deduction, which is not potentially or substantially found in the sensation itself. In strictness, on his theory, a sensation must be a purely internal feeling, having its seat in the nervous system; he can not even say, that it is an impression *made on* the nervous system, for he does not know anything at the start about its being "made," especially by an external cause. Sensations are sheer states of internal feeling, implying perhaps some change in our bodily (nervous) organism; but of this bodily organism we know nothing at first. As such internal states, they are so exceedingly obscure and unmanageable, that we can not advance a single step in deducing ideas from them without the help of a mind, furnished with processes of thinking, and even frames of thought, under which it is obliged to range the sensations, in order to find any ideas at all in them. But this leads us to another point:

3. This very process of manufacturing sensations into ideas, takes for granted certain necessary laws or ideas of the mind itself, apart from and above all that is given in the sensations. These laws and ideas are not contained in the sensations, and so can not be deduced from them; but they are necessary to the understanding of them, and really give us the knowledge which is clandestinely attributed to the sensations themselves. They are the *a priori* conditions of the possibility of sensation itself, controlling and shaping it; or, they are the frame-work in which we envisage the sensation, defining its relations to ourselves or to other forms and modes of being. They are *implied* in the sensation, but not *contained in* it; no definition of the sensation (as such) can be given, which would include them; and, consequently, they can not be deduced from the sensation. Just so far as they go, they prove that there are in the mind, native and necessary to its thinking, certain ideas and laws for which sensation can render no account by itself

alone. Mr. Mill assumes, and states, some of these: Such as, the principle of "expectation," which presupposes cause and effect; "associations of ideas," in contiguity, etc., which imply time, if not space; "invariable laws" of association, which presuppose a fixed order; the perception (or inferring) of a cause of the sensations, different from the sensations themselves; a certain "permanent" something underlying and producing the phenomena—which is a shadowy way of intimating a necessary belief in substance; "reminiscences" of past sensations, which are inexplicable but certain, and involve not only time, but something very like an identity of the percipient (self) in different states. Now all of these are elements of thought, which he is obliged to bring in, that he may work the sensations over into ideas; and of all these laws and regulatives of thought, *not a single one* can be derived from any property or peculiarity of the sensation as a sensation. And they are, further, all of them necessary to the understanding or constructing of the sensations. They are, in no sense whatever, logically derivable from the contents of the sensation; they are *a priori* laws, coming from the thinking mind. Behind the confused phantasmagoria of the senses, there is a veiled prophet giving order and law to the otherwise chaotic scene. In Mr. Mill's whole process are presupposed all the laws of correct thinking, all the conceptions by which we construct the sensations under the frame-work of space and time, and all the ideas (as substance and cause) by which we bind together the phenomena of the senses in orderly groups and relations. A thorough study of Kant's Criticism of the Pure Reason shows what assumptions are here involved.

The state of the case is just this: We have sensations, and we want to interpret them and see what will come of them. These sensations come and go, there is a before and after about them, which means "time;" and this time is not deduced from the sensations, for it is not in them; they are in it. They come and go in a certain "order," under fixed "laws of association;" and these laws again are no parts or qualities of the sensations, but determine them in their order; the

mind, reflecting on the sensations, alone knows these laws, which presuppose space, time, and cause. "Reminiscence" implies still other laws, mental and not sensational. Then the sensations come and go in "groups," and to these groups we are obliged to assign certain antecedents, which are not in and of the mind, nor in and of the sensations. And here we strike the highway which is to lead us out into "externality," but which we will leave for a moment, to consider one other point, vital to the understanding of this whole process.

4. For in this process we do not start, as Mr. Mill seems to imagine, with *a sensation alone*, but with *a knowledge of a sensation*, which is quite a different matter, and entails valuable results. It is an act of self-consciousness with which we have to do, and not a mere affection of a nervous fibre or pulp. And in examining it we must apply the true psychological method, which is also essentially introspective; though Mr. Mill contrasts these two, and calls "psychological" the method of mere induction applied to internal phenomena, as if these were to be examined in just the same way as we investigate minerals and plants. But before we can make a valid induction, we must know just what the phenomena are; and these internal phenomena can only be known by "introspection." After we have ascertained the nature and scope of the phenomena (by psychological analysis), we may generalize about them, or make inductions from them, as much as we please.

Asking, then, what is implied in a *knowledge of a sensation*, which is the fact we are here dealing with, we find at once that it *contains* both a knower and a known, a feeler and a felt, a subject and an object, an ego and a non-ego—and also the union of the two in the act of consciousness. All this is implied and involved in the sensation itself as a conscious state. There is a certain subject knowing, and a certain object known; neither is before nor after the other; the two co-exist in the same act. Consciousness is in fact smitten into being, in its first glimmerings in us, by this union and collision of object and subject; as truly as the spark is thrust into life by the concussion of the flint and the steel. The subject is

just as certain and immediate as the object, and the object as the subject. So that, in sensation itself, we find (if we may so apply the words) a law in our members warring against the law of the flesh (materialism), and revealing to us a mind in the sensation, and yet above it, a mind knowing that its states of sensation, though of itself, are still something different from itself. And herein is made known the mysterious peculiarity, and the wonderful power, of mind, that it can know something different and distinguishable from itself, and which is yet a part of itself. Here is the marvel of consciousness.

This relation, now, of subject to object, which is found involved in sensation itself, though we here consider it as simply internal, is just as inexplicable as is the relation of the mind or self to an external object; and it is *of the same generic sort*. It is self directly knowing a not-self. And here is an irreducible fact about all consciousness. There is both the subject knowing, and the object known, and neither can be deduced from the other—any more than a wife can be deduced from a husband; only progeny can be deduced, and not the parties that make the progeny. And when this constitutive and inexplicable fact about all consciousness is once conceded, when it is seen that all our knowing is under this one law, then the major presumption against the possibility of a direct knowledge (intuition) of even external reality vanishes away; for that is simply an extension or modified application of the one law (or fact) of all conscious knowledge, viz. that the mind can and does know something distinct and distinguishable from itself. This law of all knowledge contains, we claim, the same element (that of a direct knowledge of an object), which the intuitionalist asserts in the case of our knowledge of external realities; and we have got to take account of it. It is a strictly necessary and *a priori* law of knowledge. The act of knowing implies it; the analysis of knowing reveals it. Here is preshadowed, in internal consciousness, the very process by which alone we can know external modes of being.

It may, indeed, be said, that this distinction of subject and object, as given in the knowledge of a sensation, is as yet

purely internal, and does not help us in the matter of explaining the knowledge of an external mode of being. But in knowing a sensation, is it not probable that we know directly some affection of our bodily organism? It is questionable, in fact, whether we do, or can, know even a sensation as a purely internal state—whether there is not always, and necessarily, an external localizing of the same. At any rate, just so soon as we fix our mind upon a sensation, we inevitably externalize it in space. The viewing it as primarily and simply internal is probably a fiction of the schools, and not a direct interpretation of consciousness. The mind, so far as we know it, is so constituted that it *must* put the objects of sensation into the relations of space; it must externalize them. And it does not, except by a reflective and analytic act, distinguish between the sensation and its objects. To say, that it first knows the sensation as internal, and then infers an external object, is no report of direct consciousness. Every sensation, when known, and as known, has necessarily, to the ego, the character of a non-ego, of an object, of an object in space. This presupposes the fact of the knowledge of space. Even if you call all this internal, it is still an internal object, imaged as being in space. The putting it into space is in the primitive consciousness; it is implied in the very distinction between self and non-self. The projecting it into externality (an external world) is just a continuation of the same law or method of knowledge. The distinction between sensation and perception is not so marked as many philosophers make it to be. There is no evidence at all, that the mind first directly knows only its own internal subjective states. The verdict of consciousness is rather the other way. The contrary supposition rests on the false presumption, that the mind can not know what is different from itself. This unproved theorem about knowledge is at the bottom of both materialism and pantheism. The maxim: *Quod sumus, scimus*—is not an accurate expression of the fundamental fact of knowledge.

5. But Mr. Mill wishes to get from the self to the external reality, without recognizing any such fact of immediate knowl-

edge. He must have an "inference" or an "induction;" and thinks that one of these ways will make the matter much more intelligible. The data given, let us recollect, are simply sensations, and groups and associations of sensations, all at first internal; and from these, it is claimed, we can legitimately infer an external world. The transition is to be made from these interior phenomena to an exterior source or ground of the same—no knowledge of even the idea of externality being presupposed. The direct question is not (as some of Mr. Mill's reasonings seem to imply), whether we can conclude from internal facts to a proper cause (antecedence) of the same, but whether we can legitimately prove the *externality* of that cause or antecedence. Such proof of the externality of the antecedent, or rather such a genesis of the idea of externality, we hold to be utterly impossible, by any logical or inductive method. The idea which he thinks he begets is a mere foundling, slipped in unawares and very illogically. Such proof, if valid, must be in the way, or on the principles, of either the formal or the inductive logic; it must be either an inference or an induction; and it can not, we claim, be the one or the other.

It can not be a logical *inference* from anything contained in the premises. Neither of the premises can, or does, contain the idea of externality, and of course the inference can not legitimately include this idea. All that we can have in the premises is, sensations and associations of the same, and certain possibilities of sensation—all as yet internal phenomena. These groups of possibilities, he says, come to stand to an actual sensation "in the relation of a cause to its effect." They assume such "differences of *position* relatively to our sensations, that we *conclude*, that they are as different from sensations as sensations are from another," and "*suppose* them to be *intrinsically distinct* from sensation." Very well, suppose we do thus conclude? Have we reached their "externality?" By no manner of means, unless the mind has the power, and the necessity, of locating these antecedents in external, spacial relations to us, from its prevision of such externality. The

externality is not at all deduced or inferred, it is illusively intruded. The sensations are internal, the groups are internal, the possibilities are internal, and consequently the possible antecedents must be also and only internal. All that is deduced is an antecedent; the *externality* is not deduced but superinduced. There is in the reasoning a two-fold illegitimacy; on the one hand a direct conclusion from the possible to the actual, which all logicians grant to be illegitimate; and, on the other hand, a deduction of the external from the internal, of the object from the subject—which can nevermore be a matter of inference. Grant that a sensation must have an antecedent; how does this necessitate the conclusion, that this antecedent must be out of the mind?

But perhaps this process will fare better on the ground of the inductive, than on that of the deductive logic, as the former is less formal and allows a somewhat greater latitude. Though the external world may not be an inference, it may be an induction. Two points in the inductive method are here involved. One principle, implied in every legitimate induction, is, that the generalization (or general truth) that forms the conclusion, shall not transcend the class or sphere of the observed facts, which form the basis of the process. If the facts are botanical, or zoological, or psychological, or external, or internal, the conclusion must be the same. An induction concludes from a part to the whole; but the whole must be of the same order of facts with the parts. Still further, the rational law, which makes an induction valid, is this—that the same antecedents, in the same circumstances, will have the same consequents; both the antecedents and consequents must be known. Mr. Mill's induction of an external world from sensations, now, violates both these cardinal points; for it transcends the sphere of the phenomena, and it concludes to an antecedent which is not, and can not be, a matter of experience.

His conclusion, we say, transcends, in the first place, the sphere or class of the observed facts. The "groups," the "associations," and even the "possibilities," are only of inter-

nal sensations—these are the facts he has to deal with, and generalize upon. How can he, then, by induction, conclude to a cause of these, which is entirely different from them, and which is moreover outside of them? If the cause is something of a different kind (even though it be of an unknown nature), and especially if it be external while all the facts are internal —there is manifestly a violation of the first principle of all valid induction in this process of coming at "the external world." How can the external be an induction from the internal? It is a clear case of the Aristotelian *metabasis eis allo genos*. If the mind is obliged to assign such a cause, and to view it as external (which we do not dispute), it must be because it has some other way of coming at ideas than that of mere induction, and some knowledge of externality from another source than that of inference from our sensations. The mind gives what induction can not. The induction has a superficial seeming of soundness, because it presupposes and slips in the intuitive and *a priori* elements of thought. If we are obliged to localize in external space the antecedents (causes) of our sensations, it is not because the sensation forces the mind to this conclusion, but because the mind, by the very necessity of its thinking, puts the sensation into this external relation. We *can not think* the antecedents of our sensations to be otherwise than external to us: there is a strict necessity of thought implied.

Our author's conclusion violates also the inductive principle, that the antecedents of phenomena must be among the observed facts of the case. An induction presupposes a knowledge of both antecedents and consequents, otherwise it is not valid. This will hardly be doubted; for the main claim of the inductive philosophy is, that it is simply a generalization of observed facts, nothing more or less. If now we feel obliged to conclude to any antecedents (or causes) which have not been matters of experience, this must be on the ground of some other principles than those contained in the philosophy of induction. Mr. Mill makes such a conclusion. For the facts and phenomena of sensation he assigns causes of an

unknown name and nature, and causes, too, exterior to the mind, having a wholly different state and mode of being from that of the observed phenomena. And these causes (or antecedents) are not observed, but simply supposed to be. So that, either Mr. Mill can not come fairly, on his principles, to knowledge of external reality; or, if he does attain thereto, it is because he presupposes some other source of knowledge to be necessary and valid. If the mind had not an immediate intuition of externality, it never could imagine that the antecedents (causes) of its sensations were exterior to it. An immediate knowledge is presupposed in the mediate induction. Otherwise, sensations could never lose "the property of their first being," and cease to be viewed as purely internal in both their nature and their causes. The inference of the externality of the cause may be warranted by a pre-intuition of externality as real, but is wholly unwarranted as an induction.

Mr. Mill seems at one point (i., p. 249) to recognize a part of this difficulty: "It may, perhaps, be said, that the preceding theory gives, indeed, some account of the idea of Permanent Possibilities which forms part of our conception of matter, but gives *no explanation of our believing these permanent objects to be external, or out of ourselves.*" Precisely so. In reply he says, that "the very idea of anything out of ourselves is derived from the knowledge experience gives us of the Permanent Possibilities." And this for the reasons, that "we carry our sensations with us *wherever we go*; but we do not carry the Permanent Possibilities of Sensation; they *remain until we return*;" and, "more than all—they are and will be, after we have ceased to feel, Permanent Possibilities of Sensation *to other beings than ourselves.*" It can hardly be credited, that he can suppose that the difficulty is here touched, much more, answered. What do the phrases, "wherever we go," "when we change our place," "remain till we return," and those favorite "other beings than ourselves" brought in to help us out of the difficulty—what do all these modes of statement imply, excepting that the idea of externality is so necessary, so inwrought into us, that the author can not get rid of

phrases that assume it, even when replying to the objection that he does assume it." All that Mr. Mill can possibly deduce, even supposing his procedure logically valid, is a hypothetical or possible external world; but what he ought to account for is our belief in the *reality* of an external world. His process is ingenious, and proves almost every thing excepting the one point to be proved. It gives us at the best an hypothesis when we want a fact.

6. It is partly implied in what precedes, but is also worthy of distinct notice, that Mr. Mill in all his reasonings on this point, assumes an *a priori* necessity and validity of the law of cause and effect, or invariable antecedence and consequence, which he elsewhere as emphatically denies. His mode of argument has no force, unless the law in question be a necessity of thought, and not merely an induction from facts. He takes for granted a mental necessity of making an inference from certain facts or phenomena to a cause or causes (or antecedents) of the same, which antecedents are not observed, but inferred, and are inferred to be outside of the phenomena, before them, and entirely different from them, so different that he can only give them a name, but knows nothing of their interior nature. All that is observed, directly known, is, certain sensations; what is inferred is certain "Permanent Possibilities of Sensations;" the consequents are known, the antecedents are inferred. If this process, or argument, be a valid one, then we can and must believe in a cause or causes of phenomena, which are no part of our conscious experience, which we never in fact directly perceive. This, now, is leaping the walls of the inductive method at a single bound. We can and must conclude to real causes, which are above and beyond the sphere of the phenomena, and even of another nature or order of existence. If this be not valid, his argument is worthless; if it be valid, the inductive philosophy, and the whole idea of cause (as an observed and invariable antecedent) in that philosophy, are insufficient to account for all our knowledge. The idea of cause is no longer convertible with that of an invariable antecedent. As soon as you come into the sphere of the

"possibilities" of things, you have left that of mere experience, and are on the metaphysical highway of efficient causation. If Mr. Mill be right here (and we think he undoubtedly is), he is wrong in his positive and partial statements about the nature of causation everywhere else. To prove, against the intuitionalist, that our knowledge of external being is acquired, he is obliged to resort to a line of argument which presupposes that our idea of causation is not acquired. From the shifting phenomena of sensation, Mr. Mill concludes to a permanent external cause, entirely different from and independent of the phenomena; he does this, because he must assign a sufficient cause or reason for the facts; and in doing this, he serves the cause of truth by a pertinent example, illustrating the insufficiency of the exclusive inductive method. The clamor of the positivist against the à posteriori proof of the being of God, viz.: that it assigns a cause for the facts and changes of the world, outside of and above the phenomena themselves, is effectually rebutted; since Mr. Mill here argues that we must do the same thing in accounting for a knowledge of the world as external to ourselves. With what grace can he still accuse Hamilton (ii. 37) "of gliding back into the beaten path of the school of thought which, erecting human capacities of conception into the measure of the universe, maintains that *causes must be*, because we are incapable of conceiving phenomena without them." If we are not necessitated by thought to conceive of causes for our sensations, his argument for an external world is baseless; if we are, his objections to this idea of causation are worthless. And whether we are or are not, he is involved in a damaging inconsistency. Thus it is that a denial of the primitive necessities of thought ever revenges itself. Why, in fact, write a book to show how we may and must come to all our ideas in one only way, if there is not a necessity of thought involved in the process and arguments!

In this discussion as to the origin of our idea of external being, we have kept clear of any theory about the nature or essence of matter, whether atomic or dynamic; for this is unes-

sential to the argument. The simple point to be reached is the origin of the idea of an external world, whether it be an immediate perception or an acquired notion. Nor have we entered directly into an investigation of the various theories, known by the technical names of Objective or Subjective Idealism, Natural Realism or Dualism, and Hypothetic (or Cosmothetic) Idealism—though it is the last (substantially Mr. Mill's) which we have been opposing ; and the second which we in substance adopt. But these theories all intermingle the question as to the nature or essence of the external world with that of the origin of our idea of the same. And this nomenclature needlessly embarrasses the discussion, and leads off into ontological speculations, necessary in their place, but not at all needful in considering Mr. Mill's hypothesis on the particular point in debate between the adverse schools of intuition and experience. What we have aimed to show is, that he has not succeeded in proving, that our knowledge of external being is acquired or inferential ; and that no logic, deductive or inductive, warrants his confident assertions. If this knowledge is not an inference, it must be direct or intuitional. The possibility of such a direct knowledge of what is different from the mind or self, we have found foreshadowed in the very knowledge of a sensation with which the inquiry begins—the simplest assumed state of consciousness. As to how much we know about the external world in this way, what properties or qualities (whether extension, or even impenetrability)—these are open questions, and to their solution we may bring any aid from observation and science. But as to the fundamental and decisive question between the intuitional and empirical schools, the very question on which our author risks the contest, finding here the key of the conflict—we claim, not only that he has not shown how the knowledge of external reality can be acquired, but also that no logic, no induction (from the nature and limits of these processes), ever can show this. If this be so, the backbone of the empirical revolt against the natural and permanent belief of mankind is broken. One such positive and undeniable intuition settles the

question between the schools. The maxim of Leibnitz against empiricism still holds good: Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius in sensu, nisi intellectus ipse. *Nisi intellectus ipse*; the intellect remains, ever grandly attesting the priority and superiority of itself. When we renounce its rights, we renounce our immortal birthright.

We had intended to examine some other questions of nearly equal importance, raised in this remarkable examination of Sir William Hamilton's philosophy; such as, the author's application of his "psychological theory" to account for the belief in mind as well as matter—in which, we think, he fairly gives up the case as impossible; the vagueness of his definitions of both mind and matter, as mere "possibilities of sensation or feeling," suggesting real substances which he will not concede; his double deduction of both mind and matter from one and the same class of facts, viz.: sensations, and his defining both mind and matter in about the same way; his Law of Association, as the grand solvent of all our necessary ideas; his views of causation; his attempt at reducing the very laws of thinking, as well as all our ideas, to experience; and several subjects of a kindred nature. But we must dismiss these topics, at least for the present.

We welcome these volumes of John Stuart Mill, not merely as an admirable specimen of polemic skill and candor in sifting the positions of an adverse philosophy, but as helping to bring the great debate between the two counter schools of speculation to a more definite issue and adjustment. The real questions are put into precise statements, and we come closer to the point where we must say Yes or No. The bearing of these metaphysical controversies upon the practical and momentous themes of morals and religion, becomes more evident. For in nobody's mind, least of all in that of a lucid and consecutive thinker, are these metaphysical refinements barren abstractions. They are vitally connected with the thinker's real views about subjects of the highest practical moment. Mr. Mill's "experientialism" results, by an inevitable necessity in a utilitarian theory of ethics, and, to say the least, in a

negative or doubting attitude in respect not merely to the main articles of the Christian faith, but even to the truths embodied in the so-called natural theology. He is cautious and reserved on these points, but no one can fail to see the bearing of his theories. He can indeed censure M. Comte for his too peremptory exclusion of the supernatural from the sphere of possible scientific investigation; but Comte is herein perhaps more consistent with the principles of an exclusively inductive method. Mr. Mill will have the questions about God, miracles, immortality, the supernatural in general, left as "open questions;" for the reason, that some future experience may possibly throw new light upon them; just as he considers it an "open" question, that somewhere or somehow there may be an "experience" which will warrant the conclusion that three and three make seven, and that two parallel lines may be extended until they meet. But as far as present experience and philosophy reach, the stress and pressure of his system tend to negative conclusions on all these points; or, at the utmost, to the simple recognition of a vast and unknown background of possible being,

> "where the circumambient gloom
> But hides, if gods at all, gods careless of our doom."

He argues (i. 258–262), that his metaphysical skepticism about any real substances, such as mind or matter, does not necessarily invalidate the evidence for God, for immortality, for Christianity: And this is certainly conceivable; even a more thorough-going subjective idealism than that which he on these points advocates, may be and has been held, without banishing a belief in the great articles of religion. But this is not where in his system the real pressure of the difficulty comes. It is rather in his theory that all our ideas and knowledge are simply an induction from sensible experience. On such a ground there can not be any valid proof of God, of freedom, of immortality, of any of the truths implied in supernaturalism. On his theory, all of those "sacramental expressions" (as Mr. Mill calls them) by which the human race has

signalized and sealed both its native and its religious beliefs, come to be mere external signs, or convenient names, and lose all their significance as embodying and setting forth spiritual realities and invisible agencies. The *numina* become *nomina*. And this is the last word of a philosophy, which denies those intuitions that are the substance and strength of human reason. It is only as we rest in certain intuitive and fundamental truths, and recognize some strictly necessary laws of thinking, that we can attain to a speculative system, which shall give us "authentic tidings of invisible things," and be in harmony with the permanent religious faith and needs of the human soul.

Art. VIII.—BUSHNELL ON THE ATONEMENT.*

This book upon the doctrine of Atonement will surprise many readers, who know its author as one who for many years worked in evangelical connections. The previous publications of Dr. Bushnell, though exhibiting a strong aversion to scientific statements in theology, and marked by a latitudinarian tendency, had, nevertheless, not extinguished the hope in many well-wishers to him and to truth, that he might ultimately see what the Christian mind has seen upon such high themes, and might rest where the majority of Christendom has rested. This hope had been strengthened by the general tenor of his thinking in his recent works upon "Nature and the Supernatural," and in the "Sermons for the New Life." In these writings, the serious and thoughtful view which the author seemed inclined to take of the great themes of sin, and spiritual regeneration, did much to allay the apprehensions awakened by his earlier speculations respecting the Trinity and Christ's Person. The subject of anthropology is so central, and withal so practical, that agreement here with the general current of religious experience is quite certain to bring about agreement, sooner or later, with the evangelical system generally.

It is in this respect, that we think the conclusion which the author has reached in this work will occasion disappointment. Those who have read the "Sermons for the New Life," and such a discourse in his last volume as that upon the "Wrath of the Lamb," would not be prepared for a treatise like the one before us, which adopts the Socinian position respecting the doctrine of Atonement. In regard to the depth and bondage of sin in the human soul, and the need of spiritual agency in order to

---

* *The Vicarious Sacrifice Grounded in Principles of Universal Obligation.* By Horace Bushnell. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1865.

deliverance from it—in respect to the doctrine of sanctification as distinguished from that of justification—Dr. Bushnell unquestionably adopts much higher and truer views than those of Socinus. But in respect to the tenet of *expiation*, or *satisfaction of justice*, either retributive or governmental, he is as unquestionably in agreement with Socinus. That we deeply regret the position which he has finally assumed, in regard to the most vital truth in the Christian system, we can say with profound sincerity. But the author is not a man who is to be influenced by regrets of this sort. He would probably regard all such utterances as the workings of a weak-mindedness that does not see the whole truth, and would spurn them as an exhibition of that religious cant to which he is uncommonly wide-awake. We shall, therefore, take the book exactly as it stands, without any reference to antecedents, and estimate it upon its own affirmations and denials.

The phrase "vicarious sacrifice," in the history of Opinions, means the suffering of the Son of God, in the place of sinners, to satisfy the demands of justice. Those, consequently, who have rejected this dogma have generally rejected the term "vicarious sacrifice," and have substituted the more general one of "redemption" or "incarnation." Dr. Bushnell holds on upon it, and in the exercise of ingenuity endeavors to show that it does not, in the least, involve the idea of a satisfaction of justice. The doctrine that the judicial claims of law were met by the work of Christ in *any* sense, either the Anselmic or the Grotian, he not only rejects but scouts. We have never read a treatise in which the intense aversion of the mind towards a tenet is more evidently kept at that point where every muscle is stretched to aching, without passing over into convulsions. The writer never becomes violent in his denunciations, but the repressed vehemence in phrase and figure with which he assails the obnoxious tenet, evinces a deep and settled detestation. The impression of the work upon a reader is unquestionably in consonance with his remark, that "if the doctrine of justification by faith, as Luther gave it in his dogmatic record, is the *articula* [*articulus*] *stantis vel cadentis ecclesiæ*, he could more easily see the church fall than believe it." (p. 439.)

This retention of the term "vicarious sacrifice," and its adoption as the title of a work, the aim of which is to extinguish all that evangelical Christendom ever meant by the term, we regard as one of the most objectionable features in the treatise. It conveys the impression that the author will be employed in defending the same truth which is commonly defended in works upon the Atonement. He himself seeks to convey the impression, that he is in sympathy, after all, with those great defenders of the doctrine of vicarious sacrifice, Anselm and Luther. In the Introduction to his treatise he informs the reader, that he had prepared a "carefully studied, historical chapter, showing as accurately as he was able, the precise point of progress which the doctrine has reached," but concluded not to publish it. He, however, is "tempted to review" the doctrine of Anselm, and the Introduction is accordingly devoted to proving, that through the absurd and confused speculations of this schoolman in favor of the theory of strict satisfaction flashes of the theory held by Dr. Bushnell are seen here and there. He remarks that when Anselm gets disentangled, and really comes to himself, "the idea of a penal suffering in Christ, and a satisfaction made thereby to retributive justice, is expressly rejected as a thing too revolting to be thought of." (p. 19.) In proof of this astounding assertion he quotes the following from the *Cur deus homo*: "Where is the justice of delivering to

death for a sinner, a man most just of all men? What man would not be condemned himself who should condemn the innocent for the guilty?" These words Dr. Bushnell has hastily copied without looking at their connection and place in the dialogue. Had he done so, he would have perceived that they are not the sentiment of Anselm, but of his ignorant, yet teachable pupil Boso. They are one of those many objections raised by the *disciple* to the doctrine of a substituted and plenary satisfaction of justice, to which the master gives, in the context, a complete and decisive *reply*. If this is the manner in which Dr. Bushnell reads the fathers and schoolmen to construct the "carefully studied historical chapter," we think that our readers will agree with us, that his prudence in withdrawing it from publicity is commendable. By this method, he could prove that the three friends of Job were in sweet accord with the patriarch, and that Protagoras and Hippias, notwithstanding external differences, yet agree in the depths of their mind with Socrates. But the attempt to prove that Anselm was really in sympathy with a theory of Christ's work that denies its penal element and nature is puerile. It is the first attempt yet made, to our knowledge. Equally futile is the endeavor, in the latter part of the volume (p. 437), to show that Luther was a double man: "viz. a Christian and a theologian;" of whom the former was in full sympathy with the Hartford divine, and the latter with the "theologic contriving." "This he thought he believed; but we are not obliged to believe that he did"—says our author. We should rejoice to see reason for applying this method of reaching the opinions of a writer, to most of Dr. Bushnell's own speculations upon the doctrine of forgiveness of sins through the blood of Jesus Christ.

We regard it, therefore, as not strictly high-minded, to cover up a strenuous and positive attack upon the evangelical faith under a title that would, upon the face of it, convey a different thought, and under a claim to be in real, though not formal, sympathy with the great defenders of vicarious atonement. If the author had expressly informed the world that the movement of his mind in reference to this particular doctrine had finally carried him entirely off and away from the creed of the denomination in which he had lived and labored, and in connection with which he is widely known; if he had in form, as he has in fact, adopted the Socinian soteriology, this would have been setting an example worthy to be followed by all who admire explicitness of statement, as well as freedom of thought.

To show that we have not misapprehended or misstated the dogmatic attitude of Dr. Bushnell, in reference to the doctrine of Atonement, we shall now proceed to examine some of the fundamental positions of his work.

1. The first position antagonistic to the orthodox statement upon this subject is taken in his definition of "vicarious sacrifice." He first defines it negatively, and, after several other negations, asserts that it does not mean that "Christ becomes penally subject to our deserved penalties. This a kind of substitution that offends every strongest sentiment of our nature. He can not become guilty for us. Neither, as God is a just being, can he be any how punishable in our place—all God's moral sentiments would be revolted by that" (p. 41). This excludes all judicial reference in the suffering and death of Christ, and prepares for his positive definition of "vicarious sacrifice," as being "the expense of great suffering and even of death itself," upon the part of Christ, "to bring us out of our sins themselves, and so out of their penalty" (p. 41).

The sacrifice of Christ was made not for the purpose of expiating the guilt of sin, but of removing its pollution. Throughout the whole treatise, sin is contemplated under the aspect of corruption solely; and the function of the Redeemer from sin is that of renovation and sanctification only. The common view which the church believes to be the Scriptural one, is that sin consists of *two* elements; its guiltiness or liability to penalty, and its pollution. Accordingly, the function of a Redeemer from sin must be a double one. He must deliver from both the guilt and the pollution; and this requires that he be, both an atoner and a sanctifier. By his vicarious sacrifice the Son of God accomplishes the first; and by the indwelling Spirit, obtained through his merits and intercession, he accomplishes the second. The justification precedes the sanctification in the order of nature; and the later is impossible except upon the supposition of the existence of the former. No process of cleansing from pollution is possible unless the sting of guilt has first been extracted. Sanctification can not begin, or go on, in a soul still in the hell of remorse. "Whom he (first) justifies, them he also glorifies."

But Dr. Bushnell rejects all this. He assumes that a renewing and sanctifying work can immediately begin and go on in the human soul, without any provision being made in the way of satisfying justice and pacifying conscience for the sins that are past. Cleanse out the pollution itself of sin, and the guilt of sin, if such a thing exists, goes into nonexistence as a matter of course. In the phrase of his definition quoted above, Christ "brings us out of our sins themselves, and *so* out of their penalty." This is no other than the theory of Socinus, viz.: that nothing is needed in order to set the human soul in right relations to God in respect to the past, but to purify it for the future. There is, in fact, no past to be looked after in the method of redemption. There is nothing retrospective, nothing judicial in it.

In harmony with this definition of vicarious sacrifice—a definition clearly of the *lucus a non lucendo* class—the author proceeds still further to explain his view by showing that "vicarious sacrifice" is no such anomalous matter, upon the part of God, as is commonly represented. It is a species of suffering for the good of man which the deity shares *in common* with good angels, and redeemed souls themselves. It is here that his idea obtains its most distinct form and becomes perfectly intelligible, so that no mistake in regard to his meaning is possible. Dr. Bushnell means by vicarious suffering mere *sympathy*, and nothing more. As the mother identifies herself in feeling and suffering with her child's feelings and sufferings, and willingly endures pain and sorrow to deliver it from pain and sorrow, so God does in reference to his creature man. "God himself takes our sinning enmity upon his heart, painfully burdened by our broken state, and travailing, in all the deepest feeling of his nature, to recover us to himself. . . What we call the vicarious sacrifice of Christ is nothing strange as regards the principle of it, no superlative, unexampled, and therefore unintelligible grace. It only does and suffers, and comes into substitution for, just what any and all love will according to its degree. And, in this view, it is not something higher in principle than our human virtue knows. . . . Nothing is wanting to resolve the vicarious sacrifice of Jesus, but the commonly known, always familiar principle of love, accepted as the fundamental law of duty even by mankind" (pp. 47, 48). The love of God, in the method of redemption, accordingly, is represented to be of the same nature with that of the mother towards the child—and thus, confessedly,

has no judicial references or relations; of the same nature with that of a good man towards his ignorant and vicious fellow-man whom he seeks to reclaim—and this, confessedly, involves no satisfaction of the retributive demands of law. Dr. Bushnell distinctly places the Infinite and the Finite in one category, and argues that as in the creaturely relations of mother and child, of man and fellow-man, there is no endurance of suffering for purpose of justice, in the ordinary exercise of benevolence, so in the relation of God to his moral universe, there is no endurance of suffering for purposes of justice, in the exercise of his mercy. The first part of his work is devoted to proving that not only the Son, but the Father, and the Holy Spirit, and good angels, and all redeemed souls are "in vicarious sacrifice." All alike suffer with a sympathetic (but not one of them with a retributive) suffering for the welfare of others; and the only difference between the "vicarious sacrifice" made by God the Father, and that made by John Howard, for example, is one of degree. The *species* is the same in each instance.

The mere statement of such a theory is its refutation. Setting aside all the difficulties which press from the doctrine of the Trinity (for what becomes of the hypostatic distinction between Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, if they stand in the same relation to the vicarious sacrifice?); setting aside all the difficulties which press from the doctrine of God in the abstract (for how, upon this view, can a distinction in kind between God and man be maintained?) the difficulties that press from the Christian experience, to say nothing of Scripture, are enough to stamp it as false. What human soul in all the Christian centuries that was conscious of being redeemed from guilt and sin by the blood of Christ, ever dreamed that that strange and infinite compassion in the Godhead which spared not the Only Begotten, was a feeling of no higher order than that of one creature toward another, and contained no more and no different qualities and elements!

2. A second position taken by the author, antagonistic to the evangelical statement of the doctrine of atonement, is, that Christ was obligated to suffer "in vicarious sacrifice" for the welfare of man. "Do we then assume that Christ, in his vicarious sacrifice, was under obligations to do and suffer just what he did. Exactly this. Not that he was under obligations to another, but to himself. He was God fulfilling the obligations of God." (p. 58.)

The exercise of compassion in the way of salvation through Jesus Christ has by universal consent been denominated "sovereign." "God," says St. Paul, "hath mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will, he hardeneth." Both Calvinists and Arminians agree that God was under no moral necessity, any more than he was under a physical necessity, to save sinners from their own self-will and sin. Grace, by all evangelical schools, is denominated "free." By these terms "sovereign" and "free," is meant, that had God not devised and executed a method of redemption, no stain would rest upon his character. He is as free and unobligated in regard to man's redemption, as he is in regard to those angels who kept not their first estate, and whom "he hath reserved in everlasting chains under darkness, unto the judgment of the great day." If Dr. Bushnell's argument is valid in reference to man's deliverance,—if God in Christ would not be true to the obligations which spring out of his own nature and attributes, had he not entered upon "vicarious suffering" in order to save wretched and sinful man,—then a blot rests upon him for his neglect of the devils. Anything that issues

out of the immanent necessities of the divine nature is universal in its application, and operation. God can not, for illustration, be true to the principle of veracity in his nature, in reference to the seraphim, and not be true to it in reference to the cherubim. And if it be a fact that the moral nature of the deity makes it incumbent upon him to "suffer vicariously" to save mankind, then it makes it incumbent upon him to "suffer vicariously" to save every lost spirit. Nothing is gained by the remark that God in Christ "was not under obligations to another, but to himself." (p. 58.) The liberty of the Divine Being in the exhibition of compassion to the sinner would be as completely nullified by an internal attribute of his own necessitating such exhibition, as by an external right of man demanding it. If Dr. Bushnell can establish the fact that God is under the same obligation to save sinners that he is to be holy, or truthful, then such a phrase as "free and sovereign grace" is absurd.

But this position flows from his preceding one, because it is involved in it. We have seen that the author logically nullifies the distinction between God and man by his assertion, that the former, like the latter, is capable of, and is absorbed in, the same species of sympathetic suffering which one creature feels toward another. "There is a cross in God before the wood is seen upon Calvary; hid in God's own virtue itself, struggling on heavily in burdened feeling through all the previous ages, and struggling as heavily now even in the throne of the worlds." (p. 73.) "God himself, as well out of Christ as in the incarnate person of Christ, incurs a profoundly real suffering,—not physical suffering, as I now speak, yet a suffering more deep than any physical suffering can be. The principal suffering of any really great being, and especially of God, is because of his moral sensibility." (p. 224.) This is a humanization of deity, not in the sense of the Incarnation, in which the two natures remain each unchanged (the divine still divine, and the human still human), but in the sense of the transmutation of one into the other. And the transmutation is not even so noble as that of the old Monophysite, who absorbed and lost the human in the divine. In the scheme before us, the Infinite is transmuted into the Finite, and appears clothed in the same feelings, affections, sympathy, and "vicarious suffering," with a good angel, or a good man. It is, therefore, both natural and logical to place the good God under the same *obligations* with the good creature. As the latter owes it to himself, to sympathize with his suffering fellow-beings and deliver them from their evils, so the former owes it to himself, to sympathize with his suffering and sinful universe, and redeem it from its woes. "God himself is not any better than he ought to be, and the very essence and glory of his perfection is, that he is just as good as he ought to be . . Here then is our first point when we attempt (*sic*) the cross and sacrifice of Christ; we must bring everything back under the common standards of eternal virtue, and we must find Christ doing and suffering just what he ought, or felt that he ought, neither more nor less." (p. 58.)

That such a position as this, which we believe is original with our author, carries its refutation with it, is plain. Our Lord, in enunciating the doctrine of a creature's merit, lays it down that no creature can establish an absolute meritoriousness before the Being who created him from nothing, preserves him in existence, and (in the case of man) redeems him from sin and hell. "When ye have done all those things that are commanded you, say, we are unprofitable servants, we have done that which it was our duty to do." If the theory of Dr. Bushnell be correct, the deity is in the same category in respect to the redemption

of man. He has done that which it was his duty to do; he is an "unprofitable servant," not meriting even the thanks, much less the eternal hymn and hallelujah of those who sing the song of Moses and the Lamb.

3. A third position of Dr. Bushnell totally incompatible with the doctrine of vicarious atonement is found in a distinction which he makes between law before instituted government, and law in instituted government. This, also, is a distinction entirely original with the author. There is nothing like it in the history of opinions, either Pagan or Christian. It is an altogether new invention, and manufactured, as we shall see, to provide for the necessities of his scheme. We are to conceive of law in its absolute and highest form, says our author, as existing prior to any government or legislation. It is God's moral nature abstracted from any statute which he promulgates accompanied with penal sanctions. It is the idea of "right," which is deeper than God's will, which is not constituted by God's will, and to which God's will is itself subject. God's "allegiance to an idea, viz: *right*, was his righteousness—the sum of all perfections" (p. 135.). God is obligated to do "right." This is a law under which He is placed, in common with angels and men. There is no difference between the Creator and the creature, in this respect. Both alike are under law. "The grand primal fact then is, that God's own nature was in law, or crystallizing in eternal obligation, before he became a law-giver, and that he became a law-giver only because he was already in the power of law." (p. 235.) But this idea of "right," to which God and all his rational creatures are alike subject, contains in it *no element of retributive justice.* It is only when God establishes a moral government that he invents retributive justice, and arms law with penal sanctions. He is not necessitated to do this by anything in his essential nature, because, as has been noticed, this nature of his has nothing to do with retribution. It is only for the purpose of enforcing the claims of law *in the government* which he has set up, that he threatens and inflicts penalty; and if he had chosen not to affix any such sanctions and penalties he might have done so (p. 259). In this way, the author so defines the idea of justice, and so arranges it in his scheme, as to deprive it altogether of its absolute and necessary quality in the divine nature, and to make it a merely optional and secondary thing. As such, it requires no satisfaction. It is merely held *in terrorem* over transgressors for the purpose of bringing about their conversion from sin.

For another singularity of Dr. Bushnell's view of instituted law is, that it is a part of the *redemptive* agency itself. It does not merely prepare for the exercise of mercy, but it is a co-factor with mercy, in delivering the soul from sin. Mercy draws the sinner, and instituted law drives him, and between the two he gets into heaven. In consonance with this theory, the author supposes the apostasy of man to occur *previously* to the existence of law in its instituted form. Law with retributive sanctions is not given in and with the creation of a moral agent. Justice, says our author, is not necessary to moral character; it is necessary only in order to polity (p. 260). Consequently, the sinless creature is merely under that idea of "right," to which God himself is subject, and knows nothing of retributive justice, and never will in case he remains sinless. In this state of things, however, "some one or many races of moral natures throw off the impersonal law, and break loose in a condition of unsubjection. Their moral natures compel them to suffer a tremendous shock of recoil. There is a terrible disjunction of order in their parts and powers; so that what they call their soul will be scarcely better than

a wrangle of contrarieties, or cage of growling antipathies. Not that in this fall, or self-undoing, the soul suffers anything which is called justice, under the political analogies. We do not know that it suffers anything in the scale of desert, which is the common notion of justice; we only know that it receives a shock of necessary pain, or disorder, from the violation of an immutable idea that belongs inherently to its moral nature" (p. 242). This is the author's notion of apostasy; and, in this state of things, God brings in law in its *governmental* or *instituted* form, containing the punitive element and armed with terrors and penalties, to help undo the mischief that has been done.

That such an illogical idea of law as this is should have ever entered the brain of a sane man is remarkable. For if writers upon law agree in anything, it is that penal sanctions as necessarily enter into the conception of all law given to a creature as heat does into the conception of fire, or cold into that of ice. They hold it to be impossible even to conceive of law for man without penalty. And yet here is an author who postulates for the race of man in its primitive state, a species of law in which there is nothing punitive. The only possible palliation for such an irrational notion, that we can invent for the writer, is to remind the reader that the sinless creature is supposed to be under the very same law with the sinless Creator; and that the Creator can not be supposed to be liable to penalties. God is not threatened with retribution, and neither, therefore, is his creature.

But this, again, only exposes the intrinsic worthlessness of the whole theory. Dr. Bushnell quietly postulates that the Creator and the creature are under one and the *same* law. The Creator is obligated to do "right," and the creature is obligated to do "right." Therefore, the Creator and creature stand under the same rule of duty. But the sum and substance of the moral law for the creature runs thus: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbor as thyself." This, certainly, is no law for the Lord God himself. By playing with the vague word "right," the author deludes himself. Obedience and love towards a superior are "right" and proper in the instance of the creature; but are neither "right" nor possible in the instance of the Creator. It is the vicious annihilation of the difference between the Infinite and Finite, which here, as throughout the work, lies at the root of this misconception of law. The author does not hesitate to speak, in this connection, of these races of moral natures as "*fellow-natures* with God" (p. 244).

Another difficulty with this notion of punitive law, as distinguished from instituted law, is seen in what our author remarks upon the apostasy which is supposed to occur under it. When moral agents revolt against it, their whole internal state is thrown, he says, into a "nimbus of confusion. For though nothing as yet is contrived in them and the world, to have a retributive reaction, their simply being moral natures will compel them to suffer a tremendous shock of recoil" (p. 240). But how is such an effect to be produced from such a cause as he assigns? If after the violation of law there is no consciousness of amenability to justice, and no sense of its claims, such a recoil in the soul as the author speaks of would be impossible. After eliminating from the human spirit everything of a retributive nature, such a reaction as is described would be as likely to be produced by gunpowder as by anything else. There is no *moral* cause for it, and if there be any such thing, we must seek its efficient in the sphere of matter, rather than of mind.

It is very plain why this arbitrary and fictitious distinction between

absolute and instituted law was invented. Unless the author can get rid of punitive justice as an absolute, necessary, and eternal attribute, he can not reach his conclusion. So long as the idea of justice remains in the common form in which it lies in the human mind, and pervades all the ethical products of the human mind, either in science or literature, so long it will be impossible to evince the rationality of the "moral theory" of the atonement. Hence these postulates and definitions which throw justice into the category of the relative, the contingent, the secondary, the optional. It can then be manipulated to suit the preconceived theory. "If we could but get rid of this *justice*," says Socinus, "even if we had no other proof, that fiction of Christ's satisfaction would be thoroughly exposed, and would vanish." Dr. Bushnell has got rid of it in his book, by the short method of a definition and a distinction; but this is something quite different from dethroning that august principle "whose seat," says Hooker, "is the bosom of God, and whose voice is the harmony of the world."

Our limits do not permit us to enter further upon the positions of this treatise; and there is the less need to do so, after the account we have given of the fundamental principles that lie at the bottom of it. It is easy to see what must be the theory of Christ's work, in case the theorist begins with denying that it has the slightest reference to the attribute of justice, and that it is a work which can not be left undone without a blot upon the divine character. That "justification" must be transmuted into "sanctification," and all forensic acquittal upon the ground of the substituted suffering of the Son of God be denied, follows as a matter of course. Justification is making just,—is "righteoussing," or making righteous. "Christian justification," says Dr. Bushnell, "has no reference whatever to justice under the political analogies, or to any compensation of justice." (p. 427.) The "righteousness" of God which, according to St. Paul, is manifested in the "propitiation" of Christ, is not his retributive justice, but goodness,—and a goodness that is of a most vague and unintelligible species. "When we are justified by faith, we are carried directly back into the recesses, so to speak, of God's eternity,—back of all instituted government, back of the creation, back of the statutes, and penalties, and the coming wrath of guiltness, and all the contrived machineries and means of grace, including in a sense even the Bible itself,—and rested with God, on the base of his antecedent, spontaneous, immutable, righteousness . . . We are thus united to God in the antecedent glories and liberties of his eternal character." (p. 428.) This is an idea of righteousness much like that of the Gnostic, which can not be better expressed than by the term "good nature,"—a quality in which no judicial element is found, and from which it is energetically excluded. The student will be reminded in many parts of this treatise of those views of the holiness of God, of law, and of divine government which played such a part in the schematizing of the Gnostic, and which, had they prevailed over the catholic faith of the Early Church, would have brought even a thicker darkness and a more dreadful licentiousness upon Christendom, than that which resulted from the corruption of the doctrine of justification by the Papal Church. When the punitive quality is taken out of God's righteousness, and his pure and holy justice is converted into mere sentimentality, or, which is the same thing, into mere sympathy with suffering only because it is suffering, all the structures of ethics are thrown into ruins, and the "sty of Epicurus" is soon built upon them. We doubt not that the author of

this treatise supposed himself to be doing good service in its construction; and we have as little doubt that if its views of the divine character and attributes should prevail, it would be the destruction of both natural and revealed religion,—of revealed religion, because the treatise invalidates those first principles of morals and government which are presupposed by revelation, and without which it is impossible either to understand or to justify the revealed system of truth.

The refutation of the views advanced in this work has already been made in the old and long-continued controversy between the defenders and opponents of the doctrine of vicarious atonement. If the literature upon this subject does not already contain an answer to the affirmations and objections of Dr. Bushnell, we are ready to confess that his book is unanswerable. If, for example, his assertion that the sacrifices under the Old Testament economy were none of them expiatory, and that the idea of an expiatory sacrifice is wholly heathen, and not in the least Hebrew (p. 495, sq.); if his yet more sweeping assertion that the idea of expiation is not found in the New Testament, and that the entire Scriptures "exhibit no trace of expiation" (p. 496),—if such affirmations as these, running counter to the whole current of Biblical exegesis, as represented, not by the evangelical critic only, but by the rationalistic, are not abundantly refuted by existing discussions and treatises, then it is useless to open the subject any further. Does not Dr. Bushnell know that one principal reason, probably the determining reason, for the rejection of much of the Old Testament as a divine revelation, by the more learned class of rationalizing exegetes, like Semler, Eichhorn, and Gesenius, was its representation of Jehovah as "a jealous God," "angry with the wicked every day," and its sacrificial system as placatory in its types and ceremonies? These scholars were as competent Hebraists as the author of this work, and were as little likely as he to find the doctrine of expiation in the Old Testament Scriptures, in case it really were not there. Their detestation of the dogma was as intense as his own. But their learning did not permit them to be blinded by their detestation; and they adopted the fair and candid method of taking the Old Testament as they found it, and because they found it full of expiating blood, they rejected its claim to be the inspiration of God. Has Dr. Bushnell never read the tirades of that unlearned and much more pass onate class of critics, represented by Theodore Parker, against the "ugly deity" of the Pentateuch? After all the attack and defence of the Bible as *containing* the doctrine of atonement from beginning to end,—both parties alike conceding this,— has it been reserved for Dr. Bushnell to discover that it has been the defence and attack of a phantom?

A similar remark is suggested by the confidence with which the author propounds his exegesis respecting the meaning of such words as "justice," and "righteousness," occurring in the Pauline Epistles. When a critic, like Fritzsche for example, with no bias in favor of the evangelical tenet, yet, as conceded by all, a thorough philologist and grammarian, finds the doctrine of forensic justification in those passages where our author finds only the doctrine of "righteoussing," can he wonder if his reader craves a longer and more thorough discussion than he has devoted to such key-words? Dr. B. may object, that in this mode of arguing we are merely appealing to authorities, but what is he himself but an authority in this instance? The reader of this treatise, in respect to the use of Scriptural words and phrases, finds little more than the author's *ipse dixit*; and surely it is fair in such a case to inquire who *ipse* is, and to weigh him in the scales with others.

And this brings us to our concluding remark, that this treatise is one of the most dogmatic in its tone, while yet it is a vehement protest against dogmas and dogmatism. The author's cry against "formulas" is unceasing. Henry Heine complained that the spasmodic writing of the novelist Hoffman was "one agonizing shriek in twenty volumes." We have often thought of this phrase in connection with Carlyle's agonizing shriek in twenty volumes upon the virtues of silence; and now it comes up again, upon reading Dr. Bushnell's lamentation over "theologic contrivings," in a treatise which is the most ingenious "contrivance" in theology we have ever seen. And coupled with this positiveness of manner—to which in itself there is not the slightest objection, provided it is supported by depth of insight, and a calm commanding consciousness of truth and power—there is a passionateness of manner, somewhat subdued, yet pervading the entire treatise. It has infected and somewhat vitiated the author's style, which in his previous works, though not untinged with mannerism, was generally pure and racy English. The author's mind is put under a strain by his theory, and this strains his style. In attempting to hold on upon such strong terms as "vicarious sacrifice," "made a curse," "propitiation," etc., while yet the notion of penality must be excluded from them, he is compelled to draw upon his vocabulary and his imagery to the very utmost. His description of the suffering of Christ, and of "God the Father in vicarious sacrifice," oftentimes becomes so forced as to be objectionable not merely upon rhetorical but religious grounds. He speaks, for example, of "the soul of Jesus just reeling into death" (p. 229); as if it were the blind uncertain plunge of an earthly hero into the great gloom, instead of the calm, and majestic departure of Him who came from God, and went to God, who had power to lay down his life, and power to take it again.

As we said in the beginning of our notice, so we say again in its close, we sincerely regret the position to which Dr. Bushnell has finally come. There is such a thing as vital truth, and such a thing as fatal error, in regard to the central dogma of the Christian system. We believe, with the mass of Christendom in all ages, that the evangelical statement of the doctrine of Atonement contains the former, and the Socinian statement contains the latter; and the differential between these two lies in the piacular element in Christ's work. The publication of any treatise of any human creature can not, of course, make any material difference in the total history of the Christian religion and church. The individual man, and the individual treatise, is a bubble in the ocean, and in reference to them both it may be said, that the purposes of God will reach their consummation *nolens volens*. In this sense, it is certain that "we can do nothing against the truth, but for the truth." But while the doctrine of forgiveness through the expiating blood of the Son of God does not need the support of any individual, the individual needs the support of the doctrine, and in this reference we sincerely regret that the author, and that circle who may be influenced by him, are building their house upon the sand. W. G. T. S.

Art. IX.—CRITICAL NOTES ON RECENT BOOKS.

THEOLOGY.

History of Rationalism; embracing a Survey of the Present State of Protestant Theology, By the Rev. John F. Hurst, A. M. With Appendix of

Literature. New York: Scribner, 1865. pp. 623. The author of this volume, we understand, is a minister of the Methodist church, who has spent some time in Germany pursuing studies in relation to this History. The work bears throughout the marks of diligent study, and shows that the writer has taken a wide range of investigation. For the most part he is candid and just in his estimate of the theological and philosophical tendencies of rationalism. About half of the volume is devoted to the development of German rationalism, which he traces back to some of the earlier divergencies in the Lutheran theology, and portrays through its multiform changes down to the present time. There is a marked difference in the treatment of different phases of this movement; the older rationalists, Kant, Schleiermacher and his school, and Strauss are most fully treated; Baur and Hegel are dismissed with a somewhat curt notice. The same History is presented in its successive stages in Holland, France, Switzerland, England, and this country. Thus the field traversed is a pretty broad one, leaving at several points certain *desiderata* to be supplied; yet affording on the whole a wide and fair view of all the various latitudinarian and rationalistic tendencies. The work is not so much the fruit of original study, as a diligent compilation from other histories covering the same ground. It will answer in many respects a very useful purpose, as a preliminary and popular survey of a subject of absorbing and increasing interest. Extracts from other writers give variety to the points of view. The style is in general lucid, though here and there it stands in need of a judicious pruning. The Appendix of Literature is a useful addition.

The Person of Christ: the Miracle of History.—With a Reply to Strauss and Renan, and a Collection of Testimonies of Unbelievers. By Philip Schaff, D. D., Boston: American Tract Society. pp. 375. This work grew out of an address on the *Moral Character of Christ;* but it is very much enlarged, and made more complete and convincing as an argument. The object is to show, that the strongest evidence for Christianity is found in the Person of Christ, as this appears in the Gospels and in history. It is an excellent treatise, written in a popular and impressive style. The false theories about Christ are fairly stated and refuted with cogent arguments. The collection of Testimonies of Unbelievers is a new attempt, and well handled. The book can not fail to be of great use, and it ought to be widely circulated to counteract many present unbelieving tendencies. The English of the author is singularly idiomatic for a foreigner. He uses, however, we notice, the words "realness" and "universalness," instead of "reality" and "universality."

History of Protestant Theology. (Geschichte d. Prot. Theologie.) By Gustav Frank. 2d Part. From Calixt to the Philosophy of Wolf. Leipsic, 1865., pp. 410. The first volume of this work was published in 1862. This second volume is divided into three heads: 1. Syncretism (of Calixtus), Salmurianism (the School of Saumur), and Philosophical Emancipation. 2. Pietism and Cocceianism. 3. Critics, Free Thinkers and Philosophers. The time embraced is about a century. The work is animated and thorough; on the whole, perhaps, the most interesting sketch of Protestant Theology we have yet had—more condensed and graphic than the volumes of Gass. A large space is given to the Reformed Theology in France and Holland. The School of Saumur (Cameron, Amyraut, Placæus, Pajon, etc.) is well described. The Federal Theology of Holland (Cocceianism) is also quite elaborately portrayed. In style and

method the author somewhat resembles Hase; he is also a Professor at Jena.

Essays on the Supernatural Origin of Christianity, with Special Reference to the Theories of Renan, Strauss, and the Tübingen School. By Rev. George P. Fisher, M. A. Professor of Church History in Yale College. New York: Scribner. 1866. pp. 586. This able volume discusses in thirteen essays the following topics: 1. The Nature of the Conflict with Skepticism and Unbelief; 2. The Genuineness of the Fourth Gospel; 3. The Origin of the First Three Gospels; 4. Baur on Parties in the Apostolic Church and on the Book of the Acts; 5. Baur on Ebionitism and Early Christianity; 6. Strauss's Mythical Theory; 7. Strauss's Restatement of his Theory; 8. The Legendary Theory of Renan; 9. Theodore Parker's Critical Opinions; 10. Baur and Strauss on Paul's Conversion; 11. Nature and Function of the Christian Miracles; 12. Testimony of Jesus concerning Himself; 13. The Personality of God in Reply to the Positivist and Pantheist. Several of these Essays have been previously published in various religious quarterlies (one of them is our own); but they are republished in an enlarged and improved form, and with important additions. The work is timely; the questions it raises are widely entertained, and are of vital import. Professor Fisher handles them in the spirit of a true Christian scholar. He understands them; he has studied them; he knows their difficulties; and he is competent to grapple with them. The best view of some of these topics, to be found in E glish theological literature (for example, the theories of Baur) is contained in this volume. The author is eminently candid; there is no evasion of difficulties; and his replies commend themselves to the reader's most sober and reasonable convictions. The style is lucid, and the arrangement orderly. Professor Fisher has the rare art of saying and doing just enough to establish his points, and not venturing into any rash or needless positions. We heartily commend his work. It deserves a cordial welcome and a wide circulation.

Voices of the Soul answered in God. By Rev. John Reid. New York: Carters. 1866. pp. 374. We wish to commend this work again to the attention of our readers. It is warmly praised by those whose judgment is discriminating. It is a consecutive and able argument for Christianity, under the subjective aspect, as meeting man's wants at the most vital points. It is also very well written; in a clear, manly and direct sty.e.

BIBLICAL LITERATURE.

Explication de l'évangile selon Saint Jean. Par J. F. Astié. Genève, Paris: 1864. pp. 680. This elaborate work contains a Preface, setting forth the special reasons for selecting the Gospel of John to meet the religious wants of the age; an Introduction, in which the authenticity of this Gospel is conclusively argued against recent objections; a New Translation, with an exposition and notes; and, in fine, an Appendix on various theological and critical points, raised in connection with this Gospel. It is a work which has for years been growing in the author's mind, the fruit of a conviction, that thorough exegetical studies were among the best means of reviving an interest in Christianity among the French Protest nts, in the midst of their present crisis. The author is a pupil of Vinet, of whose works he has given, in two volumes, a valuable systematic synopsis, in the form of extracts. For several years he

has been a Professor in the Academy at Lausanne, where his evangelical influence has been strongly felt. He has also written a History of the United States, of which we have spoken under another head. This work on John will give him an honorable place among the interpreters of the New Testament. It is intended for general, rather than for strictly scholastic use. While it rests on exact philological study, the minutiæ of such study are not protruded upon the attention of the reader. His evident purpose is to reproduce faithfully the exact sense of the original, so as to present a faithful portraiture of the life and sayings of our Lord, in a form adapted to make the most convincing impression upon the indifferent and the skeptical. His whole exposition is pervaded by a reverential and truth-loving spirit, less anxious to conform to the demands of tradition than to arrive at truth in its purity and simplicity.

One of the more valuable parts of the work is the Introduction, in which the authenticity of the Gospel is carefully investigated. This, as is well known, is a central point of discussion, especially in the more recent German criticism. M. Astié goes over, with candor and accuteness, all the points and objections raised by Strauss, Baur and his school, Colani, Reuss and others, and shows their insufficiency to countervail the strong evidence in favor of our Gospel.

In the body of the work, we have first a new and excellent translation of each section (in his division), followed by an interpretation and notes. He makes four parts to the Gospel: 1. Prologue, ch. i; 2. Manifestation of the Glory of Christ; the Hostility and Sympathy which he arouses, ch. ii.–xii.; 3. Glorification of Jesus by means of his Death, xiii.–xx.: 4. Epilogue; Jesus in Galilee; ch. xxi.

In the Appendix various points of critical interest are more fully discussed; as, The Prologue, the Calling of the Disciples in relation to the Synoptists, the Conversation with Nicodemus and with the Samaritan woman, the Brothers of Jesus, the Discourses of Jesus as narrated by John, etc.

What most strikes us in this commentary is the skill with which this old and ever fragrant Gospel is shown to be adapted to the precise wants of the men of this century. It tends to elevate our views of the whole person and work of Christ, and his fitness to the spiritual wants of all generations.

This work of Professor Astié, taken in connection with Godet's larger commentary on the same Gospel, which we noticed in our last number, is a refreshing indication of a revival of Biblical studies in the French Evangelical Churches. This is very much needed, as will appear from a summary of all that has been done among them during the last fifty years, which we condense from an article by Prof. Ponier (Gaussen's successor at Geneva), in the *British and Foreign Evangelical Review*. In French Switzerland, Professor Gaussen set on foot a French version of the Bible, which is now continued by Dr. de la Harpe. M. Penet Gentil's version of the Old Testament is much esteemed. A "conscientious scholar" of Geneva has published a translation of the New Testament from the Vatican MS. with the aid of the Alexandrine. M. Arnaud in France has made a translation of the New Testament; and a complete translation of the Bible is in progress "though with too much negation." As to sacred criticism, Reuss of Strasbourg has written an *Introduction to the New Testament*, in German, not translated into French; a *History of Christian Theology in the Apostolic Times*; a *History of the Canon*. Cellerier's *Hermeneutics*; Gaussen on *Theopneusty* and the *Canon* (2 vols.); and Arnaud on

Jude; Rilliet on the *Philippians*, said to be "excellent;" Prof. Oltramann of Geneva on *Romans*, unfinished; Sardinoux on the *Galatians*; Bonnet and Baud's practical commentary on the *New Testament*; Arnaud's concise notes on the same; De Mestral's practical works on *Genesis*, *Exodus* and the *Psalms*; Dahler on *Jeremiah*; and some popular works by Burnier and Guers—exhaust the whole list. A history of the *Bible in France* by Emmanuel Pétavel, just published, is well spoken of; Guizot writes that he "has learned much from it."

The Prophecies of Isaiah, Translated and Explained. By Joseph Addison Alexander, d. d. 2 vols. Edinburgh and New York; Charles Scribner. 1865. pp. 492, 482. This convenient edition of Dr. Alexander's well-known and ablest exegetical work, is published under the editorial supervision of Dr. Eadie of Glasgow. Dr. Alexander's manuscript alterations and corrections have been used, and numerous errors in the printing have been rectified. The work was first published in 1846–7, in two volumes of unequal size. That edition is quite out of print; and this new edition is necessary to meet the demand for what may perhaps be regarded as the ablest philological work on an Old Testament book, which this country has produced. Upon the whole, it is regarded by many of the best scholars as the best commentary on "the evangelical prophet," free from the destructive tendencies of German neology, yet a work of the most thorough scholarship. It is a capital specimen of solid work. It is also strict commentary, not interlarded with practical reflections and homiletic inferences, but intended to get at the exact sense of the original, and there leave the matter. Dr. Alexander was every way a remarkable man. His comparatively early death was such a loss to the Christian scholarship of this country as can hardly be made good. This work is the richest product of his scholarship, and in this new edition is destined to exert a still wider influence than before.

A Concise Dictionary of the Bible, comprising its Antiquities, Biography, Geography, and Natural History: being a Condensation of the Larger Dictionary. By William Smith, LL. D. Boston: Little, Brown and Co. 1865. 8vo. Double columns. pp. 1039. In its plan and general execution, this is a model Bible Dictionary for popular use. The larger Dictionary of Dr. Smith is skillfully condensed by Mr. William A. Wright, Librarian of Trinity College, Cambridge, and brought into a form adapted to the wants of all who wish to see the results of the latest investigations in whatever pertains to the Bible. It can not fail to have, as it abundantly merits, a wide circulation. For most persons it will be found more convenient than the larger work, and it has an advantage over it in some matters of detail, and in the correction of several errors. The important articles on the Church, Anti-Christ, Baptism, Excommunication, etc., which were thrown into the Appendix of the former work, are here introduced in their proper places. The abridgments appear to us, so far as we have been able to compare the two works, to be made with sound judgment and in a scholarly way. Prolonged narratives and discussions, the literature of the topics, and like matters, are necessarily omitted, but the subjects and facts (with few exceptions) are retained, and put into convenient shape for use. Some of the articles (e. g. Chronology, Canon, Old Testament, New Testament, Palestine, Jerusalem, and those on the particular books of the Bible) are excellent examples of compressed learning. The historical and geographical articles show familiarity with recent investigations. Among the contributors are the

names of several American writers; and Dr. Robinson's R: searches are constantly used as an authority.

Of course, in such a work, embracing more than sixty different contributors, there will be a great variety of opinions, and some of them not entirely consistent with each other. Some of the views do not wholly conform to the general tradition, or the stricter interpretation of the Scriptures. But this was to be expected, from the plan of the work, which allows to each contributor the expression of his individual convictions. The general tone of the book, however, is reverential as well as scientific. The abundant illustrations, and the whole mechanical execution of the work, are excellent. The price too, is moderate; six and a half dollars. The American publishers, in having this edition prepared for a wide circulation in this country, have shown their usual judgment and enterprise.

Expository Thoughts on the Gospels. St. John. Vol. i. John C. Ryle. B. A. New York: Carters's. 1866. We like this the best of any of the author's expository works; it is more thoroughly studied than the preceding, and affords more help to students. At the same time it is earnest, practical, and searching.

Commentary on the Gospel of St. John. By E. W. Hengstenberg, D. D. Translated from the German. 2. 8vo. Edinburgh. T. & T. Clark. 1865. pp. 546, 541.

Joshua, Judges, Ruth. Being Vol. IV. of Keil and Delitzsch's *Commentary on the Old Testament.* Translated by Rev. Jas. Martin. Edinburgh: Clarks. 1865. pp. 494.

An Exposition of the First Epistle of John. By James Morgan, D. D., of Belfast. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1865. pp. 528.

These four solid volumes of Biblical exposition are all issued by one firm in Edinburgh, who seem bent upon transferring to the English language the best works of the modern German evangelical theology. Besides the numerous works already published, they announce, Keil and Delitzsch on Samuel; Delitzsch on Job and Hebrews, and his Biblical Psychology; Schmid's New Testament Theology; Martensen's Dogmatics; Harless' Christian Ethics, and Ritter's Palestine and Syria—all of them excellent treatises. They also announce a Library of the Ante-Nicene Fathers, in about 16 volumes, edited by A. Roberts, D. D., and James Donaldson, to consist of translations of all the Post-Apostolic Writings before the Council of Nicæa, excepting the Commentaries of Origen; and these, too, will be given if there is sufficient encouragement. Such publishers deserve a liberal patronage. Their works are all regularly received and for sale by Mr. Chas. Scribner, from whom we have the above volumes.

Dr. Hengstenberg's Commentary on the Gospel of John has already taken rank in Germany as one of the ablest commentaries on this central Gospel. It is not so minute in philological criticism as the work of Lücke, nor so concise and suggestive as Tholuck's interpretation; but it grapples with the difficulties fearlessly and for the most part successfully; throws new light on many passages; illustrates the Gospel at length (and more than others) from a comparison with the Old Testament, and is filled with rich evangelical instruction. It is high praise to say of it, that in many important respects it supplements any of the commentaries which we now have. Hengstenberg is always original, and often opinionated,

as an exegete ; but he stimulates the mind to fresh explorations, and deepens our sense of the majesty and authority of the Sacred Scriptures.

The work of Keil and Delitzsch on Joshua, Judges and Ruth, supplies a want in our exegetical literature, and does it in a very satisfactory manner. It is thoroughly critical in its character, and yet conservative in its spirit. An excellent analysis of the contents precedes the exposition ; Introductions to the different books investigate the questions of their origin and authorship ; and the different points are handled in a candid and reasonable spirit, with deference to the Divine Word. This work and the preceding are better translated than some of the earlier volumes of Clark's Foreign Library.

Dr. Morgan is already favorably known by a treatise on the Scripture Testimony to the Holy Spirit. His Commentary on the first Epistle of John consists of a series of practical Lectures, exhibiting the fruits rather than the processes of investigation. It brings to light the rich veins of instruction contained in the Epistle, all centering in the Person of our Lord, and in the inculcation of brotherly love. Such meditations are adapted to elevate and quicken our faith in the fundamental facts and duties of the Gospel. And the lack of commentaries on this Epistle will draw attention to this edifying exposition.

PHILOSOPHY.

An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy. By JOHN STUART MILL. 2 vols. Boston : William V. Spencer. 1865.

The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte. By JOHN STUART MILL. Boston : W. V. Spencer. 1866. Of the former of these works we have given a full account in a previous article. The essay on Comte is reprinted from two articles in the *Westminster Review*, where they attracted a wide attention from the celebrity of the two thinkers, and from the remarkable clearness and discrimination with which the Positive Philosophy of Comte was analyzed and criticized. No better compendious view of this system has been produced. Both its merits and defects are impartially signalized. For while Mr. Mill agrees with M. Comte in his fundamental principles—that "we have no knowledge of anything but phenomena ; and that our knowledge of phenomena is relative, not absolute ; " and that all the objects of science are "the resemblances and sequences of phenomena ; " he disagrees with him on many points of arrangement and detail, and in several applications of his general views. He is also less positive in respect to the bearing of the theory on religious truth, saying, "that the Positive mode of thought is not necessarily a denial of the supernatural ; it merely throws back that question to the origin of all things."

The second article on M. Comte's Later Speculations, in his "Treatise on Sociology," while admitting the value of many of the Frenchman's generalizations and investigations, pours unsparing ridicule upon his fanciful theories, which culminated in an absurd system of worship of the Collective Humanity—a caricature of the Catholic breviary. Mr. Mill's keen irony shows up this strange medley in all its grotesque features.

These volumes are brought out by Mr. Spencer in a handsome and convenient style. He has also collected the various essays and articles of Mr. Mill, including the famous one on Utilitarianism, in three volumes.

Elements of Political Economy. By ARTHUR L. PERRY, Professor in Will-

iams College. New York: Scribner. 1866. pp. 449. Professor Perry simplifies Political Economy by defining it, with Whately, as "the science of exchanges," or "the science of value." Value is determined by various causes, chiefly, "two desires and two efforts;" it is not an independent quality, but "a relation of mutual purchase between two things." The whole treatise is well and simply arranged, in a way adapted to the wants of students. The various topics are discussed with clearness and ability. In respect to free-trade the author evidently belongs to the most advanced school of political economists. Many of the chapters, as, on Currency, Credit, Taxation, the Tariffs, and Foreign trade, are written with special reference to American affairs. The book is published in very good style.

Zeitschrift für Exacte Philosophie.—This periodical, devoted to the philosophy of Herbart, edited by Allihn and Ziller, begins its 6th volume with fresh zeal. Among the subjects of the later parts are, Allihn on Herbart's Reform of Ethics; Thilo on Kant's Philosophy of Religion; Allihn, in reply to Trendelenburg's criticism of Herbart; and reviews of recent philosophical publications. This philosophical school is doing some good service in opposition to the extreme idealistic tendencies of modern German speculation.

The Hegelian periodical, *Der Gedanke*, edited by Michelet, the organ of the Philosophical Society of Berlin, has also entered upon its 6th volume. Among the chief recent articles are, Extracts from Michelet's new work, soon to be published, on the Law of Nature, or the Philosophy of Jurisprudence: an interesting review of Plato's Aesthetics, on the basis of Sträter's recent work on the subject, which is highly praised by the reviewer, Boumann; New Studies on Rousseau; a Report of Discussions in the Philosophical Society on the Unity of the Race, and on the Theory of Sensation, introduced by essays on these topics by Schultzenstein; Letters on Italian Philosophy by Sträter; a review of Strauss's Christ of Faith by Michelet. Several sessions of this Berlin Society have been occupied with animated discussions on Man's Freedom in relation to Necessity; these discussions started from a series of theses or propositions, laid down by Dr. Tappan, late President of the Michigan University, who attended these sessions of the Berlin Society and ably advocated his views against the Hegelians. This periodical relieves its abstract discussions by notices about persons, and correspondence from various quarters.

The *Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, edited by Fichte, Wirth and Ulrici, has completed its 47th volume. This journal rather represents the *juste milieu* of German philosophy, avoiding the extremes of all the schools, but maintaining the value and necessity of thorough philosophical investigations. Besides reviews and a philosophical (semi-annual) bibliography, the last volume has articles by Fichte on Naturalism or Theism in Relation to the Natural Sciences; God and the World by E. Wedekind; the Divisions and Organism of Philosophy by Weisse; the Great Question of the Philosophy of Religion (in relation to Christ) by Sederholm; the Self-Contradictions of Materialism by C. Wiener.

Recent British Philosophy: a Review with Criticisms. By David Masson. London and Cambridge: Macmillan and Co. 1865. pp. 414. The substance of this work was delivered in the form of lectures at the Royal Institution; the additions consist chiefly of comments on Mr. Mill's examination of Sir William Hamilton's philosophy. The lectures give an

animated picture of most of the recent philosophical discussions, especially of the great battle between the empirical and transcendental schools of thought. Many fruitful criticisms and suggestions are interspersed. The author writes with vigor and talent, and though his statements may sometimes seem to lack precision and sharpness, yet they give a good insight into the questions now most debated. His arrangement of the topics is into three main differences: the psychological difference, concerning the origin of ideas, intuitions etc.; the cosmological difference, respecting the reality and constitution of the external world: the ontological difference, as to the possibility of knowing and philosophizing about the ultimate modes of being, the Infinite and Absolute. One of the best parts of the book is the criticism on Mill's recent work, to which Professor Masson assigns a high rank, though he opposes with force and skill the fundamental principles of Mill's scheme. Bain, Spencer, Ferrier, Mansel, the Swedenborgians, the Comtists, and Carlyle and Tennyson, come in for their share of the comments. The author reduces the opposing systems to "the alternative of *Nihilism* or *Summation in an Absolute.*"

HISTORY.

Manethôs: die Origenes unserer Geschichte und Chronologie. Von Dr. Anton Henne von Sargans. Gotha: Perthes. 1865. Royal 8vo. pp. 275. With a Synoptic Table of Ancient Chronology, admirably executed. Dr. Henne von Sargans was Professor of History at St. Gallen and Berne, 1834 to 1855, and Dean of the Philosophical Faculty at Berne, 1847 to 1850. He has been long engaged in laborious studies, centering in the documents of Manetho; in 1836 he published at St. Gallen, *Historical Tables*, and in 1837 a work on the *Pharaohs of Egypt*, in which he undertook to restore Manetho, out of the fragments which have come down to us. These labors received the approval of Fallmerayer, the well known orientalist, to whose memory the present work is dedicated.

This volume is a laborious and sifting comparison of all that is found in ancient writers, pertaining to the earlier history and the diffusion of mankind. Some of its results, if thoroughly established, will go far towards revising the statements and methods most in vogue in our current histories, giving to the scheme or chart of early history a new aspect. The spirit of the author is reverential; he has no zeal in the destruction of established beliefs, and aims at the conciliation of the Biblical narrative with the statements of other historians. Yet he is evidently of the opinion that the ancient chronology is by no means brought to definite results; and he assigns to the early Biblical records too low a place.

Some of the interesting and important points which Dr. Henne seeks to establish are these: the Thirty Dynasties of Manetho were not collateral, but successive; the Babylonian and Syrian Kings to the time of Sardanapalus, the Damascenes mentioned by Justin, and the Inachides of Argos, are identical with the great monarchs of the Nile. He thinks that he has found the key to the perplexed Egyptian chronology. The thirty dynasties, ending 350 B. C., he traces back to Menes, making 375 kings in a period of 6,117 years; in this coming near to the reckoning of Herodotus. One of his most curious points, not fully established, is, that the Biblical narrative begins with the second book of Manetho; the first book having been made way with by some persons opposed to the Babylonians and Egyptians. This lost first book had to do with the builders of the pyramids, and the first six dynasties, comprising forty-

eight successors of Menes, through a period of 1500 years. The second book of Manetho relates in part to the first ten Biblical patriarchs, to whom Berosus refers as the same with the first ten Babylonian Kings.

One of the most interesting and valuable parts of this volume is the re-investigation of a point, stated both by Herodotus and Strabo, that the Phrygians and Armenians (in fact, all the white inhabitants of Asia Minor) had a European origin in the mountains of Macedonia and on the banks of the Danube. This point is elucidated by an extensive examination of names and popular legends. These eastern people are supposed to be descended from a primitive and ante-historic people, belonging to the region of "the hyperborean Atlas," from which the Eridanos descends in four arms. Humboldt's theory of a prehistoric emigration from west to east is thus supposed to be confirmed; viz. of the Atlantes and Amazons or Aryans to Asia, where they founded many cities. "The Manes of these people appears in Armenia as Adam, and in India as Manus." The primitive population of these Asiatic regions is supposed to have been barbarous, and to have received civilization from this European immigration.

Notwithstanding several points, which seem to us to be far from firmly established, the researches of the industrious author are worthy of a careful examination. The fragmentary and disconnected character of some of the discussions now and then prevents a clear view of the progress of the argument. But a good deal of the obscurity is owing to the uncertain character of the facts, which hardly admit, in the present state of investigation, of a perfectly coherent junction. The work is brought out in good style.

History of England from the Fall of Wolsey to the Death of Elizabeth. By James Anthony Froude, M. A. Vols. III, IV. New York: Chas. Scribner. 1865. pp. 480, 508. If it had been asked, what character in English history it would be most difficult to redeem from obloquy, most persons would probably have replied, that of Henry the Eighth; and yet no one can rise from the perusal of these striking volumes of Mr. Froude without confessing, that he has succeeded even here in disarming prejudice of many of its data. It is a new contribution to history, resting on a thorough study of the original documents. The style is clear and racy. The order of events is well marshaled, without material omissions, and without confusion. The descriptions of national and personal character are well drawn. The narrative is straight-forward, clear, and animated. Mr. Froude possesses, in fact, many of the best qualities of a historian in an eminent degree. And he inevitably brings his readers into close sympathy with his own views. If he has any purpose, besides that of giving an impartial view of the facts, he never lets us suspect it.

He is also in thorough sympathy with his main subject, the rise and progress of the English reformation. We see why it was retarded, and how it advanced. We estimate, better than before, all the difficulties in the way, and what patience and courage were needed to surmount these difficulties. For England was not prepared for the reform as was Germany: in the former country it was less a popular movement, springing from deeply felt religious needs, than in the latter. But it struck its roots deeper and produced in the end a better harvest.

Mr. Froude succeeds in palliating many of the sins and faults of Henry VIII, though he can not free him in his private character and relations from much of the censure, which his sensuality and extravagance and im-

periousne s deserved. But he does succeed in exhibiting him in his public acts and relations in a much more favorable and conspicuous light than we should have supposed possible. He shows that, after all, it was Henry's mind and will which carried through the beginnings of reform; whi h gave to England its English Bible; which brought Ireland and Scotland under English sway: which curbed nobles and bishops, and raised up the Commons to their rightful authority: which made England strong enough to break loose from the papacy and to defy the machinations of France and the German Empire. He sowed the seeds from which sprang England's independence and supremacy. He began the work which culminated under Elizabeth.

Every student of history can learn much from these volumes: no student of history can afford to neglect them. They are published in the best style.

Histoire de la République des Etats-Unis. Par J. F. Astie. Préface par Laboulaye. 2 Tomes. Paris. 1865. pp. 478, 589. Of Professor Astié's commentary on the Gospel of John, we have given some account on a previous page. For this History of the United States he has some special qualifications. He resided several years in this city, faithfully ministering to a French congregation, and then began his preparations for this work, which is now published in the midst of events that could not at that time have been foreseen. But it is none the less apparent, that through our whole previous history we have been preparing for the consummation which is now upon us. The whole argument of this work shows, that the spirit of the Protestant religion in its most austere type, that of Puritanism, and the spirit of liberty, are the two main elements out of which this republic has been fashioned. Laboulaye insists upon this in his admirable preface, commending these volumes to the public attention: "There is no person," he writes, "who in closing this new history of the United States will not cry out: 'This civilization came from the Gospel;' there is no one who will not judge American institutions with a far different eye from that with which they are now generally regarded." "America has resolved the problems on which we are now at work in the Old World." And then he goes on and enumerates, in four points, the lessons which America may teach Europe: viz. the relation of church and state, popular education, the freedom of the press, and "centralization."

M. Astié's work, notwithstanding a certain disparity in the treatment of our earlier and our later history, is undoubtedly the best history of our republic, the most carefully studied exhibition of the unity and progress of that history, as all in one line of progress, which has yet been produced in either France or England. He has the first requisite of a good historian; he is in hearty sympathy with the country whose fortunes he narrates. All, too, is viewed as proceeding primarily from the religious elements, implanted in our earliest colonization. The spirit of Puritanism, freed from its exclusiveness, and applied to civil life and institutions, has produced our signal career. The colonial history of all the colonies, and their relation to the English government, are fully and fairly exhibited. Several chapters are devoted to Roger Williams, and his first proclamation of entire freedom of conscience. The faults as well as the vigor of the New England "theocracy" are carefully exhibited. The minuteness of detail on most of the earlier events make this history quite complete for consultation. Then the War of Independence

is described, and our political history to the election of Abraham Lincoln. The contest with slavery in all periods of our history, down to the ushering in of the late rebellion, is carefully narrated; and it is shown, that the whole pressure of our history, the whole force of the principles in which this country was cradled and nurtured, the whole tendency of our religious and civil ideas, run into that final contest, whose end was not reached, when the last pages of this able work were composed. We commend it cordially to our readers. At some future time we may recur to it more fully.

Sherman's March Through the South, With Sketches and Incidents of the Campaign. By Capt. David P. Conyngham. New York: Sheldon and Co. 1865. pp. 431. This is a picturesque description of a campaign, which will long be memorable in the annals of war. The author was a correspondent of the the New York Herald, and "a volunteer aid-de-camp," from March 1864, when he joined the army at Chattanooga, to the surrender of Johnston's army to Sherman. He was present at all the engagements, and gives a vivid account of the progress of events, with many interesting sketches of Southern life. An Appendix contains a sketch of General Sherman's life and other documents. The book is one of the most readable histories of this extraordinary campaign.

BIOGRAPHY.

Personal Reminiscences of the Life and Times of Gardiner Spring, D. D., 2 vols. Scribner and Co. 1866. The reputation of the author, and the high interest of the topics on which he writes, will attract unusual attention to these Personal Reminiscences. Dr. Spring has borne a prominent part in the doctrinal, ecclesiastical, and religious movements and controversies of the past fifty years, and here gives us his final judgment. He describes, in a most interesting manner, his early life, his father and mother, his training for the ministry, the theological divergencies of Calvinists and Hopkinsians, the "Principle and Exercise Schemes," the circumstances attending the founding of Andover Seminary, the New Haven Theology, the conflicts and rupture of the Presbyterian Church; he also has chapters on Revivals, Fanaticism in Revivals, Domestic and Foreign Missions, the Bible Society and its controversies, the Sabbath Reform, the Southern Rebellion, and on many incidents in his own life and ministry. The reasons for his own course in many of these trying conflicts are candidly presented. On some points of theology, and questions of reform, he acknowledges a change of views, as the result of his long experience. He still testifies against the exscinding acts of the Assembly and looks forward with hope to a healing of these unhappy breaches. Some of the letters he publishes put a new face on old matters. It is a most interesting work, describing one of the most useful and prolonged ministries in our church. We regret that, having received it just as we go to press, we can not enter into more full details.

The Life and Character of J. H. Van der Palm, D. D. *Sketched by* Nicholas Beets. *Translated from the Dutch by* Rev. J. P. Westervelt. (With ten sermons of Van der Palm, translated by the same). New York: Hurd and Houghton. 1865. pp. 401. Dr. Van der Palm was born in 1763, and died in 1840. For thirty years he was the chief ornament of the University of Leyden. As a pulpit orator he stood confessedly at the head of the Dutchmen of his times. His attainments in ori-

ental literature (of which he was Professor) were high, though he did not enter with zest into the methods of modern criticism. He published nine volumes of sermons and essays on "Solomon;" a new translation of the Bible into Dutch; an edition of the Bible with notes for the people; Historical Memorials relating to the Restoration of the Netherlands—considered a masterpiece of historical composition; and a large number of volumes of essays, discourses, orations and sermons. The list of his published works fills eight pages of this memoir.

We welcome the account of such a man and such a life, as a valuable addition to ecclesiastical and general biography. The memoir by Dr. Beets gives an excellent and simple narrative of his eminent career. It introduces us to the social and university life of Holland, of which we know too little. Accounts are interspersed of some of Dr. Van der Palm's teachers, cotemporaries and students; such as Schultens, Kist, Bilderdijk. The political life and troubles of Holland in the early part of the century are also described in the earlier chapters. The ten sermons may well be studied as models of a certain high order of pulpit eloquence; methodical, earnest, simple, eloquent, and classical in outline and diction. They were effectively aided by the orator's impressive address. The translator has done his part with great care and very successfully. The volume reads simply and easily in English. We hope that the Rev. J. P. Westervelt may find such encouragement that he will give us other works from the later Dutch literature. There are volumes, *e. g.* of Osterzee, which ought to be translated.

History of Friedrich the Second, called Frederick the Great. By Thomas Carlyle. Vol. V. New York: Harpers. The Seven Years' War rises to its height in the picturesque descriptions of this volume, which covers a period of less than three years, 1757–'60, including the great battles of Prague and Leuthen. Frederick with 150,000 men was matched against at least 450,000, chiefly Russians, French and Austrians; but his army was one of the best the world ever saw, and to his military genius there was no rival. The record of the contest is minute, graphic, and full of surprises. Carlyle's style is increasing in jerkiness; and his philosophy is getting to be of what he would call a very "poorish" quality. Now he is more of a cynic than of a stoic. He believes in force and success; "the only real treaties are a well-trained army and your treasury full." He is writing the Life of Frederick to illustrate the theme that "he was the last of the kings," and that all men now-a-days are "blinded, swallowed like Jonah in a whale's belly, of things brutish, waste, abominable." But it is impossible even for Carlyle to make out of the Old Fritz a hero who can permanently command the admiration and sympathy of mankind; for he is deficient in the moral elements of a great character. It is the Prussian people whom Carlyle should most eulogize, and not their sharp, astute, unscrupulous and thoroughly irreligious monarch.

Richard Cobden, the Apostle of Free Trade. His Political Career and Public Services. A Biography. By John McGilchrist. New York: Harpers. 1865. pp. 304. This is a beautifully got up volume, with a portrait and several illustrations, and a good index. It is a carefully prepared memorial of the successful and beneficent career of an eminent public benefactor. All of Mr. Cobden's public addresses have been consulted, and pertinent extracts are given illustrating his opinions and history. It is a book to be read by our young men to give them an impulse in living and acting for the elevation of mankind. By his own merits and

power, Mr. Cobden, in the face of violent hostility and obloquy, attained an exalted position, and died lamented in every civilized country of Europe, and in this land also, to which he was a devoted friend.

GENERAL LITERATURE.

Precious Thoughts: Moral and Religious. Gathered from the Works of John Ruskin, A. M. By Mrs. L. C. Tuthill. New York: John Wiley and Son. 1865. pp. 349. This is a companion volume to the Selections from Ruskin, made a few years since by the same editor; with the difference, that, while the earlier work was chiefly devoted to Ruskin's thoughts upon Nature and Art, the present culls his best sayings upon moral and religious themes. The selections are well made. Every page presents topics for fruitful meditation. Ruskin is affluent in the side lights he contrives to throw upon the subjects he is studying; and he often lets an allusion or analogy draw him aside for a time, but with positive advantage to the wealth of the book. No writer is a better subject for such selections. The work is tastefully brought out, and will make an excellent and irreproachable gift book. Mr. Wiley also publishes Ruskin's other works in the same style; Modern Painters in five vols.; the Stones of Venice in three; and his Miscellaneous Works in four volumes.

A Latin Reader, intended as a Companion to the Author's Latin Grammar. By Albert Harkness, Professor in Brown University. New York: D. Appleton & Co. pp. viii., 212. An excellent work for beginners in the Latin language. The merits of the author's Latin Grammar are generally recognized. This work is designed simply as a Reader, and is accompanied with Notes and a Vocabulary. Exercises in writing Latin are deferred to a future volume.

The Tenth and Twelfth Books of the Institutions of Quintilian. With explanatory Notes. By Henry S. Frieze. Professor in University of Michigan. New York: Appleton. 1865. pp. 175. The author has done a good service in preparing this edition of a portion of Quintilian's Institutions for the use of college classes. The text of Bonnell's edition is mainly followed. The learner has a double advantage, in studying Latin, and the best principles of rhetoric, at the same time.

Plain Talks on Familiar Subjects. By J. G. Holland. New York: Scribner. 1866. pp. 335. Nine of Mr. Holland's Lectures, which have been so popular in the delivery, are here collected in a neat and compact volume. Self-Help, Fashion, Work and Play, Working and Shirking, High Life and Low Life, the National Heart, Cost and Compensation, Art and Life, the Popular Lecture, are the titles of the subjects discussed in a racy, off-hand and forcible style, and with a spice of humor. His plain speech, backed up by strong moral convictions, finds its way straight to the popular heart. His success is deserved by his honest and manly tone, his aversion to affectation, and his inveterate hostility to all pretence and humbugs.

Notes from Plymouth Pulpit. A Collection of Memorable Passages from the Discourses of Henry Ward Beecher. By Augusta Moore. New Edition. New York: Harpers. 1865. pp. 375. Mr. Beecher's personal appearance, and his gifts as a preacher, are delineated in the introduction to this volume, which is made up of witty and wise, off-hand

and studied, remarks of the eloquent Brooklyn preacher. A deep tone of religious feeling and sympathy pervades these utterances.

The Sunday Book of Poetry. Selected and arranged by C. F. Alexander. Cambridge: Sever and Francis. 1865. pp. 335. This is a gem of a book, both in its contents and in its fittings up. The selections are made with good feeling and judgment; and the hymns are well adapted as they were meant to be, for learning and reading in the family. The children ought to be nurtured upon these sacred lyrics.

Miss Carew. A Novel. By Amelia B. Edwards. New York: Harpers. No. 259 of Library of Select Novels. The autobiographer and Miss Carew make their appearance, under the most interesting circumstances, at the beginning and end of this entertaining book, and spend the rest of the time in reading with us a collection of strange, pathetic, and well-told tales.

PRACTICAL RELIGION.

The Word. Walks from Eden. By the author of the "Wide, Wide World." New York: Carters. 1866. pp. 426. A new work by Miss Warner will be sure of a cordial greeting from a very large class of readers. This is a succession of animated and critical conversations upon the main facts of the Old Testament history, from the creation to the times of Abraham. The design is excellent, and it is well executed. It is the first of a series of volumes.

Bible Blessings. By Rev. Richard Newton, D. D., New York: Carters. pp. 318. With Illustrations. Some of the leading blessings, pledged and promised in the Bible, are illustrated by a great variety of impressive and pertinent facts, and in a simple and direct style. The volume is handsomely got up.

A Highland Parish. By Rev. Norman Macleod, D. D., New York: Carters. 1866. pp. 318. Dr. Macleod here introduces the reader, not merely to the scenery, but to the real life and the varied characters and incidents of a Highland Parish. The book is one of deep interest.

Hope for the Hopeless. An Autobiography of John Vine Hall. Edited by Rev. Newman Hall, LL. D. Abridged with the Author's Sanction. Am. Tract Society: New York. pp. 264. This is a deeply interesting narrative, chiefly of struggles with, and conquest over, the vice of intemperance. It is well abridged, and adapted to our wants, by the American editor, whose Preface is apt and striking. It is a genuine Autobiography, and must prove a real help to many struggling souls.

The same society has lately issued the following excellent publications, well got up: *Ilverton Rectory; or the Non-Conformists of the 17th Century. Founded as Fact. By the Author of Allan Cameron etc.; Lilian: a Tale of Three Hundred Years Ago; Evelyn Percival: The Family Christian Almanac for* 1866: *The Glen Cabin; or Away to the Hills*—the scene of which is among the White Mountains, N. H.; *The Huguenots of France; or the Times of Henry IV.*—an impressive sketch; *Save the Erring; or the Gospel Purpose* by Rev. J. H. Langille; *A Father's Letter's to his Daughter*, by Robert A. West; *Clayton Allyn, or Learning Life's First Lessons*; *Effie Morrison, or the Family of the Redbrœs; Our Sympathizing High Priest*, by A. L. O. E.; *Lullabies and Ditties.*

The American Sunday School Union is constantly adding new and beau-

tiful books to its excellent collection. Among its recent issues are: *The Silver Cup.* pp. 316, the scene of which is laid in Michigan, where two adopted brothers, and two Indian boys, play the chief part—a tale of great interest; *Home in Humble Life*, pp. 256, re-printed from the London Tract Society, an instructive narrative, warm with a religious spirit; *Willie's Step Mother*, pp. 124, a spirited delineation of character; and *Pictures and Stories.* pp. 151; *The Light of the Forge; or, Counsels drawn from the Sick-Bed of E. M.*, pp. 228, re-printed from the London Tract Society—an excellent exemplification of the power and triumph of faith; *Three Hundred Years Ago; or, the Story of Lilian*, pp. 178, a beautiful tale of the times of the "Bloody Mary." *Nic at the Tavern, or Nobody's Boy;* and *Hymns for the Nursery.*

Our Comparisons in Glory, or Society in Heaven Contemplated. By Rev. J. M. KILLEN, M. A. Author's Edition. New York: A. D. F. Randolph. pp. 354. This beautiful volume discusses in an edifying manner the chief points that pertain to the future state of blessedness, so far as revelation throws any light upon them. While all the author's opinions may not be generally received, yet there will be sympathy with his devout spirit, and with his endeavor to bring the realities of another world home to man. The chapters on Personal Intercourse with Christ Forever, and on the Cherubim, are specially worthy of consideration.

The Perfect Light; or, Seven Hues of Christian Character. By JULIA M. OLIN. New York: Randolph. 1866. pp. 256. The different colors are here taken as designating certain noble or lovely female characters; the red stands for the Good Duchess, Renée of France; the yellow for the Angel Queen, Louisa of Prussia; the blue for Eugénie de Guérin; the violet for Vittoria Colonna, etc. The accounts of these Christian ladies are very well done. The volume is published in fitting holiday style. The author is the widow of the late Dr. Olin.

O Mother Dear Jerusalem! The Old Hymn, edited by WM. C. PRIME. New York: Randolph. 1865. The origin and history of this noble hymn are amply discussed; and an account is given of its various forms and translations. This excellent volume is a good contribution to our hymnology.

Work: or Plenty to Do and How to Do it. By MARGARET MARIA BREWSTER. New York: Randolph. Two Series. This little work contains valuable practical hints and directions as to the various forms of Christian work, at home and abroad, tending to guide and encourage an earnest Christian life.

Vital Godliness: a Treatise on Practical and Experimental Piety. By WILLIAM S. PLUMER, D. D., LL. D. American Tract Society. New York. pp. 610. Dr Plumer's wisdom and experience as a Christian teacher are fully and fitly represented in this work, which unfolds in a clear order the vital elements of a thorough Christian experience. It is a volume adapted to a high degree of usefulness.

The American Tract Society, Boston, besides the work of Dr. Schaff on the Person of Christ, which we elsewhere notice, has published several volumes, brought out in beautiful style, appropriate as gift-books. *The Cup-Bearer*, (with illustrations, pp. 204), is an admirable book in its illustrations and contents. The selections are happily made from a great variety of sources, and well adapted to the different phases of Christian experience. The paper, printing, and ornamentation help to

make it a very attractive volume. *Remember Me; or, The Holy Communion*, by Ray Palmer, is also brought out in finished style, and is an excellent and appropriate Manual for every communicant. *The Word of Promise; a Handbook of the Promises of Scripture*, by Horatius Bonar, D.D., is edited and recommended by Dr. Kirk, and is full of rich, evangelical instruction. *Precious Truths in Plain Words*, is reprinted from the London Tract Society, and answers well to its title. This Society commends itself to public favor by the style and quality of its publications.

MISCELLANY.

The Rev. Charles Gillette of Texas, in his correspondence with Bishop Gregg, under the title *A New Historic Record of the Church* (pp. 131. New York), protests against the bishop's arbitrary assumption of powers, in the service of the rebel cause.

The Baccalaureate Discourse of President Asa D. Smith, D. D., of Dartmouth College, on *Beneficence our Life-work* (Hanover. 1865), is a forcible and attractive exposition of that great theme, applied especially to the college graduates.

Prof. Egbert C. Smyth's (of Andover) *Address before the Massachusetts General Conference* is a very able advocacy of the principle of Fellowship as essential to Congregationalism.. Councils, he argues, are not "merely advisory; their proper function is to determine fellowship, ecclesiastical and ministerial." The tone of the address towards other denominations is just and fraternal.

A Discourse Commemorative of the late John A. Vaughan, D. D., of Philadelphia, by Rev. D. R. Goodwin, D. D., Provost of the University of Philadelphia, is an admirable portraiture of one of the most devoted and self-denying ministers of this generation. Dr. Vaughan's character was exceedingly lovely and symmetrical; all who knew him testify to his worth.

Art. X.—THEOLOGICAL AND LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

FRANCE.

The *Revue Chrétienne*, August, opens with an excellent article by Prof. J. F. Astié, of Lausanne, on the History of Emancipation in this country; M. Astié, by his former residence in New York, and his study of our history and institutions, is unusually well qualified to write on our affairs. M. Pédézert concludes his philosophical estimate of the character and opinions of Marcus Aurelius. Roger Hollard contributes the first part of a thoughtful study on the character of Jesus Christ. Sept., Dr. de Valcourt, The Sanitary Condition of Armies during the Late Wars. G. Delmas, An Obstacle to the Realization of the Separation of Church and State in France. F. Bonifas, a fragment of an essay on Corneille's Polyeucte. Dr. Valcourt's article has for its avowed object to show, that the late war in the United States, as compared with the Crimean and Italian, established, in respect to sanitary measures, "the superiority of a free people, and exhibited the magnificent results which Christian charity can achieve." This subject is continued in the October number, and the work of our Sanitary Commission is highly lauded; of the Christian Com-

mission there is no account. The mortality among our sick and wounded is shown to have been very much less than in the allied armies in the Crimean campaign. In the same number there is the continuation of Hollard's interesting essay on the Character of Christ.

Count Agénor de Gasparin has published a work on the *Christian Family*, in 2 vols., which is spoken of in warm terms of praise. Madame de Witt (daughter of Guizot) has written a work, *Sacred History Related to Children*,—a series of narratives, in excellent style.

Annales de Philosophic Chrétienne. 1865. Dirigé par M. Bonnetty. V. Series. Tomes xi, xii. The editor continues through several numbers his essays on the Religion of the Romans, and their Knowledge of the Biblical Traditions. There are also articles on the recent papal Encyclical and Syllabus of Errors: a valuable series of papers by M. J. Oppert on the History of the Empires of Chaldea and Assyria, from 2000 B. C., to the Times of the Seleucidæ, 150 B. C., on the basis of new monuments; three articles by Bianconi, on the Ape and Man; a Bibliography of the work of Duns Scotus, and of the Scotists, down to 1790, etc. It says that a new list of 70 Egyptian Pharaohs, and of 130 geographical names of the epoch of Sesostris, discovered by M. Mariette in Egypt, has been surreptitiously published in Berlin. One curious document published in the Annales is a Letter of the Congregation of the Index to all Roman Catholic bishops on the course they should pursue towards "bad books."

The whole Bible has been translated into the (French) Basque language, and published at the expense of Prince Louis Lucien Napoleon; the translator is Captain J. Duvoisin, who has been engaged six years in this task, aided throughout by Prince Lucien, who has studied this difficult language with great precision. A translation into the (Spanish) Basque, has been begun under the same auspices; it is expected to be finished in five years. In other Basque dialects (Biscayan, Navarre, etc.) portions of the Bible have also been published.

M. Beaussire, Professor at Poitiers, has discovered a "French precursor of Hegel" in one Dom Deschamps, a Benedictine of the abbey of Montreuil Bellay, who died in 1774, among whose manuscripts he found an essay on the "True System," which advocates a kind of idealistic pantheism. Beaussire has published extracts from it in a work entitled "Antecedents of Hegelianism in the French Philosophy," Paris, 1865. This Deschamps was a nephew of D'Argenson the elder; and his son Marquis D'Argenson was his correspondent and disciple. Deschamps was also a correspondent of Rousseau, Voltaire, Helvetius and D'Alembert. He wrote against D'Holbach's Système de la Nature; he also wrote a refutation of Spinoza. Some of his principles, as given by Paul Janet in an article in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, are—that there is no reality outside of our ideas; God made the world from himself; the Trinity means the beginning, the middle and end; original sin is the transition from the state of nature to that of law; redemption is the return to the state of nature; he propounds communism, and even the community of wives, as the first social state, etc. His nearest approach to formal Hegelianism is in the passage: "Truth denies no system; it consists not only in contarieties, but in what is contradictory; it not only reunites that which is entirely opposite, but also that which it denies in all the rigor of the term."

The rigorous investigations of M. Pasteur of the French Academy in respect to spontaneous generation, having been contested by Voigt, Pou-

chet, Joli, and others, the academy appointed a commission, who, after careful examination, decided (Feb. 20) that "the facts observed by M. Pasteur, and contested by M. Pouchet, Joli, and Musset, are of the most complete exactitude." The *Methodist Quarterly Review* for October, contains an article on Pouchet, etc., by J. Jamin, translated from the *Revue des Deux Mondes*.

A curious mingling of subjects is seen in the following title of a work by Hpp. Blanc. *The Marvellous in Jansenism, Magnetism and American Baptism, the Epidemic of Morzine, Spiritism, etc.*

J. Milsaut has published an essay on John Ruskin, under the title, *L'Esthétique Anglaise*, pp. 180, giving an account of the principles of art advocated in Ruskin's various works. Barthélémy Saint Hilaire, *Mahomet et le Coran*, preceded by an introduction on the mutual duties of philosophy and religion. Abbé Domenech has published a work of Rapin, hitherto inedited, *The History of Jansenism*.

An essay on *Condillac and Empiricism* has been published by Réthoré. Schultze's explanation of *Kant's Critique of the Pure Reason*, has been translated by Tissot. J. de Strada, an essay on an *Ultimate Organon*, or Scientific Method, 2 vols., first series, on the Bases of Metaphysics. E. Arnaud, *The Pentateuch defended against its Assailants*. *The Works of Dionysius the Areopagite* have been translated by Abbé J. Dulac. Schœbel, *Philosophy of Pure Reason*. H. Taine, *The Philosophy of Art*. F. de Saulcy, *Travels in the Holy Land*. 2 vols. Michel Nicolas, *Studies upon the Apocryphal Gospels*.

M. Renan has in press two new works, one on the *Evangelists*, the other on *St. Paul*.

GERMANY.

Historische Zeitschrift, edited by Prof. Heinrich von Sybel, München. This quarterly publication is now in its seventh year. It is devoted to the historical sciences; more than a third part of each number is given to a classified view of all the works relating to history, published in the various European languages. The immense extent of this literature is seen in the fact, that some 300 pages of the first two numbers for 1865 are taken up with the titles, and occasional short notices, of the historical works for 1864. Among the more important articles are, C. von Noorden on the Literature and History of English Self-government; G. Waitz, The Beginnings of the Feudal System; H. Peter on John DeWitt; W. Junghaus on the Hanseatic League; Von Wietersheim on Friaul and Dalmatia; Usinger, The Sack of Magdeburg; an address by Von Ranke on the Oriental Question. One of the most interesting articles is by the editor, Von Sybel, on two recently published French works, edited by D'Humolstein and De Conches, pretending to give a new Correspondence of Maria Antoinette; this is shown to be a literary forgery. The genuine letters were published from the Vienna archives in a volume by Von Arneth, Vienna, 1865. The English critics of the *Athenæum* and the *Saturday Review*, have received these letters as genuine. They are written by some one of literary habits and taste; and Maria Antoinette was notoriously deficient in literary culture.

Zeitschrift f. d. historische Theologie. 1865. Parts 2, 3, 4. Hochhuth, History and Development of the Philadelphian Churches, in Eng and, giv-

ing a minute account of the life and writings of the noted enthusiast, Jane Leade; with a list of the writings of Dr. Pordage and Thos. Bromley. The author has previously written on other fanatical sects, bringing to light many curious and well nigh forgotten facts. Gustav Schmidt gives an account of a Church Visitation in Eisenach, by Jacob Strauss, as early as 1525; that of Luther and Melanchthon in 1527 has usually been reckoned as the first; the same writer gives an account of Justus Mennius and his Catechism, 1532, only a part of which is known. The third number of the *Zeitschrift* is filled with a long analysis of the work of J. H. Scholten of Leyden on the Doctrine of the Reformed Church, 4th ed., 1862 (first 1848), in 3 vols., the chief doctrinal work, of a rationalistic tendency, produced in Holland. It is necessarian work on the basis of the modern philosophy, and has had a wide influence. It is divided into only two main parts: 1. The Fundamental Formal Principle of the Reformed Church: 2. Its Material Principle. Ebrard replies to Herzog on the age of the Waldensian treatise, styled *Nobla Leiczon*. Engelhardt exhibits the relations of the Augsburg Confession to the three older symbols, viz.: the Marburg, Schwabach and Torgau Articles. Plitt, of the Moravian Church, corrects statements of Laurent, in a previous number. Spiegel gives an account of William Voss of Osnabrück, as illustrating some details of the history of Crypto-Calvinism.

Dr. Schenkel in his *Allgemeine Kirchliche Zeitschrift* continues with indefatigable zeal the contest raised by his Characteristics of Christ, striving to represent it as a conflict chiefly for freedom of thought and instruction. The seventh part, 1865, has a long account of the so-called First German Protestant Diet held at Eisenach, June 7, 8, the most noticeable feature in which was a remarkable address by Prof. Rothe of Heidelberg, on the true mode of bringing back to the church those who, in these modern times, have become estranged from it. His thesis was this—that the church must reconcile itself with modern culture. He also insisted that church matters should be more fully under the control of the congregations. Schwarz, of Jena, also delivered a spirited oration on liberty of teaching.

The *Zeitschrift f. Wiss. Theologie*, 1865, edited by H. A. Hilgenfeld. H. Spörri, Zwingle's Doctrine about the Scriptures. Hilgenfeld on the Gospel of Matthew, in reply to Dr. Keim; on the School of Baur; on Weizsäcker's Evangelical History; on the Christ Party in Corinth, in reply to Beyschlag, maintaining that it consisted of direct disciples of Christ, who opposed Paul; on Tischendorf's work on the Four Gospels, assailing it sharply. Egli attacks the recent works of Riehm and Köhler on the Old Testament, with an intemperate criticism. E. Zeller, a Greek Parallel to Acts xvi. 19. Dr. Erdmann gives an instructive account of the Development of Scholasticism. H. J. Holtzmann reviews the opinions on the phrase, "Son of Man" as applied to Christ; Lipsius on the Shepherd of Hermas, and Montanism in Rome. E. Zeller on the Gospel of Mark. F. Hitzig on Ben Pandera and Ben Stada—the reputed parents of Jesus in a Jewish tradition. Egli also has an account of a recent essay of Steiner on the Mutzlaites, a rationalistic sect of Islam. The last number of this Journal contains a letter to the Editor from Duke Ernest of Coburg-Gotha, avowing his sympathies with Hilgenfeld's tendencies.

Studien und Kritiken. 4s. Heft., 1864. Professor Weiss, Critical Investigations on the authorship of the Epistles of Peter; the author has already written a work on Peter's Doctrinal System. Romang reviews

Schweizer's Dogmatics in connection with a discussion on the sources of dogmatics. Köbel has a valuable essay on the ethics of the "Wisdom of Solomon." Köster explains Luke xvi, 1 sq. and Burk, Gal. ii. 6. Ahrens on the Office of the Keys is reviewed by Düsterdieck, and Baur's Church History of the Nineteenth Century by Herzog. The latter strongly dissents from some of Baur's positions.

Brockhaus has published another edition, (8vo, price 4 thlr.) of Tischendorf's Novum Testamentum græce, ex Sinaitico Codice, giving also the readings of the Vatican Codex, and of the Elzevir edition. The previous edition by Brockhaus, *Novum Test. Sinaiticum*, 1863, is out of print. This later edition omits the palaeographic peculiarities, and corrects the evident blunders of the original; nor does it contain the Epistle of Barnabas, nor the Pastor of Hermas. Tischendorf has also written an Appendix on this Codex for the 8th edition of Theile's New Test.; and another collation for the Polyglot of Stier and Theile. He replied sharply in 1863 to the impudent claim of Simonides, in a pamphlet, entitled "Assaults on the Sinai MS.;" and there too refuted the theory of the Russian Archimandrite, Porphyry Uspenski, that the Codex had a heretical origin. In another pamphlet, "Weapons of Darkness against the Sinai Bible," 1863, he replied to an anonymous writer in the *Sächsisches Kirchenblatt*, who assigned the MS. to the 6th century. Hilgenfeld also tried to bring it down to the 6th century; Tischendorf replied to him in the Tübingen *Zeitschrift*, 1864. But while this MS. is generally conceded to belong to the fourth century (e. g. by Weizsäcker on the Epistle of Barnabas, 1863; and by Tobler in an essay on the Epistle to the Hebrews in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschrift*), several recent writers put it below the Vatican MS. as an authority, on account of its evident carelessness and numerous mistakes. Thus, Prof. Buttmann, in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschrift*, 1864, examines it carefully and finds in the Gospels alone some 360 plain errors or mistakes. Dr. Bömel, in a work on the Galatians, Francfort, 1865, comes to a kindred result, and says, that Tischendorf himself, in the last edition of his New Test., in the part on Matthew, i. to xvi. 23, "adopts the Sinaitic reading against the Vatican in 130 places, but the Vatican against the Sinaitic in 164 places." The above is condensed from the *Neue Evang. Kirchenzeitung*. The editor of the *Journal of Sacred Literature* (April, 1865), Mr. Cowper, assigns the Sinai Codex to the 4th century, and a Coptic origin.

Dr. Niedner, Neander's successor in the chair of Church History, Berlin, died August 13. He was born August 9, 1797; Professor in Leipsick, 1829–1850; then in Wittenberg till 1859, when he was called to Berlin. His manual of Church History is a very able work. For years he has been engaged in writing a History of Doctrines. Dr. Lehnerdt, General Superintendent of Saxony, is spoken of as his successor. Lehnerdt preceded him for a few years in the same post. Professor Lipsius has been called from Vienna to Kiel.

Dorner's *History of Protestant Theology* is, we understand, in the press. It is prepared as a part of the History of the Sciences in Germany in Recent Times, the plan of which was drawn up by Leopold Ranke, and which is published under the auspices of Maximilian II. of Bavaria. We gave some account of it in the April number of this *Review*, 1865.

Dr. Erdmann of Halle has in preparation a *Handbook of the History of Philosophy*, which will undoubtedly be a valuable work. He has writ-

ten one of the ablest expositions of Modern Philosophy, and is the best representative of the right wing of the Hegelian school.

Dr. G. Weber's *Universal History*, has reached its 5th volume, beginning the Modern History. The Ancient History, vols. 1 to 4, has been in the course of publication since 1857. It is a thoroughly executed work, the fruit of thirty years labor. His smaller manual is much used in this country.

It is proposed to erect in Constance a monument to the memory of John Huss. July 6, 1865, completed 450 years since his martyrdom. The clergy of Constance have issued a call for subscriptions to this object.

A. Salomon's edition of the Babylonian Talmud, in Hebrew, has reached its 10th volume ; each volume costs 22 1-2 ngr. Ancient and modern commentaries are appended. There are now 6 editions of the Talmud in the press at Berlin, Vienna, Warsaw, Lemborg, Sentomir, and Wilna; but they are all mere reprints. F. Lebrecht, Berlin, proposes to issue a critical edition, and has published a "Selection of Improved Readings and Interpretations of the Talmud," Berlin, 1864, pp. 64, which is exciting attention, and has been noticed by Geiger and Frankel. Such an edition is very much needed.

The Prussian government has again refused to add to the number of Polish schools in Posen. There are now in that province, which contains 818,000 Poles, and 650,000 Germans, one German college to every 111,000 Germans, and one Polish college to every 400,000 Poles.

HOLLAND AND BELGIUM.

The Hague Society for the Defence of the Faith has awarded a prize for the best essay on Slavery to Dr. Wiskemann ; and another prize to Dr. Trip for the best treatise on the Accounts of Paul in the Acts of the Apostles.

Commentarius in Acta Apostolorum. J. T. Beelen. Ed. altera. Louvain.

The tenth volume of "The Chronicles of Ibn-el-Athir" has been published at Leyden ; the Arabic text is accompanied with a Latin version. It comprises the period A. D. 907–1231, giving the history of the empire of the Seljuks at the height of its renown.

The Genuineness of Paul's Epistles to the Thessalonians. The First Epistle. By W. C. Van Manan. Weesp. 1865.

J. P. Muller, *History of the Christological Doctrine in the Greek Church.* A.D. 325–680. Amsterdam. 1865.

H. Ort, *Human Sacrifices in Israel.* Haarlem. 1865.

J. G. Ottema, *The Gospels of Matthew and Mark in their Original Agreement.* Leenwarden. 1865.

RUSSIA.

The Minister of Public Instruction in Russia, Alexander Wasselewitsch Golownin, has published an account of the history of the Schools of Learning in the empire, and their condition in 1865. Since 1802, when Alexander I. established this ministry, the number of the Universities has increased from three to seven, and of gymnasia from eleven to eighty-seven. The

Universities are St. Petersburg (founded 1724); Moscow (1755); Dorpat (founded 1632 by Gustavus Adolphus, closed 1704 to 1802); Kasan and Charkow, 1804; Wilna, an old Catholic university (1578), revived in 1803; Odessa, 1864. A reorganization of the Universities was made in 1863. The provision for the poorer students is ample. In 1864, St. Petersburg had 623 students. Moscow 1515, Kasan 325, Charkow 543, Kiew 518, Dorpat 560; of these, 950 were stipendaries, and 180,000 rubles were given for their support. The professors, too, are well supported. None of these universities has a theological faculty, excepting Dorpat; the four faculties are law, medicine, history and philology, physics and mathematics. The clergy are educated in special institutions, in 4 academies, 50 seminaries, some 200 institutions in larger districts, and several thousand church and cloister schools. The 87 gymnasia have 30,000 students. The number of schools for elementary instruction is rapidly increasing.

ITALY.

Fr. Miniscalchi Erizza published at Verona, 1864, the second volume of his edition of a very rare work, the *Jerusalem Lectionary* (*Evangeliarum Hierosolymitanum*), from a Palestine MS. of about 1030 in the Vatican library—the original text with a Latin version. The original is in Syriac, with Palestinian letters. Of this version no other copy is known to be extant. A lexicon is also given.

The Viscount Colomb de Batines' Bibliography of Dante is continued in a work by Garguolli (Bologna, 1865); the Bibliography of the last thirty years is given in another volume published at Siena. All the past Dante literature is going through a renewed examination, while the number of new works is largely on the increase.

The number of priests is diminishing in some parts rapidly. In 1862 Naples had 44,000 clergy, in 1864, 39,000; Sicily in 1862 had 27,000, in 1864, 20,000. There is still in Naples one priest to 152 persons; in Sicily one to 86. In Umbria there were 17,000 clergy in 1862, and 12,000 in 1864; still leaving one priest to 69 persons. In Rome there is one to every 33 persons. In Lombardy there is one to 265; in Piedmont one to 233; in Austria, one to 498. There are 50 Episcopal Sees now vacant in Italy. In Naples eleven convents of monks, and six nunneries have been recently closed.

The last Papal Encyclical and Syllabus were publicly burnt by a company of students of the University of Naples, near the statue of Giordano Bruno, also by students at Palermo and Padua.

The work of Prof. Spaventa of Naples, published in 1861, *Introduction to Philosophical Lectures in the University*, is said by Dr. Sträter (in *Der Gedanke*) to exhibit rare talent, and to have for its aim to bring before the students the main results of German speculation. Spaventa is described as a man "of imposing personality, well built, and having that strong phlegmatic temperament, to which Hegel ascribed the highest degree of energy and thoroughness." Prof. Vera teaches the Hegelian Logic at the same University. The Professor of Aesthetics, Antonio Tari, "is the most amiable and attractive of the *corps*,—long, lean, nervous, rapid, and animated." His lectures are based on Kant and Hegel. He has published the first volume of a system of æsthetics. Spaventa has also written a work (1863) on the *Philosophy of Gioberti;* in 1860, he

published a work on the *Character of Italian Philosophy in the Sixteenth Century*, Modena, being his lectures delivered at the University of Bologna. C. Passaglia is writing a History and Confutation of Renan's Life of Jesus. The first volume has been published at Milan.

Professor Auguste Conti of the University of Pisa, has entered the lists against the Hegelianism taught at Naples by Vera and Spaventa, in a work, which M. Ernest Naville has translated into French: *Le Campo Santo de Pise, ou le Scepticisme.* It is written in the form of a dialogue, and dissects acutely the nature and causes of Skepticism. The same author has written a work, entitled *Evidenza, Amore e Fide.*

SPAIN.

Salvador Mestres, *Ontology, or Pure Metaphysics.* 2 vols. Barcelona. 1865.

J. Manuel Orti y Lara, *Lectures on the Pantheistic Philosophy of the German Krause*, delivered before the Literary Catholic Society of Armonia. 1st Part. Madrid. 1865.

The Duke de Rivas, born at Cordova 1761, has recently died. He was a soldier, a cabinet minister (1836), a diplomatist, and a poet. His poems are held in high repute in Spain; his first one, *El Paso Honroso*, was published in his twentieth year; his best known work is a drama, *The Power of Destiny.* His son, late Marquis Aunon, who succeeds to the ducal title, is also devoted to literature, as are many of the Spanish grandees, such as the Marquis de Miraflores, Marquis de Val de Gamas, Marquis de Molins, General Ros de Olano, the Duke de Frias, etc. *Am. Lit. Gaz.*

ENGLAND.

The British and Foreign Evangelical Review. July.—Anschar, the Apostle of the North; Plymouthism and Dr. Whately; French Evangelical Criticism; The Broad Church and Moral Law; George Calixtus; David Hume by McCosh; Principles of Church Union; Herbert Spencer's Philosophy; Rambles in Italy. October.—The Development of the Ancient Catholic Hierarchy, by Dr. P. Schaff; Augustine; Candlish's Cunningham Lectures; Early History of Heathenism; Scripture Songs of the Scottish Church; The Skepticism of Hume; Rome and the Roman Question in 1865. The article on Candlish's recent able lectures, on the Fatherhood of God, is the longest essay. Dr. Candlish thinks that the subject of Adoption has been very meagerly treated in theology; and that here is the article by which the most effective blows may be struck against the Broad Church. His main position is, that on the platform of nature there is no relation of fatherhood and sonship between God and man; that our sonship is solely through communion with the man Christ Jesus in his sonship. Dr. Candlish has ready for the press an Exposition of the 1st. Epistle of John.

The Journal of Sacred Literature. October, 1865. The Historical Character of the Gospels, by Rev. C. A. Row; an Ancient Syriac Martyrology, in Syriac Text, by Dr. W. Wright; The Tree of Life, from the German of Piper; Proverbs xxiii. 29–35; Biblical Literature in France in the Middle Ages, by Prof. G. Masson; Exegesis of Difficult Texts; The Book of Jonah; how far historical?—a series of visions in a trance; The Four

Gospels, State of the Question in 1851, by Prof. Stowe; Innovations in the Ritual, 1641; Rationalism in Europe, by Rev. W. Kirkus; Correspondence, etc. Mr. Thos. Tyler (pp. 197–200) continues the controversy with Mr. Mac Whorter as to precedence in the discovery of the meaning of the "memorial name," Jehovah.

The work on *Daniel, or the Apocalypse of the Old Testament*, by Philip S. Desprez, with an Introduction by Dr. Rowland Williams (one of the writers in the noted *Essays and Reviews*), presents the counter view to that advocated by Dr. Pusey. He brings the writing of the book down to the times of Antiochus Epiphanes. Dr. George Smith has published *The Book of Prophecy*, classifying all the prophecies, and involving a proof of the plenary inspiration of the Scriptures.

B. Harris Cowper, editor of the Journal of Sacred Literature, has published *The Logic of Life and Death*, partly in reply to the atheistic work of Holyoake on the Logic of Death.

Dr. Pusey has published a formal reply to the letter which Archbishop Manning recently addressed to him on behalf of Anglo-Romanism. It contains, not only a personal defence of Dr. Pusey's position and policy, but "a full and complete vindication of the catholicity of the Church of England." Dr. Pusey addresses the letter formally to Mr. Keble, preferring this to entering into personal controversy with Dr. Manning. The title of the book is: *The Church of England a Portion of Christ's One Holy Catholic Church, and a means of Restoring Visible Unity.*

Dr. Donne is preparing the letters of George the Third for early publication. Thomas Carlyle says they will show the King to be a very different sort of person from what he is generally considered, and that he tried hard to do his duty to America, as well as to his own kingdom.

The *Record* says of the successor of Dr. Jacobson as Regius Professor of Divinity at Oxford:—"We are happy to confirm the announcement made in the *Times* of Saturday, that the Rev. Robert Payne Smith, M. A., the learned sub-librarian of Bodleian Library, has been selected by her Majesty, on the recommendation of Viscount Palmerston, to fill the vacant post. The Rev. gentleman ranks as one of the most eminent Oriental scholars in Europe, being in Hebrew deemed equal to Dr. Pusey, while in Syriac he is without a rival. He has published, both in Latin and English, St. Cyril's Commentary on St. Luke, [and a translation from the Syriac of the third part of the Ecclesiastical History of John of Ephesus] also several other learned works; but we regard as the most important and valuable of his publications his sermons entitled "The Authenticity and Messianic Interpretation of the Prophecies of Isaiah vindicated in a Course of Sermons preached before the University of Oxford."

A new version of the trilogy, or three connected dramas, "The Agamemnon, Choephoræ, and Eumenides," has just appeared, the work of Miss A. Swanwick, a lady whose *début* in literature was made by the performance of the task—scarcely less difficult—of translating "Faust" for Bohn's edition of the works of Goethe. The merit of this version attracted so strongly the notice of Chevalier Bunsen that he warmly recommended the Greek tragic dramas as subjects for Miss Swanwick's study.

Mr. T. W. Allies, Professor of History in the Roman Catholic University of Dublin (Dr. Newman, rector), has published a work on the *Form-*

ation of Christendom, Part First, which is said to be "an extremely brilliant series of Lectures."

The series of Roman Catholic *Essays on Religion and Literature*, edited by Dr. Manning, contains, among other papers, a review of Colenso by Mr. Laing, and an attempt by the late Cardinal Wiseman to establish the historical truthfulness of the legend of the "eleven thousand" virgins of Cologne.

The subject of the Arnold Prize Essay (Oxford) for 1865, is *The Secret Fraternities of the Middle Ages*. The prize was gained by A. P. Marras. In his essay (pp. 89) he gives accounts of the Knights Templars, the Vehmgericht, the Manichees, the Assassins, etc.

The second volume of Dean Stanley's History of the Jewish People is announced; it is said to be even freer in its criticism than the first.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

The Literary Churchman, London, says of Dr. Robinson's *Physical Geography of the Holy Land*, that "so far as faithful observation goes and accurate recording, we have now the means of knowing the exact truth of the Sacred Geography;" and, that "any one who turns to it for information upon one point will find himself insensibly lured on, page after page, to fresh subjects of interest, until he is unwilling to put it down."

The second volume of Lange's Commentary on the New Testament will be published by Mr. Scribner early in 1866. It will comprise the Gospel of Mark, revised and edited by Professor Shedd; and the Gospel of Luke, translated by Rev. C. C. Starbuck. Genesis, translated and edited by Professor Tayler Lewis, is about ready for the press, as is also the Acts. Mr. Scribner will publish Pressensé's Life of Christ, from the English translation. He has nearly ready the Life and Letters of the late Professor Silliman, by Professor George P. Fisher; and Dean Stanley's Lectures on Old Testament History, volume second.

Pusey on Daniel is to be re-published by Carlton and Porter, New York.

Dr. C. V. A. Van Dyck, of the Syrian mission, is now in this country, carrying through the press an electrotyped edition of the Arabic Scriptures, for the American Bible Society. There are to be four different editions, the first, a large octavo, will, it is hoped, be ready for printing next spring. The same Society has electrotyped the Spanish Bible. Dr. Van Dyck is also giving instructions in Hebrew in the Union Theological Seminary, New York, where he has also formed a class in Arabic.

Dr. Joseph Emerson Worcester, the well-known American lexicographer, has died at Cambridge, at the age of 81 years. Dr. Worcester was a native of Bedford, N. H., where he was born August 24, 1784. He graduated at Yale College in 1811, and for several years afterward taught in Salem. While there he prepared the greater part of his "Geographical Dictionary, or Universal Gazeteer," which appeared in 2 vols., in Andover in 1817, and was followed by a "Gazetteer of the United States," (Andover, 1818,) and a number of other works on Geography and History. Dr. Worcester's first effort in the field of English lexicography was "Johnson's English Dictionary as improved by Todd and abridged by Chalmers, with Walker's Pronouncing Dictionary combined," which appeared in 1827. In 1827 he edited, at the request of the pub-

lisher of Webster's Dictionary, an abridgment of that work. In the following years several dictionaries were published by him in succession, until he gave to the public, in 1860, his chief work, "A Dictionary of the English Language," the ripe fruit of more than thirty years of lexicographical studies. Dr. Worcester was also, from 1831 to 1843, in lusive, the literary editor of the "American Almanac." He received the degree of LL. D. from Brown University and Dartmouth College, was a Fellow of the American Academy of Science, a Corresponding Member of the Royal Geographical Society in London, and a member of other learned bodies.

Rev. Dr. Francis Wayland, who was more than twenty-eight years President of Brown University, was prostrated by a paralytic stroke on Tuesday, the 26th September, and died on the following Saturday, aged sixty-nine years. Dr. Wayland was born in New York in 1796. After graduating at Union College in 1813, he studied medicine, and was licensed as a physican. Having joined the Baptist church, he pursued a course of theological studies at Andover, and afterwards, was a tutor at Union College, and for five years minister of the First Baptist church, in Boston; and after having been for a few months a professor at Union College, was, in December, 1826, chosen President of Br wn University, succeeding Dr. Messer. Dr. Wayland held this responsible post for a quarter of a century, resigning in 1855. Since that time he has been occupied in literary and ministerial labors of various kinds, and has also performed some ministerial duty. Among his works were Elements of Moral Science, Elements of Political Economy, both extensively used as class books; Life of Adoniram Judson, two volumes; and Intellectual Philosophy. He was a man of large frame, and imposing presence, such as well corresponded with his breadth and strength of mind. His life was one of very great usefulness. As early as 1812 he wrote on the *Collegiate System in the United States*. His Moral Science was published in 1835; some 80,000 copies of it have been circulated; he was revising it during the last few weeks of his life. In 1845 he had a correspondence on Slavery with Dr. Fuller of Baltimore, published under the title, *Christianity and Slavery*. His Notes on the *Principles and Practices of the Baptists* appeared in 1856. In his later years he insisted earnestly on the need of more practical and direct preaching. One of his latest essays was published in our Review for last July, on the Life and Ministry of Brainerd. In the January number for 1865, he reviewed Foster on Fu ure Punishment. His executors will publish a uniform edition of his works.

The *Church Monthly*, (Boston) October and November, contains a translation of an excellent essay on Materialism, from a treatise of M. Ernest Naville, of Geneva, on "Eternal Life in Christ." The whole work is translated. M. Naville taught philosophy in the Academy of Geneva, 1843 to 1848. He is engaged in editing the works of Maine de Biran, whose "Life and Thoughts" he has published. Chs. de Reunusat in an article in the *Revue des deux Mondes* (July, 1865,) on the Future Life, commends highly the work of Naville on Eternal Life, as eloquent, and reposing on a solid basis of knowledge.

American Presbyterian and Theological Review.

NUMBER XIV.

CONTENTS OF THE APRIL NUMBER, 1866.

Page.

ART. I. THE BIBLE IDEA OF TRUTH, AS INSEPARABLE FROM THE DIVINE PERSONALITY..... 199
By TAYLER LEWIS LL. D., Union College, Schenectady, New York.

II. THE DOUBLE SENSE OE SCRIPTURE..... 214
By Prof. W. S. TYLER, D. D., Amherst, Mass.

III. THE ANCIENT CATHOLIC LITURGIES..... 230
By PHILIP SCHAFF, D. D., New York.

IV. QUATREMERE, THE FRENCH ORIENTALIST..... 247
By GUSTAVE MASSON.

V. THE RELATION OF INTUITIONS TO THOUGHT AND THEOLOGY..... 272
By Prof. JOHN BASCOM, Williams College.

VI. JAMES iv. 5, IN CONNECTION WITH GENESIS iv. 7.... 292
From the German of E. PARET.

VII. THE POLITICAL SITUATION..... 298
By GEORGE L. PRENTISS, D. D., New York.

VIII. CRITICAL NOTES ON RECENT BOOKS..... 335

THEOLOGY: Nitzsch, Agustine on Miracles—Bunsen's Bible-Work—Passavant's Colossians—The Foundations of our Faith—The Church, by Luthardt, Kaknis, etc.—Schaff's Person of Christ—Morgan on Holy Spirit—Buck's Ecclesiastical Law..... 335

PRACTICAL RELIGION: Hymnal of the Presb. Church—Books of Presb. Publication Committee—Books of Am. Tract Soc.—Goulburn's Study of Scripture—Guthrie, Man and Gospel—Vaughan's Christ the Light of the World 336

PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE: Hatch, the Constitution of Man—McDonald, Spiritualism—The Shadow of Christianity—Caro, L'Idée de Dieu—Alden's Intellectual Philosophy—Draper's Anatomy—Draper's Physiology—Annuaire Philosophique—Thompson's Forces of Nature

CONTENTS OF APRIL NUMBER, (CONTINUED).

Page.

—Agassiz, Animal Life—Vera, Essais—Bluntschli, Gottesideen 338

History and Biography: Life of Samuel Adams—Zeller Abhandlungen—Mahn on "German"—Köllner, Church History—Life of Dr. Baird—Stevens on Methodism—Life of Petigru—Carlyle's Frederick the Great—Life of Robert Owen 341

General Literature: Duyckink's Cyclopædia of American Literature—Haven's Travels—Plumptre's Poems—Fonthill Recreations—Belton Estate—Guy Deverell—Works of Epictetus 344

Miscellany: Pamphlets by Henry Neill, Dr. Harbaugh, Dr. Schaff, De Schweinitz, John Pike, Henry Hopkins, G. F. Magoun, Mason Gallagher 346

IX. THEOLOGICAL AND LITERARY INTELLIGENCE 348

Germany 348

France 349

Spain 350

England 350

United States of America 353

X. ECCLESIASTICAL REGISTER 353

By G. F. Hatfield, D. D.

BUSINESS NOTICE.

We send bills in this number, according to our standing custom, to such as are still indebted to us. We respectfully request a *prompt* response.

Our terms are $3, paid strictly in advance; $3 50 if paid within three months; and $4 if not paid until the end of the year. Necessity compels us to adhere to these terms, and our subscribers will please note them.

FOR SALE.

One complete set American Theological Review, 1859–1866, price $26. Also one complete set of the Presbyterian Quarterly, 1852–1866, Price $45. These sets (except 1866) are substantially bound.

PUBLISHER.

New York, *April* 1, 1866.

THE

AMERICAN PRESBYTERIAN AND THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

NEW SERIES. NO XIV.—APRIL, 1866.

Art. I.—THE BIBLE IDEA OF TRUTH, AS INSEPARABLE FROM THE DIVINE PERSONALITY.

By Tayler Lewis, ll. d., Union College, Schenectady, New York.

"His truth, thy shield and buckler."—Psalms xci. 4.

It is a most important thought that in the Scriptures the idea of *truth* is ever regarded as inseparable from that of *personality*. Abstracted from this, or in the abstract, as we say, it is not recognized as existing, though such existence is not expressly denied. Of the more usual Hebrew word *emeth*, it may be safely affirmed that it is never used for *truth* intellectually, or for any abstract truth or nature of *things*, but ever as an attribute of some *person* human or divine, finite or infinite, temporal or eternal. It does not denote even moral truth viewed abstractly, or simply intellectually, as a system of ideas, according to the more modern usage. It is not, therefore, as Gesenius defines it, *vera doctrina et religio*,—for which he refers to Psalm xxv. 5, "Cause me to walk in thy truth" (*ba-amitteka*), Psalm xxvi. 3, "I have walked in thy truth," Psalm lxxxvi. 11, etc. It is no "congruity of ideas" merely, as perceived in the thoughts or thinking, according to Locke's

definition. The Scriptural idea of truth includes something more than this, and without which the other lacks the highest reality. It is not any such reality of things as seen in themselves, but a *personal* trust taken both subjectively and objectively,—that is, in reference to the soul trusting and the soul trusted in. *Truth* then is *trust*. When the idea is enlarged to take in the great system of things physical and moral, it carries this notion, this feeling, along with it. It receives the world as that constitution of facts, and laws, and ideas, which represent the mind of God as a *person*,—the first two, that is facts and laws deduced from facts, as representing His outward doings and manifestations as far as they are known,—the third, or ideas, as representing the infinite Mind itself, themselves inseparable from the infinite personality, and having their necessity, as *truth*, in such connection; so that it cannot be conceived of as separate from such eternal mind, any more than such mind can be thought as something separate from or without its eternal *truth*. In either view, whether particular or universal, whether as having regard to acts in nature and in history, or to ideas as perceived in their necessity, *truth* is *troth*, *trust* in a personal mind, or soul, finite or infinite. So that we might say that atheism, if we could clearly think such a paradox, would be an utter negation of truth,—of all truth. There could be no "*truth* of things," so called, for there could be no *trust* that things would certainly be, for one moment, what they were or are. There could be no reason or reasons *for* them or *in* them; for such reason or reasons are inseparable, in our thinking, from an eternal mind, thought, or word, of which they are the reasons, and in which they have their necessary ground. When we lose the one, we lose the other; and thus all reason for things being as they are having disappeared, they may be one set of things as well as another; they may vary infinitely, and at every moment; there is no *truth* because there is nothing to which we can *trust*. All that is said by such men as Comte and Spencer about progress in the universe, and about laws and ideas, becomes an empty babble. What ground have they for their assertions? What

do they know about it? How do they know whether their progress is really progress, or in what direction it is going—from what, or towards what? What assurance have they that it has not passed its maximum, or may be nearing its retrograding point. There are maxima and minima, birth, growth, decay, in all the lesser cycles, that fall within their inductions, why not in all the greater and in the greatest of them all? They talk of rectilineal progress right on forever more. It is not with them, trust in one eternal personality infinitely wise and holy; but they have discovered it from their own observations. They see it in the little history of our microscopic earth; they trace it in the nebular system, as they are pleased to call it, and of which they profess to have so exact a knowledge. But even granting their extraordinary insight here, how do they know on which side the mighty curve is bending? Straight on forever more; so might the insect fancy as he roams the vast cathedral dome. He sees nothing but straightness and evenness in his way. And so with these philosophers and the infinite cycle of the universe. What eyes have they to measure or deny the rate or fact of its departure from the tangential line. From their moment of time and their inch of space, how do they know how soon their order,—which, after all, may be but a phantom of their own finite minds,—may become disorder, real or comparative, and their boasted law appear under another aspect giving it, in its new stage, the seeming of utter lawlessness? Talk they of ideas! They have no right to the word in its proper sense; it is a revulsion from their own atheistic impersonality; but even they cannot get along without them. Things may come and go, worlds may wax and wane, nature may be born and die, but still there is ideal truth, it may be said, abstract and of itself; and here, it may be imagined, that we perceive a necessity, an unchangeableness not found in things. It is a better ground of trust than their inductions, and such writers sometimes seem inclined to place themselves upon it. But still it falls short of the scriptural ground of faith. How do they know whether the necessity as perceived in ideas is anything more

than a necessity of their own finite minds, or of their own finite modes of thinking. There can be no trust except in a personality transcending these, and in which they abide. Ideas are nothing except as visions of some mind. There cannot be *intellecta* without *intelligens*, *scibilia* without *sciens*. There cannot be eternal *noemata* without an eternal *Nous*, eternal *thoughts*, without an eternal *Thinker*. And so again, there cannot be *necessary ideas* without a *necessary Knower*; the knowable is inconceivable except as knowledge somewhere. As well attempt to hold an idea of space without extension, or of action without an agent. Truth except as ultimately knowledge, and with a necessity of being, as being that which is known to be, vanishes from our comprehension, while knowledge itself, except as personal thought, is utterly unthinkable; it passeth all understanding. In other words, truth is truth only as it is an attribute of mind, and, in the highest sense, of some eternal, necessary, personal mind. This only can we *trust*—"His truth our shield and buckler."

Such a mode of interpretation, it may be said, is inconsistent with the simplicity of the Scriptures. It is true, the Bible does not teach us philosophy, in the common acceptation of the term, but it is not too much to say that if it be indeed a revelation from God, it must interpret philosophy,—giving us that without which philosophy has neither meaning nor interest. It belongs to the very idea of such a revelation that in some way it must underlie all other truth. We are not to take the Holy Scriptures as our child's book of pictures, and Spencer, or even Sir William Hamilton, as the instructors of our maturer minds. The first named author has been praised even by the religious press, but what a Saharan desert of atheism does he present, for the want of this very idea which is given to us in the Scriptures, not in the pretentious style of philosophy, but in the language of believing devotion, and in the very etymology of primitive terms. Truth, not as an abstract, impersonal thing, but as the representative, the image, yea, the very mind itself, of an infinite and eternal personality, and, therefore, something to be *trusted*,—take this

away, and systems of philosophy of every form and school, become emptied of life and meaning. "Wells are they without water, clouds that are carried of tempests, to whom belongs the mist of darkness forever." Make truth wholly impersonal, or in other words, set aside such infinite personality among the things unknowable, as Spencer does, and our finite personality too becomes a phantom that we cannot trust. We are but parts in a system of things; our consciousness of being something higher may be only an aspect and a working of the universal nature from which it falsely conceives itself separated. "*As Jehovah liveth and as thy soul liveth*,"—this old Hebrew oath touches the very core of the idea. The divine personality is the ground and warrant of that human personality which is infinitely below it, indeed, in worth, yet equal in *certainty*. On no other principle than that of such equal certainty can we account for their being placed together in this remarkable parallelism as the grounds of assurance in the jurative appeal. For a curious exegesis of this Hebrew oath, see Maimonides, Porta Mosis, Pococke ed. p. 256,* and the Treatise Yad Hachazaka, Lib. 1, ch. I, and II.

Herbert Spencer places God, and especially God's personality, among the things "unknowable." The Scriptures represent Him as the confidence of all truth, the ground of all *knowledge*, as well as the source of being and of action to all *things known*. In other words, faith is the condition of all true

---

* חי יהוה חי נפשך. Why the grammatical absolute form of חי here as applied to God? He answers by saying that "the Creator and his life are not two, but one and the same: *by Jehovah, life.*" "So God and his knowledge are not two; He *is* His knowledge; He does not know creatures by means of the creatures; He knows them by himself, because all things are, and are supported, through him;" Treatise *Yad Hachazakah* [The strong hand] Book 1, ch. II, 14, 15. Again, Section 11th of the same chapter: "All things exist as His truth, or by the power of His truth; and as knowing Himself, He knows everything." Sect. 13; "Hence we may say that He is the *knower*, the *known*, and the *knowledge* itself, all at once." And so in the opening of this profound treatise; "The foundation of foundations, and the pillar of wisdom is to know the First Being, and that He called all other beings into existence, and that all things existing [כל נמצאים] exist only through the *truth* of His being. His truth, therefore, is not like the truth of any one of them (taken separately or as abstracted from Him), and thus the Prophet says, Jer. x. 10, "*Jehovah God is truth, and God is life; He is the King of eternity.*"—the truth, the life, the everlasting law.

science. "The beginning of thy Word is truth." Ps. cxix, 160. "He who made the heavens, earth, and seas, and all that in them is, He keepeth truth forever." cxlvi, 6. They are *His* truth; there preservation is His truth; "Truth goeth before thy face," Ps. lxxxix. 15: "O send forth *thy* light and *thy* truth," Ps. xliii. 3: "For with thee is the spring of life; in thy light do we see light." Ps. xxxvi. 10. It reminds us of the dictum of Malebranche, "We see in God." With the philosopher it is a forced theory of sense perception. Understand it however, of the sight of the mind, and it is an approach to this sublime declaration of the Psalmist. What flashes of glory these! Philosophy is worthy of the high eulogium that Cicero pronounces upon her as "the guide of life, the elevating and refining power of human thought;" but it is not too much to say that her proud language might often get a higher significance, and her shadowy forms a more distinct illumination from the light that thus often gleams upon us from these ancient Psalms.

Truth is trust in God. It is ever this in the Scriptures, even when the word seems to be used, for abstract truth,—*vera doctrina*, as Gesenius calls it. Thus when the Psalmist says: "Make me to go in *thy* truth," or "I have walked in *thy* truth," the emphasis is on the personal pronoun as denoting confidence, assurance, and security. "He guideth my steps in *his own* right way; he maketh me to walk in paths of rightness, (or sure paths) for *his own* name's sake."

Connected with this is another most precious Scriptural thought. The highest value of truth, as trust in the infinite soul, demands the finite personality for its trusting perception; hence the dignity of such finite personality. Hence the longing for immortality, and the inspired development of the doctrine of a future state. Parting with life or mere existence is not the keenest pang, but to bid farewell, forever, to a personal Deity, and the vision of His immortal truth. "To thee, O Jehovah, do I cry and make supplication; what *gain* that I go down to corruption! shall dust praise thee? Shall it declare *thy* truth?" Ps. xxx. 8–9. So Psalms lxxxviii. 10–11:

"Wilt thou show thy wonders to the dead? Shall thy goodness be declared in the grave, thy faithfulness (emunatheka) thy truthfulness in Abaddon?" See also Ps. vi. 5. From germs like these grew up the Hebrew doctrine of a future life,* dim, indeed, but more impressive than any abstract dogmatic declaration, having far more of moral power than any mythological particularity such as we find in the Greek fancies of Hades and Elysium. It was God inspiring the soul through a sense of its wants, teaching it by awaking a feeling and a perception of its divine affinities. "Art thou not from everlasting, O Lord my God, my Holy One? *We shall not die*," Hab. i. 12. "As the Lord liveth and as thy soul liveth;" and "because I live, ye shall live also." It is a personal trust, even in its dim questionings, and it is still this feeling when it breaks out in that language of assurance which only the most stubborn rationalism can fail to understand: "Whom have I in heaven but Thee?" "Thou wilt guide me with thy counsel, and afterwards receive me to glory"—"I will behold *thy* face in righteousness, I shall be satisfied when I awake, *thy* likeness"—"*Thou* wilt show me the way of life; in *thy* presence is fullness of joy; at thy right hand are pleasures forever more." Not for life merely, not for sense, not for happiness in itself, do such souls long to live, but for the vision of immortal truth as seen to be inseparable from trust in a personal God.

The noun *emeth* (syncopated for *ameneth*) is from the verb *a-man* or *a-men*. This root is found in all the Semitic languages with a wonderful constancy in its primary idea. This is every where *firmness*, *security*, *support*. It is our *amen* the substance of prayer and the seal of faith. Hence *emeth*, that

---

*Thus regarded, these texts, and others of a similar kind, which have been stumbling-blocks to some, and regarded by them as sure proof that the Jews, even the pious among them, were sheer materialists, acquire a most precious spiritual value. Such a connection of the soul's life with the life of Deity, such a desire to live because he lives, (especially if we regard it as inspired by God himself) is worth more to the great doctrine than any dogmatic statement. The very *feeling* here is a higher thing, nearer to the source of life and the fountain of light, than any mere knowledge regarded as speculative or abstract—that is, as *truth* without *trust*.

which is trusted as assurance and security. There is the same idea in the kindred nouns *amana*, *amuna*, and the Arabic *amanat*. In the latter language, however, there comes in later a word which denotes merely abstract truth, but the earlier term is used in the more solemn asseverations, and in the early Arabic translations of the Bible. *Emeth* then, or truth, is security. In its largest sense it is the security of the universe, as resting on the idea of a personal God. This is the Bible teaching. All truth is His truth. Thus we may say, first,

The Scriptures are God's truth.

This is what the Psalmist had chiefly in mind,—the ancient law and covenant, the written Word. "I will praise thy name for *thy* truth, for thou hast magnified thy Word above all thy *name*." The name of God is that by which we know him. Specially it is the great personal name Jehovah by which He is known to his people. It is the name signed to the Covenant, or to the Scriptures as a special epistle to humanity and directed to us in *our name*, even as Nature is a general epistle directed to all intelligence. And so, secondly,

Nature is God's truth.

It is His thought, His intelligence, His wisdom. We have his *word* in it; we can, therefore, trust it. We see this very beautifully expressed in some of the Scriptural passages where this idea of truth as truth, or the ground of trust, stands out in such a way that it cannot be mistaken for mere truth of doctrine, or any mere abstract truth of things. Thus Ps. lvii. 10, "even to the skies (the *Shchakim*, the highest supposed regions of space) is thy *truth*;" Ps. lxxxv. 12; "*Truth grows up* out of the earth, whilst righteousness (faithfulness) looks down from heaven." Hence it is that the herbs and flowers are called *oroth*, *lights*, Isaiah xxvi. 19: 2 Kings iv. 39; they are God's thoughts coming out of the earth, his assurance and faithfulness in the seasons; for "whatsoever maketh manifest is light." Eph. v. 13. It is this higher idea which is in the old Hebrew, and not any such mere prettiness as Gesenius would make of it. Again, Ps. cxi. 7, 8, "The works of his hands are truth, supported forever and ever (*la-ad le-olam*, or while the

world standeth) made in *truth* and rightness." See Psalms lxxxix. 8, where we have the cognate word *amuna* expressing the same idea, "O Lord God of Hosts who is strong like unto Thee, with thy faithfulness (thy truth) round about thee." It suggests again, Psalms cxxxviii. 8, "The work of thy hands thou dost not forsake;" and Isaiah xl. 26, "Lift up your eyes on high, and behold who hath created these? who bringeth out their host by number and calleth them all by name? it is because *He is strong that not one of them faileth*,"—literally, *is wanting*, or loses its place in the series. Nature is all God's truth from the highest to the lowest. "In His hand lie all the deep places of the earth, and the strength of the hills is His also." Ps. xcv. 4. Thirdly,

Creation is God's truth.

"He made the heavens, earth, and seas, and all that in them is; He keepeth truth for ever."—Psalms, cxlvi. 6. Fourthly,

History and Providence are God's truth.

"All the *ways* of the Lord are truth."—Psalms, xxv. 10. "The judgments of the Lord (His dealings with his church and with the world) are truth."—Psalm, xix. 10. They are placed here in parallelism with the great works of nature described in the beginning of the Psalm. As the heavens declare His glory, so these proclaim His truth and faithfulness. It is in them that "goodness and *truth* meet together."—Ps. lxxxv. 11. Fifthly,

All abstract truth is God's truth.

We call it abstract in its relation to our finite minds, but it is not abstract to Him; neither should it be strictly so to us. It is still a personal trust. It is not simply that which is believed intellectually, as though it were the mere abstract agreement of impersonal ideas. Even of mathematical reality it may be said that it only becomes strictly *truth* to us, in this primitive etymological sense, when we regard it as an exposition of that eternal Mind in which all ideas lie for ever, and from which they are reflected to us in their eternal, changeless entity. Thus, the eternal and necessary principles, mathematical, dynamical, and ethical, which became phenomenal in creation,

in nature, and in providence, are his eternal and necessary thought. They are not to him a reflected light, as they are to us. They do not belong to him as they belong to us. They are not attributes of the infinite mind as they are of the finite—attributes, we mean, regarded as separate from his being. God, as Maimonides says, *is* his knowledge as he *is* his love and his power. It is in Him an unchanging truth, unchanging knowledge, however varied and even mutable they may seem to be in their finite manifestations. As the revolving mirror sets in motion the immovable landscape, so do these ideas of the Lord phenomenally traverse nature, "running very swiftly" through all the changes and causalities of time, yet ever remaining in their changeless, and timeless, and uncaused eternity. Matter and force and motion do but reveal them, whilst the ideas themselves reveal to us God, because He hath made us in His image, wherein we behold and recognize them. "We see them as in a mirror, shadowly," yet, in all the worlds of sense, it may be reverently affirmed, there is nothing real but they and their beholders.

Immoveable, yet ever moving, *standing*, yet ever flowing. Let us not be charged with paradox. We find similar representations in that scriptural doctrine of the Logos in nature which so transcends our highest inductive science. "Forever, O Lord, thy word is settled (*nitz-tzab*, fixed immoveable, like a pillar) in the heavens."—Psalms, cxix. 89. The same word (Psalm, cxlvii. 15) is described as "*running very swiftly*." "By faith we understand that by the word of the Lord (Heb., xi. 3; Prov. viii. 22–31) were the worlds (not the *kosmoi*, but the *aiones* or creative ages) framed" or harmonized in their time successions; it is by the same word as we are taught (Col. i. 17), "that all things *stand* together" [συνέστηκε] in the totality of their cosmical idea.

The rationalist may smile at such a mode of interpretation. He finds no such ideas in the texts that thus speak of truth as God's truth. Very true; for he sees and acknowledges no inspiration in them; they are only oriental forms of speech—old Hebrew rhapsodies, hyperbolical, and sometimes having

little or no meaning, or a very common meaning, which the mystic, they say, strains to a fancied height they will not bear. But no matter for that, as long as they are fairly suggested to the religious mind (and with all deference to the claim of superior reason, will we say it), the rational mind that "seeks wondrous things out of God's law," assuming that a true divine revelation, with all its simplicity and unphilosophicalness of diction, must, in some way, underlie the deepest truths revealed to us by sense or reason. When the Psalmist uttered these words it may be said, and with all correctness, that he had not in mind, or actually present to his mind, the different kinds of truth, natural, moral, and speculative, on which we have been dwelling. It is enough that he meant *all truth*, whether then thought by him or not, whether known to him or not. His science and his conception were not the measure of the great utterance with which he was inspired. Had there been opened to his mind, a vision of all that Plato thought, of all that Newton knew—had his soul been carried to heights of philosophical and scientific contemplation as much transcending all *their* attainments as they surpassed the rudest Australian savage, still would it all have been to him the word and truth of the Lord, the ground of trust, the very trust itself, in a personal God. The thought would have been essentially the same, and ever as it enlarged to take in more truth of fact or science, would the idea of the divine personality, instead of becoming more and more remote and "unknowable," as in the "positive philosophy" of Comte and Spencer, have shone brighter and brighter. Ever as he rose, still would his thought have been,

> "Nearer, my God, to thee,
> Nearer to thee,—"

and still would he have poured forth the rapt language: "*Thy* truth, O Lord, *our* shield—*Thou* keepest truth for evermore: With *Thee* is the fountain of life, and in *Thy* light do *we* see light; for *Thou* hast redeemed *me*, O Lord God of *truth*."

The simplest words here are the most important. These personal pronouns! What is philosophy without them? They

present at the same time, the plainest and the profoundest truths in the universe, aside from which the world is but so much matter, force and motion, making a state of things that, for all we can know or trust, might have been, and may yet be, any other state of things as well as this. Say not in thy heart who shall ascend up into heaven to bring us down the *truth* from above (from the regions of philosophic speculation), or who shall descend for us into the deep to bring up *truth* from the dead (from the explorings of irreligious science). But what saith it, even the righteousness of faith? The *truth* is very nigh unto thee, even in thy mouth and in thy heart; *His* truth thy shield and buckler.

As might be expected, the idea advanced finds some of its aptest and richest illustrations in the use of the corresponding Greek word for truth in the New Testament. It may be seen every where, while, in certain passages, it is so evident that it cannot be mistaken. It is the only key to their explanation, which is difficult and confused as long as we adhere to the abstract conception of truth as impersonal being. Thus, for example, when Christ is called "The Truth," He is the trust, the truth of God. He is so in his humanity,—the Word of God to us, the pledge, the assurance of his love, the exhibition of his moral glory. He is to us also the truth of God as that eternal Logos, or "reason of things," in which we trust. Thus he is the λόγος ἀληθείας, the Word of truth. "Sanctify them through thy truth, thy Word is truth." Sanctify them through thy trust, or faith in thee. This trust or truth is the word, whether taken as the written or the incarnate word, the written or the incarnate revelation.

In many other passages the thought of *truth* as *trust* gives them a force they do not otherwise seem to possess, even though we may not call it a new idea, or a new sense. It at least presents the old sense in a new and more living light. Thus, John i. 4, "Full of grace and truth,"—trust, confidence, that which inspires trust, whether taken objectively or subjectively. John i. 17, "The law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ." Abstractly, the Gospel is

no more a *system* of truth, or truth impersonally, than the law, —in fact, the law has more of this abstract doctrinal aspect,— but what a significance does the Gospel have which the law did not possess! It is God's truth in this higher and truer sense, God's trust, his call to man to trust in him,—God's faithfulness, his promise of mercy ever sure, his "unspeakable gift" of Christ the pledge of *his* love to man; it is Christ himself as the truth, the assurance, the reconciliation. John iv. 23, "They shall worship the Father in Spirit and in *truth*,"—not with the correct ritual, and the sound abstract doctrine, though all that may be implied, but primarily, and essentially, in trust, in confidence, in assurance, with a knowledge of the ground of trust,—that is, Christ the truth. Here, too, it may be taken subjectively of the human confidence, or objectively of that in God and Christ which inspires it. John viii. 32. "And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." Viewed as referring to abstract truth merely, it is hard to see the exact meaning here. In the personal sense, as we have called it, how clear and glorious! It is the freedom of trust, of faith in the love and faithfulness of God. 1 Cor. xiii, 6. "Charity (love) rejoiceth in the *truth*." We have heard this interpreted as denoting sound doctrine, and so employed as a kind of offset against the false liberality which some might think to support from other parts of this description. Love, doubtless, is consistent with a zeal for orthodoxy; yet, however true that may be,—and we are not disposed to underrate its importance,—such is not the point here intended. *Ἀλήθεια* in the verse is in contrast with *ἀδικία*, and means more properly truthfulness, or rather truth as a thing trusted, and, therefore, the ground of its joy. As in Neh. viii. 10, "The joy of the Lord is your strength."

Other passages may be cited to the same effect. We need only barely mention, and commend to the study of the reader, such as these: John iii. 21, "He that doeth *truth* (or rather *the truth*) cometh to the Father." It is the drawing power of truth as the confidence and revealed mind of God. John xvii. 37, "that I should bear witness unto the truth; every

one that is of the truth heareth my voice." It sounded strangely to Pilate to hear truth spoken of in this way, and it suggested to him the mighty question of the following verse: "Pilate said unto him, what is truth?" Rom. i. 18, "who hold the truth in unrighteousness"—pervert it into its counterfeit, that is, abstract speculation. Rom. i. 25, "Who changed the truth of God into a lie." Some would render it here, "the truth respecting God;" but this was the beginning of the very degeneracy the apostle is describing. They made it a theosophy, and so began to worship it as something abstract, something by itself, severed from the personality. As is set forth, 1 Cor. i. 21, where ἐν τῇ σοφίᾳ τοῦ Θεοῦ is equivalent, we think, to ἐν τῇ Θεοσοφίᾳ,—"when the world in its theosophy (its wisdom about God, a sense which the Greek genitive will well bear) knew not God through its wisdom, then God, etc." 2 Cor. vi. 7, "By the word of *truth*, by the *power* of God." Eph. iv. 21, "As the truth is in Jesus." Eph. vi. 4, "Your loins girt about with truth." James i. 18, "He begat us by the Word of truth." It is not a mere moral or didactic influence, but a trust-creating, love-enkindling, life-giving power.

This idea of truth is deeply marked in early language—that soul-mirror which sometimes seems to reflect a divine light, as though it still preserved something of a primitive revelation. We have traced it in the Hebrew and in the Shemitic family of languages, where it lies most distinct and clear. It is also unmistakable in English. Truth is troth and trust. So, also, the old Saxon *sooth* (*in sooth*, in verity), as a noun, is trust, confidence, from the verb *soothe*, to assure, comfort, make confiding; and this from the Gothic *sunis*—Anglo-Saxon *sodh*, *sooth*, having its noun, *sunja*, used in the Gothic Bible for the Greek ἀλήθεια. The Saxon *sooth* is equal to *soonth*, *sunth*, just as the Hebrew emeth has the *n* dropped from the form *ameneth*, and which still remains in all the Arabic derivatives. The Latin *verus* would seem to have the same radical idea, as would appear by comparing it with the German *wahr*, and the verb *wahren*, to endure, hold out. *Wahr* is that which is firm, *sure*, on which we can rely. So *sure* would seem to

be the same with *swere*, *severe* (*assevero*); and hence, *verus*, with the initial s — sverus, as is the case with so many other primitive words that have assumed or dropped this letter. In all these we find the same constant radical idea.

It is not so evident in the Greek ἀλήθεια, but even there the negative form, though at first obscuring, brings us round at last to the same thing. Ἀλήθεια—α negative, and the root λαθ—is the unconcealed, the open, that which lies before us, as very nigh to us when we see it, and thus inviting our confidence—that which we cannot forget—on which we can rely; it has more reference than the corresponding word in other languages to an abstract truth of things, and elsewhere than in the New Testament is almost wholly thus employed; but still the personal idea, or the idea of truth as an attribute of mind, is inseparable from it; as a quality of some soul, finite or infinite, it is not wholly lost in all the abstract uses to which Greek philosophy and Greek sophistry have subjected it. The connection appears very beautifully, sometimes, in Plato, especially where he makes ἀλήθεια, or νοῦς, the light proceeding from the ἀγαθὸν (the good), even as light and vision are inseparable from the physical sun.—*Plat. Politeia*, lib. vi. 503–510.

Philosophy has marred the primitive thought. In its advancing speculations it has more and more separated the two ideas, tending ever to a theosophy rather than to religion,—making God *a* truth instead of *all* truth—one out of many truths to which he stands related, and from which he is as much severed as we are. This process has gone on until the *most* modern thinking of the irreligious schools, not content with the divorce between truth and God, would seem to sink altogether the divine personality, thus losing the truth itself in losing, or ignoring, that which is its only trusty ground.

Art. II.—THE DOUBLE SENSE OF SCRIPTURE.

By Prof. W. S. Tyler, D. D., Amherst, Mass.

Since the Bible is our rule of faith and practice, a right understanding of the Scriptures must lie at the foundation of sound theology and true religion. A correct exegesis is especially fundamental to the faithful and successful *preaching* of the word of God. Protestant Christians and preachers of the gospel, therefore, cannot but be deeply interested in the question: What is the right method of interpreting the Scriptures? Are they to be interpreted on the same general principles and according to the same established laws of thought and language as other books? or are they to be explained by a method peculiar to themselves, according to special rules, or without any rules or laws whatsoever? May they be interpreted to suit the fancy and caprice of the reader? Has each passage one and only one intelligible and ascertainable meaning? or has it a double sense? or may it have as many different senses as it has readers, and these again multiplied by as many fancies as each reader can conjure up?

In this matter, as in almost everything else, two extremes have been widely prevalent. The one may be called the allegorical, and the other the literal extreme. The extreme of allegorizing was originated by the writers of the Talmud, who insisted that every verse of Scripture was susceptible of seven times seven senses (which was certainly many more senses than they had in their own heads), and was carried to its *ne plus ultra* of perfection by the Jewish cabalists, who maintained that every word, letter, number and accent of the Hebrew Bible had its hidden meaning. The early Christian fathers inherited, partly from Jewish tradition, and partly from heathen philosophy, the same subtle allegorizing and re-

fining spirit. Even Augustine, the soundest and ablest of them all, discovered, in the dimensions, form and structure of Noah's ark the incarnation and the whole Christian economy. Some modern commentators have fallen little behind these illustrious predecessors in the ingenuity with which they have allegorized everything in the Old Testament, while they have even gone beyond them in their fanciful and mystical interpretations of the miracles and the parables of the New Testament; thus introducing not only *mystery* but *mysticism*, not only *mysticism* but *mystification* (if I may be allowed to answer a fool according to his folly, by a little punning and double and triple sense), and not only *mystification* but *mist* and *moonshine* into the clear sunlight of the Gospel. This method of interpretation was reduced to a science by Origen, and culminated in Cocceius, whose law of exegesis has often been said to be this, that everything is in a text that the imagination of man can possibly get out of it.

The extreme of literalizing may be seen in Warburton, who denied that the doctrine of a future state is taught in the Books of Moses; in Grotius, who never applies to the spiritual and eternal world any passage of Scripture that can by any possibility be understood of the present visible and tangible life, and in those Unitarians of England and America who separate the Old Testament from the New, and find no Christ in the one, no incarnation or atonement, perchance no doctrine of depravity or future punishment in the other. The German rationalists, with their French, English and American followers, for the most part, belong to the same school, interpreting the Bible with the grammar and lexicon alone, with *less* common sense, and far less personal sympathy than they do any other book; with little or no regard to harmony of doctrine and the analogy of Scripture, and no recognition of the necessity of Christian experience, or the teaching of the Holy Ghost, in order to a right understanding of the word of God. But with the extreme of credulity and superstition (which not unfrequently accompanies the extreme of skepticism), the extreme left of the rationalistic school, after dissect-

ing the Scriptures with their cold and hard criticism, and extracting from them every element of divine authority and truth and love, sublimate them into a mere cloud-land of more than heathen myths and fables. Under the wide-spread influence of German philology, sanctioned and partially sanctified by the learning, piety and enthusiasm of Professor Stuart, the tendency of Biblical criticism in our country now is, perhaps, to the literalizing rather than the allegorizing extreme.

Without stopping to collect opinions, compare views, or canvass arguments, we shall have time only to state a few of the fundamental principles by which this question must be decided.

1. We start with the assumption that the Bible is a revelation from God to men, through the medium of men. This is no unreasonable assumption; it is only extending to the Bible the courtesy which we extend to every other book, and which we *must* extend to any book which we would interpret or even understand; that is, to take it on its own ground, and look at it from its own standing-point. For none can deny that the Bible *claims* to be truly divine, while at the same time it purports to be, and manifestly is, fully human—we might say, the most intensely human of all books. It is the word of God; but that word is uttered by the voices of men, and those voices echoed by all the objects and circumstances by which the human authors were surrounded, and deeply colored by the whole character and history of the peculiar people to whom they belonged. So, too, the living, incarnate Word of God was God, and yet dwelt as a man among men, was fully divine, and at the same time perfectly human—the most completely human of all men, the only representative of all which is human that ever walked the earth.

2. If the Bible is a revelation to men, it must be in the language of *men*, else to men, at least, it were no *revelation* at all, and would require another revelation to make it understood. If it is a revelation through the medium of men, it must be in the language of the men through whom the revelation is

made. To suppose the contrary, were to charge God with folly in choosing unsuitable instruments, or using instruments in an unsuitable way, that does violence to the nature which he himself has given them; and all this without accomplishing—without the probability, or even the *possibility* of accomplishing—the object at which he aimed. And when we look at the Bible, we see that what must be true in the nature of the case, *is* true as a matter of fact. The Old Testament is written in Hebrew, and the New Testament in Hebraistic Greek; and each one of the many different writers, living in many successive centuries, manifestly writes, not only in the language of his age and country, but in a style and manner that corresponds with his own birth, education, talents and character, so far as these are disclosed in his personal history.

3. The Bible must, therefore, be interpreted on the same general principles, and according to the same general laws of mind, thought and language as other books. As in other books, especially books in foreign languages, the foundations of all correct interpretation must be laid in the grammar and lexicography of the language, and the geography, history and archæology of the people who spoke the language; and the biography, topography and, so far as possible, all the surroundings of the authors, are collateral and essential aids to a right understanding of their writings.

4. Like other books, the Bible, and every part of the Bible, must have some one intelligible, primary meaning, and that the meaning which the writers conceived in their own minds, and intended to convey to their readers. And the more nearly we can reproduce in our own minds the *status* of the original authors and their immediate readers, and place ourselves in their *status*, the more likely we shall be to apprehend this primary meaning. This is the first duty of the interpreter, and essentially pre-requisite to the right interpretation of any portion of the Scriptures, that he should not only understand the history and outward circumstances of the sacred writer, but enter into his experience and inmost spirit, and thus reproduce the very *meaning* which he intended to convey.

5. All books that live contain general principles, great truths, pregnant thoughts, prophetic anticipations that are of universal and perpetual application; it is for this reason only that they *deserve* to live, and *do* live. This is the only reason why they are perpetually quoted, and it is this perpetual quotation that perpetuates their lives. Many of these modern applications may be widely different (and all of them probably differ more or less) from the precise intention and application of the author; and he may be said to be taken in almost as many different senses as there are writers and speakers that quote his pithy or pregnant sayings. The doctrine of a double sense, or rather of a *manifold* sense, is no new thing under the sun; it is not at all peculiar to Jews and Christians. The early Greeks had their Bible in the poems of Homer, and they discussed his meaning, and interpreted his language in as many different senses, almost, as we do that of the Bible. And while it may be justly said that

> "———— Sober commentators view
> In Homer more than Homer knew,"

yet they never would have found, or thought they found, such marvelous wisdom in his works but for his accurate observation of nature, and his intuitive discernment of men and things just as they are. The followers of Plato corrupted and perverted his writings, just as the different schools of interpreters have abused the Bible, by putting upon his language a physical, a metaphysical, an ethical, a theological, an allegorical, and I know not how many other interpretations. But in the one case, as in the other, it is only an abuse of a good thing. Plato always has been, and always will be, the representative, and in some sense the *embodiment*, of *all* spiritual philosophy. We call Shakspeare the myriad-minded, because he seemed not only to see all the present, but to reproduce all the past, and anticipate all the future.

Now, if the books of great *men* have this manifold meaning and significance, and that just in proportion as they *are* great and their genius is comprehensive, how much more the Book

of God. It is the spark of deity within that reveals to uninspired men so much of truth. How much more the sunlight of inspiration that illumines the Bible! We should expect in a book that came from God an *all*-comprehensive wisdom, and an *all*-revealing truth. And this is just what strikes the candid and thoughtful reader of the Bible—its suggestiveness, its wonderful fullness of meaning, the breadth and depth of its thoughts, the universality and perpetuity of its principles, the all-enfolding and all-penetrating light of its revelations.

6. There is more of truth and significance in the works of original and creative minds than the authors themselves fully understood. They contain germs which other men will develop, and other and better times only can bring to maturity. Like the morning star, they bring with them the dawn and promise of a brighter day than they saw or distinctly conceived. It is, therefore, no reproach to Homer or his commentators, if they do discover in his "winged words"—words winged for their long flight down the ages—more than Homer knew. When Christian scholars find a "Christian Element in Plato," and "unconscious prophecies" of Atonement and Redemption in the Greek poets and philosophers, it is only doing just what Paul did when he reproved the idolatry of the Athenians out of what "certain also of their own poets had said"—(he even calls them *prophets* in his Epistle to Titus)—and just what we do, constantly, when we quote Shakspeare's language as an anticipation and felicitous expression of a thousand "things in heaven and earth" that his "philosophy never dreamed of." So Theophrastus foreshadowed the sexual system in plants, and Galen almost discovered the distinction and separation of the nerves of motion and sensation in animals; and the writings of Roger Bacon contain obscure hints, and those of Lord Bacon the living germs, of the modern physical sciences.

What wonder then, if the Evangelists discover in the prophets prophecies of Christ where the prophets themselves were, at most, but dimly conscious of their Christology, and the

Apostles in their Epistles unfold whole systems of theology from those words and acts of the Lord Jesus of which the Evangelists had hardly begun to understand the significance, and the whole Bible contains mines of wealth, hidden from the view even of the chief of the Apostles, which the church has been bringing out ever since, and will be working and developing until the end of time! If those authors, whom the Providence of God has used as his chosen instruments for instructing the separate nations and disclosing the physical sciences, abound in unconscious prophecies, what wonder if those writers whom the *Spirit* of God has chosen as the medium of the revelations of his own truth and grace to the *church* and the *world*, are full of mysteries that were quite unsearchable to the writers themselves; and yet the providence and the spirit of God will gradually unfold those mysteries to the experience and reveal them to the consciousness of those who love him. This is the principle on which the writers of the New Testament manifestly interpret the Old; and there is no good reason why *their* writings should not be interpreted on the same principle. Doubtless the language in which the apostle Peter so explicitly and so beautifully announces this principle, will never become obsolete. "Of which salvation the prophets have inquired and searched diligently, who prophecied of the grace that should come unto *us*, searching what, or what manner of time the spirit of Christ which was in them did signify, when it testified beforehand the sufferings of Christ and the glory that should follow. Unto whom it was revealed that not unto themselves, but unto *us* they did minister the things which are now reported unto you by them that have preached the gospel unto you, with the Holy Ghost sent down from heaven; *which things the angels desire to look into.*" So that even when we have ascertained the precise meaning which the sacred writer intended to convey, it is not unreasonable, still less profane, it is not attempting to be wise above what is written, but only following the example which the apostles themselves have set us, to inquire farther, whether "the Holy Ghost" does not "signify" something more. And in

this question, our great guide and teacher is "the Holy Ghost himself, sent down from heaven," to reveal the truth to the consciousness of the church and of individual Christians in the increasing light of God's providence and their own experience. Thus "light is *sown* for the righteous;" "and in *thy* light, *we* shall *see* light."

7. Laws and principles that are founded in the nature of things, are, of course, in their very nature universal and perpetual, and their applications infinitely varied and diversified. Hence the decalogue, and the preceptive and doctrinal parts of the Bible generally, have in them a fullness of meaning and a variety of interpretation that never can be fully understood till the end of time. The Psalms of David are meeting with a succession of fulfillments and interpretations in the history of the church, and the experience of Christians, of which David could hardly have had the most distant conception,—as inadequate a conception (to illustrate in a familiar instance) as he had of the extent and magnificence of the material creation, when he penned those inspired words which are still adequate to express all the wonders of modern astronomical discovery: "When I consider thy heavens, the work of thy fingers," etc. And the Epistles of Paul have been justly quoted in a variety of senses and applications far exceeding even his fruitful imagination.

Moreover *history* is perpetually repeating itself. Facts are continually recurring, not in just the same but in similar order and combination, in never ending cycles. Ancient history is often reproduced, under a somewhat different form, in modern history; and it is in the light of modern history that Niebuhr and Grote and the new school of historians have so wonderfully elucidated the obscurities and reproduced the lost portions of Grecian, Roman, and other ancient history. And as the past contained the present, so the present contains the future, even as the oak is contained in the acorn. All history is therefore virtually prophecy; and a prophecy which is fulfilled in one epoch or event, must be fulfilled again and again in every similar epoch or event till the final consummation of all things.

This is emphatically true of the history of God's ancient people as written by the Spirit of God through the medium of inspired men. That is the history of the *church*, and the history of the *world*, in miniature. The laws and principles by which God ruled his ancient people, are those by which he governs the *church* and the *world*, and the great epochs in their history illustrate and foreshadow like epochs in the history of the church and the world in all ages. Thus the covenant with Abraham contains in it the covenant, not only with every pious Israelite, but with every true Christian, and every true Christian church, and so has been repeated and re-repeated in every age and nation of Christendom, and will continue to be repeated and re-repeated as long as God has a church on earth, and a kingdom in the hearts of men. The return from the captivity foreshadowed, and in a sense involved, the coming of the Redeemer, and the promulgation of the gospel in the apostolic age—it foreshadowed the Protestant Reformation—the great reformation in the days of the Wesleys, Whitfield, and Edwards—the revivals of the nineteenth century—and all the great revivals and reformations that ever have marked or ever will mark the history of the church. And the promise that was made to Abraham and fulfilled to his natural seed, has been fulfilled *again*, times without number, to his spiritual children ; and the prophecy that was fulfilled in the return from the captivity, has received many and far more glorious fulfillments in the grand epochs of church history. And it is just because the promise and the prophecy were *intended* by the Spirit to represent and embody all these great eras and events, so far exceeding any possible comprehension of the patriarchs and prophets to whom and through whom they were uttered—it is just because they were *intended* to be thus pregnant and comprehensive, that the promise and the prophecy are clothed in such general and such glowing language, so far surpassing the dignity of the single event in which they received their first accomplishment.

Again the Exodus from Egypt, how often has that been re-

peated (as, for instance, in the American Revolution and the recent acts of Emancipation), in all the revolutions of nations and deliverances of races that have succeeded each other down the track of ages. And the destruction of Jerusalem, as it was itself threatened and foreshadowed in the overthrow of Nineveh, and Babylon, and Tyre, and other idolatrous and rebellious nations, so did it threaten and foreshadow the subversion of Grecian and Roman power, the ruin of other corrupt and ungodly cities, states and empires, and at length the destruction of the world. Accordingly the language in which the destruction of Jerusalem is predicted by our Lord in the gospels and by the Apostle John in the Apocalypse, like that in which the destruction of Nineveh, and Babylon, and Tyre, is predicted by the prophets in the Old Testament, is comprehensive, grand and awful enough to express the whole series of catastrophes that are to befall the nations and the world, till at length in the fullest sense "the sun shall be turned into darkness, and the moon into blood, and the stars shall fall from heaven."

8. "Known unto God are all his works from the foundation of the world;" and, as a manifestation and demonstration of this knowledge to his intelligent creatures, in all his works whether of creation, providence or grace, he has made the earlier stages preparatory to and typical of the later stages; and in general (though with such exceptions and interruptions as effectually to disprove all the development theories of modern skeptics) each successive creation or dispensation is an advance or improvement upon the preceding, in a progressive series from the beginning to the end. As the seed not only contains the tree but resembles it in form and embryo organization, is the *type* the whole tree, and of every branch, twig, flower and fruit that springs from it, so the earth, as we read its Genesis and history either in the book of science or in the book of revelation—the earth as it first proceeded from the hands of its Maker, had in it the germs and types of all its subsequent internal changes, and of all the forms of vegetable, animal and rational life that have existed on its surface. And not only

has the general law of creation and order of development been in a progressive series, from the purely mineral to the vegetable, from the vegetable to the animal, and from the lower orders of animal organization to the higher, till the scale was at length consummated in man, but each successive period was manifestly *preparatory* to that which succeeded it, and all the epochs to the epoch of man; and each lower order of animals contained in their structure the type and promise of man as the consummate flower and fruit of the series. Nor does the typical and progressive series end with the introduction of man upon the earth; but the successive races and nations of men follow the general law of progress. We do not believe in the uninterrupted education and development of the human race from an original savage state, any more than we believe in the development of man from the monkey. But history does show a general and gradual advancement of society, government, civilization and moral culture from those semi-barbarous and colossal empires of Asia, which were so aptly symbolized by monsters coming up out of the sea, through the Grecian cultivation and adoration of beauty, and the Roman development of law, to the Teutonic education and elevation of the individual, and the modern aspiration after liberty, equality and fraternity; and we do believe that this foreshadows the better time coming, the reign of philanthropy, Christian charity and universal love. It is only in retrospect, and with eyes enlightened at once by science and religion, that *we* can thus read the history of "earth and man," as a series of types and antitypes, of prophecies and repeated fulfillments. But we can well imagine and believe that those morning stars that sang together, those sons of God who shouted for joy when the foundations of the earth were laid, read no inconsiderable portion of it in *anticipation;* and no one can tell how far the prophets, illumined by the Spirit of God, may have seen, through the *medium* of *natural* types and symbols, what they did see, of successive epochs in the history of the church and the world.

Such being the general law of God's working in creation and

providence, if the Bible is his book, we should expect to find the same law there. If we did not, we should be disappointed, and should be constrained to admit that it wanted one essential evidence of divine authority. Now, I need not spend time in showing how completely the Bible answers to this expectation—how full it is, from beginning to end of those types and antitypes, prophecies and repeated fulfillments, and those successive and progressive dispensations, which in their striking analogy to the constitution and course of nature, furnish conclusive evidence that it has the same author. The chief difference is that the Bible carries this series of types and prophecies, on further from earth to heaven, and up higher from man to God through him who is the Son of man, and also the Son of God, and who, being "the *image* of God" in a far higher sense than the first Adam or any of his posterity-is the great antitype of all the types both of nature and revelation. How unhistorical and unphilosophical as well as unscrip, tural, then, is the attempt to dissever the Old Testament and the New! How fully is the interpreter of the Scriptures and the preacher of the gospel justified by all the analogies of nature and providence, as well as by the example of the sacred writers, in finding all the fullness of meaning which the church has been accustomed to find in such pregnant promises as that, for instance, made to our first mother, that the seed of the woman should bruise the serpent's head; or that made to the father of the faithful, that in his seed all nations should be blessed; and in *expecting* to find the Old Testament full of types and prophecies of the New, and the whole Bible, historical, doctrinal and prophetical, fulfilled again and again in the history of the church and the world—accomplished *more* and *more* perfectly, with more and more of moral grandeur and spiritual significance, till at length, through a series of catastrophes and progressive revolutions, the climax is reached in the universal reign of him who is at once the Son of man and the Son of God.

9. One object which the Creator contemplated in the material creation seems to have been the preparation of a language

through which he could reveal himself, his thoughts and feelings, his character and will, to rational beings, but especially to men who are a compound of reason and the senses. For, what *is* the material universe but the *language* of the spiritual —the signs and symbols of truth, beauty and goodness—the alphabet in which are written, or the types on which are printed, the thoughts of God and of spiritual intelligences, the inarticulate but not unintelligible speech in which nature voices itself, day utters speech unto day, and night shows knowledge to night, and God himself speaks to his intelligent creatures. And what is *human* language but an improved copy of the language of nature—a translation of all the varied tones and voices of inarticulate nature into articulate speech; a transfiguration of all the types and shadows, and signs and symbols of the material world, by the reason and imagination of man (trained under the providence of God, and taught by his Spirit) into a material-spiritual medium of communication, whereby man communicates his thoughts and wishes to his fellow-man, but whereby, as its highest function, God, all the while, intended to reveal his truth and love to the soul of man, and thus each soul that received the revelation might breathe it, as the breath of the Divine Spirit, into the souls of others.

What is the Hebrew language, in its antique simplicity and expressiveness, but a grand old trumpet which God was, through many generations, preparing that he might speak through it directly to his ancient people, and remotely to his chosen in later times. And what was the Greek language but a magnificent organ which he built on a grander plan and perfected with still more care, that with it he might instruct, and, if possible, charm the listening nations. And what were the sacred writers but so many pipes, and stops, and keys, (partly conscious but for that reason only the more musical and expressive), which he gradually introduced into those instruments and touched successively as the medium of his revelations. And, to come at length more directly to the point we wish to illustrate, what was the whole Old Testament and

the entire ancient dispensation of which it was a part, but the long and gradual preparation of a *language* through which he might reveal himself more fully in the New; and what is the New Testament and the dispensation of the Spirit of which it was the opening, but a more perfect language which God was still longer preparing for the communication of his gospel and his grace, not to one nation or one age, but to the church in all nations and the world throughout all ages.

Now if this view is just—and it seems to be not only the view which the apostles took of the old dispensation, but also the view which we are constrained to take by the very nature of language and the analogy of divine providence—then we must believe that over and above the sense which the writers of the Old Testament intended to convey to their immediate readers, there may be, and must be, a fullness of meaning in their words which is understood and fulfilled, that is, *filled full*, only in the New. So that when the apostles and evangelists appropriate many passages of the Old Testament in a manner and sense which was clearly never thought of by the original author, (as, for example, in the passages, "Out of Egypt have I called my son;" and "In Rama was there a voice heard," and very many others especially in the gospel of Matthew, and the epistles of Paul,) it is not a perversion, it is not even an arbitrary accommodation, but the language of the Old Testament, and the event which it resembles under the old dispensation were always intended, in the providence and by the Spirit of God, to have this application, to prepare the way for it, and to express it more perfectly and more powerfully than it could otherwise be expressed, in the New. And on the same principle, the New Testament was prepared by the providence of God to express, and was intended by the Spirit of God to convey, a fullness of meaning, a variety of applications, and, I think we may say, a number of significations, which the writers themselves did not understand and could not have been made to understand or imagine without a miracle. And the prophecies, like the precepts and the promises and the facts and the doctrines, both of the Old and New Testament,

will be perfectly fulfilled, that is, absolutely *filled full*, in their divine significance and expressiveness, only at the final consummation of all things.

In conclusion, then, of this wide range of argument and illustration, we believe in a single primary sense of Holy Scripture, as of all other writings, and *that* the sense understood and intended by the sacred writer; and this sense is to be ascertained and determined according to the same laws of mind and language, and with the same helps of grammar, lexicography, geography, and history as the heathen classics. We believe, also, that there is a foundation in the nature of things, and especially in the Bible for a secondary and a double sense. Man has a body and a soul. Human language has a body and a soul. The world, the universe, is partly material and partly spiritual. The language of God has a body and a soul, an external form and an inward substance or spirit, and so has the revelation which he has made to men. There is the letter, and there is the spirit. And that which is literal or "natural is *first;* and afterward that which is spiritual." So that there is some good reason for those forms of expression which are so commonly used by theologians and commentators, and which the church has always cherished in her heart as well as on her lips—"the secondary meaning," and "the double sense of Scripture." But I believe also, and am constrained to believe, in a *manifold* and *multiform* sense of Scripture, not the countless and senseless whims of the Jewish cabalists nor the endless allegories of many of the Christian fathers which make the Bible a book of riddles and enigmas and hieroglyphics, but the repeated and culminating fulfillments in which the Bible marches down the ages, or rather on which, as by so many grand gradations, it ascends through all the great epochs of human history to the consummation of God's kingdom on earth and in heaven.

In regard to the prophecies, our belief is that, with comparatively few exceptions, they had an immediate fulfillment in the age in which they were written, and usually not long after they were written. But they have also been fulfilled

again and again in similar ages, epochs, or events, that have succeeded. And many of them will receive their highest fulfillment only in the last days of the church and the last ages of the world's history. The Revelation, for example, expressly declares at the beginning, that it is intended to reveal "things which must shortly come to pass," and at the close, the Son of Man says, "Behold I come quickly." Probably the seals were all opened, the trumpets all sounded, the vials all poured out, and, with the exception of the concluding chapters,* the entire prophecy fulfilled in the apostolic age. But it has also been fulfilled again and again, many times over, in all God's interpositions from age to age for the deliverance of his church from persecution and for the destruction of her persecuting enemies. And it will be fulfilled in its highest sense, in all the fullness of its awful significance, in all the grandeur of its magnificent visions, only when the Son of man shall come at the end of the world to punish the wicked with everlasting destruction from his presence, and to exalt the church militant into the church triumphant. Thus all prophecy, like all other inspired Scripture, becomes profitable for consolation and encouragement to Christians, and for warning and reproof to sinners, not in some one age and country only to which it may be imagined to relate, but to all countries and all ages. If it were the avowed object of commentators to rob the Revelation of all practical value and all real significance, no contrivance could more effectually accomplish this object than the common way of interpreting this book as if each of its symbols were intended to represent some one and only one event in a chronological series from the apostolic age to the close of human history. While each successive portion of the book is thus limited in its application and instruction to a single age, that single age can derive no instruction from it, because, accord-

*These chapters are the *background* on which the visions are all seen and painted; and it is not denied that they *color* the whole. So Isaiah's glowing pictures of the Return from the Captivity are manifestly projected on and colored by the future glories of the Messiah's kingdom; and so in general the destruction of Babylon, Jerusalem, etc., by the final catastrophe.

ing to the same method of interpretation, the prophecies can be understood only after they have been fulfilled. Instead of wasting our ingenuity in the calculation of prophetic times, how much better to take for granted that the Scripture means *us*, and is fulfilled in us, and was intended for us, just so far as it is applicable to us. This is the great practical aim and end of our discussion. We cannot go with Lord Bacon in all the details of his doctrine of interpretation. But we give our hearty assent to the general principle which he lays down in his Advancement of Learning; that as our Lord often answered not the words but the thoughts of his hearers, so the Scriptures, being written to the thoughts of men and to the succession of all ages, are not to be interpreted only according to the latitude of the proper sense of the place, and respectively towards that present occasion whereupon the words were uttered, but have in themselves infinite springs and streams to water the church in every age.

Art. III.—THE ANCIENT CATHOLIC LITURGIES.

By Philip Schaff, D. D., of New York.

Liturgy* means, in ecclesiastical language,† the order and administration of public worship in general, and the celebra-

---

* Λειτουργία, from λεῖτος, *i. e.*, belonging to the λεως, or λαός, public, and ἔργον—ἔργον τοῦ λεω or τοῦ λαοῦ, public work, office, function. In Athens the term was applied especially to the directing of public spectacles, festive dances, and the distribution of food to the people on festival occasions. Paul, in Romans, xiii. 6, calls secular magistrates λειτουργοὶ θεοῦ.

† Comp. Luke i. 23, where the priestly service of Zacharias is called λειτουργία; Heb. viii. 2, 6; ix. 21; x. 11; where the word is applied to the high priesthood of Christ; Acts, xiii 2; Rom. xv. 16; Rom. xv. 27; 2. Cor. ix. 12; where religious fasting, missionary service, and common beneficence are called λειτουργία, or λειτουργεῖν. The restriction of the word to divine worship or sacerdotal action occurs as early as Eusebius (Vita Const. iv. 37), bishops being there called λειτουργοί. The limitation of the word to the service of the Supper is connected with the development of the doctrine of the eucharistic sacrifice.

tion of the Eucharist in particular; then, the book or collection of the prayers used in this celebration. The Latin church calls the public eucharistic service *Mass*, and the liturgical books, *sacramentarium*, *rituale*, *missale*, also *libri mysteriorum*, or simply *libelli*.

The Jewish worship consisted more of acts than of words, but it included, also, fixed prayers and psalms (as Ps. 113–118), and the *Amen* of the congregation (Comp. 1 Cor. xiv. 16). The pagan Greeks and Romans had, in connection with their sacrifices, some fixed prayers and formulas of consecration which, however, were not written but perpetuated by oral tradition. The Indian literature, on the contrary, has liturgical books, and even the Koran contains prescribed forms of prayer.

The New Testament gives us neither a liturgy nor a ritual, but the main elements for both. The Lord's prayer and the words of the institution of baptism and of the holy supper, are the living germs from which the best prayers and baptismal and eucharistic formulas of the church, whether oral or written, have grown. From the confession of Peter and the formula of baptism gradually arose, in the Western church, the Apostles' Creed, which, besides its doctrinal import, has also a liturgical office, as a public profession of candidates for baptism and of the faithful. In the Eastern church, the Nicene creed is used instead. The song of the angelic host is the ground-work of the Gloria in Excelsis. The Apocalypse is one sublime liturgic vision. With these belong also the Psalms, which have passed as a legitimate inheritance to the Christian church, and have afforded at all times the richest material for public edification.

In the ante-Nicene age we find as yet no traces of liturgical books. In each church, of course, a fixed order of worship gradually formed itself, which in apostolic congregations ran back to a more or less apostolic origin, but became enlarged and altered in time and, until the fourth century, was perpetuated by oral tradition. For the celebration of the sacraments, especially of the Eucharist, belonged to the *Dis-*

ciplina arcani, and was concealed, as the most holy thing of the church, from the gaze of Jews and heathens, and even of catechumens, for fear of profanation, through a misunderstanding of the warning of the Lord against casting pearls before swine, and after the example of the Samothracian and Eleusinian mysteries.* On the downfall of heathenism in the Roman empire, the Disciplina arcani gradually disappeared, and the administration of the sacraments became a public act, open to all.

Hence, also, we now find, from the fourth and fifth centuries onward, a great number of written liturgies, and that not only in the orthodox Catholic church, but also among the schismatics (as among the Nestorians and the Monophysites). These liturgies bear in most cases apostolic names, but in their present form can no more be of apostolic origin than the so-called Apostolic Constitutions and Canons, nor nearly so much as the Apostles' Creed. They contrast too strongly with the simplicity of the original Christian worship, so far as we can infer it from the New Testament, and from the writings of the apologists, and the ante-Nicene fathers. They contain also theological terms, such as ὁμοούσιος, concerning the Son of God, θεοτόκος (concerning the Virgin Mary), some of them the whole Nicene Creed, with the additions of the second œcumenical Council of 381, also allusions to the worship of martyrs and saints, and to monasticism, which point unmistakeably to the Nicene and post-Nicene age. Yet they are based on a common liturgical tradition, which, in its essential elements, reaches back to an earlier time, perhaps in some points to the apostolic age, or even comes down from the Jewish worship through the channel of the Jewish Christian congregations; otherwise their affinity—which in many respects reminds one of the affinity of the synoptical gospels—cannot be satisfactorily explained. These old Catholic liturgies differ from one

* Comp. Tertullian, Apolog. c. 7; Origen, Homil. 9 in Levit. towards the end; Cyril of Jerusalem, Præfat. ad Catech. § 7, etc.

another in the wording, the number, the length, and the order of the prayers, and in other unessential points, but agree in the most important parts of the service of the Eucharist. They are too different to be derived from a common original, and yet too similar to have arisen each entirely by itself.*

All the old liturgies combine action and prayer, and presuppose, according to the Jewish custom, the participation of the people, who frequently respond to the prayers of the priest, and thereby testify their own priestly character. These responses are sometimes a simple *Amen*, sometimes *Kyrie eleison*, sometimes a sort of dialogue with the priest:

PRIEST: The Lord be with you!

PEOPLE: *And with thy spirit!*

PRIEST: Lift up your hearts!

PEOPLE: *We lift them up unto the Lord.*

PRIEST: Let us give thanks!

PEOPLE: *It is meet and right.*

Some parts of the liturgy, as the Creed, the Seraphic Hymn, the Lord's Prayer, were said or sung by the priest and congregation together. Originally, the whole congrega-

---

*Trollope says, in the Introduction to his edition of the Liturgia Jacobi: "Nothing short of the reverence due to the authority of an apostle, could have preserved intact, through successive ages, that strict uniformity of rite and striking identity of sentiment which pervade these venerable compositions; but there is, at the same time, a sufficient diversity both of expression and arrangement to mark them as the productions of different authors, each writing without any immediate communication with the others, but all influenced by the same prevailing motives of action, and the same constant habit of thought." Neale goes further, and in a special article on Liturgical Quotations (Essays on Liturgiology and Church History, Lond. 1863, p. 411 sqq.), endeavors to prove that Paul several times quotes the primitive liturgy, viz., in those passages in which he introduces certain statements with a γέγραπται, or λέγει, or πιστὸς ὁ λόγος, while the statements are not to be found in the Old Testament: 1 Cor. ii. 9; xv. 45; Eph. v. 14; 1 Tim. i. 15; iii. 1; iv. 8, 9; 2 Tim. ii. 11–13, 19; Tit. iii. 8. But the only plausible instance is 1 Cor. ii. 9: καθὼς γέγραπται ἃ ὀφθαλμὸς οὐκ εἶδε, καὶ οὖς οὐκ ἤκουσε, καὶ ἐπὶ καρδίαν ἀνθρώπου οὐκ ἀνέβη, ἃ ἡτοίμασεν ὁ θεὸς τοῖς ἀγαπῶσιν αὐτόν, which, it is true, occur word for word (though in the form of prayer, therefore with ἡτοίμασας, and ἀγαπῶσί σε, instead of ἀγαπῶσιν αὐτόν) in the Anaphora of the Liturgia Jacobi; while the parallel commonly cited from Isaiah, lxiv. 4, is hardly suitable. But if there had been such a primitive, written, apostolic liturgy, there would have undoubtedly been other and clearer traces of it. The passages adduced may as well have been quotations from primitive Christian hymns and psalms, though such are very nearly akin to liturgical prayers.

tion of the faithful* was intended to respond, but with the advance of the hierarchical principle the democratic and popular element fell away, and the deacons or the choir assumed the responses of the congregation, especially where the liturgical language was not intelligible to the people.†

Several of the oldest liturgies, like those of St. Clement and St. James, have long since gone out of use, and have only a historical interest. Others, like those of St. Basil and St. Chrysostom, and the Roman, are still used, with various changes and additions made at various times, in the Greek and Latin churches. Many of their most valuable parts have passed, through the medium of the Latin Mass-books, into the liturgies and agenda of the Anglican, the Lutheran, and some of the reformed churches. But in general they breathe an entirely different atmosphere from the Protestant liturgies, even the Anglican not excepted; for in them all the eucharistic *sacrifice* is the centre around which all the prayers and services revolve. This act of sacrifice for the quick and the dead is a complete service, the sermon being entirely unessential, and in fact usually dispensed with. In Protestantism, on the contrary, the Supper is almost exclusively *Communion*, and the sermon is the chief matter in every ordinary service.

Between the Oriental and Occidental liturgies there are the following characteristic differences:

1. The Eastern retain the ante-Nicene division of public worship into two parts: the λειτουργία κατηχουμένων, Missa Catechumenorum, which is mainly didactic, and the λειτουργία τῶν πιστῶν, Missa Fidelium, which contains the celebration of the Eucharist proper. This division lost its primitive import upon the union of church and state, and the universal introduction of infant baptism. The Latin liturgies connect the two parts in one whole.

---

* In the Clementine Liturgy, *all*, πάντες; in the Liturgy of St. James, *the People*, ὁ λαός.

† In the liturgies of St. Basil and St. Chrysostom, which have displaced the older Greek liturgies, the διάκονος, or χορός, usually responds. In the Roman Mass, the people fall still further out of view, but accompany the priest with silent prayers.

2. The Eastern liturgies contain, after the Words of Institution, an express Invocation of the Holy Ghost, without which the sanctification of the elements is not fully effected. Traces of this appear in the Gallican liturgies; but in the Roman liturgy this invocation is entirely wanting, and the sanctification of the elements is considered as effected by the priest's rehearsal of the Words of Institution. This has remained a point of dispute between the Greek and the Roman churches. Gregory the Great asserts that the apostles used nothing in the consecration but the Words of Institution, and the Lord's Prayer.* But whence could he know this in the sixth century, since the New Testament gives us no information on the subject? An *invocatio Spiritus Sancti* upon the elements is no where mentioned; only a *thanksgiving* of the Lord, preceding the Words of Institution, and forming also, it may be, an act of consecration, though neither in the sense of the Greek nor of the Roman church. The Words of Institution: "This is my body," etc., are, moreover, addressed, not to God, but to the disciples, and express, so to speak, the result of the Lord's benediction.†

---

* Epist. ad Joann. Episc. Syriac.

† On this disputed point Neale agrees with the Oriental church, Freeman with the Latin. Comp. Neale, Tetralogia Liturgica, Præfat. p. xv. sqq.; and his English edition of the Primitive Liturgies of St. Mark, St. James, etc., p. 23. In the latter place he says of the ἐπίκλησις πνεύματος ἁγίου: "By the Invocation of the Holy Ghost, according to the doctrine of the Eastern church, and not by the Words of Institution, the bread and wine are "changed," "transmuted" "transelemented" "transubstantiated" into our Lord's body and blood. This has always been a point of contention between the two churches—the time at which the change takes place. Originally, there is no doubt that the invocation of the Holy Ghost formed a part of all liturgies. The Petrine has entirely lost it; the Ephesine (Gallican and Mozarabic) more or less retains it, as do also those mixtures of the Ephesine and Petrine—the Ambrosian and Patriarchine or Aquileian. To use the words of the authorized Russian Catechism: "Why is this (the invocation) so essential? Because at the moment of this act, the wine and bread are changed or transubstantiated into the very body of Christ, and into the very blood of Christ. How are we to understand the word transubstantiation? In the exposition of the faith by the Eastern patriarchs, it is said that the word is not to be taken to define the manner in which the bread and wine are changed into the body and blood of our Lord, for this none can understand but God; but only this much is signified: That the bread truly, really and substantially becomes the very true body of the Lord, and the wine the very blood of the Lord." Freeman, on the contrary, in his Principles of Div. Serv. vol. II. part ii. p. 196 sq., asserts: "The Eastern church cannot maintain the position which, as represented by her doctors of the

3. The Oriental liturgy allowed, more like the Protestant church, the use of the various vernaculars—Greek, Syriac, Armenian, Coptic, etc.; while the Roman Mass, in its desire for uniformity, sacrifices all vernacular tongues to the Latin, and so makes itself unintelligible to the people.

4. The Oriental liturgy is, so to speak, a symbolic drama of the history of redemption, repeated with little alteration every Sunday. The preceding vespers represent the creation, the fall, and the earnest expectation of Christ; the principal service on Sunday morning exhibits the life of Christ from his birth to his ascension; and the prayers and lessons are accompanied by corresponding symbolical acts of the priests and deacon; lighting and extinguishing candles, opening and closing doors, kissing the altar and the gospel, crossing the forehead, mouth, and breast, swinging the censer, frequent change of liturgical vestments, processions, genuflexions, and prostrations. The whole orthodox Greek and Russian worship has a strongly marked Oriental character, and exceeds the Roman in splendor and pomp of symbolical ceremonial.*

The Roman mass is also a dramatic commemoration and representation of the history of redemption, especially of the passion and atoning death of Christ, but has a more didactic character, and sets forth, not so much the objective history, as the subjective application of redemption from the *Confiteor* to the *Postcommunio*. It affords less room for symbolical action, but more for word and song, and follows more closely the course of the church year with its varying collects and pre-

---

last four hundred years, and alleging the authority of St. Cyril, she has taken up that there is no consecration till there has followed (1) a prayer of oblation, and (2) one of invocation of the Holy Ghost. In truth, the view refutes itself, for it disqualifies the oblation for the very purpose for which it is avowedly placed there, namely, to make offering of the already consecrated gifts, *i. e.*, of the body and blood of Christ, thus reducing it to a level with the oblation at the beginning of the office. The only view that can be taken of these very ancient prayers is, that they are to be conceived of as offered simultaneously with the recitation of the Institution."

* On the mystical meaning of the Oriental cultus comp. the Commentary of Symeon of Thessalonica († 1429) on the Liturgy of St. Chrysostom, and Neale's Introduction to his English edition of the Oriental Liturgies, p. xxvii–xxxvii.

faces for the high festivals,* thus gaining variety. In this it stands the nearer to the Protestant worship, which, however, entirely casts off symbolical veils, and makes the sermon the centre.

Every Oriental liturgy has two main divisions. The first embraces the prayers and acts before the Anaphora or Oblation (canon Missae) to the *Sursum corda;* the second, the Anaphora to the close.

The first division again falls into the Mass of the Catechumens, and the Mass of the Faithful, to the Sursum corda. To it belong the Prefatory Prayer, the Introit, Ingressa, or Antiphon, the Little Entrance, the Trisagion, the Scripture Lessons, the Prayers after the Gospel, and the Expulsion of the Catechumens; then the Prayers of the Faithful, the Great Entrance, the Offertory, the Kiss of Peace, the Creed.

The Anaphora comprises the Great Eucharistic Prayer of Thanksgiving, the Commemoration of the life of Jesus, the Words of Institution, the Oblation of the Elements, the Invocation of the Holy Ghost, the Great Intercession for Quick and Dead, the Lord's Prayer, and finally the Communion with its proper prayers and acts, the Thanksgiving and the Dismissal!

It is a note-worthy fact, that in the Protestant Episcopal Trinity chapel of New York, with the full approval of the bishop, Horatio Potter, and the assistance of the choir, on the 2d of March, 1865, the anniversary of the accession of the Russian Czar Alexander II. the full liturgy or mass of the orthodox Græco-Russian church was celebrated before a numerous assembly by a recently arrived Græco-Russian monk and priest, Agapius Honcharenko. This is probably the first instance of an Oriental service in the United States (for the Russian fleet

* The Collects belong strictly only to the Latin church, which has produced many hundred such short prayers. The word comes either from the fact that the prayer collects the sense of the Epistle and Gospel for the day in the form of prayer; or that the priest collects therein the wishes and petitions of the people. The collect is a short liturgical prayer, consisting of one petition, closing with the form of mediation through the merits of Christ, and sometimes with a doxology to the Trinity. Comp. a treatise of Neale on The Collects of the Church, in Essays on Liturgiology and Church History, p. 46 sqq, and William Bright, Ancient Collects and Prayers, selected from various rituals, Oxford and London.

which was in the harbor of New York in 1863, held its worship exclusively upon the ships), and probably also the first instance of the celebration of the unbloody sacrifice of the mass and the mystery of transubstantiation in a Protestant church and with the sanction of Protestant clergy. The liturgy of St. Chrysostom in a Slavonic translation was intoned by the priest, the short responses, such as *Hospode, Pomelue* (Kyrie Eleison), were grandly sung by the choir in the Slavonic languages, and the Beatitudes, the Nicene creed (of course without the "Filioque," which is condemned by the Greek church as a sin against the Holy Ghost), and the Gloria in Excelsis in English. There were wanting only the many genuflexions and prostrations, the general communion, and infant communion, to complete the illusion of a marriage of the two churches. The New York journals gave the matter the significance of a political demonstration in favor of Russia! the religious papers were divided, according to their position, between vindication and condemnation of this isolated phenomenon. The High Church "*Church Journal*" saw in it an exhibition of the unity and catholicity of the church, and a resemblance to the miracle of Pentecost, in that Greeks, Slavonians and Americans heard in their own tongues the wonderful works of God. But most of the Protestant papers, especially the "*N. Y. Evangelist*," felt the doctrinal inconsistency, and the encouragement of superstition and error, since the Greek liturgy coincides in all important points with the Roman mass. Unfortunately for bishop Potter and his philo-Greek and anti-Presbyterian friends, the monk Agapius afterwards, on his own confession in the newspapers, turned out to be an opponent rather than a representative of the holy orthodox Oriental church. Our high-church Episcopalian friends evidently caught a Tartar.

We now proceed to characterize the ancient liturgies in detail, first those of the East and then those of the West, with their various subdivisions.

I. The Oriental Liturgies.

There are, in all, probably more than a hundred ancient liturgies, if we reckon revisals, modifications, and translations.

But according to modern investigation they may all be reduced to five or six families, which may be named after the churches in which they originated and were used, Jerusalem (or Antioch), Alexandria, Constantinople, Ephesus, and Rome.* Most of them belong to the Oriental church; for this church was in general much more productive, and favored greater variety, than the Western, which sought uniformity in organization and worship. And among the Oriental liturgies the Greek are the oldest and most important.

1. The liturgy of St. Clement.—This is found in the eighth book of the Apostolic Constitutions, and, with them, is erroneously ascribed to the Roman bishop Clement.† It is the oldest complete order of divine service, and was probably composed in the East in the beginning of the fourth century.‡ It agrees most with the liturgy of St. James and of Cyril of Jerusalem, and may for this reason be considered a branch of the Jerusalem family. We know not in what churches, or whether at all, it was used. It was a sort of normal liturgy, and is chiefly valuable for showing the difference between the Nicene or ante-Nicene form of worship and the later additions and alterations.

The Clementine Liturgy rigidly separates the service of the catechumens from that of the faithful.§ It contains the sim-

---

* Neale now (The Liturgies of S. Mark, etc., 1859, p. vii.) divides the primitive liturgies into five families: (1) That of St. James, or of Jerusalem; (2) that of St. Mark, or of Alexandria; (3) that of St. Thaddæus, or of the East; (4) that of St. Peter, or of Rome; (5) that of St. John, or of Ephesus. Formerly (Hist. of the Holy Eastern Church) he counted the Clementine Liturgy separately; but since Daniel has demonstrated the affinity of it with the Jerusalem (or, as he calls it, the Antiochian) family, he has put it down as a branch of that family.

† It is given in Cotelerius' edition of the Patres Apostolici, in the various editions of the pseudo-Apostolic Constitutions, and in the liturgical collections of Daniel, Neale, and others.

‡ Neale considers the liturgy the oldest part of the Apostolic Constitutions, places its composition in the second or third century, and ascribes its chief elements to the apostle Paul, with whose spirit and ideas it in many respects coincides.

§ Before the Sursum corda, or beginning of the Eucharist proper, the deacon says: "No catechumens, no hearers, no unbelievers, no heretics, may remain here (*μὴ τις τῶν κατηχουμένων, μή τις τῶν ἀκροωμένων, μὴ τις των ἀπίστων, μη τις τῶν ἑτεροδοξων*). Depart, ye who have spoken the former prayer. Mothers, take your children," etc. This arrangement is traced to James, the brother of John, the son of Zebedee.

plest form for the distribution of the sacred elements: "The body of Christ," and "The blood of Christ, the cup of life," with the "Amen" of the congregation to each. In the commemoration of the departed, it mentions no particular names of saints, not even the mother of God, who first found a place in public worship after the council of Ephesus in 431; and it omits several prefatory prayers of the priest. Finally it lacks the Nicene Creed, and even the Lord's Prayer, which is added to all other eucharistic prayers, and, according to the principles of some canonists, is absolutely necessary.*

2. The liturgy of St. James. This is ascribed by tradition to James, the brother of the Lord, and bishop of Jerusalem.† It, of course, cannot have been composed by him, even considering only the Nicene Creed and the expressions ὁμοούσιος and θεοτόκος, which occur in it, and which belong to the Nicene and post-Nicene theology. The following passage also bespeaks a much later origin: "Let us remember the most holy, immaculate, most glorious, blessed Mother of God and perpetual Virgin Mary, with all saints, that we through their prayers and intercessions may obtain mercy." The first express mention of its use meets us in Proclus, of Constantinople, about the middle of the fifth century. But it is, as to substance, at all events one of the oldest liturgies, and must have been in use as early as the fourth century; for the liturgical quotations in Cyril of Jerusalem (in his fifth Mystagogic Catechism), who died in 386, verbally agree with it. It was intended for the church of Jerusalem, which is mentioned in the beginning of the prayer for the church universal, as the glorious Zion, the mother of all churches."‡

* The absence of the Lord's Prayer in the Clementine Liturgy is sufficient to refute the view of Bunsen, that this prayer was originally the prayer of consecration in all liturgies.

† Neale even supposes, as already observed, that St. Paul quotes from the Liturgia Jacobi, and not *vice versa*, especially in 1 Cor. ii. 9.

‡ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐνδόξου Σιὼν τῆς μητρὸς πασῶν τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν καὶ ὑπερ τῆς κατα πᾶσαν τὴν οἰκουμένην ἁγίας σου καθολικῆς καὶ ἀποστολικῆς ἐκκλησίας. The intercessions for Jerusalem, and for the holy places which God glorified by the appearance of Christ and the outpouring of the Holy Ghost (ὑπὲρ τῶν ἁγίων σου τόπων, οὓς ἐδόξασας τῇ θεοφανείᾳ τοῦ χριστοῦ σου, κ. τ. λ.), appears in no other liturgy.

In contents and diction it is the most important of the ancient liturgies, and the fruitful mother of many, among which the liturgies of St. Basil and St. Chrysostom must be separately named.* It spread over the whole patriarchate of Antioch, even to Cyprus, Sicily, and Calabria, but was supplanted in the orthodox East, after the Mohammedan conquest, by the Byzantine liturgy. Only once in a year, on the 23d of October, the festival of St. James, it is yet used at Jerusalem and on some islands of Greece.†

The SYRIAC liturgy of JAMES is a free translation from the Greek; it gives the Invocation of the Holy Spirit in a larger form, the other prayers in a shorter; and it betrays a later date. It is the source of thirty-nine Monophysite liturgies, which are in use still among the schismatic Syrians or Jacobites.‡

3. The liturgy of ST. MARK, or the ALEXANDRIAN liturgy. This is ascribed to the well-known Evangelist, who was also, according to tradition, the founder of the church and catechetical school in the Egyptian capital. Such origin involves, of course, a shocking anachronism, since the liturgy contains

---

* Neale arranges the Jerusalem family in three divisions, as follows:

1. "SICILIAN S. JAMES, as said in that island before the Saracen conquest, and partly assimilated to the Petrine Liturgy.

2. S. CYRIL: where used uncertain, but assimilated to the Alexander form.

3. SYRIAC. S. JAMES, the source of the largest number of extant Liturgies. They are these: [1] *Lesser S. James.* [2] *S. Clement.* [3] *S. Mark.* [4] *S. Dionysius.* [5] *S. Xystus.* [6] *S. Ignatius.* [7] *S. Peter I.* [8] *S. Peter II.* [9] *S. Julius.* [10] *S. John Evangelist.* [11] *S. Basil.* [12] (*S.*) *Dioscorus.* [13] *S. John Chrysostom I.* [14] *All Apostles.* [15] *S. Marutas.* [16] *S. Eustathius.* [17] *Philoxenus I.* [18] *Matthew the Shepherd.* [19] *James Baradæus.* [20] *James of Botra.* [21] *James of Edessa.* [22] *Moses Bar-Cephas.* [23] *Thomas of Heraclea.* [24] *Holy Doctors.* [25] *Philoxenus II.* [26] *S John Chrysostom II.* [27] *Abu'lfaraj.* [28] *John of Dara.* [29] *S. Celestine.* [30] *John Bar Susan.* [31] *Eleazar of Babylon.* [32] *John the Scribe.* [33] *John Maro.* [34] *Dionysius of Cardon.* [35] *Michael of Antioch.* [36] *John Bar-Vahib.* [37] *John Bar-Maaden.* [38] *Dionysius of Diarbekr.* [39] *Philoxenus of Bagdad.* All these, from Syriac S. James inclusive, are monophysite Liturgies.

† There are only two manuscripts, with the fragment of a third, from which the ancient text of the Greek Liturgia Jacobi is derived. The first printed edition appeared at Rome in 1526; then one at Paris in 1560. Besides these we have the copies in the Bibliotheca Patrum, the Codex Apocryphus Novi Testamenti, the Codex Liturgicus of Assemani, the Codex Liturgicus of Daniel, and the later separate editions of Trollope (Edinburg, 1848), and Neale (twice, in his Tetralogia Liturgica, 1849, and improved, in his Primitive Liturgies, 1860).

‡ See the names of them in the preceding quotation from Neale.

the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed of 381. In its present form it comes probably from Cyril, bishop of Alexandria (* 444), who was claimed by the orthodox, as well as the Monophysites, as an advocate of their doctrine of the person of Christ.† It agrees, at any rate, exactly with the liturgy which bears Cyril's name.

It is distinguished from the other liturgies by the position of the Great Intercessory Prayer for quick and dead *before* the Words of Institution, and Invocation of the Holy Ghost, instead of after them. It was originally composed in Greek, and afterwards translated into Coptic and Arabic. It was used in Egypt till the twelfth century, and then supplanted by the Byzantine. The Copts still retained it. The Ethiopian canon is an offshoot from it. There are three Coptic and ten Ethiopian liturgies, which belong to the same family.†

4. The liturgy of EDESSA, or MESOPOTAMIA, or of ALL APOSTLES. This is traced to the apostles THADDÆUS (ADÆUS), and MARIS, and is confined to the Nestorians. From it afterwards proceeded the Nestorian liturgies: (1) of *Theodore the Interpreter;* (2) of *Nestorius;* (3) of *Narses the Leper;* (4) of *Barsumas;* (5) of *Malabar*, or *St. Thomas.* The liturgy of the Thomas-Christians of Malabar has been much adulterated by the revisers of Diamper.‡

5. The liturgy of ST. BASIL, and that of ST. CHRYSOSTOM form together the BYZANTINE or CONSTANTINOPOLITAN liturgy, and passed at the same time into the Græco-Russian church.

---

* Daniel (IV, 137 sqq.) likewise considers Cyril the probable author, and endeavors to separate the apostolical and the later elements. Neale, in the preface to his edition of the Greek text, thinks, "The general form and arrangement of the Liturgy of S. Mark may safely be attributed to the Evangelist himself, and to his immediate followers, S. Amianus, S. Abilius, and S. Cerdo. With the exception of certain manifestly interpolated passages, it had probably assumed its present appearance by the end of the second century."

† There is only one important manuscript of the Greek Liturgy of St. Mark, the Codex Rossanensis, printed in Renaudot's Collectio, and more recently by Daniel and Neale.

‡ The printed edition is a revision by the Portuguese archbishop of Goa, Alexis of Mennze, and the council of Diamper (1599), who understood nothing of the Oriental liturgies. Neale says: "The Malabar Liturgy I have never been able to see in the original; and an *unadulterated* copy of the original does not seem to exist." He gives a translation of this liturgy in Primitive Liturgies, p. 128 sqq.

Both descend from the liturgy of St. James, and give that ritual in an abridged form. They are living books, not dead, like the liturgies of Clement and of James.

The liturgy of bishop Basil of Neo-Cæsarea (†379) is read in the orthodox Greek and Russian church during Lent (except on Palm Sunday), on the eve of Epiphany, Easter, and Christmas, and on the feast of St. Basil (1st of January). From it proceeded the *Armenian* liturgy.

The liturgy of St. Chrysostom (†407) is used on all other Sundays. It is an abridgement and improvement of that of St. Basil, and through the influence of the distinguished patriarchs of Constantinople it has, since the sixth century, dislodged the liturgies of St. James and St. Mark. The original text can hardly be ascertained, as the extant copies differ greatly from one another.

The present Greek and Russian ritual, which surpasses even the Roman in pomp, cannot possibly have come down in all its details from the age of Chrysostom. He is indeed supposed, as Proclus says, to have shortened in many respects the worship in Constantinople, on account of the weakness of human nature; but the liturgy which bears his name is still, in the seventh century, called "the Liturgy of the Holy Apostles," and appears to have received his name in the eighth century.

II.—The Occidental Liturgies.

The liturgies of the Western church may be divided into three classes: (1) the Ephesian family, which is traced to a Johannean origin, and embraces the Mozarabic and the Gallican liturgies; (2) the Roman liturgy, which, of course, like the papacy itself, must come down from St. Peter; (3) the Ambrosian and Aquileian, which is a mixture of the other two. We have, therefore, here less diversity than in the East. The tendency of the Latin church everywhere pressed strongly towards uniformity; and the Roman liturgy at last excluded all others.

1. The OLD GALLICAN liturgy, in many of its features,* points back, like the beginnings of Christianity in South Gaul, to an Asiatic, Ephesian, and, so far, we may say, Johannean origin, and took its later form in the fifth century. Among its composers, or rather, the revisers, Hilary of Poictiers is particularly named. In the time of Charlemagne it was superseded by the Roman. Gallicanism, which in church organization and polity, boldly asserted its rights, suffered itself easily to be Romanized in its worship.

The old *British* liturgy was, without doubt, identical with the Gallican, but after the conversion of the Anglo-Saxons, it was likewise supplanted by the Roman.

2. The OLD SPANISH, or (though incorrectly so-called), GOTHIC, also named MOZARABIC Liturgy.† This is, in many respects, allied to the Gallic, and probably came through the latter from a similar Eastern source. It appears to have existed before the incursion of the West Goths, in 409; for it shows no trace of the influence of the Arian heresy, or of the ritual system of Constantinople.‡ Its present form is

---

* Edited by Mabillon: De Liturgia Gallicana, libri III. Par. 1729; and recently, in much more complete form, from older MSS. by Francis Joseph Mone (archive-director in Carlsruhe): Lateinische u. Griechische Messen aus dem 2. bis 6 Jahrh. Frankf. A.M. 1850. This is one of the most important liturgical discoveries. Mone gives fragments of eleven mass-formularies from a codex rescriptus of the former cloister of Reichenau, which are older than those previously known, but hardly reach back, as he thinks, to the second century (the time of the persecution at Lyons, A. D. 177). Comp. against this, Denzinger, in the Tübingen Quartalschrift, 1850, p. 500 sqq. Neale agrees with Mone: Essays on Liturgiology, p. 137.

† Called "Gothic," because its development and bloom falls in the time of the Gothic rule in Spain; "Mozarabic," it came to be called, after the conquest of Spain by the Arabs. Mozarab, Muzarab, Mostarab, is a kind of term of contempt for the Spanish Christians under the Arabic dominion, in distinction from the Arabs of pure blood. The word comes, not from *mixti* and *Arabes*, nor from *Muza*, the Maurian chieftain who subjugated Spain, but from a participle of the tenth conjugation of the Arabic verb *araba;* therefore something like "arabizing Arab," or Arab by adoption, in distinction from Arabs of the pure blood. Comp. the similar distinction between Hellenist and Hebrew.

‡ Pinius (in a dissertation prefixed to the 32nd vol. of the Acta Sanctorum) supposes that the Spanish liturgy came from the Goths, therefore from Constantinople; but Neale (Essays on Liturgiology, p. 130 sqq) endeavors to prove that it was contemporaneous with the introduction of Christianity in Spain; but afterwards, by Leander of Seville (about 589), was conformed in some points to the Oriental ceremonial.

attributed to Isidore of Seville, and the fourth council of Toledo, in 633. It maintained itself in Spain down to the thirteenth century, and was then superseded by the Roman liturgy.* It has, like the Gallican, besides the gospels and epistles, lessons also from the Old Testament;† it differs from the Roman liturgy in the order of festivals, and it contains, before the proper sacrificial action, a homiletic exhortation. The formula *Sancta Sanctis*, before the communion, the fraction of the host into nine parts (in memory of the nine mysteries of the life of Christ), the daily communion, the distribution of the cup by the deacon, remind us of the Oriental ritual. The Mozarabic chant has much resemblance to the Gregorian, but exhibits besides a certain independent national character.‡

3. The AFRICAN liturgy is known to us only through fragmentary quotations in Tertullian, Cyprian and Augustine, from which we gather that it belonged to the Roman family.

4. The liturgy of ST. AMBROSE.§ This is attributed to

---

* The Spanish cardinal Ximenes edited from defective manuscripts the first printed edition at Toledo, 1500, which, however, is in a measure conformed to the Roman order. He also founded in the cathedral of Toledo a chapel (ad Corpus Christi) where the so-renovated Mozarabic service is still continued daily. A similar chapel was founded in Salamana for the same purpose. Neale, in his Tetralogia Liturgica, gives the Ordo Mozarabicus for comparison with the Liturgies of Chrysostom, James and Mark. The latest edition is that in the 85th volume of Migne's Patrologie, Paris, 1850, with a learned preface.

† On the Mozarabic pericopes comp. an article by Ernst Ranke, in Herzog's Encyklop. vol. x. p. 79–82. He attributes to them great intrinsic value and historical importance. "They even seem important," says he, "for the general history of the ancient church. With the unmistakeable affinity they bear to the Greek on the one hand, and to the Gallican on the other, they evince by themselves an intercourse between the Eastern and Western regions of the church, which, begun, or at least aimed at, by Paul, further established by Irenæus, still under lively prosecution in the time of Jerome, afterwards ruptured in the most violent manner, is, without doubt, one of the most note-worthy currents in the life of the church.

‡ Neale has made the discovery that the Mozarabic litanies were originally metrical, and attempts to restore the measure, l. c. p. 143 sqq.

§ Missale Ambrosianum, Mediol, 1768; a later edition, under authority of the archbishop and cardinal Gaisruck, Mediol. 1850. Comp. an article by Neale: The Ambrosian Liturgy, in his Essays on Liturgiology, p. 171 sqq. Neale considers the Ambrosian liturgy, like the Gallican and Mozarabic, a branch of the Ephesian family. "All three have been moulded by contact with the Petrine family; but the Ambrosian, as it might be expected, most of all." He places it, however, far below the two others.

the renowned bishop of Milan (†397), and even to St. Barnabas.

It is certain that Ambrose introduced the responsive singing of psalmns and hymns, and composed several prayers, prefaces and hymns. His successor, Simplicius (A. D. 397–400), is supposed to have made several additions to the ritual. Many elements date from the reign of the Gothic kings (A. D. 493–568), and the Lombard kings (A. D. 568–739).

The Ambrosian liturgy is still used in the diocese of Milan; and after sundry vain attempts to substitute the Roman, it was confirmed by Alexander VI., in 1497, by a special bull, as the Ritus Ambrosianus. Excepting some Oriental peculiarities, it coincides substantially with the Roman liturgy, but has neither the pregnant brevity of the Roman, nor the richness and fullness of the Mozarabic. The prayers for the oblation of the sacrificial gifts differ from the Roman; the Apostles' Creed is not recited till after the oblation; some saints of the diocese are received into the canonical lists of the saints; the distribution of the host takes place before the Paternoster, with Formulas of its own, etc.

The liturgy which was used for a long time in the patriarchate of *Aquileia*, is allied to the Ambrosian, and likewise stands midway between the Roman and the Oriental Gallican liturgies.

5. The ROMAN liturgy is ascribed by tradition, in its main features, to the apostle Peter, but cannot be historically traced beyond the middle of the fifth century. It has, without doubt, slowly grown to its present form. The oldest written records of it appear in three sacramentaries, which bear the names of the three popes, Leo, Gelasius, and Gregory.

(*a*) The Sacramentarium Leonianum, falsely ascribed to pope Leo I. († 461), probably dates from the end of the fifth century, and is a planless collection of liturgical formularies. It was first edited in 1735, from a codex of Verona.*

(*b*) The Sacramentarium Gelasianum, which was first printed

* Hence called, also, Sacram. Veronense.

at Rome in 1680, passes for the work of the Roman bishop Gelasius (†492–496), who certainly did compose a sacramentarium. Many saints' days are wanting in it, which have been in use since the seventh century.

(*c*) The Sacramentarium Gregorianum, edited by Muratori and others. Gregory I. (590–604) is reputed to be the proper father of the Roman Ordo et Canon Missæ, which, with various additions and modifications at later periods, gradually attained almost exclusive prevalence in the Latin church, and was sanctioned by the Council of Trent.

The collection of the various parts of the Roman liturgy* in one book is called *Missale Romanum*, and the directions for the priests are called *Rubricæ*, from their being written or printed in red.

Art. IV.—QUATREMÈRE, THE FRENCH ORIENTALIST.†

By Gustave Masson.

At the last public sitting of the Paris *Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres*, the president, M. Guigniaut,‡ read an interesting and suggestive biographical notice on M. Etienne Quatremère, whose merits as an Orientalist are so well appreciated by competent judges. This kind of homage paid to the memory of deserving men is a custom which we should like to see more generally introduced; it both serves as an encouragement for those who devote themselves to scientific pursuits, and marks the progress made in the less frequented parts of the literary field.

---

* Sacramentarium, antiphonarium, lectionarium (containing the lessons from the Old Testament, the Acts, the Epistles, and the Apocalypse), evangelarium (the lessons from the Gospels), ordo Romanus.

† M. Guigniaut (Joseph-Daniel), member of the Académie since 1837, and well known especially by his French translation of Kreuzer's *Symbolik*.

‡ From the Journal of Sacred Literature, January, 1866.

Already at the death of M. Quatremère, nearly ten years ago, one of his *confrères* had paid a graceful tribute to his memory in the *Journal des Savants* (November, 1857). The article to which we are now alluding was written with the accuracy and freshness so characteristic of M. Barthélemy Saint Hilaire's essays, and from a perusal of it every one must have felt that the loss of M. Quatremère was, in particular, a heavy blow for the cause of Biblical literature. On such grounds alone, if not on others, the late professor of Hebrew at the *Collége de France* deserves a place in the pages of this review, and we gladly avail ourselves, whilst giving a short account of his life, of the details contained in the two *éloges* already mentioned.

M. Etienne Marc Quatremère, who was for more than forty years member of the French Institute, and for nearly twenty, one of the *collaborateurs* of the *Journal des Savants*, was born in Paris, July 12, 1782. His family had during many generations been engaged in business as cloth merchants, and they held a distinguished position in the *bourgeoisie* of their native city. His grandfather, who occupied the post of *echevin*, received from Louis XV. a patent of nobility, together with the decoration of the order of St. Michael, and the letters expressly stated—a most wise clause—that one of the sons could always carry on commerce without any detriment to his dignity. M. Quatremère's father availed himself of this permission, and thought it no disgrace to be a tradesman. We must notice, however, that the substantial Paris *bourgeois*, trained up in a religious and intellectual atmosphere, knew how to conciliate the pursuits of taste with the exigencies of business. Thus, no less than three of the Quatremères were at the same time members of the Institute, viz., the two brothers, Quatremere-Disjonval and Quatremère de Quincy—and their cousin, the subject of the present memoir. Another relative, Quatremère de Roissy, cultivated light literature with success. The ladies in that remarkable family were quite as distinguished as the men; for instance, M. Quatremère's grandmother, Anne Bourjot, had deserved, on account of her virtues, the honor of being

mentioned by the Benedictine Dom Labat, editor of the collection *Les Conciles de France*.

It is in the midst of such noble examples that M. Quatremère was brought up. His mother understood Latin, and could therefore superintend part of his classical education, in which he received also the valuable assistance of his father's intimate friend, M. D'Ansse de Villoison.* The child made an ample return for all the care with which he was surrounded; his memory was prodigious; he could read when three years old, and at five years of age he had already mastered the contents of a goodly number of books. The end of his scholastic education was marred by the most tragical catastrophe that ever lad of fourteen met with. His father, well known for his liberal opinions and his active benevolence, had been elected in 1789 to the important office of municipal officer. So honorable a choice amounted to a sign of proscription when the reign of the mob was substituted to that of law. The *sans-culottes* of 1794 summoned before the bar of the revolutionary tribunal the *citoyen* Quatremère, just as they had summoned all those whose virtues, talents, or patriotism pointed them out as the "representative" men of French society. In vain did the poor and the destitute plead on behalf of him who had been their constant benefactor. The chairman of the tribunal said derisively that "Quatremère, in his acts of charity, had always had in view his God and not the *sans-culottes;* he therefore deserved death because he had humiliated the people by his benefits."† The fatal sentence was carried out on the 21st of January, 1794, exactly one year after the death of Louis XVI. Etienne received from so atrocious an act of tyranny an impression which never wore off.

Madame Quatremère, left a widow under such frightful circumstances, did not lose courage. Obliged to seek a refuge in

---

* Jean-Baptiste Gaspard D'Ansse de Villoison (1750 1805), professor of Greek literature, at the *Collège de France*, distinguished as a scholar and a critic.

† Quatremère, dans sa charité pour les pauvres, n'avait en vue que son Dieu, et non les sans-culottes, et il mérite la mort pour avoir humilié le peuple par ses bienfaits.

the cottage of some peasants who were devoted to her, deprived of her property as a *ci-devant* noble, she managed to live through the reign of terror, and when it was over she immediately set to work gathering the scanty remains of her fortune, and providing for the support of her family. A few friends came to her assistance, and enabled her to begin business again; whilst young Etienne's tutor, M. Gravier, continued gratuitously his lessons to one who already promised to become a brilliant scholar. M. Quatremère, on leaving college, took up in the first instance the study of botany, mineralogy, mathematics, and entertained some idea of qualifying for admission at the *Ecole Polytechnique*, which had just been created. This plan, however, was soon abandoned; the young man's talent for languages manifested itself, and he learned unaided all those he ever knew, beginning with the Hebrew. He attended, at the *Collége de France*, M. Silvestre de Sacy's lectures on Arabic, and also those of M. Dupuis* on Latin poetry. The well-known author of the *Origine de tous les Cultes* was far from sharing his pupil's religious opinions; but with a spirit of courtesy which did him the greatest credit, he avoided every reflection capable of offending what were, at all events, honorable scruples.

M. Quatremère was for a short time engaged as clerk at the Imperial Library in Paris (MSS. section); afterwards he accepted the post of professor of Greek literature at the Roman *Faculté des Lettres;* finally he returned to Paris about 1811, and never since did he leave that city. He had already made himself known by several remarkable works when, in 1815, he was elected as the successor of La Porte du Theil† by the *Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres;* in 1819 he received his appointment to the lectureship of Hebrew, Syriac, and

---

* Charles-François Dupuis (1742–1809), known by his fanciful opinions on astronomy, the Zodiac, etc.

† François-Jean-Gabriel de la Porte du Theil (1742–1815), distinguished especially as an archæologist and a critic. He published, in common with M. de Bréquigny, a collection of charters, diplomas, and other documents relating to the early history of France.

Chaldee, at the *Collége de France;* in 1832 he succeeded M. de Chézy* in the Persian chair at the school of modern oriental languages; and, at the death of M. Silvestre de Sacy, who had been so long his master and his patron, he took his place amongst the *collaborateurs* of the *Journal des Savants.*

Such are the principal chronological data in the life of M. Etienne Quatremère. Painful events, heart-rending separations marked its early period; but the latter part of it was spent amidst that calm which is so grateful to the votaries of science; and unremitting labor gave it a character of useful uniformity. Let us add, that for nearly half a century M. Quatremère enjoyed the blessing of having near him the mother to whom he owed so much. We shall now give a brief notice of his works.

Our author's literary *début* was a volume entitled *Recherches Historiques et Critiques sur la Langue et la Littérature de l'Egypte.* Printed in 1808 at the expense of the State, this book was dedicated to M. Silvestre de Sacy, who, together with another eminent Oriental scholar, M. Langlès,† had encouraged and assisted the writer. Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt had at that time turned the attention of every one towards the mysterious land of the Nile, and some persons have supposed that this circumstance determined M. Quatremère in the selection of his subject. But, as M. Barthélemy Saint Hilaire remarks, it was never the habit of the author of the *Recherches* to consult public opinion on any point whatever, and why should we not simply say that the direction of his studies led him to continue the researches made by Renaudot, Jablonski, and Barthélemy. These three scholars had suspected that the Coptic language, such as it had been preserved to us in numerous MSS., was exactly the same as the ancient idiom of Egypt under the Pharoah's;‡ M. Quatremère completely

---

* An eminent Sanscrit scholar.

† Louis-Mathieu Langlès (1764-1824), professor of Persian at the *Ecole des Langues Orientales Modernes*, and keeper of the oriental MSS. at the *Bibliothéque du Roi.*

‡ Cf. *Egypt's Place in Universal History*, vol. i., pp. 659-60.

demonstrated the truth of what was at the time considered only as a plausible hypothesis. Since the conquest of Alexander, the Coptic vocabulary had been enriched by the addition of a large number of Greek words; during the third century of the Christian era it had even adopted the Greek alphabet with very slight modifications, and about the tenth century it had almost entirely disappeared as a colloquial language, leaving its place to the Arabic, and subsisting merely as a learned idiom. But, after all, it constituted really the language which the Egyptians spoke in the time of their independence and of their glory.

In this first work, M. Quatremère, who was only then twenty-six years old, exhibited all his merits, and, we must likewise add, his defects. He was evidently thoroughly acquainted with the various Semitic languages, which he quoted equally well. His reading was immense, but badly digested; although he had twice re-cast the book, it was extremely deficient as a literary composition, and the interesting details it contained were not presented with sufficient method. In 1811, M. Quatremère published a sort of sequel to his *Recherches*, in the shape of two volumes of geographical and historical memoirs taken from the Coptic and Arabic MSS. preserved in the Paris Imperial Library. In 1812 he added, by way of supplement, his *Observations sur quelques points de la Géographie de l'Egypte*, with the view principally of defending against recent critiques the labors of the younger Champollion.

The *Mémoires Géographiques et Historiques sur l'Egypte* are divided into two distinct parts, the former being an alphabetical list of all the towns and villages, the names of which have been preserved in the MS. collections alluded to above. M. Quatremère's work cannot be considered as occupying the same ground as Reinhold Forster's *Index Geographicus*, because it is not borrowed from classical sources, and only gives incidentally the designations handed down to us by Greek and Latin writers. Moreover, Forster had bestowed a great deal of his attention upon etymological difficulties, whereas M.

Quatremère made geography his chief, we might almost say, his exclusive theme. The Coptic Gazetteer now under consideration embraces one hundred and three distinct articles, some of which are of great length, and their *ensemble* forms the most valuable contribution to the knowledge of ancient geography.

In the second volume of the *Mémoires* we have a series of essays on various topics of oriental history and literature, beginning with a description of Nubia, which was then, as it still is, relatively unknown. Whilst preparing this part of his work, M. Quatremère had unfortunately but very scanty resources at his disposal. Arab geographers speak of Nubia only in a most superficial and incorrect manner, and it is necessary to read from end to end a number of chronicles, if we would glean a few meagre facts, a few badly authenticated descriptions. It is a subject of regret that we do not possess in Europe the history of Nubia, composed by Abdallah, and of which Makrizi gives so favorable an account; such a work would, no doubt, have brought out a number of interesting details, but the extracts quoted by Makrizi are all we have, and these M. Quatremère reproduced, completing them by quotations from other sources. The memoir which interests us most in the volume, as bearing upon topics connected with the history of religion, is an essay on the condition of Christians under the two dynasties of Mameluke princes. From this piece we gather that during the year 658 of the Hegira, Sultan Hulaku having made himself master of Damascus, appointed as governor of the citadel a Mongol Emir, named Il-Sinan, who was favorably disposed towards Christianity. Under his administration, the followers of the Gospel not only obtained all the guarantees which justice requires, but were allowed to interfere as much as they liked with the Mahometan population; so that, elated by the influence they enjoyed, they condescended to acts of petty tyranny, for which they were afterwards severely called to account. It never struck them that the rule of Il-Sinan could only be a temporary one, and that the chances of war might remove

from Damascus the Mongol invaders. After seven years' occupation of the city, they were, as a matter of fact, obliged to depart; the Sultan Kutuz entered Damascus, and his first step was to exact from the Christians a contribution amounting to one hundred and fifty thousand dirhems. M. Quatremère, taking Makrizi as his authority, then goes on to describe the different episodes which marked the history of Christianity in the East after that event, and he brings down his narrative to the year of the Hegira 842. Egyptian antiquities engrossed our author's attention, and we have just seen that he took up the pen in defence of Champollion. At the same time, we must notice that he never would adopt the views which are now universally admitted respecting the mysterious system of writing which his friend so admirably brought to light; he was convinced that hieroglyphics had no phonetic value, and nothing could make him alter his opinion.

The period in the history of Egypt which chiefly occupied M. Quatremère was that which corresponds to the Mussulman rule. Thus it is that he published for the London Oriental Translation Committee Makrizi's history of the Mameluke sultans, and he thought more than once of editing the same writer's description of Egypt, the greater part of which he had rendered into French. The history of the Mamelukes forms two volumes, divided into two *livraisons* each, and which were published between 1837 and 1845; it was M. Quatremère's purpose to add, at his own expense, a third volume, but his plan was never carried into execution. No *compte-rendu* can give an adequate idea of the treasures of learning accumulated by the French *savant* in the notes to his translation. Too often, in fact, the small print at the foot of the page draws our attention away from the historian's text, and by the time we have digested the note, we find it somewhat difficult to resume the thread of the narrative. Did we talk of *the foot of the page?* More than once the foot is of much larger dimensions than the body, and two lines of Makrizi disappear under thirty-eight or forty of illustrative matter.

The first volume begins with a biographical sketch of the Arabic chronicler, and takes us to the end of the reign of Melik-Adel (Hegir. 678, A. D. 1279). In the second part alone, one hundred and ninety notes elucidate every possible difficulty, not only of a chronological or historical nature, but also referring to natural science, grammar, literature, etc., etc. Makrizi's details are often supplemented and completed by long extracts from Nowaïri and other oriental writers, thus affording M. Quatremère the opportunity of introducing a number of particulars of the most curious nature. For example, Makrizi, as he goes on, enumerates the different personages of note who have died, during the course of each year, but he forgets a few, and finds himself corrected by a Frenchman of the nineteenth century, from the Arabic MSS. preserved at Paris. It is thus that under the year of the Hegira 668 we have a note devoted to the poet Ebn-Abi Osaïbah, a specimen of whose compositions is added by M. Quatremère. The word *naib* (نايب), which means lieutenant, delegate substitute, suggests, in like manner, a very long excursus, in which not only the signification is explained, but the most interesting details are given on the administration of Egypt, and the military and civil dignitaries of that country. Another instance: the French language contains, it is well known, many words derived from the Arabic;—*chicane*, *chiffre*, *cancan*, *place*, may be quoted. To the list we add, on M. Quatremère's authority, the mediæval substantive *hanap*, which means a cup or goblet, and which is identically represented by هناب *hanab*.* One more: Makrizi relates (Hegir. 673, A. D. 1274) that the Sultan (Melik-Daher-Bibars) received from the king of Abyssinia a message requesting that a metropolitan should be sent to him, selected by the patriarch. "This petition," Makrizi merely says, "was granted." The French

* Cf. also in vol. ii. part i. pp. 70, 71, the note on the word عتابى attâbi, from which is derived the French *tabis:* "on apporte aussitôt ses somptueux habits, où sur l'ouate molle éclate le *tabis*." (Boileau.)

translator is not satisfied with so short a piece of information; he turns to Nowaïri, from whom he quotes a long passage, correcting him as he goes on, with the help of Bruce's *Travels*.

The manner in which the first volume of the *Histoires des Sultans* terminates is strikingly characteristic of M. Quatremère. He did not like, on the one hand, to begin the reign of so celebrated a man as the Sultan Melik-Mansur-Kelun with the concluding leaves of the book; on the other, he could not allow these leaves to remain unoccupied. The dilemma might certainly have been avoided by diminishing the size of the volume; but the stores of erudition at the translator's disposal solved the problem in a way more profitable for the reader, and the result was an appendix containing further investigations of subjects relating more or less directly to the Mameluke sultans. Let us especially note a valuable article on the city of Gaza* and its environs.

The second volume, beginning with the year 1280, only goes down as far as 1309; it is as copiously illustrated as the former one, and the variety of subjects discussed by M. Quatremère is not less surprising than the accuracy of his learning. Thus he remarks that for the year of the Hegira 683 (A. D. 1284) Makrizi has given no notice whatever of the distinguished persons who died; thereupon he undertakes to supply the necrological list, and with the materials furnished by Nowaïri and Abu'lmahasen he draws up a short account of the sheikhs, emirs, etc. Thus again, explaining a word by which the Arabs used to designate the Roman, he shows that it corresponded to the Hebrew *Edom*, and that the Arabs, following the Jewish tradition, applied the same name to all Christians. In the second part of this volume we observe amongst other curious particulars, a long philological and historical essay (it would be a misnomer to call it a note) on the carrier pigeons, and on the custom of employing these birds—a custom which appears to have been extensively practised in the East.

* Cf. also a long note on Bozrah, vol. ii. part i. pp. 248–255.

Time, however, prevents us from dwelling at any further length on the *Histoire des Sultans Mamelouks*, and we must pass on to describe M. Quatremère's labors in another part of the literary field. Semitic studies occupied much of his attention, and yet no distinct work remains as a monument of his industry in connection with this subject. But he took the opportunity of reviewing for the *Journal des Savants* the most important publications which appeared either in France or abroad on Hebrew lore and other cognate topics, and the collection of these articles would form an extremely interesting volume for the student of the old Testament Scriptures. In examining, for instance, the Abbé Glaire's *Lexicon Manuale Hebraicum et Chaldaicum*,* he begins by sketching the progress of Hebrew studies from the Renaissance period. He appreciates Reuchlin, shows Buxtorf and his school following, perhaps too closely, the explanations given by Jewish commentators, points out briefly but correctly the conflicting theories of Gousset and Schultens, and finally pays a tribute of just praise to Gesenius, whose exegetical views he did not, however, altogether sympathize with. This introductory portion occupies the first article, whilst the Lexicon itself is closely considered in the following ones, M. Quatremère taking here and there several words which he discusses thoroughly, occasionally expressing his dissent from the author, and always exhibiting his wonted copiousness of illustration.

Dr. Juynboll's edition of the *Chronicon Samaritanum* and his history of the Samaritans were examined in two *livraisons* of the same journal. The well-known details of Scaliger's correspondence with the Samaritans of Nablous are first related, and the text of the *Chronicon*, as published by the Dutch commentator, is subjected to the most searching criticism. Emendations of every kind are proposed, errors corrected, and then M. Quatremère, leaving the sphere of mythology, goes on to review the principal facts connected with the history of the Samaritans, from the earliest times to their subjection under

* *Journal des Savants* for October, 1844, April, May, and July, 1845.

the Mussulman sovereigns. From the evidence supplied by the Second Book of Kings and the Book of Esdras, we find that two successive colonies were sent by the despots of Assyria into the kingdom of Israel in order to make up the deficiencies left by the horrors of war, and by the exile of part of the population. Now the colonists who settled in Samaria were designated by the Jews under the name of Cutheans, and the question has often been raised as to who these Cutheans were. Michaelis derived the name from Sidon, and identified it with that of the people inhabiting the neighborhood of that metropolis, but M. Quatremère and Dr. Juynboll reject this opinion entirely. According to the Second Book of Kings (xvii. 24, 25), the colony sent into the kingdom of Israel consisted of inhabitants of the cities of Kuthah, Ava, Sepharvaïm, and Babylon. Respecting the two last there is of course no difficulty whatever in the way of identification. As for Ava, M. Quatremère suggests that the letter ר has been substituted erroneously for a נ, and he is inclined to see here the city of Anan, situated on the banks of the Euphrates, and Ammianus Marcellinus calls by the name of Anatha. Kuthah is more puzzling to ascertain, and opinions are still divided on the subject. M. Quatremère thinks he has identified it with the town *Kudh*, which was situated on the banks of the Euphrates, and which was really formed of two localities built close to one another. Traditions preserved by Masudi, Takuti, and other Eastern authorities ascribe to Kuthah very great importance, and an anonymous geographer quoted by M. Quatremère, even goes so far as to say that the first building erected after the flood was the fortress Madjdal, which Nimrod constructed at Kuthah. From these and many similar indications our author concludes that the actual site of Kuthah is that occupied now by the town of Iskenderich, where numerous ruins bear even now decisive testimony to the prosperity and importance of its ancient representative.

We have already alluded to M. Quatremère's suspicion of trans-Rhenan exegesis ; at the same time we must say that he followed attentively the progress of philologico-theological

studies abroad, and that he quite felt their importance. It is somewhat singular, too, that he, the man of tradition, the antagonist of novel theories, should have brought to the interpretation of several portions of the Holy Scriptures the very freedom which he denounced in others. Thus he had written on the Book of Job a disquisition which has never yet been published, and in which he tried to prove, amongst other points, that this portion of Scripture is a far more recent date than usually supposed. He assigned it to the eighth, or at the very earliest the ninth, century before the Christian era.

Some distinguished pupils still remain to show that M. Quatremère's thirty-eight years' service as a lecturer at the *Collège de France* were not altogether without result. Nevertheless he lacked that fire, that enthusiasm, which are so necessary to one who would attract and fix around him a large audience ; he had neither the brilliancy of M. Villemain, nor the proselytizing energy of M. Cousin ; he was conscientious and painstaking, and that was all. He encouraged often his most promising disciples by reviewing their works, and giving them useful advice through the medium of the *Journal des Savants.* Thus it is that he noticed M. Thornberg's excerpts from Ibn-Khaldun and other oriental historians, taking at the same time the opportunity of illustrating the subject with the help of his own exhaustless erudition.

The Phœnician world and the history of its colonies occupied also the attention of M. Quatremère ; but here, as well as in the sphere of Semitic literature, his labors were limited to critical memoirs instead of original works. The productions of Gesenius, Hitzig, Movers, and the Duke de Luynes were carefully reviewed by him, and he proved, in discussing the subjects treated of by these eminent authors, that he was familiarly acquainted with everything we know on the civilization of the ancient inhabitants of Phœnicia. The reader may have noticed that M. Quatremère moves most freely where written documents abound, and where, therefore industry is chiefly required. *A priori* theories are not in the least degree to his taste, nor is he fond of building systems on

the point of a needle, to quote the French proverb. However, his researches, on Carthage especially, should not be forgotten, and his remarks on the ancient history of the Philistines deserve to be quoted amongst his best works. It may be questioned whether we shall ever learn any more than we know at present on the literature of the Phœnicians, supposing, to quote M. Barthélemy Saint Hilaire's expressions, that the merchants of Tyre, Sidon, and Carthage really had a literature. Chance may, no doubt, bring to our knowledge inscriptions more or less mutilated, the remains of so much industry, glory, and wealth; but those we have now, like that of Marseilles, are very rare, and it is a singular thing that the nation to which tradition ascribes the invention of writing is the one which has left behind it the smallest number of written monuments.

In the domains of Aramaïc or Chaldean researches, M. Quatremère has been more fortunate, and his memoir on the Nabateans, published in the *Journal Asiatique*, will remain as a lasting evidence of sagacity and learning. The Nabateans, or the people whom the Latin and Greek writers designate by that name, are associated with the very origins of the Semitic and the Aryan worlds, between which they form a connecting link. Established on the territory bounded by the Tigris and the Euphrates, they there developed in the most distant ages a form of civilization possessing its peculiar features, and represented by a large number of literary monuments, the names of which have been handed down to us through a tradition which cannot be questioned. One of these monuments, relating to agriculture, such as that science was carried on during the palmy days of Nineveh and Babylon, is extant in an Arabic translation assignable to the third century of the Hegira, that is to say, to the ninth century of the Cristian era. Several European libraries possess MS. copies of the work; the one preserved amongst the treasures of the Paris *Bibliothèque Impériale* is incomplete, supplying only two out of the nine books which the treatise on agriculture contains. It was, however, the sole codex to which M. Quatremère had access, and

the details it furnished were well calculated to awaken the liveliest curiosity.* In 300 pages folio it gave an agronomical catalogue equally exact and minute, besides a precise list of all the plants used for common purposes by the inhabitants of the large towns throughout the Asyrian empire.

It is in taking as a starting-point this valuable document, of which the Leyden Library possesses two complete copies, that M. Quatremère was enabled to reconstruct, so to say, the whole history of the Nabateans, from the evidence furnished by the writers of antiquity; evidence which, although scattered here and there in many a volume, is sufficiently strong. He demonstrated that the Nabateans, driven from Mesopotamia about the time of Nabuchodonosor II., had come to settle in Arabia, bringing along with them the reminiscences and the traditions of a civilization relatively much more advanced than that of their neighbors. He proved especially, with an amount of sagacity which seems almost extraordinary, that a book such as the treatise of Nabatean agriculture could not have been written in the deserts of Arabia; it corresponded to habits and wants which belonged evidently only to the people inhabiting the plains of Babylon and of Nineveh,—plains rendered fruitful by the most perfect systems of irrigation and of culture. M. Quatremère accordingly fixed the date of the composition of that singular work to the seventh century before the Christian era.

If we turn to M. Ernest Renan's *Histoire des Langues Semitiques* we find further details on the book we are now noticing, and which give a still more striking idea of its importance, and also of the state of civilization among the Nabateans. "They had treatises on agriculture, medicine, botany, natural philosophy, and astrology, besides special works on the religious mysteries, and on symbolic paintings. One of the Nabatean books contained the fabulous history of Tammuz; others

* For further details on this subject, cf. *Journal of Sacred Literature* for April, 1862, and the translation of M. Renan's essay, published by M. Trübner, London, 1862.

treated of magic and of incantations ; some were of a polemical character, and referred to the worship of the constellations and to monotheism. Many of the works were ascribed to the patriarchs of the Old Testament ; some were said to have been inspired by the sun and the moon ; there were also small poems in the shape of epigrams on various subjects." If we may believe the later statements of Dr. Chwolson, the fragments of these writings which have been handed to us contain metaphysical and physical speculations of great depth, and a very remarkable system of political and social legislation. Libraries are mentioned ; all the branches of religious and profane literature, history, biography, etc., appear to have received extensive developments. The epoch of the composition of this singular work has given rise, M. Renan says, to the most extraordinary statements. In the portions which M. Quatremère examined, this learned oriental scholar found no quotation from Greek authors, no names of Greek towns, such as Seleucia, Ctesiphon, etc., no fact relating to Christianity ; on the other hand, there were numerous mentions of Nineveh and Babylon as still existing, and allusions to the most ancient religious creeds of the East. M. Quatremère concluded from this fact the great antiquity of the work, and ventured even to assign it to the flourishing period of the Assyrian monarchy, under the reign of Nabuchodonosor. M. Chwolson, strange to say, was in favor of a still remoter date. M. Renan, we should add, raises several objections against this hypothesis.

M. Quatremère's intention was to publish a complete analysis of the book on Nabatean agriculture, but other works prevented him from carrying out his views, and Dr. Chwolson, who announces the speedy publication of the work itself, is perhaps destined to bring to perfection the plan entertained by the French *savant*, and prematurely defeated by the hand of death. We hope the more earnestly that such an issue may come to pass, because the learned author of *Die Ssabier und der Ssabismus* is, like M. Quatremère, particularly opposed to fanciful hypotheses, and cautious in the use of the documents which he consults.

Together with the history of Egypt, Phœnicia, and Chaldea M. Quatremère devoted during his whole life a great deal of his attention to the Mussulman world, and it is perhaps here that his works have been both more numerous, and stamped with the greatest originality. Already at the outset of his career his first disquisitions on Egypt gave evidence of long and learned investigations. He never ceased from prosecuting these special researches, and it is not too much to say that no oriental scholar ever mastered more thoroughly the fastidious and intricate details of that branch of history. From Northern Africa and Spain to India, from the earliest times of Islamism to the most recent epoch, from the popular songs to diplomatic documents, M. Quatremère had read all, studied all, annotated all with that power of memory which nothing could defeat, and with an amount of diligence which was never wearied. Geography, history, politics, religion, literature, philology, grammar, science, he neglected nothing, and from his stupendous researches he derived the materials of a large number of works, disquisitions, articles, which alone would be sufficient to establish the reputation of several persons. Arabic, Persian, Turkish, both oriental and occidental, Arminian, and several Aryan idioms, were equally familiar to him, and he had studied them completely even in their various dialects.

Amongst so many works we can only quote the principal. On the same rank as *The History of the Mamaluke Sultans*, which we have already alluded to, we must place *The History of the Mongols of Persia*, of which the first volume alone has as yet appeared. It belongs to that splendid oriental collection voted by Napoleon's government in 1813, but which the advisers of His Majesty Louis Philippe first carried into execution. As early as 1811, and whilst in the midst of his labors on Egypt and on Coptic literature, M. Quatremère had bestowed a great deal of attention upon the history of the Mongols; twenty-five years after, he merely worked out materials which he had for a long time collected. Those who wish to appreciate thoroughly both the talent and the style of composition of M. Quatremère should study the work we are now

alluding to. The amount of learning displayed is immense; but it often refers to comparatively unimportant subjects, and does not seem to be worth the labor it must have cost. Even the choice of the subject is not very happy, and the history of Raschid-Eldin deserves perhaps, neither on the author's account, nor on that of the *dramatis personae*, the honor of figuring among the monuments of the *Collection Orientale*. But the subject once admitted, it was impossible to treat it more thoroughly, more accurately; and for those who wish to be acquainted with that portion of the annals of mankind, M. Quatremère will ever be the safest, the most infallible guide. His intention was likewise to furnish for the *Collection Orientale* the complete *receuil* of Meidani's Proverbs, of which he has given interesting extracts in the journals of the Paris Asiatic Society.

Next to the *Histoire des Mongols de Perse*, we may enumerate several memoirs relating more or less directly to Islamism: thus, 1st, on Mahomet's nephew, Abdallah-ben-Zobaïr; 2nd, on the Ommiades; 3rd, on the Abassides; 4th, on the Fatimites: and, in another direction, 1st, on Meidani's proverbs, just mentioned; 2nd, on the Kitab-al-Agani, or collection of popular songs published by Abu'l Faradj-Ali-ben-Hosaïn; 3rd, on the taste for books amongst Eastern nations; 4th, on the life and works of Masudi; 5th, on the description of Africa by an anonymous author; 6th, on the Kalmuks, etc.

The essay referring to the taste for books in the East has been lately reprinted in the *Mélanges d'Histoire et de Philologie Orientale*, published by M. Ducrocq, and is one of the few which by their character and style are more likely to suit general readers. The author begins by showing how the Arabs, during the course of their brilliant military exploits, came in contact with the literary treasures of Persia and of Greece. The first works towards which their attention was drawn consisted principally of treatises on dialectics, and if we think for a moment that these were translated originally from the Greek into the Syriac language, and then from that into the Arabic, we shall see that the readers could have but a very imperfect

idea of the primitive texts. But the nature of the treatises upon which the ingenuity of Syriac physicians exercised itself was calculated, besides, to influence unfavorably the mind of the Arabs; it gave them a taste for a subtle but too often trifling kind of logic, which was fond of quibbles, and dealt in useless disputations. Lastly, from the stand-point of the Koran, the tendency of metaphysical studies was still more dangerous, as it diffused free-thinking opinions, and made people call in question or explain away the doctrines of Mahomet. At the same time the intellectual movement led, as a matter of course, to the establishment of libraries; calligraphers, more or less expert, were summoned to multiply copies of the works of Aristotle and other writers, not to mention the Khalifs themselves, who considered it an act of honor to transcribe with their own hand the sacred scripture of their religion.

After giving a number of curious details on the MS. copies of the Koran made by Othman, M. Quatremère goes on to describe the principal libraries of Africa, Spain, and the East, and he quotes several anecdotes of an amusing character with reference to that part of the subject. The following one may be introduced here as a specimen. According to the evidence of Khondemir, the celebrated Alischir having deputed, as ambassador to the Sultan Yakub-Mirza, a personage known as Emir Hosaïn, commissioned him to take from his library a copy of the collection of Djami's works, as well as other valuable books, for the purpose of offering them as presents to the Kadi Isa and to his substitutes. Abd-Alkerim, the librarian, by a singular mistake, gave to the ambassador a volume containing the history of the Mussulman conquests, which, for size and binding, was the exact counterpart of Djami's works. Hosaïn did not take the trouble of examining the volumes delivered to him, but he took them, and added them to the other presents he had to carry. On his arrival at the court of the Sultan Yakub-Mirza, this prince asked him about his journey, and whether he had not felt weary during its progress. "I had with me," answered Hosaïn, "a companion whose society

did not allow weariness to approach me." The Sultan naturally wished to know who that companion was. "I carried," replied the Emir, "a collection of Djami's works which the Emir Alischir sends as a present to the Kadi ; so that whenever I felt weariness coming on, I opened the book and read a few passages out of it." The prince manifested an extreme desire to see this important *receuil* ; accordingly Hosaïn sent for the volume, but as soon as it was produced the mistake, of course, appeared. The pretended collection of Djami was seen to be nothing else than the history of the Mussulman conquests. We may easily believe that the unfortunate ambassador remained quite disconcerted ; and this circumstance made him lose the favor he enjoyed with Alischir.

M. Quatremère belonged to the committee on literary works at the *Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres*, and in this capacity he had undertaken the publication of the Arab and Armenian historians in the collection of the historians of the Crusades. He was also to print in the memoirs of the Académie the text and a translation of Ibn-Khaldun's *Prolegomena* ; the text, however, is the only part of this work that he was able to publish.

From the above details it will be seen that M. Quatremère would have been exceptionally qualified for works of lexicography, which require, above all, a good memory and considerable accuracy. He had himself the consciousness of his peculiar fitness for such a task, and in one of his works he announced (1808) the publication of a Coptic dictionary which was already in a very forward state, and the materials of which he would have derived from the Coptic MSS. of the Imperial Library examined thoroughly. During the course of his scientific career, he collected the elements of a pentaglot lexicon, Arabic, Persian, Oriental-Turkish, Syriac, and Coptic. But the difficulty of printing so gigantic a work led him to propose the separate publication of these five dictionaries ; and a few years ago he had had set up a specimen sheet of an Arabic and French lexicon. Unfortunately this undertaking was not carried out, and the works of Meninski, Castel, and Freytag, are

still those which in this branch of literature enjoy the favor of students. Elements of this dictionary have been found amongst M. Quatremère's papers, written on small cards ; but a long revision it seems would have proved necessary before sending the work to the press. The author had communicated great part of his labors to the Abbé Glaire,* his friend, and for thirty years the *confident* of his literary researches.

The papers and MS. collections left by M. Quatremère should contain likewise numerous scraps on the reign of Louis XIV. He used often to boast, in the company of his friends, that he had read every single *inédit* document referring to that reign, contained in the public collections at Paris. He never dreamt, no doubt, of becoming the historian of *le grand monarque*, but thanks to his intense application, he discovered most probably a number of interesting pieces which others will be able to turn to account.

This notice on M. Quatremère would be incomplete if no allusions were made to his moral qualities. As he always lived in great seclusion, the world in general has neither known him much nor appreciated him with sufficient justice and impartiality. And yet, during his whole life, M. Quatremère has constantly set the example of the rarest and noblest virtues. At an epoch like ours, when fickleness and agitation seem to prevail, his political faith was as invariable as his religious opinions. All his energies were devoted to literary labors, which he never discontinued for a single day, and the excess of which often compromised his health, especially when he was young. Exclusively given up to his studies, he never knew what intrigue was or cabal. Literary honors came to seek him, not he them, and if he desired some amongst them, it was more for the sake of the duties they imposed upon him, than for the advantages he could derive from them. In that case he treated himself as he would have treated his neighbor, and he has often been seen defending the interests

* Jean-Baptiste Glaire, born 1798, dean of the Paris *Faculté de Théologie*, and one of the most accomplished oriental scholars living.

of others more warmly than he did his own. His friends were few, but constant and devoted, because he could always be depended upon. His early teachers, and those who guided him during his youth, were ever remembered by him with the greatest and deepest gratitude. He devoted his first pecuniary savings to the idemnification of the generous tutor who had instructed him gratuitously during the Revolution. He gave to M. D'Ansse de Villoison unceasing proofs of an attention which astonished the old *savant* on the part of a young man. In the bosom of his family he was loved as much as he was respected and admired. Some people will perhaps be astonished to hear that he was naturally cheerful; in the difficult times through which he had to live, he contributed very much to keep up the courage and the hopes of those amongst whom his lot was cast, by his genial disposition, combined with the Christian resignation which he had learned from above. In the fire-side festivities which enlivened the family circle he freely contributed to the general mirth, and he was particularly fond of taking a part in the sports and pastimes of children. His conversation, thanks to his astonishing memory, was extremely varied, and it gave first animation to the parties which he joined, whilst it was for his hearers a source of never-ending instruction. Walking in the footsteps of his parents, he was, like them, actuated by the true spirit of Christian benevolence; his charities were bestowed in the quietest manner possible, and it is only after his death that the extent of them was accurately known.

The question arises, Why is it that M. Quatremère's virtues and his excellent qualities have never been appreciated abroad as they were by those who knew him intimately? We may say, by way of answer, that he did not mix in society to that extent which is absolutely necessary, not only if we wish to do good to others, but even if we would benefit ourselves. We can excuse a man for being passionately fond of his books, especially when, like M. Quatremère, he can work them to such purposes; but the society of books is not the only one he should court. We are, above all, called to live with our fellow-

men, and if we do so as we ought, there is no reason why we should not benefit them in the highest degree without sacrificing any of our duties, without even breaking the severest rule of conduct. The intercourse with the world requires habits of sociability and forbearance which need not always accompany us in the seclusion of our study, and we should be able to condescend to these habits, especially as they do not require much self-sacrifice. Good temper and courtesy are positive duties, because without them society would be impossible. Men owe to one another not merely concessions, but sympathy. M. Quatremère had certainly these sentiments in his heart, but, unfortunately, he did not bring them out sufficiently, and he took no pains to secure the love of those who certainly would have been his sincerest friends if he would have consented to throw off his habitual reserve and to appear before them as he really was.

Several causes explain, however, to a certain extent, M. Quatremère's peculiarities of temper. In the first place, the terrible circumstances through which he had to pass when young left upon him so vivid an impression that he could never entirely forget them, and the saturnalia of the Reign of Terror were certainly well calculated to fling around him a deep gloom which no amount of sunshine could ever dissipate. We must also bear in mind his devotedness to work. When a book-worm even grudges as wasted the necessary intervals of repose claimed by nature, it is not astonishing that he should look upon society as a nuisance, and upon drawing-room relaxations as worse than useless. Finally, reserve and timidity characterized, more or less, all the Quatremères; we know, for instance, that Quatremère de Quincy was even less accessible than his cousin, and that his closest relations themselves were not easily admitted within the precincts of his study.

The details we have just given are interesting for us, chiefly because they were fraught with what we may call scientific consequences. Less secluded habits, a greater amount of intellectual and social expansiveness, would, we doubt not, have told very beneficially upon M. Quatremère's style of writing, which

is in most cases very far from elegant. Productions of a merely literary character have a polish *sui generis;* their ideal is one which antiquarians and commentators are not called upon to aim at. But, at the same time, erudition should also endeavor to realize certain conditions of lucidity and finish, not necessarily with a view to success, but for the purpose of rendering accessible to a larger class of readers ideas which they think to be useful and important. No one who holds a pen is justifiable when he forgets La Bruyère's excellent precept:—"Quand le philosophe donne quelque tour à ses pensées c'est moins par une vanité d'auteur que pour mettre une vérité qu'il a trouvée dans tout le jour nécessaire pour faire l'impression qui doit servir à son dessein." If we consider exclusively the writings of French scientific authors, we shall see that Fontenelle, d'Alembert, and Cuvier—to name only these three—obtained as *littérateurs* almost, if not quite, the same pre-eminence which they enjoyed in the world of science. Whatever opinions we may have of M. Renan's philological theories, and of his religious speculations, it is impossible to deny that they are clothed in the most fascinating style. Like these *savants*, M. Quatremère should have sacrificed to the Graces, and his literary education would have rendered this for him a very easy task.

But another consequence, and a more serious one, of our orientalist's habits, was the view which he took of the duties of a critic. Nothing, assuredly, was more contrary to his intentions than the purpose of hurting those whose books he reviewed; he often repeated, and with the greatest sincerity, that his only ruling principle was the love of truth, and that he was not moved by what is called *esprit de système*. This declaration was perfectly true; M. Quatremère meant solely and exclusively to submit certain useful remarks to the authors on whom he sat in judgment; but in doing so it is necessary to make use of the greatest precautions, and as a critic always appeals to the public, he should take care not to wound or irritate those whom he finds fault with. The most trifling want of discretion often leads to angry controversies which

injure the cause of science, whilst, at the same time, they do not benefit the person for whom the Aristarchus especially wrote. These are quicksands which a little experience of the world can teach a critic to avoid; this very experience, however, was precisely what M. Quatremère stood in need of.

It is the duty of the biographer to delineate faithfully the portrait of his hero, with all its blemishes as well as its beauties. Posterity has, in the case of M. Quatremère, very few of the former to note, whilst the latter abound. The immense and thorough researches of our *savant*, his indefatigable zeal for the cause of oriental literature, the scrupulous accuracy which it was ever his aim to realize, have already borne their fruit, and will hereafter produce still greater results. He leaves, as M. Renan has remarked, an immortal track behind him.

M. Quatremère died on the 18th of September, 1857. According to his custom, as early as six o'clock in the morning he had given his orders to the faithful servant who for the last thirty years took care of him: at seven he was struck down by an apoplectic fit. The catastrophe was only discovered two hours afterwards, but it is certain that even immediate assistance would have been totally ineffectual. The state of his health had for some time caused serious anxiety to his friends, and the physicians had uselessly warned him in the most plain-spoken manner. M. Quatremère, as a general rule, took very little care of himself; and he neglected this advice as he had neglected so many others. But death, however sudden, did not take him by surprise; and souls like his are always ready to appear before the tribunal of God. When his friends entered his bed-room they found him in the attitude of repose, with his eyes turned towards his crucifix, as if his last thoughts had been for heaven.

M. Quatremère's library, consisting of 45,000 volumes, 1,200 of which are MSS., was purchased by the king of Bavaria, and transferred to Munich. With the greatest liberality, the rich materials left to the world of *savants* were immediately forwarded to those who seemed best calculated to turn them to

account. Thus, the notes accumulated in view of a disquisition on Nabatean agriculture are now in the hands of Dr. Chwolson, at St. Petersburg; the materials for the Eastern-Turkish dictionary have been sent to Dr. Zenker, the editor of the *Bibliotheca Orientalis*, who is engaged upon a work of the same kind; Dr. Payne Smith, the new Oxford professor, will make excellent use of the portion referring to Syriac lore. Both Dr. Smith and Dr. Zenker profess to be well satisfied with the communications they have received, and they will, no doubt, in their respective publications, acknowledge their debt of gratitude to M. Quatremère, and to the Munich librarians. The Coptic documents have not yet been considered. Finally, with respect to the Arabic and Persian collections, which are the richest of all, the German Oriental Society established at Leipsick has been applied to; for the publication of an Arabic lexicon is considered as being now the most urgent desideratum in Oriental literature.

It will be seen, at any rate, that M. Quatremère's labors will not be lost for the world, and that even after his death his industry and learning will still be proved by fresh monuments in the most varied walks of linguistic erudition. His correspondence, which must be of the greatest literary value, had been in 1860 forwarded to the Munich Library: we hope that it may likewise be presented to the public.

Art. V.—THE RELATION OF INTUITIONS TO THOUGHT AND THEOLOGY.

By Professor John Bascom, Williams College.

By our intuitions we mean those ideas which the mind directly perceives, which are not the fruit of inquiry, but its conditions; the seed and not the sheaves of the harvest.

While philosophy has done little to enumerate and settle these ideas, it has, with many struggles and occasional regression, come more and more to accept the fact of their existence, and thereby laid the foundation for new and most manifest progress. We shall not here enter upon the subtle and difficult analysis by which these ideas have been established, but, assuming their validity, unfold the relation in which they stand to thought. The most pleasing and satisfactory proof of any theory is the light it scatters, its power of explanation, of flashing vividly on the eye the electric lines of influence, the concealed connections of things. The goal to which it leads us shows the true character of the paths we have followed. A prodigy even, by which we do not ascend to God, sinks into a passing marvel, or intense delusion; a trick of evil men or evil spirits, we do not readily know which. Means and ends are so interlocked, that we may reason safely in either direction.

The first proposition we lay down is, That our intuitions are the conditions, the very foundations of thought—its rational and constructive element. We see this in the barrenness of mere perception. Redness, sweetness, hardness—what can these sensations furnish except the raw material of thought? Conceive them as simple sensations, as they are when lodged in a mere brute organ, and it is evident that while we have one point on which a judgment might fasten, there is to be found in the sensation alone, organic impression, with no judgment whatsoever. Locke calls in reflection to enlarge this single point given by sensation, to separate it into subject and predicate, and make of it a full proposition. Suppose the mind begins to reflect, strives to evolve a judgment out of a single sensation—what can it do? The redness is redness; nothing more, nothing less; and this the organ of perception has already announced. This hard, opaque pebble of knowledge the mind may roll over and over again, view it on this side and on that, but can make nothing more of it. The intellectual eye thus remains as curious and as empty as that of the monkey seizing as a toy some instrument of science; all its

chatterings do not contain the substance of a single proposition.

There is, indeed, something ready to receive an affirmation; but absolutely nothing which the mind can, looking to the sensation alone, affirm of it. The perceptive organ has done its work thoroughly, and we have the undeniable, inexplicable sensation, redness, sufficient to itself, and incapable of addition by any other power than that which gave it.

But the mind, hard pushed for a thought, may say, as the simplest possible judgment, *redness is*. Here are two things: whence comes the second? We had the redness through the eye, but how have we reached the notion of existence which we now unite with it? It is evidently no product of sensation; we do not see existence, we see only redness. The mind, then, has furnished the new notion.

We were standing on a single point, upreared from chaos by sensation, looking where we might step. The mind found in itself an applicable, correlative idea, passed over to it, and thus walked off in a thought. Only thus can the mind escape this barren foothold of a sensation; it must wed an idea to a fact before it can reach a judgment. This is the type of all thinking.

Nor suppose that we should escape the difficulty by going on to multiply sensations. These would all lie apart, separate and unrelated, and we could not stride from one to the other without some kind of an idea to connect them. To the color red, add brown and black—we are still ready for no thought concerning the three, till we can spring an arch of relation from one to the other, through the mental world. We may say of the brown that it is like the red, and of the black that it is unlike it; but whence this notion of likeness and unlikeness, of resemblance? Mere sensation does not give it. How long may the shad float above the pebbles of the river without instituting a comparison between their colors? Sensations may exist distinctly, and objects produce each its own peculiar effect, without being *thought* of as different. When these impressions are taken *inward* from sensation to

thought, they are then considered with this notion of resemblance *present* to the mind. *This* is what the mind adds to the sensations; that by which it explains them, and converts them into the members of a judgment. If the notion of resemblance also were a sensation, then would the whole proposition be a sensation, and we should have in it no thought.

If we vary the judgment, and say that the brown is near the red, or that it follows the black, we simply vary the ideas supplied by the mind. We now employ in the one case that of space, in the other that of time. Thus all our thinking involves a constant interplay of facts and ideas—they are the warp and woof which the flying shuttle of thought weaves into a fabric; both are essential. Our sensations, our experiences would lie loose side by side, like threads in the loom, were they not continually crossed and related by ideas; and all the play of our ideas would be but the idle dodging of the shuttle, were not the attenuated, ideal thread each time caught and bound by the permanent facts which it unites.

Nor have we any reason to believe this process different in infancy from what it is in manhood. In thinking, as now expounded, all parts of our nature have play; the senses furnish material, the intuitive powers ideas, and the reflective faculties unite them. So all thought must from the beginning proceed under one or other of the various regulative ideas. These are its antecedents, not its consequents—the conditions, not the results of its action. We do not see that the phases of infant or of savage life, if thoroughly understood, could cast any new light on the inherent conditions of thought; these are involved as perfectly and distinctly in its complete as in its partial and immature forms. We may check the rapidly revolving machine, and again slowly start it, the eye following the play of its wheels, yet we know that this is the same in its swiftest as in its slowest revolutions.

Let us pause a moment to justify the illustrative method thus far employed. The imagination is often looked upon as an unsafe instrument in a close logical process. It may be quite the reverse; all depends on the manner of use. Illus-

trations play in recondite discussion much the same part as words, they carry us on, but cannot be rested in. We may cross the river on blocks of ice, some of which can bear us up. Our safety lies in the rapidity with which we leap from one to another, not insisting on the completeness of the support rendered, or stopping to see-saw on any single fragment. The pursuit of ideas by the aid of the imagination is not unlike that of fish by torch-light; the gleam of a fin must be sufficient, and the spear must follow; every movement must be as quick as lightning and thus as sure. If we expect to shade our wind-blown, flickering fagot, till we distinctly see our prey, and can deliberately put down the hand and take it, we shall doubtless be disappointed. Thus the imagery of this outer world is constantly casting sudden flashes of light into the deep places of philosophy, by which, at the instant, and for the instant, we penetrate points not otherwise attainable.

2. Returning to our proposition, that intuitions are the indispensable conditions of thought, we find a second source of proof in the fact that only through them can we lay hold of the invisible and supersensual. Sensation cannot transcend itself, and now we wish to transcend it, reaching the world of ideas. What can reflection do to aid us, acting only on sensation? Evidently nothing. It can get no more out of them than is in them, and all that is in them is sensational. We might as well try to reach sensations themselves by reflection, as thus to reach intuitions. What sensations are to the visible, sensible world, intuitions are to the invisible, ideal world; they are the only, the exclusive means by which we approach it. Color *must* be *seen*, we cannot reason to it; space, time, right must be seen, they cannot be reasoned to.

But without ideas we shall have nothing wherewith to organize facts. Thinking is taking naked sensations into the mind, expounding and connecting them there by ideas; thus only is thinking something more than sensation. For the very passage of sensations, by means of a judgment, *into* the intellectual world, there must be this previous independent hold of the mind on the invisible. Under every sensation, indeed,

as under the surface of the ocean, there lie hidden many things which the senses do not reach. As the glimmer of the upper film of waters tells to the eye the whole story of currents, caverns, and coral depths, so through the thin layers of colors, and the touch of superfices, the *mind* reaches the substance and forces of the universe, the invisible filling out and giving solidity to the visible. These notions are not the sensations, but *back* of them, beneath them, waiting the plummet of the spiritual nature. All is the transient surface-play of phenomena, till sensation is deepened and made substantial by the penetrative, comprehending power of mind.

The conceptions of the nature and office of intuitions on the part of those philosophers who have recognized them also show how fundamental they are to thought. They have been spoken of as universal and necessary, as convictions of common sense. This universality and necessity have, indeed, been asserted of their presence in the mind, and not of the presence of one or more of them in every thought; yet if these intuitions are the native, inevitable data of common sense, and are present to every mind, we are prepared to see them play a most important, organic part in the construction and ordering of mental phenomena. Such an office other philosophers have, with greater or less distinctness, assigned them. Hamilton, while very far from recognizing their full number and importance, terms them regulative ideas, and the power by which they arise, the regulative faculty. This we think a clear and fortunate expression. It is these ideas that throw regulation and order into all thinking. Every proposition arises under one or other of them, and finds its most deep-seated relation to other knowledge in the particular idea under which it is primarily contained. In some respects, no philosopher has had a firmer, clearer hold of this class of mental phenomena than Kant. He conceived these ideas as the necessary, universal moulds of thought—its very form, from which it is impossible that it should escape. We have, indeed, here error as to their nature, but a most just conception of their office. Others, as Dr. Hickok, have looked on them as

the insight of the reason, that which gives rationality to thought. Now these conceptions, increasing in clearness, prepare the way for our present proposition, that the intuitions are the conditions of all thought, and underlie every judgment. If there is any thinking which does or can proceed without one or more of these ideas, the establishment of the fact would go far to disprove their existence; it would then appear that they are not essential to thought, and if the mind can get a foothold without them, we should be prepared to see it even more readily sustain and enlarge its action independently of their aid.

If, however, the proposition now labored is true, it is evident that the inquiry after these ideas is quite allied to that of Aristotle and others after the categories of thought; the ultimate divisons of thought being found in these, its regulative ideas. It is evident that philosophy presents in its further progress no more important and feasible inquiry than this of intuitive ideas, their number and nature. The ideas with which they are chiefly liable to be confounded are those derived from the generalizations of experience; indeed, the philosophy which denies their intuitive character is compelled to refer them in this form to experience.

Before passing to my second proposition, allow me to illustrate this confusion in a single instance. Many things have this in common, that they add to human enjoyment gratifying some appetite, taste, or active power. We generalize this relation to human pleasure, under the word utility. The kinds and degrees of utility may be very different, according to the nature of the desire gratified; but all that ministers to happiness is, in the broad application of the word, useful. Men are now called to explain the right, and find a chief element in it the happiness which obedience confers. They are thus led to say, that the notion is allied to that of utility.

By this assertion we may understand one of two things: either that the gratification of the recognized impulse, right, is a source of pleasure, and therefore that it comes under the generalization, utility; or, that the word right expresses

neither less nor more than the word useful. The first assertion may be true, but leaves the perception, right, still to be explained. The second annihilates the notion it was set to expound, and dissipates the problem it undertook to solve. This philosophy starts with asking what is the right, and ends in answering there is *no* right, thus exploding ethics, and in the first heat of analysis dissolving its elements into intangible vapor. Spencer, who is bold enough to generalize from experience the intuitions of space and time, yet so feels the impotence of this conclusion, that overlooking the rational element contained in the right, he is fain to recognize it as a blind instinct, a sort of appetite.

As the duck coming to the surface, and seeing its enemy still near, dives to re-appear at some new point, so this utilitarian explanation rises from time to time under a new word. We have been recently told that it is the blessedness flowing from the right which makes it what it is. Regarded in one light the assertion is a truism; the water doubtless constitutes the fountain; regarded in another, blessedness being now made truly ultimate, the word ceases to have any *peculiar* force, and can mean nothing more than happiness. Thus the right again disappears in the explanation, leaving nothing but utility.

Our second proposition is, that only by a distinct recognition of the intuitions are we able to see the nature and limits of knowledge. We fearlessly make the assertion, that more confusion and darkness have arisen in philosophy from misapprehending or disregarding the character of intuitive truth than from any other source whatever. Philosophers, so powerful and acute as Hamilton and Mansel, have been led to the absurdity of requiring us to accept by faith that of which we can have no knowledge whatever, that which is simply and purely a negative idea. We might as well be required to breathe in a vacuum, as to have spiritual respiration and life amid these sweeping denials of philosophy. Believe in what! have faith in what! In something, not only utterly unknown, but impossible to human knowledge. The religion

that could rest on so fine a point would truly be reduced to a minimum. But this denial of knowledge cannot be made without knowledge. It requires perception as much to deny hardness, roughness, sickness, as to affirm them. The very process by which these philosophers show the inadequacy of each notion of the infinite, the absolute, implies some idea present to the mind of what the infinite, the absolute, truly is, leading to the rejection of every inadequate statement. If I see nothing, absolutely nothing, truly I may save myself the labor of multiplied negations, of saying that it is not hard nor soft, black nor white. If the idea of the infinite is truly negative, it should suffer one simple sweeping denial, leaving the the mind at rest.

This fallacy Spencer seems to recognize, and, therefore, accepts for the infinite, as for the right, a sort of instinct, forcing men perpetually to symbolize it under various and changing forms. Yet he also, unwilling to follow the clue in his hand, designates God as the unknowable, and affirms the complete want of representative power in the series of symbols by which man, in the progress of culture, strives to image forth the Deity. The polytheist, with his manifold and malevolent spirits, the Jew with his God of justice, and the Christian with his God of grace, are indeed in an ascending series, but none touch the heavens; to one as to another, the concave remains afar off and inapproachable. There is indeed that in man which impels him to multiply and refine his symbols, but the last, equally with the first, disappears at the touch of philosophy. Though refusing, like unpalpable ghosts of the night, to be handled, these fictions of the mind are sure to return, and gather new conviction and reality the moment the cold gaze of reason is turned away or relaxed. Here the same fallacy re-appears in Spencer, which he himself detected in Mansel. The idea of God cannot be wholly *fanciful*, any more than it can be wholly *wanting*, and yet impel us to a perpetual enlargement and correction of our conception. Such a movement can only proceed under some standard present to the mind. We modify or cast away our successive notions

of the infinite, not at random, but in obedience to some profound, penetrative power. With no idea of the infinite, there is ground, not even for change, much less for progress, in our conception of it. Whence comes the steady expansion, this acknowledged growth of symbols, but from the reaching forth of the mind toward an idea present to it?

Where, then, lies the difficulty? Plainly and simply in making the matter which has entered the mind through one faculty amenable to other faculties. Who would think of testing sound by the eye, or fragrance by the ear? yet Spencer finds a grave mystery in our apprehension of space, because we can know it neither as substance nor as attribute. Substance and attribute (so runs the statement) make up existences: space is neither; therefore we cannot conceive it as existing. This is simply saying, because space is not known as matter, it cannot be known at all; that not being cognizable by sensation, it is not cognizable by mind. We are prepared, then, that this philosophy should deny the knowledge of the infinite, for the equally good and equally poor reason that it is not recognized by the same faculties which measure the finite. We have one faculty, to wit, an intuitive power by which we reach the infinite; we have other faculties by which we expound and explain the finite. These last insist on taking the subject-matter of the first, and trying to handle it. Failing, with the same presumption which prompted the effort, they affirm that there is nothing to be handled, to be understood. What the mole sees, is; what the mole don't see, isn't. The ear cannot discern, and denies sight to the eye; the tongue cannot smell, and discredits the nose.

Magnetism is urged as an *imponderable* agent on the notice of the natural philosopher; yes, says the man of science, but immediately drops the magnet into his nicely adjusted scales, by which he has thus far felt his way through the universe; and these making no answer, he affirms that magnetism is a negative notion. Thus we hand over our idea of the infinite to the logical faculties, which work only in brass and iron—infinite and causal relations, and because these cannot find it,

or screw it in the vice of their major and minor premises, we come to regard it as a myth and nonentity.

Why not lock this doughty logic, determined to play the smith, and tinker all our knowledge, to explain redness, and failing of a solution, refuse the testimony of the eye?

What would this philosophy have? what *does* it wish? Suppose our logical and imaginative faculties could satisfactorily handle this notion of the infinite, would it not thereby sink into finite forms, and be lost? Is it a just dilemma to apply to a transcendental idea, that, if we can conceive it, we lose it, and if we cannot conceive it, we equally lose it? This is the same sharp practice that distinguished the witch tribunal of old. If the accused party, bound hand and foot, sank in the water, she lost her life; if she floated, conviction was complete, and she still paid the forfeiture of life.

Nor is it possible for such a philosophy to be consistent with itself. What is in no sense an object of knowledge, can in no sense be an object of faith, and it is a *reductio ad absurdem* for Mansel to require such faith. How can we believe in him of whom we have not heard? It is as impossible for Spencer to use language in consistency with his theory, and make mention of God, as for the idealist to maintain his hypotheses, and speak of the phenomena about him. The opposite notion is too deeply wrought into every movement of mind and method of expression to allow this scheme consistent utterance. Spencer employs the phrases, God intends, God wills, God's command; yet, on his theory, they are mere forms without substance, as empty as algebraic letters that have not yet been assigned to particular quantities.

On the other hand, with what analogy even to our other powers, do these intuitions give a valid basis to our knowledge, and yet assign it limits? No faculty can transcend, or explain, or deny that of sight in its own field. If we could have reasoned to color, and reached it as a conclusion instead of as a sensation, no organ of vision would have been necessary, or have been given us. Nor can any other sense take the place of the eye. The senses are separate from each

other—are single and final in their own departments, or they are not senses. Why not accept the analogy in our intuitions, and be able to see that we *have* them, simply *because* the matter given through them is *not* otherwise approachable by the mind, cannot be handled by its rationative and imaginative faculties. On this condition alone can we have the idea of liberty, that we accept it as the direct, ultimate insight of the mind, and refuse to explain it under the analogies of cause and effect. Our intuitions, like our senses, determine the kinds and bounds of our knowledge. When we can conceive a taste or a smell, the final nature of sight or of sound, it will be time enough to conceive liberty and the infinite. *Because* our reasoning faculties cannot transcend themselves, or those necessary connections which give them foothold, God gives us wherewith to reach himself, a higher intuitive organ. Shall we, then, in the fullness of our wisdom, refuse its testimony, for the very reason that it performs its office, and reveals that which our inferior faculties are not able to comprehend or measure? Shall we reject God, because he is God, and not man? Shall we depreciate the sun, because it dazzles and blinds the steadfast eye?

If we do this, and are logical enough to see what is involved in our system, we shall shortly, with Hume—far more keen and discerning than his adversaries—deny the possibility of ascending to that supersensual region, lost to us by the closed spiritual eye of intuition, shut and weighed down in death by the poor penny of knowledge which our pitiful philosophy has laid upon it. Having lost the vision of faith—the vision of the soul, we can no longer erect the ladder of miracles by which we may ascend to God, and the angels of God descend to us.

Our third proposition is, That the intuitions assign limits between the different departments of knowledge, and determine the appropriate method of investigation in each. A statement so broad as this can only be hastily and partially illustrated.

Knowledge has often been greatly embarrassed and delay-

ed, in passing from one field of investigation to another. It is astonishing how much deduction had accomplished in mathematics and logic, before men recognized and successfully employed the inductive method that has broken up and made fruitful the rich fields of natural science. Yet, when we recollect how diverse are the attitudes of mind, and the faculties called forth in the two departments, our wonder partially ceases.

In the one class of sciences the steps are demonstrative, the insight intuitive, and the relation in which the reasoning proceeds is one of absolute coincidence between members, both of which are perfectly seen; in the other class, we deal with resemblances reached by the senses, partial in themselves, and only partially perceived, and with causes known only through their effects, and thus never completely known. The whole movement is one—not of reasoning, but of inquiry—by which we add fact to fact, and so come slowly and imperfectly to understand the events that transpire about us.

The regulative idea of the deductive sciences is that of resemblance under its full, perfect form—identity; expressing itself in such axioms as, the whole is equal to the sum of all its parts, in the complete equality of mathematical units, and in the inclusion of the minor under the major premise. Handling truth under such ideas, the mind never needs to go out of itself.

In the natural sciences, the regulative ideas are resemblance under its *partial* and *analogical* forms, and cause and effect. Here the mind must constantly go out of itself, has no deeper insight than that of the senses, and must, by *patient* observation, reach the nature and limits of resemblances, the character and fullness of causes expounded in the entire circle of their effects.

It is not strange, then, that the mind, having in its own workshop set up such a beautiful mechanism of thought as the propositions of Euclid, or the Aristotelian logic, should look upon them as the types of knowledge, be forced with reluctance to lay aside its analytic solvents, and should go forth

impatiently to inquire into those imperfect agreements of which, stone by stone, induction builds its temple. When noble edifices of demonstrative truth had gone up, like a dream of magic, an exhalation of the brain, it is not surprising that philosophy was slow to accept the sweat and toil of day labor, that she did not easily take to hod and hammer—the stone and mortar of mere masonry.

We are now embarrassed by another such transition. Men, who have done much in science, very freely ridicule the imperfections of philosophy, affirming that nothing of moment will be accomplished in this department till the methods so successful in physical research are adopted. There is here a double error. These men neither recognize the advance made by philosophy, nor in the least see the inapplicability to mental science of those ideas which play so conspicuous a part in the material world.

It is amusing to observe the bold dash which a philosopher of this school, astride the hobby of positive knowledge, will sometimes make into this intellectual field, overturning at the first tilt liberty, right, all that is peculiar to philosophy; and how, after this new confusion and overthrow, he trots complacently back, as if something worth while had now been done, an initial step of progress been taken, and a good lesson taught the musty metaphysicians, if they should only have sight enough left to see it. So Buckle denies the leading facts of mind, and sweeps away the prime truths of history in a work which claims to be their philosophy. So phrenology, having secured the whole science of mind between its thumb and forefinger, fumbles the skulls of clowns, and fools, and criminals; expounds the living play of thought by peeping into its dead cranium; expresses the powers, loves, aspirations of man in vulgar fractions; and, with model, map and chart, makes the outlines and relations of the soul more systematic and simple than the geography of the German States. He who expects to carry the same methods from one department to the other, to lay down an iron track from physical science to philosophy, and to pass over, carrying all his

rolling stock with him, will do nothing but bewilder himself and mislead others. Philosophy is a new continent; an ocean rolls between it and the physical world; new regulative ideas here start up and bind all successful methods to their recognition. As we pass these waters, we must sail by the stars in the ascendancy, not by those below the horizon; as we step upon these shores, we must have our Bacon, our *novum organum*—a new charter of rights. If we treat of ethics, we must turn our compass to its polar star, the right; if of human action, we must accept to the full its condition, liberty; if of theology, we must reach God by a bound of the soul, a grasp of faith never again to be shaken off.

We have already tarried long on the philosophical bearings of our subject, and pass to its theological connections.

Here our first statement is, That our intuitions constitute the refuge and bulwark of Christian doctrine. The illustrations are so numerous and important that selection is not easy. We remind you of the fact that these intuitions were first set up as a barrier against the sweeping skepticism of Hume, a skepticism so profound and great that nothing could or did withstand it, on the old ground that all knowledge is derived from experience. Against this deluge many worthless mounds of sand, down to our own time, have been thrown up; but the grave of these waters was only found in the new philosophy of Reid and Kant. Then, with a great gulf, the heavens began to part from the earth, and to take to themselves this child born not more of science than of faith. If men had defended and developed the intuitive ground with the same skill and firmness with which it was taken, the philosophic foundations of theology would to-day be much broader, much more impregnable.

Nor need we refer again to those methods of reasoning by which philosophy, wholly in the spirit of positive knowledge, has warned off from its limits, and pushed beyond its pales, any idea of the infinite, and thus driven religion out into the realm of myths, inventions, chaos and night.

The impenetrable defence against all such assaults is the

firm, unyielding assertion of intuitive power, proved by the nature, universality and necessity of the ideas it gives us. Men may reason liberty away, and with it responsibility and the Divine government, but it is sure to return the instant we give play to nature, to re-open the grounds of guilt and re-lay the foundations of moral law; so is it with right, with all the ideas theology especially handles; they have each in turn been assailed, and each been invincible only when held as intuitive. It is as true of these holier, as Horace found it of lower impulses, driven out with a pitchfork they soon come back to us.

Again, our intuitive powers are the chief organs of faith. All recognize the emotional element in faith, not all its intellectual element. Yet true faith is no more blind, is no less rational, than philosophy itself. We are inclined especially to dignify with the terms knowledge, science, the conclusions of our logical, our ratiocinative processes. These seem more the products of our own thought, have been secured with a more manifest and diversified action of our faculties, with the full play of our scientific methods; and suffer the mind, with all the pride of reiteration, to travel over the ground, step by step, by which they have been gained. Our intuitions, on the other hand, come, we hardly know how, are the still voice within us, and, sternly questioned, seem to forget or lose their message altogether.

Yet these intuitions above all products of the mind are certified by the seal of God. Indeed, the whole credence we give them arises from faith in Him, and thus in the powers which he has bestowed. We accept the convictions and voice of the soul, because we believe that therein God whispers otherwise ineffable truths to us, and draws directly the inner ear and eye of the mind to himself. Argument may assail these first conditions of belief, but faith makes them her citadel, and will not surrender them. She reposes on these great truths, sealed to herself under the hand of God, as title-deeds which philosophy may not recognize, but cannot invalidate.

There was sublimity as well as dogmatism in the unflinch-

ing faith with which Reid fled to the convictions of common sense, and refused to yield to a skepticism he could not distinctly confute. This repose on the voice of God within him, prepared the way for that recognition, those limitations and tests, of our intuitions which make them as incontrovertible as they were before certain. Faith in the time of panic held the ground till logic could rally its forces and reclaim it for truth. These intuitive convictions thus became the refuge of faith, the ground of that certainty with which it exclaims, "I know that my Redeemer liveth."

We see also how faith, through them, secures its superior hold of the supernatural and invisible. In proportion as we carry the balance of authority over to the logical faculties, and employ these to reflect discredit upon our intuitions, or to deny them altogether, spiritual vision is lost. On the other hand, as faith revives, as we distrust our own conclusions, and prefer rather to rely on the first convictions of the soul, the supernatural comes back to us, and we live as seeing things invisible. Faith thus shows itself the ground of the exercise of those faculties by which we reach the central truths of the spiritual world. Only as we become children and learn to see and to hear with the undoubting play of native powers, does the supernatural have its just authority with us. The man who uses his ratiocinative faculties as the only and the complete interpreters of truth, is like one who should insist on always wearing a microscope before the eye. Doubtless, certain things close at hand he might see with astonishing fullness of details, but the grand range of the universe, which belongs to the naked eye, would be lost; the sweep of the earth and the glory of the heavens would be veiled. Strike down the glass, and give him sight in place of this mole-like vision. Faith, weary of the narrow stretch of the reasoning powers, looks up, and beholds its God. The overpowering, commanding element in its argument is the intuitive one, setting the glory of the infinite, as the balance and fullness of thought, over against the excellency of the finite.

Now, also, may we understand the inner illumination of a

pure spirit. How a clear atmosphere lengthens vision, and carries sight pleasurably to the summit of far off mountains, or enables it to gather up along the slope of hill and valley the innumerable diversities of objects and surfaces. We are astonished at the distinctness and multiplicity of details rendered by the eye in a perfect medium. Let the mists of passion, prejudice, false philosophy, that hang on our spiritual horizon, and draw their unrecognized veil over us, be cleared up; let the inner eye, whose light is the lamb of God, be put in quiet, complete possession of its own field, and we shall discover lines of revelation longer than those which descend upon us from Orion and the milky way, broader, fuller, more penetrating than those which go ebbing forth from the fountains of the sun. With eyes couched of the Holy Spirit, we shall range the invisible world, with a vision like that which now wanders at will through the confines of this physical universe, and feed on its truth and beauty.

Our intuitions, also, show themselves the adjuncts of faith by the interpretation they bring to portions of Scripture. We should be slow to draw direct proof from the Bible for a point in philosophy, so wholly is it shaped to the practical exigencies of the spiritual life, so completely is it devoid of those clues and implications of a metaphysical system which belong to human composition on kindred themes. A very different thing is it to observe the fullness and force which our philosophy reveals to us in Biblical statements. The wisdom of the word is said to be foolishness with God. The profane and vain babblings and oppositions of science falsely so called are spoken of, and things which indeed have a show of wisdom. These and similar passages are certainly not intended to disparage knowledge or human faculties, but rather those conclusions of reason which are thrown into opposition with our primary convictions. This is the wisdom of man as opposed to God's wisdom, an argument into which we have skillfully woven our own will and desire, and then used it to hush and smother the voice of God in the soul.

Thus it is said, if any man thinketh he knoweth anything he

knoweth nothing yet as he ought to know. The conceit and assurance of our logic are here flung back upon us as proof of ignorance, and we are remanded to that more undefined, humble, yet profound knowledge which comes by love. The honest play of our faculties, the doing of God's will, is made the condition of knowing the doctrine.

So fundamental, both to philosophy and religion, is the recognition of the intuitive grasp and range of the human soul in the invisible world. If we retreat no further than Hamilton, and with him believe that the notion of cause arises from the inability of the mind to conceive a beginning, and that the idea of the infinite is the falling off and vacancy of our feeble intellect, we shall find that our argument has cut, at some invisible point above, the lines of thought which ran heavenward, and that they now fall back upon us, slack and worthless cordage, unable to lift us a foot from the earth.

If we sink into that other philosophy, which makes all knowledge the generalization of experience, our eyes are out, and we shall grind in the mills of the Philistines, till God sees fit to visit us. But if we awaken the powers of the soul, if we see what we may see, and believe what we see, conviction will gather strength in the mind, and we may say to logic, filling the ears of a critical world with the din of its diversified proofs, as the men-of-Samaria to the women who led them to Christ: "Now we believe, not because of thy saying, for we have heard him ourselves, and know that this is indeed the Christ, the Saviour of the world."

It is not by *a priori* and *a posteriori* arguments, by the heavy flapping of logical wings, carefully balanced on this side and on that, that the soul mounts to God. Such a laborious flight cannot transcend the dense atmosphere which sustains it. We reach the upper region, where mere blood comes pricking through the pores, under the piercing eye and buoyant power of our intuitive nature, moving in direct line, by concentrated impulse, towards its Maker. We do, indeed, find our starting-point in the data of sense, but the mind is not shot thence with the dead force of an argument, as the

stone flung from the catapult, but leaps thence with the living fire of the soul, as the eagle from its perch.

Mere science carries death wherever it goes. Even physical life it strives to resolve into chemical and mechanical phenomena, and is content in proportion as it has driven before it all free, personal and immaterial agencies. Universal, eternal, unchangeable law is its favorite formula, thus looking upon nature as having everywhere stiffened into cold, dry atoms, beyond the power of the potter, whether for honor or dishonor. Under this banner science still leads many a foray on faith; it knows not how to handle a spiritual force. When it has filled the universe from side to side, and end to end, with the play and hum of second causes, it sits down to contemplate the spectacle with the delight of the mechanist who has crowded his factory, from loft to basement, with the noisy wheels of industry, and made human life in man and child their implement and servant, running as they run, or caught and crushed by them.

Let us rather welcome that intuitive philosophy, which is able to recognize spiritual truth as it comes flooding through the physical world, and is found everywhere palpitating in it, giving it the poetry and inspired life of religion, binding back the soul to God; a philosophy that will not suffer these heavens, as they gush out with warmth by day, and radiate the infinite reaches of God's wisdom by night, to become to the soul as cold and cheerless as an ice palace; nor this world, with its diversified, dependent lives, children of a near and dear Providence, to waste its words of present watchfulness and love on the silent air; but fills the soul and the universe profoundly full, as its last, most comprehensive and certain revelation, with the idea of the Infinite, the Almighty, thus conquering back from the cold, dead forces of science the animate world to a living God.

Art. VI. — INTERPRETATION OF JAMES iv. 5, IN CONNECTION WITH GENESIS iv. 7.

By E. Paret.*

[This passage in James is considered by some interpreters as one of the most difficult in the New Testament. The *Studien und Kritiken*, and other German periodicals, have largely discussed it. In 1840, Zyro, of Bern, advocated in the *Studien* substantially the following view:—"Since the Scripture says that the Holy Ghost which dwells in us strives against envy, this is a truth which certainly unveils the divine grace; but the Scripture speaks of a still greater gift of grace," etc. Kern, in his commentary on James (1838), adopting a reading of Lachmann, renders thus: "God zealously longs for the Spirit which he has made to dwell in us." Tholuck, in his *Litt. Anseiger*, 1843, gives the sense thus: "The Holy Ghost who dwells in you loves you with a jealous affection; he will endure no other love, no friendship of the world (vs. 4); but in return he gives greater gifts, and makes up for all he deprived you of," etc. Baur, in the *Theolog. Jahrbucher*, Tübingen, 1855, says the citation is from Genesis vi. 1, and the sense this: "Do you think that the Spirit saith in vain, Out of envy hath he a desire to the Spirit that dwells in us? (*i. e.*, that God is unwilling to give his Spirit to men because he thinks them unworthy to have it, since they are of flesh?) As little will he do thus with them who turn to the world through fleshly lusts. On the contrary, to those who turn to him he giveth more grace," etc. Dr. Grimm, *Studien und Kritiken*, 1854, renders: "Is our envy a work of the Spirit? No, but he giveth more grace," etc. The author of the following article advocated his interpretation against Zyro in the *Studien und*

* Translated from the *Theologische Studien und Kritiken.*

Kritiken. Zyro replied, 1861. And now Herr Paret, Deacon in Mäckmühl, sums up the matter in a concise exposition and defense, which is certainly ingenious, and may help to throw some light on this enigmatical text.—Eds.]

Previous investigations have made two points clear. 1. That the passage may be so punctuated that the quotation shall begin with ἐπιποθεῖ, and not with πρὸς. 2. That the πρὸς, before 'envy,' can have the sense of περί, as in Luke xviii. 1, and Heb. iv. 13. This I assume, and translate the passage, with Rauch, thus: "Or do ye think that the Scripture saith in vain about 'envy, that it lusteth (longs) for the spirit that dwelleth in us'?" This reading—or, rather, punctuation—and this translation, being considered as allowable, and, I may add, the most simple and natural, it is still to be vindicated (1) in relation to the sense and connection, and (2) in respect to the passage here cited from Genesis.

1. The connection is clear, and is also correctly given by Zyro, in general terms. The subject of discourse is watchfulness against the influence of the world, the flesh and the devil, and particularly against envious and jealous striving, whereby grace and the new life, the gift of God, are imperiled. This yielding to the flesh and the world, already (in verse 2) set before the reader as 'killing' and 'envying,' as 'fighting' and 'warring,' is declared to be (verse 4) adultery towards God, ensuring his enmity, and also, on the other hand, bringing the devil near and giving him power over the soul. The object of our passage, then, is to give a scriptural basis for this earnest warning, and it does this in the above citation.

What, now, is the *sense* of these words? Zyro doubts whether it can be said with psychological accuracy that "envy lusts, or longs, to get possession of man;" for he says, envy is a mere negation, and is within the soul, and not, like an evil spirit (Matthew xii. 44), outside of the man. And yet I must think that the sense of the passage is just this: Envy longs to get possession of man. Zyro, following Kamphausen (in the *Studien und Kritiken*, 1860, p. 116 sq.) with reference

to the application of Genesis iv. 7 to this case, stumbles at the seeming contradiction, that sin should be said to lie in wait before the door of the heart, while it is still and ever within, whenever any one acts unjustly, or even feels unjustly. But on this point I need only refer to one of the most terrible instances of this enigmatic truth, which, however, we everywhere encounter, viz., that of Judas Iscariot: He was satanic even before Satan in a special sense entered into him (John vi. 70; xiii. 27). So, too, all of us have sin in our hearts, and yet sin also remains outside, especially in its demoniacal concentration, lying in wait for more complete entrance within our hearts, that it may make those satanic and ungodly who are partially righteous. Sin, especially in its concentration as a personal power, strives with the human personality that has not yet become satanic, in order to get full hold, to possess and to devour like a lion. See Peter v. 8, to which passage and epistle James refers.

Besides, sin—here viewed in the special form of envy—is not a mere negation, but a power, in its negation, working in positive hostility to the good; see Rom. vii. 8, 11, 17, 20. Hence there is no psychological objection to taking "envy" as the *subject* of "lusteth;" the connection, in fact, favors this; for the readers, as we have seen, are threatened with having the sin, that has insinuated itself, get the upper hand, and are in danger of losing the better part, which they now have. They themselves are of divided hearts (verses 4 and 8), and their enemy—that is "envy"—with whom they have already begun to dally, is represented as having something of independence, something personal, and which they ought to subjugate, which they are still able to withstand, but which demands, on this very account, a double watchfulness. This personification of envy is indicated in part by the expression, "adulterers," and the contrast between the "world" and "God," in verse 4, in part by the reference to "the devil" in what follows. The word "lusteth" strikingly corresponds with this personification of envy.

But, now, how is it with the object? Many interpreters are

reluctant to apply to the spirit which dwells in man by nature the words, "the Spirit that dwells in us." (With our understanding of the verse, we have nothing to do with such interpretations as make "the spirit of envy" to mean the same with "flesh," or the natural man; for Zyro is right in saying that "flesh" and "spirit" are contraries, and cannot be taken as identical.) In our view, the word "spirit" here includes both the natural human soul (*Psyche*) and the Holy Spirit, which dwells in believers (Rom. viii. 9). Incontestably, the higher, better part of man is implied, which (whether belonging to his native endowments—Gen. ii. 7—or received by faith) descends from God and takes abode in man. And as Christians, believers, are here addressed, the Holy Spirit is not excluded but included; but, as the text is taken from the Old Testament, the physical or natural spirit of man is first of all implied, which in the New Testament appears in higher potence through the indwelling of the Holy Ghost. By "spirit," therefore, we are here to understand both man's native spirit and the holy spirit of life coming from God; and, we may add, that in the passage of the Old Testament to which allusion is made, the Holy Spirit itself is not distinctly spoken of. However, this special phrase, "the spirit that dwells in us," strikingly fits in with the context, because the readers are thus reminded of the nobility of their original and renewed descent from God, whereby they are bound, if they would live after their true nature, to abide in the spirit, and to ward off the assaults of "envy," which comes of the world, the flesh and the devil, and is therefore earthly, carnal and devilish; so that thus their spiritual life be not abased by adultery, and in the end brought wholly under the dominion of the Evil One.

2. It remains for us to consider the citation, and first of all to find what passage is here cited. Manifestly, James supposes that the passage is well known. We are not to look for it, then, in the Old Testament, nor in an apocryphal book, nor need we suppose that it is in a book now lost. It seems to me indubitable that Genesis iv. 7, is the passage referred to,

viz., "Unto thee is his desire," or 'he longs (lusts) after thee.' The citation is literal as to the subject and predicate; not literal, but illustrative, in relation to the object.

The predicate 'desire', (Heb. *teshooqa*) it is evident, is identical with the word in James. Yet we may allude to the special usage of this word as applied to the conjugal desire of woman for man (Gen. iii.), or of man to woman (Song of Songs, vii. 11 (10), which is here pertinent in connection with the previous references to 'adulterers.'

The subject in both passages is only the indefinite pronoun, or the verbal ending of the third person, not the *nomen substantivum* itself; and this is not unimportant for the parallelism. But it is of special note, that the subject to be supplied is in the masculine gender, and this too in the Hebrew, and, what is more striking, it follows a feminine form. This is important in relation to the personification of "envy." For in the passage in Genesis reference is first had to sin, that is the sin of envy, as lurking before the door of the heart, to find admission; for "its longing is towards man"—in this ca e towards Cain. But in what follows another subject is substituted for the 'sin,' viz.. 'one that lies in wait,' and this subject was previously the predicate; the sin of 'envy' is, then, in Genesis also, personified, and in a very distinct way, strikingly like the personification of the devil as 'a roaring lion' in James, and in the corresponding passage in 1 Peter, v. 5–8, to which allusion is doubtless had in James. And it is all the more unwarrantable to blunt the edge of this sharp personification by exegetical flexibility, since it is the Lord God himself who is speaking in this 'scripture' of the Old Testament; which fact also makes it doubly congruous with what is said in the next verse (James iv. 6), "he giveth greater grace."

As to the difference in the *object*—instead of 'unto thee' (as in Gen. iv. 7), James has 'the spirit that dwells in us,'—this is not inconsistent with the correctness of the citation, for it is only an instance of using a passage by way of illustration, and in a wider point of view; and it is used, as already intimated, with skilful adaptation to the readers, to remind them of the

sacredness of the personality with which they are ennobled. Hence also James selects the first person plural 'us,' in order to include himself as well as his readers in the number of those who are sanctified by the Spirit of God, and who do not of right belong to the devil, but are to withstand him. James had the more warrant for using the phrase in Genesis ('unto thee') in this way, because the other passage in Genesis (ii. 7) which speaks of the 'spirit' breathed into man, would naturally come into mind in connection with Gen. iv. 7; and then, too, the 'desire' spoken of in Gen. iii. 16, (where also, as in iv. 7, the word *mashal* 'rule' is appended,) is used more in relation to the body, while in iv. 7, it is a desire in relation to the 'spirit', which James means to emphasize in order to a correct understanding of what he says in verse 4, about 'adulterers' and 'adulteresses.'

The more exactly we consider both these passages in their words and connection, the more, I think, we shall be convinced that they are related to each other. We may also take into account the similarity of situation in both cases, viz., a heart in danger of evil, yet forewarned by God; in both, dissension between brethren, in connection with prayers (and sacrifices); the expressions in James about 'ki ling' and 'desiring to have,' 'fighting' and 'warring,' all culminating in 'envy', and the description of Cain's 'fallen countenance,' indicating the wrath, which threatens to pass from envy and revenge into open murder; and then, too, the craft of Satan, seeing all, and actually prevailing over Cain, who "was of that wicked one" 1 John, iii. 12); while it is the object of James to warn against his subtleties (verse 7).

This passage, too, in James (iv. 5), throws light upon that in Genesis, iv. 7, which has been so variously interpreted.* There is a manifest reference to the peril of the soul from the wrath and "falling countenance" to which Cain had yielded, in contrast with the uplifted look of friendship. It may suffice to give in a paraphrase a rendering in the passage in Genesis:

* See Kamphausen in Theol. Studien und Kritiken, 1860, p. 116, sq.

"Is it not so? when thou art right, then thou art friendly (towards God and thy brother: meaning this—so is an uplifted countenance in contrast with the gloomy discontent expressed by the 'fallen countenance'); but if thou art not right (in act and thought), sin lurks before the door (of the heart), and his (the lurker's) desire is towards thee (to take full possession of thee), but do thou rule over it!"

Art. VII.—THE POLITICAL SITUATION.

By George L. Prentiss, D.D., New York.

1. *The Question before the Country.*

The history of society has rarely presented a political problem so important and difficult as that which now occupies the thoughts and is puzzling the will of the American people. Nearly a year has elasped since the conquest and surrender of the rebel armies; Congress has been almost four months in session; but the great problem seems still far from being solved. Nor is this a matter for special wonder or discouragement. It is what was to be expected. It is the very thing for which the teaching of history and the principles of human nature ought to have prepared us. If at the end of even two or three years, the country shall be thoroughly pacified, the questions raised by the rebellion settled in the right way, and the Union restored on the basis and in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence, the result will be not less honorable to the political wisdom, prudence and energy of the American people, than that of the war itself to their military skill and prowess. And such a result, achieved in so short a time, would have scarcely a parallel in the annals of the race. While the national struggle went on, we were constantly saying that the world had seldom, if ever, looked upon

a civil war so stupendous and to which Heaven had joined such

"Great issues, good or bad for human kind."

Nor upon a calm review of the contest, are we disposed to retract this opinion. How, then, can we wonder, if it require much time, much earnest thought and discussion, and long patience also to secure the "great issues" so full of blessing to us and to mankind, *by incorporating them with the Constitution and laws and ruling policy of the Country?* For in this way alone, so it appears to us, can the inestimable fruits of the loyal victory be wrought into the nation's life and made part of its heritage forever.

2. *The Question to be settled by Legislation.*

In saying this we do not forget or lightly esteem the need and value of other agencies in helping on the work of a genuine and perfect restoration. We believe in the importance and good effects of argument, discussion and public opinion, as well as in the efficacy of an enlightened self-interest; so, too, in the healing influence of time, reflection, and the "sober second thought." And our faith is unbounded in the renovating power of American and Christian ideas. Without the aid and co-operation of these moral forces, it would be, indeed, a hopeless task to solve successfully the problem of national restoration. But it seems to us equally clear, that without wise and effective legislation these moral forces are likely to prove altogether inadequate to the crisis. On this point we ought to learn something from our own history, especially during the last half century. If that history teaches one lesson more impressive than any other, it is the prodigious power of an anti-republican principle, when embodied in the fundamental law, and combined with ambitious passions and lust of place, to resist the principles of liberty and the force of truth, to corrupt the noblest parties, and, in the very name and garb of democracy, to organize oppression, social wrong, treason and rebellion. In spite of all the mild and persuasive agencies of freedom and Christianity, the cham-

pions of slavery not only gained complete possession of political power and opinion at the South, but they succeeded in spreading their servile and fatal doctrines broadcast over the North, infusing them into much of the popular thinking and belief, and engrafting them upon the whole policy of the nation. And had they been able and willing to use the weapons of party management, intrigue, and propagandism with the same skill and energy a few years longer; had they not made haste to turn traitors and rebels in furtherance of their dark schemes, they might probably have retained control of the government for another generation, and in the end, perhaps, have succeeded in destroying it.

While heartily acknowledging, then, the necessity and beneficent office of other agencies in the grand work of restoration, it seems to us hardly possible to overestimate the importance of wise, comprehensive and effective legislation to the same end. Without the friendly and strong arm of National law to uphold and protect it, nothing short of a miracle can save the genuine loyalty of the South, whether of blacks or whites, from being put to shame and trampled under foot. Unless they are made part and parcel of the organic law, the political surrender of the Rebellion, and the guarantees which the triumphant loyalty of the nation justly demands as the terms of that surrender, are almost certain to prove a snare and a delusion. It was in perjured defiance and violation of the Constitution and laws of the land that the Rebellion started and was carried on. It was by the offended majesty and resistless energy of the Constitution, and of the laws made in pursuance thereof, that the Rebellion was crushed out; and is it not both a logical and a righteous conclusion that the blood-bought fruits of the transcendent victory should be rendered sure and permanent by solemn constitutional and legal sanction?

3. *Legislation and the War.*

We have just said that the Rebellion was overthrown by the power of the Constitution and of the laws made in pursuance thereof. None will admit this more readily, or with a deeper con-

viction, than the patriotic soldiers and sailors of the Union, who fought and vanquished the armies of treason; none know so well as they that the secret of their moral, yea, of no small part of their physical strength and courage, and the sign by which they conquered, were the imperiled Constitution and laws of their country. How many of these laws were made for the very purpose of summoning them to the field, of arming, clothing, feeding and sustaining them there, of taking care of them when sick, and wounded, and disabled, and of providing for the mothers, widows and orphans of their companions slain in battle The patriotic and bold legislation of Congress was no less essential to the triumph of the righteous cause than the firmness, sagacity and energy of President Lincoln and his Cabinet, or, than the Union armies and navy, under Grant, Sherman, Thomas, Sheridan, Farragut and their other famous leaders. Without this legislation, the nation would have been compelled to give up the struggle at the very outset. It was Congress that not only advised but ordained,

> "..... How war might, best upheld,
> Move by her two main nerves—iron and gold,
> In all her equipage....."

So long as the annals of the Slaveholders' Rebellion last, the fame of Congress in the work of subduing it, and of destroying its guilty cause by the Great Amendment, will be indissolubly linked to that of our martyred President and his trusty ministers, to that of our living and departed heroes, and to that of their common and mighty Leader—the American people.

4. *Congress and Restoration.*

And if Congress have, as we trust it has, the wisdom, firmness and foresight to perform aright the work now assigned to it by Divine Providence and the National will, the fame of its patriotism will become still more resplendent, and it will endear itself, as never before, to the heart of the loyal people, to good men over all the earth, and to coming ages. The political problem, as we said before, is one of the most difficult

and important ever presented to the judgment and decision of any nation. It demands for its solution the highest style of practical American statesmanship. If our canonized forefathers, the founders and master-builders of the Government, along with the most renowned statesmen and expounders of the Constitution and the laws, who succeeded them, were to come back again to earth and address themselves to the immense task, they would find it not unworthy of their united wisdom. We cannot summon them back to earth, but, fortunately, the clear light of their example, and experience, and noble principles, still shines about those to whose hands the task is actually entrusted. Congress has only to follow on the line, and act in the spirit of the greatest and best statesmen of the Republic in the past, in order to solve the problem in the right way.

And here we approach a question about which, unhappily, very serious differences of opinion have arisen among loyal men. We mean, of course, the question *whether it belongs of right to the President or to Congress to fix the terms upon which the States lately in rebellion shall be allowed to occupy their old places in the Union, to resume their normal relations with the Government, and to share equally, as aforetime, in the National legislation.* Had Congress been in session, or been specially assembled, as we cannot but think it should have been, upon the surrender of the rebel armies, perhaps the question would never have been raised; for nothing is plainer than that every consideration of public duty and policy required the hearty coöperation of Congress and the President in the work of reconstruction. By such coöperation the Ship of State had been piloted safely through the tremendous storms of war; and now, when the perfect triumph of the country's arms was to be crowned and perpetuated by the triumph and peaceful reign of the country's principles, how natural that the executive and legislative branches of the Government should draw still nearer to each other, should take intimate counsel together, and frown indignantly upon the bare suggestion of a rupture between them! This is what the people demanded and ex-

pected—this is what they demand and expect now; and we do not envy any man, whatever his position or his motives, who undertakes to thwart them in this matter. Not in the highest stress and pressure of the war was the loyalty of the country more in earnest, more vigilant, or less disposed to be trifled with than it is to-day; never, since the attack upon Fort Sumter, was it less wise or less safe for any servant of the American people, who desires to stand well in their confidence and affection, to set up his own will against theirs, or to tamper with the sacred principles upon which they have set the seal of their supreme approval, of their word of honor, and of their most precious blood. If it must needs be that offences come, woe to that man by whom the offence cometh!

We could have wished, we repeat, that the President and Congress might have had the opportunity for mutual consultation and interchange of views at the earliest practicable moment after the overthrow of the military power of the rebellion. That great event, so full of national joy and triumph, falling in with the assassination of President Lincoln, an event so heavy laden with national grief and agony, filled the public mind with religious thoughts, hushed the voice of faction, and knit all true hearts together in patriotic and awe-struck feeling. The hour would seem to have been singularly auspicious for harmony and a good understanding between the President, unexpectedly called to his exalted station in a way so fearful, and the National Legislature. But the golden hour passed away unused. Perhaps Providence so allowed it for the nation's good. A special meeting of Congress was deemed unadvisable; and as more than half a year would elapse before its regular session, only two courses remained open to the President; one to postpone the whole question of reconstruction until winter, and in the meanwhile hold the rebel States still in the unrelaxed grasp of war; the other, to adopt at once and begin to carry out a reconstruction policy of his own.

5. *The Course adopted by the President.*

He chose the latter course. We do not blame him for it.

We are ready to believe that he did so from deliberate conviction, and with the best motives. No candid person can read his varied utterances during the six weeks succeeding his accession to the Presidency, without feeling that he was profoundly impressed with the greatness of his responsibility to the country, and that he earnestly desired to discharge it in such a way as to vindicate and establish the principles for which the nation had been fighting. In spite of the painful scene in the Senate Chamber, on the 4th of March, his serious, modest deportment, and the manly tone of his brief speeches and responses, at once opened his way to the heart and confidence of the people. The chief fear was, lest his strong opinions respecting the crime of treason, and the duty of punishing and confiscating the property of the authors of rebellion, coupled with the remembrance of his own wrongs and suffering, might impel him to a policy of undue severity. Such was the public sentiment towards him in the earlier stages of his administration—a sentiment deepened by sincere admiration for his sturdy and truly heroic patriotism in resisting the counsels of the conspirators in the Senate Chamber during the dreadful winter of 1860–61; when, Abdiel-like,

> "Among innumerable false, unmoved,
> Unshaken, unseduced, unterrified,
> His loyalty he kept, his love, his zeal."

It cannot be denied that a very different feeling towards the President is now pervading the minds of a vast majority of his countrymen, to whose favor and suffrage he owes his great office; nor can it be denied that a change still more marked and universal has taken place in the sentiment entertained towards him by his countrymen, who did what they could to defeat his election. It is a strange political phenomenon, and we will attempt a brief explanation of it. In doing so we shall try to express ourselves in the spirit of Christian moderation, without passion and without malice.

By adopting an independent plan of his own for bringing the insurrectionary states back to their normal relations with the Gov-

ernment, Mr. Johnson was obliged to settle in advance some of the most difficult and delicate questions growing out of the rebellion. He was obliged, also, to carry out his plan by an exercise of the war-power more summary and sweeping, in several respects, than even its exercise while the war was flagrant. This was the twofold disadvantage and danger of his course; for it was a path from which, once entered upon, it was not easy to turn back. But, on the other hand, we freely admit that while the course adopted rendered any radical mistake peculiarly perilous, it afforded no small advantages for the execution of the right policy. Certainly, it was a most desirable thing to hasten by more than half a year the blessed work of peace and national restoration.

6. *The President and Restoration.*

Did the President devise the right policy? Was his plan of reconstruction in full accordance with the principles which the country had asserted by force of arms, had embodied in the immortal Proclamation of Emancipation, and the great Amendment, and had pledged its solemn word to maintain? In order to answer these questions, we must consider the Executive plan, both in its inception and in its practical development. That in its inception it was intended to do full justice to the principles asserted in the war, we do not deny; nor can we doubt, that in its later development it involved the virtual abandonment of several of those principles. From the Proclamation of Amnesty, and that of the same date appointing Mr. Holden Provisional Governor of North Carolina (which two Proclamations contained the first official announcement of the Executive plan of reconstruction), to the assembling of Congress, there was an interval of more than six months; it was a pregnant period, equal to as many years of ordinary political existence; and during this long space the President's policy was in rapid process of development. Points in it which were at first obscure, became distinct and unmistakable. Its positive application to State after State demonstrated more and more clearly exactly what it was, how it operated, and what changes it was undergoing; for not only were new features

added to it, and old features dropped, but another *animus*, a new soul, as it were, seemed gradually to get possession of it. In response to the anxious inquiries of the loyal people, it was at first said, that the whole plan was tentative; that it was only a grand experiment; and if not successful, could be reconsidered and changed when Congress met. But when Congress met, the representatives of the loyal States and people, instead of being asked to examine and express their opinion of the evidence respecting the success of the momentous experiment, were told that the whole matter was *res adjudicata*, and that it only remained for *them* to judge of the qualifications and returns of persons claiming seats from the late rebel States. The President's Message, however, did not fully reveal to the public eye the mature form and pressure, or the ultimate drift, of his policy. This revelation was completed, though the speeches of its special friends, and of the old political enemies of Mr. Johnson and President Lincoln on the floors of Congress, by the proclamation of the Secretary of State, announcing the adoption of the Great Amendment (and thereby assuming that the Secession States, enumerated in the proclamation, were in the full possession and exercise of the Constitutional powers belonging to them before the revolt) by the "Conversation with a distinguished senator," on further amending the Constitution, Negro Suffrage in the District of Columbia, and other important matters then pending in Congress — a conversation immediately telegraphed over the country in a semi-official form, by the message vetoing the Freedmen's Bureau bill, and the exultations it elicited from the bitter opponents of the war in the North, and the whole disloyal press of the South; and, above all, by the deplorable scene and speech in front of the White House, on the anniversary of Washington's birth-day. It pains us exceedingly even to allude to this speech; and we will only add, that if it was a death-blow to the budding hopes of some aspiring politicians, or of some veteran political managers, it was none the less a loud alarm to the people to stand up for their faithful Senators and Representatives. It is no part of our object to

attempt an exposition of the motive and influences which governed the Executive in the adoption and carrying out of his policy, or which led to the changes in its character and in the tone of its advocates already referred to. We believe such an exposition would be by no means difficult, and would tend to relieve the President of some unfriendly suspicions. But it would involve statements, personal allusions, and reflections upon the operation of human infirmities and prejudice, which would be here out of place and not in keeping with the conciliatory and pacific aim of this discussion.

Let us go back a moment to the earlier stages of the President's plan. We have no space, nor need we, to dwell upon all its details. Its general character is easily described. Its fundamental postulate was that the revolted States were in the Union and had never been out. The Amnesty Proclamation and oath formed an essential part of it; as did also, apparently, the pardon of a large portion of the persons excepted from the benefits of that Proclamation. It contemplated the formation of new State constitutions, and the election of new State governments, and members of Congress, though the action of the old voting masses of the white population, irrespective of their loyalty, or disloyalty, during the war. It excluded the colored race from participating in the choice of members of the Constitutional Conventions, on the ground that they formed no part of the people, in the legal sense of the term, and were not entitled to vote by the constitution and laws of the States in force immediately before the passage of their ordinances of secession.

In the selection of his provisional governors, the President may not in every case have been fortunate, but some of his appointments were admirable, and we believe he took especial pains to find out the right men. No restriction was laid upon the electors in choosing members of the conventions, or State officers, and members of Congress under the new Constitutions; and accordingly a large proportion of the successful candidates in almost every State were from the ranks of old fire-eaters, secessionists, and officers in the rebel armies. Gen-

eral Wade Hampton, instead of emigrating to Brazil, was run for governor of South Carolina, and was only defeated by a few votes. In Mississippi General Humphreys had to receive a special pardon in order to be qualified for the Gubernatorial chair, to which he had been elected over Judge Fisher, a leading opponent of secession. Mr. Holden, one of the ablest and most outspoken enemies of the Richmond despotism in all the South, and a favorite of the President, was defeated in North Carolina. Indeed, the well-known wishes of the President were constantly and openly disregarded in the choice of both Governors and Members of Congress; but very few of the latter could take the test-oath; and some of them defiantly boasted that they could not and would not take it, arguing coolly that it was in violation of their constitutional rights, and consequently null and void! In a word, had General Sherman's arrangement with General Joe Johnston been so far approved by the authorities at Washington as to allow the then existing Rebel State Governments to take the oath of allegiance and go right on, they would, probably, have proved to be about as loyal and quite as ready to comply with the other terms of the President's policy as those chosen under the new constitutions. They were essentially the same body, under different names. In allowing these things the President certainly departed very far from the doctrines laid down in his speech "defining the grounds on which he accepted the nomination" for the Vice-Presidency on the ticket with Mr. Lincoln. In that speech, delivered at Nashville, June 9, 1864, he said:

"In calling a convention to restore the State, who shall restore and re-establish it? Shall the man who gave his influence and his means to destroy the Government? Is he to participate in the great work of re-organization? Shall he, who brought this misery upon the State, be permitted to control its destinies? If this be so, then all this precious blood of our brave soldiers and officers so freely poured out will have been wantonly spilled. All the glorious victories won by our noble armies will go for nought, and all the battle-fields which have been sown with dead heroes during the rebellion will have been made memorable in vain. Why all this carnage and devastation? It was that treason might be put down and traitors punished. *Therefore, I say that traitors should take a back seat in the work of restoration. If there be but five thousand men in Tennessee loyal to the constitution, loyal to freedom, loyal to justice, these true and faithful men should control the work of re-organization and reformation absolutely.*"

We are not aware that any definite and full public statement of the Executive terms was made to the Constitutional Convention and Legislature of North Carolina, or to those of any other State subsequently assembled in pursuance of successive Proclamations from Washington. In the process of reconstruction these terms seem to have been communicated in a manner more or less peremptory, as occasion required. The principal ones were the prohibition of slavery—an abandonment of the doctrine of State sovereignty by declaring the ordinances of secession null and void from the beginning, repudiation of the Rebel debts, protection of the freedmen by granting them certain civil rights, and a ratification of the Great Amendment. In prescribing these terms, the President had so far the emphatic consent and approval of the nation. They were regarded as eminently just and reasonable; but there was a good deal of popular dissatisfaction on account of the halting and partial way in which some of them were accepted; and also with the stubborn temper in which several of them were, in repeated instances, allowed to be rejected. There was, too, a wide-spread feeling that the refusal of the conventions (there may have been one or two exceptions) to submit the new Constitutions, embodying a portion of the Executive terms, to the popular approval, besides being un-American and anti republican, indicated a clear consciousness of having complied with those terms under coërcion; andthere was, furthermore, a strong suspicion that their non-ratification by the people might hereafter be alleged as a validreason for changing them in order to annul and repudiate the obnoxious provisions.

When the correspondence between the President and the Secretary of State on the one hand, and the leaders of the Reconstruction movement in the South on the other, shall see the light, this matter will possibly become more plain. But the varied evidence already before the public demonstrates, we are constrained to say, that most, if not all, of the Rebel States did what they did to carry out the Executive policy, under silent protest, and against their own will; that they acted mainly upon a conviction—not of the justice of the policy

and the reasonableness and duty of accepting it, but of the absolute necessity of accepting it in order to get back their old rights and privileges and powers in the Government. But even if the evidence afforded at the time had been equivocal, the mass of evidence, public and private, official and non-official, which has been accumulating since, leaves ground for hardly a shadow of reasonable doubt on the subject. There is, to be sure, some conflict of testimony; as, unquestionably, there is a good deal of diversity of sentiment in different parts of the South and in different circles or *strata* of Southern society; there are, we rejoice to know, noble exceptions both individual and in the case of whole communities; but still, we repeat it, the current of evidence is overwhelmingly in the direction of a dominant spirit still disloyal, anti-Republican and inimical at heart and in purpose to the Government and to the Union—so long at least as the Union shall stand, and the Government be conducted, upon the principles of justice and freedom asserted in the war—and yet only a small portion of the testimony, taken before the Committee on Reconstruction, has been made public.

7. *The Temper of the South and the Rightful Terms of Restoration.*

The bearing of this temper and state of affairs upon the political situation is too obvious to require long comment. It explains much of the difference between the President and Congress. If there was sufficient reason to believe that the Secession States were perfectly sincere in abandoning the principles which impelled them to attempt the destruction of the Government; that they see and acknowledge the error of their ways; that they accept and intend to carry out in good faith the abolition of slavery, the concession of all their rights to the freedmen, and the repudiation of the debts contracted in the interest of rebellion; that they mean in their hearts henceforth to stand up for the Flag of our Country, "keep step to the music of the Union," and deport themselves in all things as becometh loyal members of the great democratic household and commonwealth of American liberty; we say,

if there were ample evidence for believing this concerning them, the problem would be speedily solved, and they would be welcomed back with delight to the ancestral hearth-stone, and to the confidence, love, privileges, and all the honors of the National family! Congress, we are sure, would soon be prepared to open wide its doors and bid their Senators and Representatives come in and take part in the councils of the regenerated Republic. Let them thus come with frank and manly acknowledgment of error upon their lips; let them return to their Country—that benignant Parent who nourished and brought them up as children, and against whose august Majesty they lifted up their unfilial hands—in the temper of the prodigal son, when he said—*Father, I have sinned against Heaven and before thee!*—and we are persuaded that the hardest "Radicals," even Mr. Sumner and Mr. Garrison, would not be a whit behind Mr. Seward and Mr. Beecher, or the President himself, in willingness to forget the past and restore them to the full communion and enjoyment of the National life and patrimony. And if treason and rebellion be what Mr. Johnson has so often and so impressively declared them to be—great and terrible crimes against society—if the revolt against the Government of the United States was the most causeless and wicked, as well as one of the most gigantic recorded in history, then why should not the States which have been so deep in both treason and rebellion, while seeking pardon and restoration, thus frankly and practically acknowledge that they have done wrong? Had the prodigal son, whose case is so often cited in favor of instant restoration, said to his father, that he felt no regret for having wasted his substance in riotous living, that he only regretted not having been able to "succeed" in such a course, that he was conscious of no sin against Heaven, and of no violation of filial duty; that, in a word, he had come home simply because hunger forced him to do so, and that now he claimed at once and of right a full share in the old homestead;—had the prodigal son, we say, returned in this temper, and with such words upon his lips, would his father have been so likely to have had compassion on him, and to have said to his servants, "*Bring forth*

the best robe and put it on him; and put a ring on his hand, and shoes on his feet; and bring hither the fatted calf and kill it, and let us eat and be merry; for this my son was dead and is alive again; he was lost and is found!"?

In his memorable speech, accepting the Baltimore nomination, Mr. Johnson expressed his sentiments on this subject very strongly:

"I say that the traitor has ceased to be a citizen, and in joining the rebellion, has become a public enemy. He forfeited the right to vote with loyal men when he renounced his citizenship, and sought to destroy our Government. We say to the most honest and industrious foreigner who comes from England or Germany to dwell among us, to add to the wealth of the country: 'Before you can be a citizen, you must stop here for five years.' If we are so cautious about foreigners, who voluntarily renounce their homes to live with us, what should we say to the traitor who, although born and reared among us, has raised a parracidal hand against the Government which always protected him? My judgment is that he should be subjected to a severe ordeal before he is restored to citizenship. A fellow who takes the oath merely to save his property, and denies the validity of the oath, is a perjured man, and not to be trusted. Before these repenting rebels can be trusted, let them bring forth the fruits of repentance. He who helped to make all these widows and orphans, who draped the streets of Nashville in mourning, should suffer for his great crime. * * * * Ah! these rebel leaders have a strong personal reason for holding out, to save their necks from the halter; and these leaders must feel the power of the Government. Treason must be made odious, and traitors must be punished and impoverished; their great plantations must be seized, and divided into small farms, and sold to honest, industrious men."

Now, whatever difference of opinion there may be about the repentant temper of the Secession States, or about the necessity and expediency of requiring any confession of repentance at all, we do not see how loyal men can well differ as to the expediency and necessity of making certain "fruits *meet* for repentance;" that is, certain positive, irrepealable acts and stipulations, answerable to a genuine political *metanoia*, the conditions of their restoration. If they are sincere in abandoning the principles of the rebellion and returning to their allegiance, they will uncomplainingly accept these conditions; if they are insincere, the safety, not to say the honor, of the nation renders such conditions all the more needful.

We have already mentioned the terms prescribed by the

President and complied with, in part, by the Southern conventions and legislatures; one of these, at least—that repudiating the Rebel debt—should be inserted in the Federal Constitution. It is one of vital importance, was very unwillingly accepted, and can be annulled at pleasure after the restoration is completed, unless rendered perpetual by special compact or by constitutional provision. We are astonished that any loyal man who knows the history of Mississippi Repudiation, holds sacred the National debt, and is tolerably well acquainted with human nature, should hesitate an instant in requiring the revolted States to test their sincerity in repudiating the Rebel debt, by ratifying the act *as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States;* and we do not think it would be out of place or unstatesmanlike to make part of the same amendment a pledge binding all the people of the United States and their posterity to pay in full the debt contracted by the nation in defence of its life.

There is another condition of restoration which ought to be absolutely insisted on, in the shape of an amendment to the Constitution; we mean a change in the basis of Southern representation. It is most unjust, and would be a monstrous anomaly, as well as folly, to allow the South to gain a large addition to its power in Congress and in the Electoral college in consequence of rebellion, and that too by the disfranchisement of a third of its population, all of them now free citizens of the United States. The *Conkling* Amendment seems to many to be open to grave objections, and we earnestly hope, if it should fail, that by the harmonious and united counsels of all true friends of Liberty and Union in Congress, another and still better one, if possible, may be framed and adopted. We do not quite see the propriety of some things that have recently been said and written on the subject of amending the Constitution. "A free government," says Machiavelli, "in order to maintain itself free, hath need, every day, of some new provision in favor of liberty." Especially is this true in an agitated transitional period like the present, when society, having passed successfully through great convulsions and strife of arms, is just crystalizing into fresh

forms of life and polity. How easy at such a critical moment, by some vital error of omission or commission, to jeopardize the advantages gained, and mar for ages the strength and beauty of the New Era? No rash, irreverent hand should, indeed, be laid upon the Constitution—that ark of our political covenant. But what more fitting, what more just and reasonable, than that having already seized the wonderful Providential opportunity to cleanse the sacred instrument of the Nation's life from the poison and pollution of Slavery, we should not let the incomparable season slip away without also placing under its strong protection such guarantees of Southern allegiance, and of the country's future peace, solvency and safety, as can be so well assured, if assured at all, in no other way? And in *such legislation the Secession States are justly entitled to have no other voice, than that of assenting to it as a condition of their restoration.* And the same thing may be said of such legislation as the Civil Rights bill, designed to enforce the principles of the Great Amendment. As to amendments affecting the general interests of the whole country alike, North and South, irrespective of the rebellion, we would not think it expedient to press any such now. Let us wait until all sections and all the people can freely participate in the work. We might fortify these views by the opinion of President Johnson, so forcibly expressed in his speech, already twice referred to, accepting the Baltimore nomination:

"I hold, with Jefferson, that government was made for the convenience of man, and not man for government. The laws and constitutions were designed as instruments to promote his welfare; and hence, from this principle, I conclude that governments can and ought to be changed and amended to conform to the wants, to the requirements and progress of the people, and the enlightened spirit of the age. * * * And let me say that now is the time to secure these fundamental principles, while the land is rent with anarchy and upheaves with the throes of a mighty revolution. While society is in this disordered state, and *we are seeking* SECURITY, let us fix the foundations of *the Government on principles of eternal Justice, which will endure for all time.*"

To the terms of settlement already mentioned we are aware that many of the wisest and best statesmen and Christian

patriots in the land add one more as indispensable, viz., negro suffrage.

8. *Restoration and Negro Suffrage.*

Without the ballot in the hands of the colored man, and secured to him by legal and constitutional provision, they do not believe in the practicability of peaceful and permanent restoration; and the reasons which they adduce in support of this opinion are certainly entitled to the most candid and deliberate consideration. Their argument may be stated in a few words: "What the nation wants, is genuine pacification and security; both are indispensable, and we cannot have one of them without the other. But unless the principles and passions of human nature are wholly different in this country from what they have been in any other, how is it possible to have either security or genuine pacification, so long as the *slave-holding aristocracy* is still in complete possession of its old political power, and there is nothing but the strong arm of Federal authority to protect the four millions of negroes from the selfishness, the pride, and the cruel spirit of *caste* by which it has always been distinguished? What childish simplicity to suppose that the real character of this unscrupulous, crafty, and determined oligarchy is essentially changed, because it has been defeated in its treason and rebellion; because its ambitious schemes have been foiled, and its poor slaves, instead of serving as the corner-stone of a grand slave empire, have been wrested from its grasp, and made free citizens of the United States! Is it usual in this world for ruling classes, organized in social wrong and oppression, to be converted to justice and humanity by such a process as this? And yet, this is what seems to be expected. It is proposed to install the two or three hundred thousand great planters of the South, who brought all this mischief and misery upon us, in their former "pride of place," both in their own States and in the Federal Government; and you hope that, having been taught by the nation such sharp lessons on the perils of treason and rebellion, they will henceforth demean them-

selves as good and loyal citizens. *Credat Judæus Appella!* On the other hand, as a further means of pacification and security, it is proposed to leave the four millions of freedmen to perfect themselves, under the care and instruction of their old masters, in the truly republican principles of taxation without representation, and free citizenship without the ballot! In the same way, it is proposed to teach them how the Government of the United States punishes its enemies, and rewards its faithful, but humble, despised friends! Perhaps this is the right method, but we cannot see it. Without denying that there are serious difficulties in any and every plan of settlement that human wisdom can devise, it is our profound conviction that the method of IMPARTIAL JUSTICE is is most simple, most safe, and will most quickly and effectually gain the object. Enfranchise the negro, now that he is a free citizen of the United States, put into his hands the ballot—that most approved weapon of American Law and Liberty—and with this trusty weapon he can not only protect himself, but render even better service to the cause of the Union than he rendered it with the bullet in time of war. Grant he is unlettered, ignorant and credulous; are there not also millions of *white* people in the land who are very imperfectly instructed in the knowledge of political truth and duty, and who are enthralled to most bitter and dangerous prejudices? Grant that the intelligence of the negro is coarse, plebeian bran, and that of the Anglo-Saxon the finest patrician flour; yet the deepest of political thinkers—"the Master of them who know"—illustrates the wisdom of admitting the many to share in the power of government, on this very ground.* If the negro is below the Anglo-Saxon

* The whole passage is remarkable, and seems to have been written for our instruction:

τὸ δὲ μὴ μεταδιδόναι μηδὲ μετέχειν, φοβερον· οταν γὰρ ἄτιμοι πολλοὶ καὶ πένητες ὑπάρχωσι, πολεμίων ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πλήρη τὴν πόλιν ταύτην. Λείπεται δὴ τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ κρίνειν μετέχειν αὐτούς. Διόπερ καὶ Σόλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τινὲς νομοθετῶν τάττουσιν ἐπί τε τας ἀρχαιρεσίας καὶ τὰς εὐθύνας τῶν ἀρχόντων,

of the South in mental strength and development, is he not far above his late master and a large majority of the Southern people in all the instincts of sincere loyalty and devotion to liberty? And is not righteous instinct, however rude and undeveloped, better and safer than the most highly cultivated understanding, when perverted by bitter prejudices and error? Negro enfranchisement may be a very revolutionary measure, yet, not half as revolutionary as the Proclamation of Emancipation and the great Amendment of which it is the natural, as well as logical sequence, and conclusion; nor is it half so startling to the great majority of cautious, conservative minds as was the proposal of universal emancipation, in the winter of 1861–2. What dismal things were then foretold about a war of races, social horrors and disaster to the Union cause, should the general Government venture to lay its destroying hand upon "the peculiar institution!" At all events, there is, we contend, no help for universal suffrage, without respect of color. That is our American principle, and we must now fearlessly apply it to "preserve the precious jewel liberty in the family of freedom." The negro must be clothed with the elective franchise, or both the white Unionist of the South, and the Government itself, will have nothing but trouble and agitation before them. With the ballot in the

---

ἄρχειν δὲ καταμόνας οὐκ ἐῶσι. Πάντες μὲν γὰρ ἔχουσι συνελθόντες ἱκανὴν αἴσθησιν, καὶ μιγνύμενοι τοῖς βελτίοσι τὰς πόλεις ὠφελοῦσι, καθάπερ ἡ μὴ καθαρὰ τροφὴ μετὰ τῆς καθαρᾶς τὴν πᾶσαν ποιεῖ θρηπιμωτέραν τῆς ὀλίγης· χωρὶς δ' ἕκαστος ἀτελὴς περὶ τὸ κρίνειν ἐστίν.

"It is fearful to allow them (that is, 'the freemen and the multitude of the citizens') no share in the government; for when the many and the poor are excluded from power, such a state must of necessity be full of enemies. It remains, then, that they should have a place in the public assemblies, and in determining causes. And for this reason, Solon and some other legislators give them power of electing the officers of the state, and of inquiring into their conduct after their term of office, but do not allow them to act as magistrates themselves; for All, each of whom is individually deficient in judgment, have sense enough collectively, and by being mingled with their superiors, become profitable to the State; just as experience teaches that *fine flour, when mixed with the coarse, renders the whole more wholesome and nutritious.*"—Aristotle's Politics, Book III. chap. vi. Sec. vii.

hands of the negro, the Union will have at once a majority of its friends and of friends of its principles in South Carolina and Mississippi, and, ere long, in every Southern State. There will be a great loyal party in the South, led by such true men as General Hamilton, of Texas, Governor Brownlow, of Tennessee, Governor Marvin, of Florida, Joshua Hill, of Georgia, and hundreds more like them—a party in full sympathy with the Government and the free North. Sooner or later, the principles of this party will gain the ascendency throughout the South ; and, what is best of all and the prinincipal thing, this ascendency will be only another name for the triumph of truth and justice ; it will mean genuine peace and security for the South and the whole nation alike. Give us UNIVERSAL ENFRANCHISEMENT, and we go, with all our hearts, for UNIVERSAL AMNESTY." Such is the ground occupied by the advocates of negro suffrage, as the best solution of our troubles; and among these advocates, we repeat, are some of the weightiest statesmen and Christian patriots of the country, and some of its most influential religious bodies. It is the ground taken by the undivided and emphatic voice of our own church, at the meeting of its General Assembly in the city of Brooklyn, last May. It is well known, too, that, soon after the close of the war, some of the most discerning men of the South looked with favor upon negro suffrage as the safest and quickest solution of the question of reconstruction. But, notwithstanding the great force of the argument, we must frankly confess that we have, as yet, not been able to view the subject exactly in this light. We have rather inclined to the opinion that if the basis of Southern representation were changed, and the *principle* of colored and impartial suffrage were adopted, by putting the ballot into the hand of the negro, on certain conditions, *to be hereafter applied to blacks and whites alike*, the main object would be reached, if not as speedily, yet, perhaps, more safely and happily. Other things being satisfactory, we could, for ourselves, be content at present with substantially the plan of the President, in his remarkable letter to Governor Sharkey, of Mississippi, believing that all the rest would

certainly follow in due time. Had the President made the sentiments of this letter a part of his policy of reconstruction—and under the wholly abnormal and extraordinary circumstances of the case, he had, in our opinion, the same power and as good a right to do so as to annul the existing State governments, appoint provisional-governors, order new constitutional conventions to be chosen, prescribe the qualifications of their electors, and require of the conventions, when assembled, what he did require of them;—had such a limited negro suffrage, we say, been made one of the terms of the Executive plan of reconstruction, the country would be now much nearer the end of its troubles than, we fear, it is.

The letter deserves to be quoted entire. It is as follows:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, D. C., August 15, 1865.

Gov. WM. L. SHARKEY, *Jackson, Miss.:*

I am gratified to see that you have organized your convention without difficulty. I hope that, without delay, your convention will amend your State constitution, abolishing slavery, and denying to all future legislatures the power to legislate that there is property in man; also that they will adopt the Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, abolishing slavery. If you could extend the elective franchise to all persons of color who can read the Constitution of the United States in English, and write their names; and to all persons of color who own real estate, valued at not less than $250, and pay taxes thereon, you could completely disarm the adversary, and set an example which other States will follow. THIS YOU CAN DO WITH PERFECT SAFETY, and you thus place the Southern States, in reference to free persons of color, upon the same basis with the Free States. I hope and trust your convention will do this, and as a consequence, the Radicals, who are wild upon negro franchise, will be completely foiled in their attempts to keep the Southern States from renewing their relations to the Union, by not accepting their Senators and Representatives.

ANDREW JOHNSON, President United States.

Let such wise and true counsel as this be followed; abolish the distinction of color in the exercise of the elective franchise in the District of Columbia, and then might we not confidently expect that reflection, discussion and experience, the good conduct of the negro, the dying out of inveterate prejudices, the logic of events, and the spirit of the Gospel, would do the rest? But, while saying this, we say also, that the genius of our free institutions, as expressed in the Decla-

ration of Independence, in the preamble to the Constitution, and in the humane code of the New Testament, points unerringly to the abolition of all limitation of the elective franchise, on account of color; and that, if it should be found impracticable to make a just settlement of our national troubles in any other way, we have little doubt but that the popular and Christian sentiment of the country would demand and sustain this. The doctrine of equal and exact justice to all men, which is the moral basis and tap-root of our political system, leads to this result by an irresistible logic. It is vain, in the long run, to oppose the triumph of a fundamental principle, except by revolution and an abandonment of the system which embodies that principle. Great principles are infinitely stronger and wiser, as well as more patient, persevering and long-lived than any generation of individual men, or the opinions and parties of an age. Sooner or later, all things in the United States, all forms of life and polity, all classes and conditions of men, must consent to be assimilated to the creative and governing Idea of the nation.

9. *The President and Congress.*

We have spoken of the policy of the President, and have briefly stated the points wherein we think it was wrong or defective, and has proved a failure. But what is past is past. The practical question is, how past error may be remedied, and what remains to do, be done in the best way. It was a sad mistake for anybody to take the ground that the legislative sovereignty of the country was to have no other voice in the work of restoration than that of judging of the elections, qualifications, and returns of claimants for seats in Congress from the revolted States. The pretension was, in truth, an indignity to the political intelligence and self-respect of the American people. It involved doctrines of Executive prerogative abhorrent to the whole genius of our democratic system of representative government, in conflict with the teaching of our most eminent constitutional jurists and statesmen, and in striking contrast, we may add, to the

shrinking from the possession of too much power and responsibility expressed by the President in his veto of the Freedmen's Bureau Bill. We dare say the London *Times* will be vociferous in applauding the attitude of the Executive in his conflict with Congress: and yet under circumstances at all similar, the British Crown would not have dreamed of taking such ground; or if it had, the voice of the House of Commons, echoed by the loud voice of the nation, would, we doubt not, have rebuked the usurpation in tones of thunder. We shall be greatly surprised if the pending elections in New Hampshire, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, do not give plain indications of what clear-headed New England, at least, thinks on the subject. "It rests with Congress (we quote the language of Chief Justice Taney respecting the fourth section of the fourth article of the Constitution) to decide what government is the established one in a State. For, as the United States guarantee to each state a Republican government, *Congress* must necessarily decide what government is established in the State before it can determine whether it is Republican or not." And by parity of reasoning it rests with Congress to decide, not only whether the newly established governments in the secession States are republican in character, but also, *a fortiori*, whether the political communities, which control and carry them on, are sufficiently loyal, purged of treason, and obedient to the victorious sovereign will embodied in the amended Constitution and laws of the land, as to render it proper and safe to admit them, in the persons of their senators and representatives, to full and equal participation in the National Government. The peace and well-being of the country for ages to come, are involved in the right decision of these points; and shall the supreme legislative power and intelligence of the American people have no original, determining voice in deciding them? The doctrine seems to us a most dangerous one, and the height of unreason. It requires but a moment's reflection to see that, so far as concerns the future safety of the nation, the primary and all-important question relates to the state and temper of the great South-

ern constituencies; that of the loyalty of the individuals whom they have chosen to represent them at Washington being of secondary interest. Congress can keep out disloyal men, or even expel them if admitted by mistake; but let the secession States themselves be prematurely, and without sufficient guarantee, restored to their old places in the government; and even if they do not resort again to overt acts of treason, what proper security would there be against their forming dangerous schemes and combinations inimical to the Union, to the national debt, , to the pension laws, to the rights of the freedmen, and to the whole system of measures adopted for the defence and salvation of the country, and now forming an essential part of its legislation and policy? Considerations of this sort led to the appointment of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction; and we have never been able to see why the two Houses of Congress had not the perfect right, or should have been so severely censured for agreeing, to appoint that committee; nor why the committee itself should have been called by such hard names. Some of its members are surpassed by no men in the country for the reputation of patriotic devotion, intelligence, weight of character, and prudent statesmanship. Why should such a mountain of odium have been heaped upon them? Our explanation of the whole matter is very simple. The Joint Committee on Reconstruction raised a high, if not insuperable, barrier against the success of the theory that the insurrectionary States were already "reconstructed" by the Executive policy, were actually occupying their old places in the Union, and had an unquestionable right to the instant admission into Congress of all their senators and represenatives who would take the prescribed oath. To break down this powerful barrier it was deemed needful to assail the Committee on Reconstruction with the weapons of wrath and evil speaking; and it has been done most energetically by high and low. It remains to be seen whether the attempt will succeed. Our decided impression is that it will not, either in Congress, or before the people; at all events, it is too late now to destroy the mass of evidence respecting

the state and temper of the secession States, procured by the diligence of the committee and just beginning to reach the eye of the country.*

We have no time to discuss, as it merits, the question of jurisdiction between Congress and the President. We may recur to it in a subsequent number. Whether considered theoretically, or in its immediate practical bearings, it is one of overshadowing importance. The only possible ground, as it appears to us, on which the position implied in the President's Message, and boldly asserted by some of his special friends in Congress, by the whole of the late rebel press of the South, and by the whole anti-war press of the North, is that in deciding upon the plan, in fixing the terms and prescribing the methods by which the political surrender and rehabilitation of the insurrectionary States might be effected, as also in actually making and announcing the fact of the restoration, there was no need and no exercise, direct or indirect, of any *law-making* power whatever; for "ALL legislative powers," belonging to the Government of the United States, in time of war or peace, are expressly vested by the Constitution in Congress alone. Now, is this tenable ground? Is it reasonable? Is it sound American doctrine? If Congress was entitled to no primary and controlling voice in this great political Settlement—one of the greatest in all history and in some of its most important points, almost wholly without precedent or example,—then it follows that, except in the exercise of the pardoning power, the President acted solely in virtue of his power as Commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the

---

*The Joint Committee on Reconstruction was appointed, as is well known, at the opening of Congress, to inquire into the condition of the late so-called Confederate States, and report whether they or any of them are *entitled to representation in Congress*, with leave to report at any time by bill or otherwise. Our readers will find a very clear and cogent vindication of the right of the two Houses of Congress to appoint such a joint committee in Senator Fessenden's speech made in the Senate, February 23d; they will also find in the same speech, an impressive comment upon the opinion intimated by the President in his veto message, that until the Senators and Representatives from the late rebel States are admitted to take part in the national legislation, Congress has no Constitutional right to pass laws affecting the interests of those States.

United States; for in what clause of the written Constitution did he find authority to annul State governments, appoint Provisional governors, prescribe the qualifications of electors, require State conventions to put certain articles into their constitutions, or State legislatures to pass certain laws? These things were, assuredly, a very high and summary exercise of even the war-power, after actual war had ceased; but the people would probably have acquiesced in it, without complaint, as they did in the exercise of the same power while war was flagrant, on the ground of military necessity, and in the interest of Liberty and Union; had it only been distinctly declared that the whole matter was to be submitted to the National Legislature for revision and approval. The notion that such a settlement, involving the most momentous legal, constitutional, and political issues, could be rightly made, and made absolute and final, too, without the exercise of a particle of LAW-*making* power, may be a very good *idée Napoléonienne*, but it is a strange specimen of the Washingtonian idea of government as embodied in the Constitution of the United States, and expounded by Chief Justice Marshall and Daniel Webster!

The President cannot conclude a treaty of peace with a tribe of Western Indians without the consent and approval of the Senate; nor can he appoint any United States officer from a member of his own cabinet down to a village post-master, without that consent and approval; nor could he, in the full flush and exercise of the war-power, appoint a general, a captain, or lieutenant in the army, without the same authorization; and yet he can fix the terms of settlement of the most formidable civil war in history—involving, not only the emancipation and destiny of 4,000,000 of blacks, but the safety and welfare of 30,000,000 of white men and their posterity—without asking, or needing thereto, the consent and approval of the Senate, the appointing and treaty making branch, or the House of Representatives, the popular branch, of the National Legislature!

We say again, it seems to us a most dangerous doctrine, as unconstitutional, as it is irrational and anti-republican. We

do not believe that a solitary maxim of political prudence and the science of liberty, as taught by the greatest philosophers and statesmen, from Aristotle and Demosthenes down to our own day, can be cited in justification of such a doctrine. It is exceedingly questionable, indeed, whether it is at all in harmony with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, or of our political system, that the Executive should have used the power of pardon on such a tremendous scale, without first asking counsel of the National Legislature, in which the Constitution expressly vests the "power to declare the punishment of treason." (Art. iii. Sect. 3d.) If it is the prerogative of Congress "to declare the punishment of treason," is it quite in keeping with this important provision that the laws of Congress passed in pursuance of it, e. g. the law declaring *death* to be the penalty of treason, should be rendered practically void and of none effect by the wholesale exercise of the power of pardoning? If out of millions of persons guilty of treason as it is defined in the Constitution—some of them, at least, deliberate, black-hearted, and bloody traitors—not one is punished, or tried, then what a mockery to have such clauses about treason and its punishment in the Constitution, or any such law on the National statute-book!

It is well known that strong objection was made to vesting the power of pardoning in the President in relation to the crime of treason. This, it was urged, ought to have depended upon the assent of one, or both of the branches of the legislative body. "I shall not deny (we quote *The Federalist*, No. 74, written by Hamilton) that there are strong reasons for requiring in this particular the concurrence of that body, or of a part of it. As treason is a crime leveled at the immediate being of the society, when the laws have once ascertained the guilt of the offender, there seems a fitness in referring the expediency of an act of mercy towards him to the judgment of the Legislature. And this ought the rather to be the case, as the supposition of the connivance of the Chief Magistrate ought not to be entirely excluded." After stating the objections to this plan, the writer proceeds:

"But the principal argument for reposing the power of pardoning, in this case, in the Chief Magistrate, is this: In seasons of insurrection or rebellion, there are often critical moments, when a well-timed offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels, may restore the tranquility of the commonwealth; and which, if uffered to pass unimproved, it may never be possible afterwards to recall. The dilatory process of convening the Legislature, or one of its branches, for the purpose of obtaining its sanction, would frequently occasion the letting slip the golden opportunity. The loss of a week, a day, or hour, may sometimes be fatal. If it should be observed that a discretionary power, with a view to such contingencies, might be occasionally conferred upon the President; it may be answered in the first place, that it is questionable whether, in a limited constitution, that power could be delegated by law; and in the second place, that it would generally be impolitic to take any step which might hold out the prospect of impunity. A proceeding of this kind, out of the usual course, would be likely to be construed into an argument of timidity or of weakness, and would have a tendency to embolden guilt."

This is the language of the consummate wisdom and patriotic statesmanship that formed the Constitution, then explained it to the people, and persuaded them to adopt it. Has the exercise of the power of pardoning in relation to the crime of treason been used in the spirit of these weighty and impressive sayings? But what would the writers and his compatriots, Madison and Jay, have said, had it been the power of settling, once for all, the terms upon which, after having been engaged for four years and a half in privy conspiracy, bloody treason, and rebellion, ten whole States, containing a white population twice as large as the Old Thirteen, and a population of 4,000,000 blacks, most of them slaves emancipated by the national authority and entirely dependent upon the nation's promised protection, might be forgiven and restored to their old place and power in the Government;—what, we ask, would the authors of *The Federalist*, that immortal triumvirate of the age of Independence, have said, had they been discussing before the tribunal of popular opinion, the question whether such more than imperial power as *this* should be vested exclusively in the Executive, leaving the National Legislature wholly out of the account!

But we have no desire to pursue the subject further at present. We dismiss it with the expression of our most fervent hope and prayer that Congress and the President may soon

come to see eye to eye, and agree upon a joint policy which shall be, like the wisdom from above, first pure, then peaceable, full of mercy and good fruits, without partiality and without hypocrisy. Only let the sacred claims of freedom, humanity, national security, and universal, Christian justice, be satisfied; and we think we speak the sentiment of all loyal hearts; we are sure we utter the profound sentiment of the loyal piety of the country, in adding that the more magnanimous, conciliatory and generous the policy is, so much the better; so much the more will it raise the President, his Cabinet, and Congress in the grateful affections of the country, and in the respect of mankind. We cannot admit that such a policy is impracticable, or that, with God's blessing, it would not gradually heal the wounds of the nation. The American people, if we read their sentiments aright, are still most placable. In spite of Andersonville, and Salisbury, and Belle Isle, and all other names of past horror and woe, they are in no vindictive or unreasonable mood; they desire no extreme measures, no sweeping confiscations, and no punishment beyond what is needful to render treason forever "odious and infamous," as one of the greatest and most dangerous of crimes. They care comparatively little for the elaborate theories and nice, subtle distinctions about the *status* of the revolted States; in general they, probably, hold with Mr. Lincoln, Mr. Johnson, that lamented statesman and patriot, Henry Winter Davis, and, as we suppose, a large majority of Congress, that the Southern States themselves were never out of the Union in law, or in fact; although the secession State *governments* did cease to exist both in fact and in law. But while assuming that the revolted States were never really out of the Union, the sure-footed political instinct, and quick, sagacious common sense of the people tell them, that by treason and rebellion those States fell from their high estate *in* the Union, forfeited their legal and constitutional rights, sundered their practical relations with the Federal government, cut themselves off from the fellowship and sacraments of the National life, and can be restored from their great apostacy only by favor of the injured

Nation and on terms prescribed by its sovereign wisdom, in view of its own future safety and welfare, the satisfaction of public justice, and a full redemption of all its pledges, made in the day of distress, to its friends and defenders, and especially to the oppressed millions of negroes emancipated by its power, and now wholly dependent upon its protection. No argument and no sophistry however plausible, can shake the clear and steadfast convictions of the popular mind and conscience on this matter. The people have studied and pondered the subject for themselves; hundreds of thousands of them in the camp, on the battle-field, in the hospital and by the hurried burial of their dead comrades; hundreds of thousands more of them by the dying beds, and at the open graves of their precious sons, husbands, brothers, and fathers. Myriads of them have studied it with their Bible open before them, on their knees, and in the sanctuary of God. They understand the whole matter full well: as well as the ablest politicians in the land; and *their* understanding of it is pretty sure to prevail, and in due time be transferred to the pages of American history.

10. *The Popular and Religious Sentiment of the North on the Claims of the Freedmen.*

And here let us say, that on no point is the loyal sentiment of the country deeper, or more unanimous, than on the duty of protecting the Freedmen in their newly-acquired liberty, and in all their rights as citizens of the United States. The veto of the Freedmen's Bureau Bill was not the occasion of so much surprise and grief because the people had set their heart upon that particular measure; they were quite willing to believe that it might have defects; and they did not question the President's right to return it to the Senate with his objections. What excited their strong feeling of regret and disappointment was the impression made by the tone and reasoning of the veto message, and by the manner in which it was greeted and interpreted by the enemies of emancipation North and South, that the negro was going to be abandoned by the President and handed over, before long, to the unchecked control of his former masters. This may have been altogether a wrong im-

pression ; but it was a real one ; nor do we see how any candid person can read the speech of Senator Trumbull in review of the veto message, without admitting that it was quite a natural impression. And if there is one thing more than any other that the people, who saved the Union, at the cost of so much toil, and blood, and agony, and with so many solemn vows and prayers to Heaven, have made up their mind to resist to the utmost, it is a violation of the pledge made by ABRAHAM LINCOLN, in their name, to the 4,000,000 of negroes, when he proclaimed them, henceforth and forever, American freemen. Language can scarcely do justice to the depth and intensity of their feelings on this subject. Especially is this true of the free Christian churches of the North. They look with unfeigned horror upon every suggestion to violate this pledge ; and they believe it were better for any man in the land, no matter how high he stands, or what his past services, that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and that he were drowned in the depth of the sea, than that he should do, or consent to be the instrument of doing, such a thing! Montesquieu, in his "Considerations on the Grandeur of the Romans," says: "There cannot be a more cruel tyranny than that practiced under the shadow of the laws and with the color of justice, when men go to work to *drown the wretched on the very plank on which they were saved.*"

Myriads of the faithful Christian people of the North have resolved, upon their knees, to do their part in preventing such a Heaven-defying crime, and a catastrophe so shameful and ruinous to the nation. They have resolved that by no connivance, or inaction of theirs, shall this land of the Pilgrims and of Washington be cursed and defiled by a vast Pariah class of immortal beings, for whom the Son of God died upon the cross, and whose despised nature He is still wearing in glory everlasting! They mean to stand up for exact, equal and gospel-like justice to the negro ; such justice as the New Testament of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ enjoins, and the Declaration of Independence declares to be all men's birthright. They mean, also, to stand up for their public servants,

who demand and do such justice to the negro. And the loyal churches of the North form a large army and wield a good deal of political influence—to say nothing now of their influence with the High and Mighty Ruler of the Universe. There are the *Congregationalists*, worthy heirs of the ancestral principles and Puritan churches of New England. They now stretch across the Continent; and the spirit of Plymouth Rock, of Bunker Hill, and '76, accompanies them wherever they go. There are the *Methodists;* the fearless and hard-working pioneer wing of this "sacramental host;"—stationed not only all along the frontiers, but in force in every city and village of the land. They were only ten years old when the Declaration of Independence was made; only twenty-one when the Constitution of the United States was formed; they are just a hundred years old now; but they are a million strong; and if they were a thousand years old, they could not be better champions of Christian justice and freedom. Then there are the *Baptists*, also potential in numbers, and character, and zeal; full, too, of the same lofty, and generous spirit. The names, which represent their principles and history to the world, such names as John Bunyan, Roger Williams, Robert Hall, and Francis Wayland, are symbols of whatever is most earnest, exalted and faithful, in devotion to the rights and liberty of each individual man, whatever his condition or the color of his skin. Then, there is our own branch of the renowned *Presbyterian* phalanx, with a spotless record, and marching on, elbow touching elbow, in the path of national righteousness and universal liberty. Nor are the sturdy footsteps of "the other branch" lagging far behind. Justice is a word always dear to true Presbyterians; and when they have turned their backs upon liberty, they have grievously wronged their own time-honored principles. We need not stop to define the position of our *Dutch Reformed* brethren; the church that looks back to glorious old Holland as her mother, is not likely to give a divided allegiance to any righteous cause. If after the late triennial convention at Philadelphia, we cannot speak so of the *Episcopal* church, yet what eloquent and pow-

erful advocates of National justice and humanity to the negro, are found in her ranks! Nor let it be forgotten what a patriotic and fervent prayer the whole church, bishops, priests, deacons, and laity, offer up every Sabbath day in behalf of the National Senate and Representatives in Congress assembled; beseeching Almighty God that He would be "pleased to direct and prosper all their consultations, to the advancement of His glory, the good of His church, the safety, honor and welfare of His people; that all things may be so ordered and settled by their endeavors upon the best and surest foundations, that peace and happiness, truth and justice, religion and piety, may be established among us for all generations." What friend of Congress, or of National security, honor and justice, cannot, with all his heart, say *Amen* to that prayer! No denomination in the country have been more faithful to the claims of the negro, or laid costlier sacrifices upon the altar of social justice, than the *Unitarians*; as, indeed, was to be expected of the disciples of the illustrious Channing. As to the connection of *Friends*, they have been, for generations, a living, witness-bearing epistle of impartial humanity, known and read of all men. The other Pretestant bodies are all, so far as we know, on the same side; some of them most effectually. Of the position of the Romish church we need say nothing. That, too, is well understood. The religious sentiment of the North, as represented by the Protestant churches, is, then, we repeat it, overwhelmingly in favor of equal and exact justice to all men, without distinction of color; nor will it be satisfied with anything less.

And we believe that the same religious sentiment is quite as earnest and decided in demanding fixed legal and constitutional guarantees as the condition of restoring the secession States to an equal share in the legislation and government of the nation. We will only add that, as without the upholding strength, the moral aid and comfort, ministered by the religious sentiment of the people, the Union would not have been saved, so we firmly believe that, without the upholding power and inspiration of this same sentiment of humble dependence upon

Almighty God, and devout trust in His wisdom and guiding hand, the Union can never be reëstablished upon just and lasting foundations.

11. *A Rupture deprecated.*

We have already said that the people still look for harmony and co-operation between the executive and legislative branches of the Government. They feel that the crisis entitles them to uncommon solicitude and urgency on this subject; and why should they not be gratified? If our voice could reach the ears of the humblest member of Congress, we would beseech him to do what he can to avoid further rupture, and to heal, if possible, the unfortunate breach already made. It is a time, so we cannot help feeling, for extraordinary prudence, moderation, patience and self-control; a time to exercise the highest qualities of patriotic and Christian manhood. If any member of Congress, at this critical juncture, "offend not in word, the same is a perfect man, and able, also, to bridle the whole body." While standing firm as a rock, Congress can well afford to exercise great gentleness and patience. The people may not think it perfect, nor be ready to indorse every thing it has said and done; still less, perhaps, do they approve of the peculiar sentiments and policy of some of its leaders. But the popular confidence in its sterling honesty, patriotism, wisdom and general character is very great; and we have no doubt this confidence is well-deserved. Even while we are writing, a letter reaches us from Washington, in which the writer, one of the most eminent merchants and Christian philanthropists of the country, says: "I have to-day conversed with several old members of the house, and they all agree that they have never known any Congress composed of so many men of high moral character; and that it contains more religious men, and less men who are ever seen going below for drink than any they have ever known." To this testimony the writer adds his own opinion, formed after having been for four months a careful and deeply-interested looker-on. His praise of the ability, high character, remarkable sobriety and dignified deportment of the great body of

senators and representatives, is most emphatic. We do not believe the loyal people will be disappointed in the Thirty-Ninth Congress, if only they, too, will have patience, and not exact too much at once.

We do not presume to think that our voice can reach the ears of the President. But if it could, we would also entreat him—with that entire respect to which the Chief Magistrate of the Republic is entitled, and yet with the frankness which becomes an independent American citizen—to be steadfast and immoveable in adhering to the "good old Cause" for which he buffeted the pitiless storm of war, and which is now leaning upon his stalwart arm, to help enthrone it in peace. We would recall his earlier record as the champion of "the plain people" of the South, and of the rights and dignity of labor; and of his still nobler record as the champion of the Union, both on the floor of Congress and in his own Tennessee; and also as the trusted friend and counsellor of ABRAHAM LINCOLN. We would venture to remind him of his solemn pledges to the people who raised him to his high office, to the colored race, to the world and to Heaven. Nor would we fear to predict, that, if during the rest of his term of office, he should continue to move on the line of these most honorable antecedents, he has still a peerless opportunity to link his own name to those of WASHINGTON and LINCOLN, and thus enshrine it in the perpetual and grateful memory of his country. In behalf, too, of all Christian people, who feel the heavy weight of his burden, and offer constant prayer for him, we would beseech him to do as his martyred predecessor did, to cast all his care upon God, and not to be too much disturbed by the tongue of censure. True greatness consists, not so much in not having faults, as in curbing and subduing them.

> "———— If a foe have kenn'd—
> Or, worse than foe, an alienated friend—
> A rib of dry rot in thy ship's stout side,
> Think it God's message, and in humble pride,
> With heart of oak replace it; thine the gains.
> Give him the rotten timber for his pains."

12. *Conclusion.*

But, whatever may be the course of the President or of Congress, the Republic will, doubtless, continue to sail on in the track foreordained by the Infinite Wisdom, freighted still with inestimable hopes for our posterity and for all mankind. The divine principles in which it was founded, and which have just been so effectually vindicated on the field of battle, have not grown old, or in the least spent their force; they are as a bridegroom coming out of his chamber, still fresh and strong as in the beginning,

> "Are yet the fountain light of all our day;
> Are yet a master light of all our seeing;
> Uphold us, cherish, and have power to make
> Our noisy years seem moments in the being
> Of the eternal Silence: truths that wake,
> To perish never."

Their perfect triumph may be delayed for a little while, but the end is certain; and it would be no strange thing, if even the wrath and folly of man were made the means of hastening the glorious consummation. Surely, God has not raised up this our free American nationality, breathed into it such prolific life and energy, given to it a vast continent for the development of its matchless powers, trained it with such marvellous care and providence, and now purged away so much of its dross in the fiery furnace of civil strife, to the end that it might wither and die; but rather that it might prepare the way for the advent of a higher, more humane and Christian-like civilization, and so, by the light of its great example, help to illuminate and bless the world.

P. S.—Since this article was printed, the President's policy has been still further developed by his message vetoing the Civil Rights Bill. His objections to the Bill are so fundamental as to leave little ground of hope, that he will approve of any measure which the wisdom of Congress may deem needful to protect the freedmen and enforce the Great Amendment. Without adopting exactly the doctrine of the *Dred Scott* decision, the main argument of the Veto differs but little from that decision in its essential spirit and scope. It remains to be seen whether Congress will pass the Bill over the Veto.

Art. VIII.—CRITICAL NOTES ON RECENT BOOKS.

THEOLOGY.

Augustinus' Lehre Vom Wunder, Von Lic. Fried. Nitzsch. Berlin. 1865. pp. 97. The name of Augustine is usually mentioned, in connection with the subject of miracles, as having first brought them distinctly under the head of the general providence of God; but his whole theory on the matter has not hitherto been subjected to a careful examination. This has been done in a very able way by the author of the above treatise, which is a valuable contribution both to the history of doctrines and to the elucidation of the subject of miracles. The writer, a "privatdocent" at Berlin, is a son, we believe, of the venerable Dr. Nitzsch of that university. His monograph is a model of clear arrangement, thorough investigation, and exact statement. In the first chapter he brings together all the passages that bear on the idea of miracles, and shows the different usages of the terms, and that Augustine admits miracles in the most absolute sense, as coming from the direct agency of God. The second chapter is devoted to what Augustine says of the fact and of the different kinds of miracles, including the so-called "demoniacal wonders." To this is added, pp. 73–97, a full collection of the chief passages from Augustine bearing on the whole subject.

Bunsen's Bible Work. Fünfter Halbband. Zweite Hälfte. *Proverbs and Job*, edited by A. Kamphausen. 9r. Band. *The Eternal Kingdom of God and the Life of Jesus*, edited by H. J. Holtzmann. The first of these two volumes completes the translation and interpretation of the Sacred Books. The other volume, the last of the whole series, sketches, with manifest gaps, the general history of the kingdom of God, and gives a tolerably full outline of the Life of Jesus, from Bunsen's point of view. There are many points of similarity between Bunsen's and Schleiermacher's speculations on the Life of Jesus, especially in the attempt to accommodate the miracles to the "modern consciousness." Bunsen's plan embraced several other volumes, which can now only be made up from fragments.

Praktische Ausleguag des Briefes Pauli on die Colosser. Von Th. Passavant. Basel. 1865. pp. 297. This is a posthumous work of a faithful pastor, who had previously published a similar practical exposition of the Epistles to the Philippians and the Ephesians. This volume on the Colossians is an excellent example of popular commentary, based on thorough studies, yet adapted to general comprehension. The notes are concise and pertinent; the spirit is evangelical; the lessons deduced are plain and forcible. The exposition is relieved by poetical effusions that breathe a devout spirit.

Dr. J. P. Lange, of Bonn, the editor of the Bible Work, in a University Programme, Aug. 1865, proposes an arrangement of the whole material of Theological Encyclopœdia into two parts: I. Historical: 1. History of the Revelation, or Fundamental Theology. 2. Exegetical Theology. 3. Ecclesiastical History. II. Didactic: 1. Dogmatic Theology. 2. Moral Theology. 3. Practical Theology.

The Foundations of our Faith. Ten Papers by Professors AUBERLEN, GESS, Riggenbach, and others. London and New York: Strahan and Co. pp. 279. These addresses were first delivered at Basle, by Professors in the University, as popular lectures on some of the main articles of the Christian faith. Among the subjects discussed are, Faith by Riggenbach, Sin by Stähelin, the Old Testament by Auberlen, the Person of Christ by Riggenbach, the Atonement by Gess, the Holy Spirit by Preiswerk, Justification by Faith by Stockmeier, etc. The main points connected with these doctrines are presented in a popular yet thorough style. As a whole, they are an excellent example of such a series of discourses, and have attracted, in this flowing English translation, less attention than they deserve. We cordially commend the work, not as endorsing all the statements, but as showing how doctrines may be profitably handled before mixed audiences.

Die Kirche nach ihrem Ursprunge, ihrer Geschichte und ihrer Gegenwart. Von Profs. LUTHARDT, KAHNIS und BRUCKNER. Leipzig. 1865. This volume, which has rapidly gone through three editions in Germany, is also made up of a series of popular lectures, that were largely attended, by professors in the University of Leipsic. Those of Luthardt on the Old Testament, on Christ and on the Apostolic church are able; those of Kahnis give one of the most condensed, and at the same time impressive, exhibitions of the general course of Christian church, that is to be found in the same compass. Luthardt's *Apologetic Discourses*, lately translated in Edinburgh, belong to the same general class of popular representations and defenses of the Christian faith, which are now so much needed.

Dr. Schaff's work on the *Person of Christ*, which we noticed in our last number, has been translated into German, and published in a neat volume by Besser, in Gotha, pp. 234. It has already received the recognition of a bitter assault by Schenkel in his journal.

The Scripture Testimony to the Holy Spirit. By JAMES MORGAN, D. D. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1865. pp. 494. All that the Scripture says in respect to the Holy Spirit, all his works under the Old Testament and in the New, are here brought together and clearly arranged. The pervading influence of the Spirit, his personality, and his indispensableness in the system of grace, are convincingly presented. It is not a systematic work, so much as a series of testimonies, with appropriate reflections.

Massachusetts Ecclesiastical Law. By EDWARD BUCK of the Suffolk Bar. Boston: Gould and Lincoln. 1866. pp. 310. Mr. Buck has done a good service in the preparation of this interesting and valuable volume, which gives an account and digest of the Massachusetts ecclesiastical statutes from the earliest colonial periods to the present time. Many curious bits of legislation are carefully gleaned from authentic records, and the whole body of ecclesiastical law is well arranged. The book will be an authority in its department.

PRACTICAL RELIGIOUS LITERATURE.

Hymnal of the Presbyterian Church. Ordered by the General Assembly. Philadelphia: Presb. Bd. of Publication. pp. 432. This will take rank as one of the very best collections of Psalms and Hymns with appropriate tunes, that has yet been published. One of its merits is, that it is mod-

erate in compass, containing 534 hymns, with chants and doxologies. Most of our books are overloaded with hymns seldom or never used. The selection of both hymns and tunes is made with excellent judgment, though almost every body will miss something, e. g.

"Behold the glories of the Lamb."
"Blest morning, whose first dawning light."
"My dear Redeemer and my Lord."
"Come, dearest Lord, descend and dwell."
"Sweet is the memory of the grace."
"I'll praise my maker with my breath."
"What are these, in bright array."
"Awake, my soul, stretch every nerve."

But still, those that are given are in the main excellent, if not indispensable. We like, too, the title, *Hymnal;* there is no good reason why this word should not be used in the sense here given to it; it is an innovation which will soon become familiar.

The American Tract Society, New York, publishes an excellent discourse by Dr. William Adams, entitled *Individualized Religion, as Related to the Power and Prosperity of the Church*, pp. 39: *While They Are With Us*, a collection of stories, pp. 144, illustrated; *Wee Davie*, by Dr. Norman Macleod; *The Power of Truth*, by Rev. John Gray; *How George Neumark Sung his Hymn; Titles and Attributes of the Holy Spirit*, a choice collection of Scriptural passages.

The six following books are from our Publishing Committee, and give good evidence, in their contents and in the style of publication, that this Committee is addressing itself to its work with zeal and success. They are fully equal to the publications of any of the Societies. The volumes are neat and attractive. *Daily Meditations*, by George Bowen, American Missionary at Bombay, pp. 429, is an admirable work, worthy of the emphatic recommendations given to it by Drs. Skinner and Williams. It deserves the widest circulation as a manual for daily Christian reflection, full of the pith and marrow of the Gospel. *Leaves of Consolation for the Afflicted, or Voices from the Silent Land*, by Mrs. H. Dwight Williams, pp. 360, is made up of selections from a great variety of sources, bearing upon the sorrows and trials of this world in their relation to the hopes and blessings of another life. It contains many a precious gem of prose and poetry, and cannot fail to be a source of comfort and consolation to those bowed down by affliction. Mrs. Williams is already favorably known by her "*Year in China.*" *Five Years in China: the Life of* Rev. William Aitchison, by Rev. Charles P. Bush, pp. 284, is a very interesting memorial of the short missionary life of one whose talents and devotion gave high promise of great usefulness as a missionary. The volume is happily illustrated and will aid in keeping alive that missionary zeal which is so essential to the welfare of our churches. *Bessie Lane's Mistake: Wealth is not Happiness*, pp. 330, by the author of *Money, Far Away*, etc., is also an illustrated book, inculcating in an attractive style the right use of wealth, and showing the real sources of domestic happiness. *Brookside Farm-House, from January to December*, by Martha Farquharson, pp. 176, is handsomely got up, and a right good book for children. *Love to the End; a Book for the Communion Sabbath*, by the Rev. Charles E. Knox, pp. 59, consists of a series of devout and excellent meditations appropriate to the celebration of the Lord's Supper.

An Introduction to the Devotional Study of the Scriptures. By E. M. Goulburn, D. D. New York: D. Appleton and Co. 1866, pp. 193. This treatise was first given by the author, in the form of sermons, to his pupils at Rugby School. It contains profitable and stimulating reflections and suggestions as to the best mode of gleaning spiritual results from the devout and methodical study of the Scriptures.

Man and the Gospel. By Thomas Guthrie, D. D. Alexander Strahan, New York and London: sixth thousand; pp. 455. Dr. Guthrie's peculiar excellencies as a religious writer are too well known to need any additional recommendation. This volume shows how the Gospel is fitted to be applied to the various relations of life and society. Its pertinent and faithful illustrations, its earnest spirit and eloquent style, give new interest to the truths it so forcibly inculcates.

Christ the Light of the World. By C. J. Vaughan, D. D., Vicar of Doncaster. London and New York: Alexander Strahan, pp. 269. This volume, like the previous one, is brought out in a neat and compact style, by Mr. Strahan, who has established a branch of his house in this city, and issues a great variety of excellent religious works and periodicals. Dr. Vaughan's essay was first published in *Good Words.* Its theme is central in Christian theology and experience. Christ is here plainly set forth as illumining the whole history of the world—as the true light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world. Such views are always profitable and needed, and never more so than now. To know Christ is to know self and the world.

PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE.

The Constitution of Man, Physically, Morally, and Spiritually Considered. By B. F. Hatch, M.D. New York: for sale by D. Appleton, 1866. pp. 654. Dr. Hatch appears to be attached to the Swedenborgian system, and to be earnest in his attempt to reconcile science and religion on that basis. The "conjugal principle" is the main factor in his system, which is announced as the "true Christian philosophy." With many high spiritual views, he defends some principles and methods which we can hardly believe were "revealed to him by the Holy Spirit." Several of the extravagances of modern spiritualism are fitly rebuked. An earnest moral and religious tone pervades the work. We wish that some of our New York police justices would read, and ponder their fate in hell, as it is so vividly set before them by Dr. Hatch and Swedenborg, on pages 243–7.

Spiritualism identical with Ancient Sorcery, New Testament Demonology, and Modern Witchcraft. By W. McDonald. New York: Carlton and Porter. 1866. pp. 212. If spiritualism necessarily implies a real intercourse with spirits, we have little doubt but that the greater part of these spirits are of the diabolic sort. This work carefully gleans many of the facts in the case, and shows striking resemblances, if not entire identity, between sorcery and modern spiritualism. Some of the testimonies are very convincing as to the delusions of the votaries of this morbid and insane superstition.

The Shadow of Christianity; or, the Genesis of the Christian State. By the author of the "Apocatastasis." New York: Hurd and Houghten. pp. 167. A calm, philosophical and Christian spirit pervades this little

work. It is well adapted to give higher views of the functions and necessity of the State, and to enforce the great moral ends which a true Christian republic must ever keep in view.

E. Caro, L'Idée de Dieu et ses Nouveaux Critiques. 3me éd. Paris, 1865. pp. 508. No better view of the present state of French discussion in respect to the Divine Being can be found than that contained in this clear, striking, and able volume. From the point of view of a spiritual and theistic system, the author examines the critical school, represented by Renan, whose views are clearly and justly criticized; the naturalism of M. Taine and the positivists; the idealism of Vacherot, the best statement we have met with of his singular, not to say paradoxical system; and the recent speculations in respect to a future life, closing with a chapter on spiritualism and its adversaries. The author is one of the rising thinkers in France. He announces another work, more systematic, on "God and Nature."

Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. By Rev. Joseph Alden, D. D., LL.D., late President of Jefferson College. New York: D. Appleton, 1866. pp. 292. In a moderate compass, Dr. Alden introduces the student, by a plain and natural method, to the chief questions in intellectual philosophy. His style is clear, and his statements are pertinent. His work is not a systematic treatise, but it will be found a most useful help and stimulus for both teachers and students.

A Text-Book on Anatomy, Physiology and Hygiene. By John C. Draper, M. D. With 170 illustrations. New York: Harpers, 1866. pp. 300. For all the purposes of instruction in schools and families on the above topics, this book will be found to be a superior manual. It is carefully and clearly worked up, and abundantly illustrated. Dr. Draper is making his mark early in life in scientific investigations. He is a professor in the New York Free Academy, and also in the New York University, and has an enviable reputation as a teacher.

Annuaire Philosophique. Par L. Aug. Martin. Paris, 1864, 1865. The object of this monthly periodical is to furnish an account of all the new French works on physiology, metaphysics and ethics, and also reports of the courses of lectures on these subjects by the leading professors. It is a useful summary, conducted with diligence, and exhibits the activity of the French intellect in philosophical investigations. The editor appears to sympathize with the rational and deistic school. In the volume for 1864 are reports of Flouren's lectures at the Collège de France, on the Physiology of the Human Races; of Janet, at the Sorbonne, on the Relation of Soul and Body—an able series; of Alfred Maury, at the Collège de France, on the Moral and Political Constitution of Society; of Chs, Levêque, on Greek Philosophy; besides full stenographic reports of single lectures by other eminent men, and notices of all the new philosophical works. In the number for 1865 are reports of Maury on the History of Moral Civilization; of Levêque on the Philosophy of Liberty; of Milne-Edwards, on the Instinct and Intelligence of Animals; of Janet, on East Indian Mysticism; of Jules Barni, of Geneva, on Public Ethics; of Hollard, at the Sorbonne, on the Unity of the Race; also, a full account of the conference at Berne, in 1865, on the Separation of Moral and Religious Instruction.

The Living Forces of the Universe. By George W. Thompson (a Judge, at Wheeling, Va.) Philadelphia: Howard Challen, 1866. pp. 358.

This book is announced as "the first decided step towards an American philosophy," and it is written in a new language, and accompanied with a glossary, to define such terms as "objectiv-facient," "compages," "orma," "perspicience," "psytations," "repercussing," "synchonic," "ultroneous," which are used on account "of the tendency to degradation in vulgar, rude, animalistic, and human imaginates." Man is spoken of as "the diaphonous ectype of the inner spiritual self." He receives divine ideas "by a process herein termed ideation, the intusception by the self of the divine forms from which the movements into creative actualization, were objectified by Deity." The author has probably been through this process, but it is difficult to follow him in it.

The Structure of Animal Life: Six Lectures. By Louis Agassiz. New York: Scribner, 1866. pp. 128. These Lectures were delivered in Brooklyn in 1862, as one of the Graham course, on the "Power, Wisdom and Goodness of God." They are published as taken down by the reporters. The subjects are: 1. Four Different Plans of Structure among Animals. 2. Relative Standing, or Gradation, of the Animal Kingdom. 3. Remote Antiquity of Animal Life as shown in the Coral Reefs. 4. Physical History of the Earth—Man the Ultimate Object. 5. Triple Coincidence in the Succession, Gradation and Growth of Animals, 6. Evidence of an Intelligent and constantly Creative Mind in the Plans and Variations of Structure. Professor Agassiz finds everywhere in Nature the evidence of a creative mind; his argument on this point is admirable and conclusive, and dissipates many a figment and abstraction of the materialistic and pantheistic schools.

Essais de Philosophie Hégélienne. Par A. Vera. Paris, 1864. Professor Vera, the well-known representative of the Hegelian philosophy, at Naples, has collected in this small volume three essays; the first, a defense of the death penalty, in conformity with Hegel's views; the second, a philosophical exposition of love; the third, an introduction to the philosophy of history, reviewing the leading schemes.

Alt-Asiatische Gottes- und Weltideen. Von J. E. Bluntschli. Nördlingen, 1866. pp. 168. The object of this volume. made up of five public lectures delivered at Carlsruhe, is to prove the necessity of a severance of church and state, by an exhibition of the repressing effects of their union, as seen in the great oriental systems of India, China and Judea. The work is a popular and lucid exposition of the theme, but its account of the Mosaic institution is partial and unjust.

A Text-Book of Physiology: For the Use of Schools and Colleges. By John William Draper, M. D., LL.D. New York: Harpers, 1866. pp. 376. Illustrated with nearly 150 wood engravings. This abridgement of Dr Draper's well-known *Treatise on Physiology*, presents, in a clear, well-digested manner, all the facts and theories connected with physiology, which are needed for instruction in schools and colleges. At the foot of each page are questions to facilitate the use of the book. In the preface, Dr. Draper enumerates the many points in which he has made original contributions to this science, and also the original engravings made for the volume. The materials are well arranged, and the subject, on the whole, is presented in a form at once popular and scientific. Some of the theories of the author are subjects of debate. As to the operation of the "intellectual principle" through the brain, he says, that certain impressions "act upon the intellectual principle, and are

acted upon by it, the returning influence, if any, coming down through the converging tubular structures to the corpus striatum, and by its commissural connections, sent off to particular ganglia, passing along the inferior strand of the crus, through the mesocephalon, to the anterior pyramids, and by their decussation, to the opposite side of the cord." Perhaps this is as clear an explanation of the matter as mere physiology can be expected to give; but we do not see its superiority, on the score of perspicuity, over the metaphysical attempts to explain the same inscrutable phenomenon.

HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY.

The Life and Public Services of Samuel Adams, being a Narrative of his Acts and Opinions, and of his Agency in producing and forwarding the American Revolution. With Extracts from his Correspondence, State Papers, and Political Essays. By WILLIAM V. WELLS. 3 vols., 8vo. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1865, pp. xxi, 512, x, 512, vii, 460. One of the noblest offices of history is to rescue from oblivion the names of the men who have deserved well of their country. Samuel Adams has heretofore been honored in a vague, general tradition; but the record of his life, and of all he did for his country, had not been fully made. Bancroft has always recognized his eminent merits, as also did John Adams, Jefferson, Everett, and the royal governor Hutchinson, who declared him to be "the first man that asserted the independence of the colonies upon the supreme authority of the kingdom." But his fame, partly from the independence of his character, and partly from his unpopularity in his native State at the close of his life, has not been at all equal to his eminent merit and unequalled services. At the time that he died, in 1803, the Massachusetts Legislature, "whittled down" some resolutions proposed in his honor,—because of his sympathy with the election of Jefferson. Sixty-three years have since passed away, and now from his descendant we have as complete a record as can be gathered of all he was and did during the sixty years in which he lived and acted for the independence of his country.

These volumes are in many respects the most valuable addition to our national biographical literature that has been made for many a year. In their minute revival of the acts and scenes of a century ago, they have the charm of novelty. The copious extracts from the journals, and pamphlets, and correspondence of the times bring the series and progress of the events vividly before us. In the example of a truly great man, who sought for neither wealth nor place, we see how inevitably everything tended towards our national independence—that no other result could come from the logic of events. Adams guided and controlled, because he fully appreciated, the state of affairs. For half a century he talked and wrote and plotted and counselled—but all for his country. Boston knew no other influence so potent as that he wielded in Faneuil Hall; and this was in part because no man had the confidence of the community to so great an extent—a confidence amply earned by the simplicity and probity of his character, by his high moral and religious virtues, and by his supreme devotion to the welfare of his country. When others desponded he was most hopeful. When others talked of compromises, he urged a confederacy and a declaration of independence. In the darkest hour of the revolution, the light of his example shone brightly

and steadily. He exulted, when he heard the news of the battle of Lexington. Jefferson said of him, that he had "a greater share than any other member in advising and directing our measures in the Northern war." That war in its first beginnings in Mass. was called by the royalists "the Adams Conspiracy"; and he was termed "the Man of the Revolution."

In his personal character, too, there is that which commands our homage. He was bred in the old puritan spirit, and shared some of its very best elements. He was a thoroughly moral, upright and God-fearing man. When Hancock and others, in the midst of the Revolution, sought to enliven Boston by routs and gayeties, Samuel Adams tried to form an association against these untimely extravagancies. The very last letter he is known to have penned was addressed to Thomas Paine; while praising his political writings, he solemnly warns him against tampering with the religious belief of the people. "Do you think," he writes, "that your pen, or the pen of any other man, can unchristianize the mass of our citizens, or have you hopes of converting a few of them to assist you in so bad a cause?" In his last testament, he says, "My body I commit to the dust, relying on the merits of Jesus Christ for a pardon of all my sins."

At such times as we are now passing through it is well to revive the memory of so noble, heroic and patriotic a life. He is one whom the nation does well to honor. His biographer has performed his difficult task with the greatest fidelity and with unusual success. The ample materials are just what we want. The style is in general simple and appropriate. There are few such slips as that in vol. i, p. 260, "amendable to the laws." The publishers, as usual, have done their part well and given us three noble and goodly volumes.

Vorträge and Abhandlungen geschichtlichen Iabalts. Von EDUARD ZELLER. Leipzig. 1865, pp. 503. The well-known author of the *Philosophy of the Greeks*, has collected in this volume several addresses and treatises on historical and theological subjects, written in an attractive style. The most interesting piece is a sketch of the life and works of Ferd. Christ. Baur, the father-in-law of the author; it is the best account of Baur in his personal relation, and as a professor, that has yet been published. The principles of his school are defended in other essays on Primitive Christianity, the Tübingen Historical School, Strauss and Renan. The subjects of the remaining treatises are, Monotheism among the Greeks, Pythagoras, the Platonic State, Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, Wolf's Expulsion from Halle, J. G. Fichte in Political Life, Schleiermacher, and an amusing if not convincing attempt at rescuing Xantippe from her world-wide obloquy.

Dr. C. A. F. MAHN of Berlin, who prepared the etymological part of the last edition of Webster's Dictionary, has published an address on the *Origin and Meaning of the name "German,"* in which he contends for its Celtic origin, and for the meaning of "neighbor," *i. e.*, of the Gauls. He pursues his argument with a constant polemic against Holtzmann, who, in his *Celts and Germans*, contended for a Latin derivation. Dr. Mahn has also published a volume of *Etymological Investigations on Geographical Names* (eight parts from 1849 to 1863); *Etymological Investigations in the Romanic Languages*, 24 parts, 1854–'64; and eight volumes on the Troubadours and their Poetry.

Ordnuog und Uebersicht, etc. (*Arrangement and Summary of the Mate-*

rials for Church History.) By Prof. Ed. Köllner of the University of Giessen. 1864. pp. 305. This is such a book as could be produced nowhere else but in Germany. It gives, in the most compressed form, the main points in the History of the Christian Church, all systematized, with references to the literature, and, in the latter portion, a detailed yet compressed outline of special points of history. It is intended to be put at the basis of academic lectures. The author is well known by his learned symbolism of the Roman Catholic and Lutheran Churches.

The Life of the Rev. Robert Baird, D.D. By his son, Henry M. Baird. New York: A. D. F. Randolph. 1866, pp. 347. This record of a useful and honorable life is well drawn up. It is a difficult task for a son to write his father's biography; but Professor Baird equally avoids too much reticence and too much prolixity. Dr. Baird had in some respects a remarkable career. No private man of our time has obtained with so good a grace access to the very highest European society; and no one was more diligent in promoting the best objects. His services in the Bible Cause, in Temperance, in the Evangelical Alliance, and kindred works, will be long held in remembrance. This memoir will be a most welcome book to his numerous friends at home and abroad.

The Centenary of American Methodism. By Abel Stevens, LL. D. With a statement of the Plan of the Centenary Celebration, by John McClintock, D.D. New York: Carlton and Porter. 1866, pp. 287. The able historian of Methodism has produced a most interesting and compact account of the marvellous progress of this denomination in the United States, since its first planting in this city a hundred years ago.

The author is fully master of the materials, and he has grouped them together in order under three heads: What is Methodism? What has Methodism achieved? Its Capabilities and Responsibilities. This energetic Church proposes to raise a million dollars during the present year. It is addressing itself to its great work with a foresight and zeal which are well worthy of imitation.

James Louis Petigru. *A Biographical Sketch.* By William J. Grayson. New York: Harpers. 1866, pp. 178. With an excellent likeness. Mr. Petigru, of Charleston, S. C., will long be remembered, not only for his ability and eloquence and high social qualities, but also for his uncompromising devotion to the Union, when all around him were faithless. From the beginning he opposed the schemes of Calhoun. He was a man of the very highest character, and in any Northern city he would have attained the highest positions. This memorial, by a personal friend, gives an interesting, though incomplete, sketch of the chief incidents of his life.

History of Friederich the Second, called Frederick the Great. By Thomas Carlyle. In six volumes. Vol. VI. New York: Harpers, 1866. pp. 608. With an index to all the volumes, five maps, and a portrait of *der alte Fritz*, in his 73d year, on horseback. The book ends in a characteristic way: "Meanwhile all I had to say of him is finished; that, too, it seems, was a bit of work appointed to be done. Adieu, good readers; bad, also, adieu." The first half of the volume completes the minute and picturesque description of the great Silesian campaign, in the last three years of the Seven Years' War. The last Book (XXI.) on the "Afternoon and Evening of Frederick's Life," groups together in an effective narrative scattered incidents of the last twenty-three years of the life of Carlyle's latest hero, who is to him "the last of the kings."

All of Carlyle's art and forced constructions of events cannot, however, transform that hard, cynical, unscrupulous and skeptical monarch into a model worthy of the veneration of mankind. Force and executive ability are not the ideal of a great manhood. Carlyle finds in him one of the great iconoclasts of shams; but we are very much afraid that among what he calls shams will be found the very substance of ethical and religious truth. Even in writing the life of Frederick, he cannot avoid one of his chronic flings against our own country (pp. 262–3): "In 1775, again, there began, over seas, another anarchy much more considerable—little dreaming that it could be called an anarchy; on the contrary, calling itself Liberty, Rights of Man; and singing boundless Io-Pæans to itself, as is common in such cases; an anarchy which has been challenging the universe to show the like ever since, and which has at last flamed up as an independent phenomenon unexampled in the hideously *suicidal* way, and does need much to get burnt out, that matters may begin anew, on truer conditions." And this, too, "it seems, was a bit of work appointed to be done;" and it was, also, "it seems," in like manner, "appointed" that Mr. Carlyle should talk about it in this supercilious style, as if he were the prophet of the age. "Adieu, good Mr. Carlyle; bad Mr. Carlyle, also, adieu."

The Life of Robert Owen. Philadelphia: Ashmead and Evans, 1866. pp. 264. The facts of Mr. Owen's life are here given with impartiality and sufficient fulness, on the basis of his autobiography, and other authentic works. All that was excellent and humane in his various schemes, at New Lanark and New Harmany, is freely acknowledged. His earnest philanthropy is commended; and his diligent attempts, both in theory and practice, to devise ways for relieving man's wants, and bringing about a greater equality of social blessings, are fully given and canvassed. And yet, the whole course of this remarkable biography clearly shows that his schemes and theories must fail, as they did fail, because they were based on a radically false view of human nature, and of the means for its amelioration and elevation. That circumstances create the evils of humanity, and that a change in circumstances will remove these evils; this, in substance, was his theory. Moral law is resolved into physical and social laws. Providence is ignored; the fact of human sinfulness, and the great fact of redemption, are not recognized. A reform, based on such views, cannot succeed. The author of this volume (which is handsomely printed) has done a good service in showing what Mr. Owen's life really teaches.

GENERAL LITERATURE.

Cyclopædia of American Literature. By Evert A., and George L. Duyckink. 2 vols.. *With a Supplement of* 164 *pages.* 1866. New York: Chas. Scribner and Co., 1866. The excellencies of Mr. Duyckink's Cyclopœdia are well known. It was published ten years ago, and a supplement is now added, including "obituaries of authors, continuations of former articles, and notices of earlier and later writers omitted in previous editions." The best parts of this supplement are the contributions by Mr. Buckingham Smith on early Spanish writers, by Mr. J. G. Shea on early French writers, and by Mr. J. W. Dean on antiquarian and genealogical works. Many of the notices are fair and discriminating, and there is an evident disposition to do justice to all who have contributed to

American literature in every department. At the same time, in so wide a field, it is difficult to be impartial and to avoid omissions. These omissions are more noticeable in the department of theology than in any other; and some of them are certainly surprising, especially when compared with many who are introduced. Among the older New England men and writers, we do not find the names of John Smalley, Charles Backus, Asa Burton, or Samuel Spring. Among the recent Congregational authors the following are omitted: Drs. Nehemiah Adams, Thompson and Storrs; Presidents Finney and Mahan; Professors W. S. Tyler and Fiske, of Amherst College; Professor Bascom of Williams; Professor Haven of Chicago; Prof. Noyes of Cambridge; Dr. Pond of Bangor, etc. Among the Baptists we do not find Profs. Hacket and Chase, Dr. R. Fuller, or Presidents Anderson and Champlin. Among the Presbyterians are wanting, Drs. Richards and Hall of Auburn; Profs. Green and Moffet of Princeton; Drs. Skinner and Hitchcock of New York: President Lindsley; Drs. R. W. Landis, R. C. Breckinridge, and Robert Baird; Romeyn, Beman and Duffield, John H. Rice, Thomas Smyth, etc. Among the Methodists, are wanting Drs. N. Bangs, Charles Elliott, D. D. Whedon, John McClintock; among the Lutherans, Drs. Bachmann, B. Kurtz, Schaeffer, Seiss, and Schmucker; among the Dutch and German Reformed, De Witt, Berg, Rauch, Gerhardt; among the Episcopalians, both the Bishops Onderdonk, Bp. Ravenscroft, J. S. Stone, W. D. Wilson; and the R. C. Archbishop Spaulding. Other omissions are: Samuel Adams, Allibone, Benjamin W. Dwight, O. W. Wight, Dr. Hubbard Winslow, C. F. Hudson, Joseph Huntington of Connecticut, Eleazer Lord, and D. N. Lord. The notices of the writings of the following authors is quite inadequate: Dr. Hickok, Dr. Park of Andover, Dr. Murdock, Dr. Edward Beecher, Dr. William Allen, Dr. William Adams of New York, President Torrey, and President Beasley of Penn. University. Waterville and Middlebury Colleges are not named, and Amherst is despatched in a short note; the accounts of Theological Seminaries are also quite imperfect. There is an account of the "Youth's Companion," but none of the Christian Review, the Christian Spectator, the New Englander, the Presbyterian Quarterly, the American Theological Review, the Boston Review, the Methodist Quarterly (North and South), the Universalist Quarterly, and the American Quarterly Church Review.

The Pilgrim's Wallet: or Scraps of Travel gathered in England, France, and Germany. By GILBERT HAVEN, New York: Hurd and Houghton. 1866. pp. 492. Mr. Haven is an inquisitive traveler, with keen eyes, and very much inclined to see things in his own way. On the beaten road of the tourist he finds many new matters, and describes them in a frank and animated style. Those who have been over the same ground will here find much of what they did not see; and those who are about to follow in his track, will derive amusement and instruction from these off-hand sketches.

Lazarus and Other Poems. By E. H. PLUMPTRE, A. M. 2d ed. A. Strahan. 1865. These poems, chiefly on Biblical subjects, indicate a happy facility in versification, and are pervaded by a religious spirit. The short poem, on Renan's Life of Jesus, breathes a true Christian sentiment. There is also a good rendering of "the earliest Christian hymn," by Clement of Alexandria. The soliloquy of Jesus Bar-abbas is finely conceived.

Fonthill Recreations. The Mediterranean Islands. By N. G. SLEEPER.

With illustrations. pp. 278. An interesting narrative, for children, of scenes, customs, and incidents, in a region less frequently described than many others. Historic events are interwoven. The volume is handsomely got up.

The Belton Estate. By ANTHONY TROLLOPE. New York: Harpers. No. 293 of Select Novels. One of the best told of Mr. Trollope's attractive stories.

Guy Deverell. By J. Sheridan Le Faun. Same Publishers. A striking contrast to the above in its style and sources of interest, being a tale of intrigue, unlawful love, and revenge.

The Works of Epictetus, Consisting of his Discourses in Four Books, the Enchiridion, and Fragments. A Translation from the Greek, based on that of ELIZABETH CARTER, by THOMAS W. HIGGINSON. Boston: Little, Brown and Co. 1866. pp. xvi, 437. "No one is free who commands not himself." "There is nothing good or evil save in the Will: we are not to lead events, but to follow them." Such is the wisdom of Epictetus and the Stoics, set forth so calmly in these Discourses and the Enchiridion. The book is full of pith and wit, and well worth a study, in the light even of our times. Here are some other fragments:

"Never say of anything, "I have lost it," but "I have restored it." Has your child died? It is restored. Has your wife died? She is restored. Has your estate been taken away? That likewise is restored. "But it was a bad man who took it." What is it to you by whose hands He who gave it hath demanded it again? While he permits you to possess it, hold it as something not your own, as do travelers at an inn."

Florus asked Agrippinus to advise him whether he should perform as an actor in Nero's shows. Agrippinus bade him do so. "But why do not you go then?" says Florus. "Because," replied Agrippinus, "I do not deliberate about it."

"What if I should be sick?"

It will be best that you should be sick.

"Who will take care of me?"

God and your friends.

"I shall lie in a hard bed."

But like a man.

"I shall not have a convenient room."

Then you will be sick in an inconvenient one.

Epictetus was by birth a Phrygian, also the country of Aesop; and a slave to Epaphroditus, of Rome, by whom he was lamed for life. Becoming free, he gave the discourses, which have been preserved by Arrian, and had a place in all subsequent literature. Four English translations have appeared, the best, that of Elizabeth Carter, which Mr. Higginson has carefully revised. The volume is handsomely brought out, and is a most welcome addition to our current literature. For, though its philosophy has been superseded by the higher wisdom of Christian ethics, it will always remain a monument of wit and practical wisdom.

MISCELLANY.

The Westminster Assembly, by REV. HENRY NEILL (Buffalo, 1865, pp. 98), published by request of Presbytery, is a clear and excellent account of the Antecedents, the Men, and the Work, of that reverend Assembly. The author's estimate of its doctrinal positions is deservedly high. He

also insists at large upon its clear sundering of the respective provinces of church and state.

Christological Theology is the title of the Inaugural Address of DR. H. HARBAUGH, delivered at Mercersburg, Pa. It is an able advocacy of the Christological principle as central in the theological system.

Dr. Philip Schaff, during his recent visit abroad, delivered some thirty addresses in the cities and towns of Germany and Switzerland, upon the *Civil War and Christian Life* of our country. The substance of these has been published in a pamphlet (pp. 72) at Berlin. It is a spirited and eloquent defense of the United States and its institutions, for which the author deserves our cordial thanks.

A Third Reader, of a Grade between the Second and Third of the School and Family Series. By Marcius Willson. New York: Harpers. This series of Readers is in all respects excellent.

EDMUND DE SCHWEINITZ'S *Moravian Episcopate*, pp. 28, Bethlehem, Pa., is the best concise account and vindication of a regular Moravian succession that we have seen.

Commemorative Services at the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the Pastorate of the REV. JOHN PIKE, Rawley, Mass. pp. 78. A useful and honored pastorate is here worthily commemorated.

The Discourse of REV. GEORGE F. MAGOUN, at his Inauguration as President of Iowa College, is an earnest and eloquent plea for the highest and best educational institutions in our Western States.

Peace in our Borders, by REV. HENRY HOPKINS (pp. 25), is the title of a patriotic and forcible Thanksgiving Sermon delivered at South Williamstown, by one who faithfully served for three years as a chaplain in the Union army.

The Unity of the Spirit, not Unbroken Apostolical Succession, the Revealed Bond of Peace to the Church. By REV. MASON GALLAGHER, Oswego. pp. 96. New York: Randolph. This pamphlet is valuable for its collection of testimonies in favor of "the low church" view, from writers of the Episcopal communion.

Notices of the following books have been prepared, but they are necessarily deferred, as is also a part of the Ecclesiastical Register:

H. S. Foote: The War of the Rebellion. Harpers, 1866.
D. C. Livingstone: Expedition to the Zambesi. Harpers.
J. Doolittle: Social Life of the Chinese. Harpers.
A Noble Life. By Miss Muloch. Harpers.
Half-a-Million a-Year. By Amelia B. Edwards. Harpers.
The Women of Methodism. By A. Stevens, LL.D. Carlton and Porter.
Plain Words. By C. J. Vaughan, D. D.; and three other practical works. Carlton and Porter.
Pusey's Eirenicon. D. Appleton and Co.
Abp. Manning's Temporal Mission of the Holy Ghost. Appletons.
Goulburn's Idle Word. Appletons.
Davenport's Christian Unity. Appletons.
Esperance. By Meta Lander. Sheldon and Co.
Hand-Book of Scripture Harmony. Randolph.
Hymns for the Sick Room. Randolph.
Isa Græme's World. Am. S. S. Union.
Children's Party. Am. S. S. Union.
F. W. Robertson's Life and Letters. Ticknor and Fields.

Art. IX.—THEOLOGICAL AND LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

GERMANY.

Historische Zeitschrift. Herausg. von Heinrich von Sybel, 3s Heft, 1865. B. Erdmannsdörffer, On the History of the Thirty Years' War, and Works upon it; C. v. Noorden, Parliamentary Party-Government in England; A. Schäfer, The End of the Prussian and French Alliance in 1756; L. K. Aegidi, The First Impression of the Carlsbad Conference (1819) on the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh; Theod Bernhardt, The Historical Literature of 1864, continued—some 140 pages,—the Literature of our late War is given in part. 4s. Heft, 1865; R. Pauli, Diplomacy in 1516, in relation to Maximilian I; B. Kugler, The Comneni and the Crusaders; Von Sybel, The Letters of Maria Antoinette—a continuation of the proof of their falsification; R. Usinger on General Gneisenau.

Zeitschrift f. die historische Theologie. Dr. Niedner, its late Editor, died the past year. Professor Kahnis of Leipsic, is to edit it in future. The first number, 1866, is wholly taken up with a review by Uhlhorn of works on the history of the Church from the Apostles to Constantine, published from 1850 to 1860—a full summary.

Theologische Quartalschrift, 1866. Erstes Heft. Schwab, Contributions to the History of the 14th Century; on Philip le Bel, his conflict with the Papacy, etc. Hefele, some new documents on the Abolition of the Order of the Templars. Kraus, Studies on Synesius of Cyrene, continued from a previous number. Among the new books, Hefele especially commends Schumacher's work on the Stedinger (Bremen, 1865), as exculpating the Papacy from a part of the traditional blame for its persecution of the Stedinger.

The chief articles in the *Jahrbücher f. deutsche Theologie*, Parts 2, 3, 4, 1865, are the following:—Diestel, Studies on the Federal Theology—a learned, careful and interesting sketch, with full accounts of Cocceius, Witsius, etc.; Ritschl, Historical Studies upon the Christian Doctrine respecting God—chiefly devoted to an exposition of the views of Scholastics upon the divine nature and attributes; Steitz, the Doctrine of the Greek Church on the Lord's Supper—a continuation to about A. D. 400—the best account of the matter; Paul on the Resurrection of Christ; Diestelmann on 1 Cor. xv. 51; Zahn on Rom. viii. 18–20; Baumgarten on Flavius Josephus in relation to the New Testament; Kelber, the Christian Hope; Jäger, What is Religion? This Review also gives excellent criticisms of the latest theological publications.

Zeitschrift f. lutherische Theologie, 1865–6. F. Pfaff, The Present State of the Question on the Origin of the Human Race. I. Müller, on the recent works that treat of the Life of Apollonius of Tyana; a learned and valuable essay. C. P. Caspari, on the use of the Greek Language in the worship of the Western Church, translated from the Danish by Delitzsch. T. Picker, an account of the views of John Musäus on the Formal Principle of the Lutheran Church; General Critical Bibliography of the Latest Theological Works. The first part for 1866 has, Pastor Oppenrieder on Shiloh, Gen. xlix. 10; F. Köster on Baptism for the Dead, 1 Cor. xv. 29; O. Zöckler, on John de Cruce, illustrating the history of the Reformation

in Spain; A. O. Baur, on the Difference between the Inorganic and Organic—to show that there cannot be any transition between them by a merely natural development. Köster interprets the Baptism for the Dead as referring to heathen, who, seeing the heroism with which Christians met death, were, on that account, induced to be baptized.

Theologische Quartalschrift, (Roman Catholic,) 1865. Kraus, Studies on Synesius of Cyrene. Linsenmann on Gabriel Biel, the last of the Scholastics, and Nominalism: this is a valuable contribution, continued from the previous number, to the history of scholasticism, and to the realistic and nominalistic controversy. Independence, Unity and Credibility of the Book of Joshua, by Professor Himpel; Origen on the Eucharist, by Prof. Probst of Breslau, etc.

Studien und Kritiken, 1866. *First Part:* Schultz, The Double Sense of Scripture; Kähler, on Schenkel's Portraiture of Christ—a good criticism; Ritschl, the Readers of the Epistle to the Hebrews; Weiss, The Principles of Modern Theology—with reviews of Weizsäcker's volume on the Gospels by Weiss, etc. *Second Part:* Diestel, Bible and the Natural Sciences in the Times of Orthodoxy. Weiss, Peter and his Epistles. W. Möller on the Italian Reformer, Jean Valdez and his *Divine Meditations.* Among the shorter essays is one by Paul on John's Gospel and the Time of the Lord's Supper. Among the reviews, Krummel gives an interesting account of new documents in relation to Huss.

A work by Chemnitz, hitherto unpublished, found in the Wölfenbüttel Library, has been issued by Schlauitz, on the *Incarnation of Christ*, pp. 80, edited by Hachfield. It bears upon the Crypto-Calvinistic Controversy.

The number of Protestant Theological Students in the Prussian Universities, 1865, was 1,005, Halle leads with 370, Berlin had 331, Königsberg 116, Breslau 101, Bonn 63, Greifswald 24. The Catholic Students numbered 629; Münster 276, Bonn 187, Breslau 166.

Professor Lauth of Munich has published two important works relating to ancient Egypt; *Les Zodiaques de Denderah*, avec 7 Planches, pp. 100; *Manetho und der Turiner Königs-Papyrus*, pp. 257, with 10 Plates; Erste Hälfte, on the first half of the Thirty Dynasties, from Menes to Amosis. Prof. Hub. Beckers of the same University, has written a work in exposition and defence of Schelling, entitled *Schelling's Doctrine of Immortality in its Whole Development.*

FRANCE.

The works of J. P. Proudhon are to be published in 40 vols. Among the unpublished ones are Commentaries on the Bible, an Essay on Property, Order in Humanity, Pornocracy, etc.

The first volume of Proudhon's *Annotated Bible*, on the New Testament, was "seized" by the Government at once.

Abbé Frepel has published two more volumes of his *Course of Sacred Eloquence*, on Cyprian and Clement of Alexandria.

The Volney Prize, 1865, was given by the French Academy to Herr Ferdinand Justi, for his "Hand Book of the Zend Language." The prize is for the best work on Comparative Philology.

Querard's *Encyclopedia of the Librarian* is to be published as he left it. It is arranged by subjects, giving under each title all the French books published on that topic.

Abbé Michon's *Life of Jesus, followed by the Evangelists in Parallel Col-*

umns, vol. I. has been published. It is a reply to Renan, and contains philological, topographical and archæological notes.

E. Arnaud, pastor and member of the Asiatic Society, has written a work on the *Pentateuch*, defending it against the attacks of Colenso and others. It is well spoken of. Arnaud has published a commentary on the New Testament, and a new version of the New Testament.

F. De Saulcy's *Voyage en terre sainte*, 2 vols., is lauded in the highest terms as the most complete work on the Holy Land yet published. The author is a member of the Institute. His work is profusely illustrated, with 84 plans and sketches. Price 32 francs.

The Countess D'Armaille has written a memorial of the life of Catharine de Bourbon, sister of Henry IV., who remained steadfast to the Protestant faith, in spite of her brother's change, and in the midst of all the temptations of the Court. She was married to the Duke de Bar. This is a work of deep interest, admirably composed. It is published by Didier.

The remarkable discourses of the Dominican monk, Father Hyacinthe, delivered in Notre Dame, have attracted universal attention. The cathedral was crowded to hear his attempt to reconcile modern thought with the Catholic church, in opposition to "an independent morality." Among his liberal utterances were the following: "I come into the midst of Christian Protestants and honest deists, and say you are my fellow-workers. Of course I do not overlook what separates us; the gulf that separates us is the church; but yet I cannot forget what is common to us. Do you not believe in Christ, even as we do? Or, if you do not believe in Christ, do you not at least bow your knees before the living, personal God? And so I look no longer at the gulf which separates us, but I stretch out my hands, as those of a friend, towards you, and thank you for the help which you will here give me, as often as I defend the morals of the Christian church."

The Count De Gobineau, known by his elaborate works on the "Inequality of the Human Races," "Three years in Asia," etc., has published a large treatise, in 2 vols., on the *Cuneiform Inscriptions*, brought out in elegant style. He is now the French ambassador at Athens.

SPAIN.

The Spanish Government has lately given its sanction to a work on American antiquities, entitled a "Collection of Inedited Documents on the Discovery, Conquest and Colonization of the Spanish Possessions beyond the Sea, drawn from the Royal Archives of the Indies." The editor is Duc Luis Torrez di Mendoza, and it is proposed to issue two volumes annually.

The Simancas Archives.—These valuable papers, so long kept secret, and now rendered accessible to scholars by the liberality of the Queen of Spain, will supply many materials for a "History of England during the Reign of Henry VII.," which Mr. Thomas Purnell is writing. A volume of *Documents from Simancas*, relating to the Reign of Elizabeth, 1558–1568, has been translated from the Spanish of Don Thomas Gonzalez, with Notes, and an Introduction by Spencer Hall.

ENGLAND.

The British and Foreign Evangelical Review, January. 1. Rome and the

Romans. 2. Development of the Ancient Catholic Hierarchy, continued, by Dr. Schaff. 3. Arithmetical Criticism of Colenso and others. 4. Historiography, Ancient and Modern. 5. Unitarian Annals. 6. The Incarnation—Was it necessary apart from the Existence of Sin? answering the question in the negative. The author, among other things, implies that Dr. Candlish's recent work on the Fatherhood of God favors the affirmative view. 7. Isaac Taylor. 8. The Culdean Church; using Ebrard's essay in the Zeitschrift f. d. hist. Theologie. 9. Rev. C. H. Spurgeon, etc.

The Journal of Sacred Literature, January. M. Quatremère, by Prof. G. Masson—an interesting sketch of his oriental studies; Inspiration of Scripture; Dr. Stowe on the Four Gospels; Slavery not Sanctioned by the Bible; Aethiopic Hymns, by J. M. Rodwell; Caleb and Othniel; Historical Character of the Gospels; Difficult Passages in Job; Early English Religious Poetry; the Pilgrimage of Antoninus of Placentia, A. D. 570; Ancient Syriac Martyrology, by Dr. Wright; the Doctrine of Eternal Punishment and Immortality; Correspondence; Reviews.

The following work is announced: "A Bibliographical and Critical Account of the rarest books in the English language, which during the last fifty years have come under the observation of J. Payne Collier, Esq., F. S. A., alphabetically arranged, accompanied with numerous extracts in Verse and Prose, and a very copious and useful index. Four vols., sm. 8vo."

The Early English Text Society has issued three new publications: "The Story of Genesis and Exodus," an Early English song of about 1250 A. D., now edited, for the first time, from the unique MS. in Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, about 1300 A. D., by Richard Morris; 2, "Morte d'Arthure," from Robert of Thorntone's MS. in Lincoln Cathedral, edited by the Rev. Mr. Perry, prebendary; 3, Francis Thynne's criticisms on Speight's edition of Chaucer, 1598, or, as the title goes, "Animadversions uppon the Annotacions, and Corrections of some Imperfectiones of Impressiones of Chaucer's Workes re-printed in 1598," edited by Dr. Kingsley. The two remaining texts to be issued, and that are in the press, are "The Romance of Merlin," from the unique MS. in the Cambridge University Library, Part 1, and Sir David Lyndesay's "Monarche," from the edition of 1552.

In a letter to the *Times*, Dr. Pusey says: "I am in no position which entitles me to formulize terms upon which the English and Roman Churches might be united. In regard to the Greek, we have nothing to ask for but intercommunion. But, also, any statement of details might tend to distract men's minds from the central objects. Let the English mind once grasp the idea that healthful reünion of the Church may be possible, and the overpowering greatness of the thought of a united Christendom dawn upon it, even from afar, as a thing to be hoped and prayed for, and our strong English practical sense and tranquil steadfastness of purpose will, by God's mercy, be a great instrument in his hands of realizing what it has conceived. Let it once conceive of the reünion of Christendom as a practical object, as it did of large righteous questions in our century—the admission of Roman Catholics and Dissenters to the full rights of citizenship, or the repeal of the corn laws—and the difficulties will be half surmounted. There are clouds enough gathering to make Rome, too, feel that union is strength. Let there once be an earnest desire for a healthful union on the part of England, and I have good ground to believe terms which we could conscientiously offer, and

that without any derogation to any law of the State, would be accepted. Even the thought of the possibility of our reünion, there is reason to think, might hinder any fresh declarations which would be an obstacle to it, such as a dogmatic definition of any part of the vast Marian system, or of the personal infallibility of the Pope."

Dr. Coort's *Worship of Baalim in Israel*, translated from the Dutch by Colenso (Lond. pp. 94), is based on *Dozy's Israelites in Mecca*. This latter work attempted to explain the origin of the "Sanctuary at Mecca" (called *Makoraba*), and the name of the deity worshipped there (*Hobal*), by referring its origin to the passage 1 Chron., iv. 39–44. It also argued that this showed that the worship of Baal was predominant in Israel at that time. Dr. Coort dissents in part from this, while admitting the value and validity of the derivation thus given to this obscure matter.

The Burney Prize Essay, Cambridge, 1864, was gained by J. Pearson for a treatise on the Divine Personality, which has been published.

Charles Richardson, LL. D., the lexicographer, was born in July, 1775, and died in November last, aged 90. His first work was *Illustrations of English Philology*, 1805, consisting of criticisms on Johnson and Dugald Stewart, on the basis of Horne Tooke's theories. His *Dictionary* was completed in 1837, and reprinted in this country. He also wrote on the *Study of Language*, and was a contributor to the *Gentleman's Magazine* and the *Notes and Queries*. In the former periodical he published in several papers, *An Historical Essay on English Grammars and Grammarians*, and an essay on *Fancy and Imagination*, in opposition to Wordsworth and Dugald Stewart.

Rev. John Reid's *Voices of the Soul Answered in God*, published by the Carters, has been re-published in London by Nisbet & Co., who have also republished Miss Warner's last work, *The Word: Walks from Eden*.

The British Quarterly for January contains: Richard Cobden; Epidemics; Miss Berry; Sinai; Palmerston; Religion in London; Inductive Theology; the New Parliament.

Dr. Theodore Benfey's *Sanscrit-English Dictionary* is published by the Longmans for £2, 12s, 6d. Wilson's Lexicon was published some thirty years ago.

All the works of Wycliffe are to be published by the Oxford University Press. Dr. Shirley has prepared a catalogue of them, ninety-six in Latin and sixty-five in English; the Vienna Imperial Library contains the most valuable collection of them; others are found in Paris, and Prague, and several English libraries.

Theological Works. Chas. Merivale, *The Conversion of the Northern Nations*; the Boyle Lectures for 1865; W. and G. Audsley, *Handbook of Christian Symbolism*; Mozley on *Miracles*; the Bampton Lectures, 1865; F. D. Maurice, *The Conflict of Good and Evil in our Day*; G. G. Perry, *History of the Crusades*; Bishop Forbes, *Explanation of Nicene Creed*, 2d ed.; Dr. Pusey, *History of Tract XC.*; C. D. Ginsburg, *The Kabbalah, its Doctrines, Development and Literature*.

The third part of Dr. Tregelles' edition of the Greek Testament is just published. The present number following the order of the most ancient manuscripts, contains the Acts of the Apostles, followed by the General Epistles. The fourth and concluding part is near completion, and that of the Epistle to the Romans is already in the press.

The long expected work of Dr. Jas. Henry Green on Coleridge has been published in two vols., edited by John Simon; it is entitled, *Spir-*

itual Philosophy founded on the Teaching of S. T. Coleridge. The first volume is devoted to the philosophical foundation, the second to the theological applications of the system. Bain's book on the *Emotions and Will* has reached a second edition.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

The article by Rev. Albert Barnes, printed in the October number of our Review, on the "Relation of Christianity to the Present Stage of the World's Progress," has been re-printed in England, in a new edition of his "Essays on Science and Theology," and also in a separate form.

Solomon D. Henkel & Brothers of New Market, Va., who have published a translation of the "Book of Concord," and of other valuable works, have in contemplation the issue of a translation of Luther's "Postils" and other Sermons.

A correspondent of one of our religious journals writes from Constantinople: "I see considerable prominence is given, in American journals, to a statement that the "Koran" has been translated into Turkish and published by the Turkish Government. If a simple translation of the "Koran" from Arabic into plain Turkish should be made, it might well be regarded as a long step in advance, for to translate or even to print the "Koran" has ever been held sacrilegious by all orthodox Turks. What, then, has been done? A book has been published here which has been called a "translation" of the Koran. But the work in question is a commentary on the Koran, and not a translation of the Koran itself; the original text of the sacred book is printed in the centre of the page, and the comments are printed in the margin, at the sides, and on the top and bottom.

Article X.—ECCLESIASTICAL RECORD.

By Edwin F. Hatfield, D. D., New York.

LICENSURES.

Austin P. Stockwell,	April	3d,	1865,	by the	Presb.	of	New York,	Third.
David L. Kiehle,	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
John Jay Crane,	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	Fourth.
James O. Denniston,	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
Elijah L. Barnett,	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
Mason Noble, Jr.,	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
Eben B. Parsons,	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
George Little,	"	"	"	"	"	"	Cincinnati.	
John G. Jones,	"	10th,	"	"	"	"	Cayuga.	
Gustavus R. Alden,	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	
Thomas Campbell,	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	
Chester C. Thorne,	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	
Merrit Gally,	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	

William N. Page,	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	
Charles H. Wheeler,	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	
T. Madison Dawson,	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	
Solomon H. Moore,	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	
Edward Southworth,	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	
German H. Chatterton,	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	
Willard P. Gibson,	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	
James S. Baker,	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	
Thomas A. Hamilton,	"	24th,	"	"	"	"	Phila.,	Fourth.
Henry S. Teller,	May	8th,	"	"	"	"	Brooklyn.	
Horace P. V. Bogue,	June	13th,	"	"	"	"	Buffalo.	
Richard A. Clark,	"	15th,	"	"	"	"	Otsego.	
William F. B. Lynch,	Aug.	5th,	"	"	"	"	S. Francisco.	
Arthur Goodenough,	"	22d,	"	"	"	"	Delaware.	

ORDINATIONS.

Charles A. Conant,	July	6th, 1864,	Evang.,	by Presb. of	Cayuga.
Charles M. Livingston,	Aug.	9th,	"	"	Genesee Valley.
William Campbell,	Oct.	19th,	"	Pas., Chaumont, N. Y.,	" Watertown.
Daniel A. Tawney,	Jan.	13th, 1865,	Evang.,	"	Pataskala.
James A. Laurie,	"	18th,	"	"	Columbus.
David R. Frazer,	Mar.	8th,	"	"	D. of Columbia.
Albert Krahn,	"	"	"	Pas., New'k (Ger. 2d) N.J.,	" Newark.
Peter S. Davis,	"	26th,	"	Evang., Birmingham, Pa.,	" Pittsburgh.
Clarence Eddy,	Ap'l	5th,	"	Pas., Canterbury, N. Y.,	" North River.
William R. Higgins,	"	9th,	"	Evang., Leavensworth, Ind.,	" Salem.
Eben B. Parsons,	"	11th,	"	" New York City,	" N. Y., Fourth.
Linus Blakesly,	"	13th,	"	" Dayton, O.,	" Dayton.
James M. Anderson,	"	19th,	"	" Cincinnati, O.,	" Cincinnati.
John Kelland,	"	"	"	" Angola, Ind.,	" St. Joseph.
Wilberforce K. Boggs,	"	22d,	"	" Iowa City, Io.,	" Iowa City.
Frederick H. Adams,	"	25th,	"	" New York City,	" N. York, Third.
Joseph Swindt,	"	"	"	" Connersville, Ind.,	" Indianapolis.
Nathan P. Campfield,	May	2d,	"	Pas., Cazenovia, N. Y.,	" Onondaga.
Wm. White Williams,	"	14th,	"	Evang., New York City,	" N. York, Third.
David L. Kiehle,	"	"	"	" " "	" " "
Austin P. Stockwell,	"	"	"	" " "	" " "
Edward B. Furbish,	"	31st,	"	Pas., New Hartford, N. Y.,	" Utica.
James M. Alexander,	June	11th,	"	Evang., San Leandro, Cal.,	" San Jose.
Samuel Murdock,	"	14th,	"	Pas., Craneville, N. Y.,	" Brooklyn.
C. N. Thomas,	July	11th,	"	" Fort Covington, N. Y.	" Champlain.
Bentley S. Foster,	"	"	"	Evang., Franklin, Pa.,	" Montrose.
William E. Honeyman,	Aug.	23d,	"	" Rockaway, N. J.,	" Rockaway.
William Wilmer,	Sept.	1st,	"	"	" Crawfordsville.
William M. Newton,	"	6th,	"	Evang., Sandusky, O.,	" Huron.
William T. Hart,	"	13th,	"	"	" Madison.
H. P. Higby,	"	"	"	" Vevay, Ind.,	" "
W. R. Powers,	"	20th,	"	Pas., Lysander, N. Y.,	" Onondaga.
Jonathan B. Morse,	"	27th,	"	" Moravia, "	" Cayuga,
Edwin H. Freeman,	"	"	"	Evang.,	" Newark.
Wilbur Johnson,	Oct.	3d,	"	Pas., Great Bend, Pa.,	" Montrose.
William F. B. Lynch,	"	8th,	"	Evang.,	" S. Francisco.
Thomas M. Cann.	"	27th,	"	"	" Wilmington.
Albert E. Hastings,	"	30th,		Paw Paw, Mich.,	" Kalamazoo.
Andrew Montgomery,	"	31st			" Delaware.
Arthur Goodenough,	"	"			"

George F. Chapin,	Dec.	"	Pas.,	Lawrence, K.	"	Kansas.
A. L. Green,	" 12th,	"	Evang.,	Addison, N. Y.,	"	Steuben.
David A. Holbrook,	" 15th,	"	"		"	Watertown.
Henry Ward,	Jan. 3d, 1866,		Pas.,	Minneapolis, Minn.,	"	Minnesota.
Lyell T. Adams,	" 17th,	"	"	Albion, N. Y.,	"	Niagara.
John J. F. Brunow,	Feb. 5th,	"	"	Newark, N. J.,	"	Newark.
Anthony D. Axtell,	" 21st,	"	Evang.,		"	Troy.
Charles D. Flagler,	" "	"	"		"	"

INSTALLATIONS.

Charles C. Carr,	June 30th, 1864,	Horseheads, N. Y.,	by Presb. of	Chemung.
Newton Barrett,	Dec. 13th,	" Dunton, Ill.,	"	Chicago.
Henry E. Niles,	Ap'l 15th, 1865,	York, Pa.,	"	Harrisburgh.
Henry B. Dye.	" 26th,	" Gustavus, O.,	"	Trumbull.
Hanford A. Edson,	" "	" Indianapolis (2d), Ind.,	"	Indianapolis.
William A. M'Corkle,	" 27th,	" Detroit (1st), Mich.,	"	Detroit.
Charles C. Wallace,	" 30th,	" Placerville, Cal.,	"	Sierra Nevada.
Frederick Starr, Jr.,	May 14th,	" St. Louis (North), Mo.,	"	St. Louis.
Elijah W. Stoddard,	" 31st,	" Succasunna, N. J.,	"	Rockaway.
D. Ostrom Timlow,	June 6th,	" Amity, N. Y.,	"	Hudson.
Thomas Harris,	" 8th,	" Shelter Island, N. Y.,	"	Long Island.
John M'Vey,	" 9th,	" New Lebanon, N. Y.,	"	Columbia.
Benjamin Mills,	" 11th,	" Rock Hill, Mo.,	"	St. Louis.
Samuel Wyckoff,	" 13th,	" Knoxville, Ill.,	"	Knox.
John Sailor,	" 20th,	" Allegan, Mich.,	"	Kalamazoo.
Benj. F. Willoughby,	" 21st,	" Augusta, N. Y.,	"	Utica,
Charles P. Burdick,	" 27th,	" Youngstown, N. Y.,	"	Niagara.
J. Evarts Weed,	" 28th,	" Lansing (1st), Mich.,	"	Marshall.
William H. M'Giffert,	" 29th,	" Pontiac,	"	Detroit.
Charles Thayer,	July 2d,	" Vermillion, Minn.,	"	Dakota.
William A. Fox,	" 6th,	" Dunkirk, N. Y.,	"	Buffalo.
James T. Hanning,	" 13th,	" Springville, N. Y.,	"	"
Hy. M. Scudder, D. D.,	" 23d,	" San Francisco, Cal.,	"	San Francisco.
Albert C. Bishop,	Aug. 3d,	" Sand Lake, N. Y.,	"	Albany.
T. Dwight Hunt,	" 9th,	" Niles, Mich.,	"	Kalamazoo.
Thomas Marshall,	Sept. 7th,	" Mankato, Minn.,	"	Dakota.
John Patton, D. D.,	" 27th,	" Middletown, Del.,	"	Wilmington.
Henry E. Butler,	" 28th,	" Keeseville, N. Y.,	"	Champlain.
Daniel G. Mallery,	Oct. 10th,	" Beverly, N. J.,	"	Phila., Fourth.
Austin P. Stockwell,	" 11th,	" Pleasant Plains, N. Y.,	"	North River.
Richard A. Mallery,	" 17th,	" Phila. (Cedar st.), Pa.,	"	Phila., Third.
Walter Frear,	" 18th,	" Santa Cruz, Cal.,	"	Sierra Nevada.
George Duffield, Jr.,	" 24th,	" Galesburgh, Ill.,	"	Knox.
James W. Wood,	" 25th,	" Allentown, Pa.,	"	Phila., Fourth.
Asahel L. Brooks,	" "	" Peoria, Ill.,	"	Knox.
George H. Fullerton,	" 31st,	" Sandusky, O.	"	Huron.
William S. Franklin,	" "	" Camden, N. Y.,	"	Utica.
William C. Scofield,	Nov. 1st,	" Newark (Cen.), N. J.,	"	Newark.
Joseph F. Sutton,	" 5th,	" Phila. (West), Pa.,	"	Phila., Third.
Josephus D. Krum,	" 14th,	" Seneca Falls, N. Y.,	"	Geneva.
David E. Beach,	" "	" Granville, O.,	"	Pataskala.
Alex. M. Thorburn,	" 21st,	" Ogden, N. Y.,	"	Rochester.
Jesse W. Hough,	" 22d,	" Saginaw City, Mich.,	"	Saginaw.
J. Ambrose Wight,	" 23d,	" Bay City, Mich.,	"	"
John H. Walker,	Dec. 13th,	" Neenah, Wis.,	"	Fox River.
Edward Lord,	" 15th,	" Adams, N. Y.,	"	Watertown.

Garret L. Roof,	Jan.	4th, 1866,	Lowville, N. Y.,	"	"
John Maclean,	"	9th, "	Bloomington, Ill.,	"	Bloomington.
William H. Webb,	"	17th, "	Adrian, Mich.,	"	Monroe.
V. Le Roy Lockwood,	"	23d, "	Durham, N. Y.,	"	Catskill.
Theodore D. Marsh,	Feb.	4th, "	Black Hawk, C. T.,	"	Colerado.
Charles K. McHarg,	"	14th, "	Cooperstown, N. Y.,	"	Otsego.
A. B. Lambert, D. D.,	"	21st, "	Hoosick Falls, N. Y.,	"	Troy.

PASTORAL DISSOLUTIONS.

Augustus Pomeroy,	June	14th, 1864.	Groton Village, N. Y.,	by Presb. of	Ithaca.
Edmund B. Miner,	"	22d, "	Baraboo, Wis.,	"	Columbus.
Abraham T. Young,	"	29th, "	Sackett's Harbor, N. Y.,	"	Watertown.
Joshua B. Hall,	Aug.	22d, "	Lysander, N. Y.,	"	Onondaga.
William S. Franklin,	Sept.	14th, "	Genoa (1st C.), N. Y.,	"	Cayuga.
Geo. S. Boardman, D.D.,	Dec.	1st, "	Cazenovia, N. Y.,	"	"
Franklin Noble,		"	Sandusky, O.,	"	Huron.
John D. McCord,		"	Peru, Ill.,	"	"
Henry J. Acker,	Jan.	31st, 1865.	Amity, N. Y.,	"	Hudson.
James I. Ostrom,	Ap'l	5th, "	New Windsor, N. Y.	"	North River.
James B. M'Creary,	"	12th, "	Great Bend, Pa.,	"	Montrose.
William R. S. Betts,	"	18th, "	Otisville, N. Y.,	"	Hudson.
Levi P. Crawford,	"	25th, "	Sandwich, Ill.,	"	Ottawa.
W. H. Thorne,	"	" "	Allentown (1st), Pa.,	"	Phila., Fourth.
Frederick Starr, Jr.,	"	27th, "	Penn Yan, N. Y.,	"	Geneva.
David Torrey,	"	"	Ithaca, N. Y.,	"	Ithaca.
Charles W. Hawley,	May	1st, "	Liverpool, N. Y.,	"	Onondaga.
George Duffield, Jr.,	"	2d, "	Adrian, Mich.,	"	Monroe.
Samuel W. Crittenden,	"	15th, "	Darby (2d), Pa.,	"	Phila., Third.
J. S. Willis,	"	" "	Phila. (West), Pa.,	"	" "
T. Dwight Hunt,	"	31st, "	Waterville, N. Y.,	"	Utica.
Franklin L. Arnold,	"	"	Rome, O.,	"	Grand River.
Henry Smith, D.D.,	June	13th, "	Buffalo (North), N. Y.,	"	Buffalo.
Joshua Cooke,	"	27th, "	Lewiston, N. Y.,	"	Niagara.
William W. Atterbury,	July	28th, "	Madison (2d), Ind.,	"	Madison.
Abner De Witt,	Aug.	15th, "	Hoosick Falls, N. Y.,	"	Troy.
Francis Z. Rosseter,	Sept.	5th, "	Huron, O.,	"	Huron.
Jeremiah N. Diment,	"	12th, "	Franklin, Pa.,	"	Montrose.
Louis P. Ledoux, D.D.,	"	20th, "	Cornwall, N. Y.,	"	North River.
Albert Krahn,	"	27th, "	Newark (German 2d), N. J.,	"	Newark.
Samuel Loomis,	Oct.	10th, "	Vineland, N. J.,	"	Phila., Fourth.
Robert Adair,	"	" "	Norristown (Cen.), Pa.,	"	" "
Clement E. Babb,	"	19th, "	College Hill, O.	"	Cincinnati.
John Hussy,	"	" "	Lockland, O.,	"	Hamilton.
David Magie,	Dec.	"	Mendham (1st), N. J.,	"	Newark.
Baruch B. Beckwith,	Jan.	15th, 1866,	Gouverneur, N. Y.,	"	St. Lawrence.
Tertius S. Clarke, D. D.,	"	16th, "	Weedsport, N. Y.,	"	Cayuga.
Albert C. Reed,	"	" "	Elbridge, N. Y.,	"	"
A. B. Lambert, D. D.,	Feb.	"	Salem, (Wash. Co.), N. Y.,	"	Troy.

American Presbyterian and Theological Review.

NUMBER XV.

CONTENTS OF THE JULY NUMBER, 1866.

Page.

ART. I. THE BEING OF GOD..... 357
By MILES P. SQUIER, D. D., Geneva, N. Y.

II. THE FULLNESS OF THE TIME..... 375
By J. J. VAN OOSTERZEE, D. D., Prof. of Theology in the University of Utrecht.

III. RAPHAEL SANZIO..... 402
By Rev. A. D. GRIDLEY, D. D., Clinton, New York.

IV. THE REFORMED CHURCH OF FRANCE..... 424

V. THE NAME OF THE LORD..... 465
By Rev. J. M. JOHNSON, Hanover, N. J.

VI. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ST. LOUIS..... 474

VII. CRITICAL NOTES ON RECENT BOOKS..... 503

THEOLOGY: Dr. Pusey on the Church of England—The Temporal Mission of the Holy Ghost—Christian Unity and its Recovery—Ingham's Hand Book of Baptism—Dr. Robertson's Sermons and Expositions—Dr. Stone's Living Temple..... 503

BIBLICAL LITERATURE: Lange Commentary..... 505

PHILOSOPHY: Examination of J. S. Mill's Philosophy..... 506

HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY: Life and Letters of F. W. Robertson—Palfrey's History of New England—Dean Stanley's Lectures on the Jewish Church—Froude's History of England—Life of Benjamin Silliman—Women of Methodism—Baptist Missionary Jubilee—Dr. Marsh's Temperance Recollections—Wilson's Presbyterian Historical Almanac..... 507

PRACTICAL RELIGION: The Idle Word—The Christian's Daily Treasury—Battle Echoes—The Young Lady of Pleasure—A Hand Book of Scripture Harmony—Hyms for the Sick Room—American Sunday-school Publications—Presbyterian Publication Committee do.—Carlton & Porter do.—Six Months among the Charities of Europe..... 511

CONTENTS OF JULY NUMBER, (CONTINUED).

Page.

General Literature: Social Life of the Chinese—Thirty Years of Army Life on the Border—Shakspeare's Delineations of Insanity, etc.—Esperance—A Noble Life—Half a Million a Year—Mary Powell—True History of a Little Ragamuffin—Gilbert Rugge—Citoyenne Jacqueline—Walter Goring—The Toilers of the Sea. 513

EDITORIAL NOTE.

We regret to be obliged to lay over to the October number a considerable portion of our Notes on Recent Books, and the whole of the Intelligence prepared for the present number.

CHANGE OF OFFICE.

The office of the *American Presbyterian & Theological Review* will hereafter be 654 Broadway (at the Bookstore of Messrs. Charles Scribner & Co.,) instead of 5 Beekman St.

THE

AMERICAN PRESBYTERIAN AND THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

NEW SERIES. No. XV.—JULY, 1866.

Art. I.—THE BEING OF GOD.

By Miles P. Squier, D. D., Geneva, N. Y.

The existence of God is a fundamental subject of thought. Nothing underlies it or goes before. All theology and moral science arise out of, and depend upon it. If God be not, then nothing is. All else must be resultant of him, and take on the postulate that he is. How can the finite be but by reason of the infinite, the created but by the uncreated, the dependent but by the independent, the conditioned but by the absolute and eternal?

Investigations in theology and moral truth have been much at fault here. They have shown weakness and equivocation, where of right belonged manhood and strength. The subject has not had justice at the hands of its friends. We have failed in method and in cogency of argument, in the reliability and comprehensiveness of our positions, in the resources and completeness of our logic and convictions. We have felt as if the theory of truth here was involved and intricate; as if the thread of the Sybil conducted us through dark and cavernous passages, and along by-ways which we knew not;

that there water was too deep for us, and that we must here pass from the sphere of knowledge into that of simple faith.

In this direction the English mind has taken the lead. Sir William Hamilton has formally stated "that the *knowledge* of God is impossible," in his article on the "Unconditioned"—a position which has been laboriously supplemented by Dr. Mansel, of Oxford, in his *Limits of Religious Thought*. The natural effect of such counsels is to beleaguer conscience and embarrass faith, and set men free from the obligations of religion. And the seed has already borne its legitimate fruit. This is observable in the new impulses and encouragement of "*Positive Science*" on the one hand, and of philosophic atheism and infidelity on the other. What else could be expected? Men will not forswear their intelligence. They will not be religious by prescription, or believe beyond the limits of rational conviction. They will not consent to this divorce between reason and faith; and if attempted by those who should assist their faith, they will only choose their own alternative, and repudiate a creed that does not take the intellect into its conclusions, and build its economy of belief on those enduring principles and first truths which are common to all safe and satisfactory inquiry in other departments of knowledge. Indeed, the conscience should have special help here, in view of the "law in the members," warring against the "law in the mind." It is suicidal to put reason and conscience in antagonism, or reason and faith. And yet this has been the anomaly and perturbation of our theology hitherto, and its false mission to the thinking classes of men. France turned infidel by reason of the unappreciable mummeries of the Romish faith. The Tractarianism of Oxford gives ominous signs of a like reaction. Error germinates in the twilight of conviction, and grows rank in the oscillations and tergiversations of truth.

But why found religion in mysticism, and put its chief elements beyond limits of human thought? Was it not designed for man, and man for it. Should it not inhere in the principles of common sense, and be like the sunlight—for all, and

adapted to all? It is false humility to say that we cannot know God, and that he cannot make himself *known* to us, and that the reason he has given us is not the offspring and counterpart of his own—made in his likeness, and adapted to intelligent correspondence with himself.

St. Paul was a philosopher as well as a Christian; and in a single sentence has he scattered to the winds all this timorousness and misgiving in respect to the elements of religious belief, and brought the whole subject into relation to the human mind, and incorporated it among the legitimate subjects of our knowledge and conviction, and declared our ignorance of it to be without excuse. Rom. i. 20: "For the invisible things of him (God) from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse." This passage is very emphatic. Its statements and positions are comprehensive. Its averments are characteristic and unequivocal. They go the full length demanded for the proof of the being and perfections of God, and account the belief in God to be so obvious and obligatory in its apprehension and requisition, that the heathen even are inexcusable for not recognizing the true Jehovah, and worshiping, loving and serving him as such. The apostle waits for no special economy to reveal God to his creatures, but proclaims him manifested in his works, his being, his eternity and Godhead. All is clearly *seen*—intuitively beheld, and obviously implied and understood, in the legitimate apprehension of the mind from things that are made. "Eternal power" implies eternal existence; that is, uncreated, absolute existence. And then there is the embodiment of the whole grand idea of the "Godhead," as manifested in his works, as *clearly* beheld, as undeniably apprehended and understood. The reference in the passage is to the one true God, with his divine perfections, as thus known in reason, and clearly seen by the intelligence—the invisible things of him—the eternal potentiality and proper "Godhead" of the Deity.

On the basis here referred to, and in the light of the clear

convictions of the apostle, we propose to give the proof of the being of God.

1. *Something is.* This is the testimony of reason, of consciousness, and of the senses. There is infallible truth in this position. If I think, I am; for only that which is, can think. How can we have secondary phenomena without the primary, or actions and words without being and thought?

We are conscious both of acting and of being. Some good writers have given up this last position, but without sufficient reason. There is in the soul a conciousness of existing as well as of acting, of being as well as behaving. This consciousness of self as being and acting is infallible in its instruction, that something is—that we ourselves are, and have faculties and powers, convictions and feelings, intelligence, emotions and passions, observation and experience. In no other way could knowledge be more infallible, or be possible independent of it; and it is worse than idle to call in question the universal and necessary convictions of humanity on this point.

The senses, too, are sure sources and media of instruction; and we distinguish the "me" from the "not me." The eye, the ear, the touch, the taste, the smell, all are channels of knowledge to us from an external world, and methods of our access to it and communion with it. Only by these and like ways could we be put in communication with material objects, and become cognizant of the universe around us. And this linking of the "me" to the "not me" of external nature is a wonderful economy, yet fully authenticated.

Thus we have various means of coming to the knowledge that something is. We are; others are; suns and planets are, and all the universal cosmos of created things. This we may affirm with the certainty of clearly apprehended truth, without troubling ourselves with speculations about the presentative or representative methods of inquiry. Science and common sense agree here. This conviction comes to us with a thousand voices, from within and without, as the universal language of humanity, so that we need not prolong an argument in proof of that which every one feels and knows.

2. *Effects are.* We do not need to prove that man did not create the sun, or himself, or anything else. We know he did not. It is an undeniable position. And yet there are effects. The intelligence sees them to be so. Matter is; and it is meted, bounded and limited, and must have been meted, bounded and limited by what was outside and independent of itself. It is, because it was made to be, and was put into existence by a power before and extraneous to itself. It is, as it is, and where it is, by reason of something else. At most, it is but a "*causa causata*." We see it to be, and to contain only the "*vis inertia*." It is finite, and some being must have made it. It is a creation, and in itself an inert effect. Philosophy and common sense, reason and revelation, intelligence and the senses, agree in affirming this. We arrive at it as surely as we do at the truth, that the whole is equal to the sum of its parts; that matter exists in space, and events in time; and that he who acts, is.

Men dive deeper than the truth sometimes, and show themselves more like muck-worms than philosophers. All science takes rise in the intuitions of the intelligence. Demonstration is in aid of intuitional apprehension. The first truths of reason need no demonstration; they are intuitionally self-evident; they are infallibly seen in the mind's own light. Why undertake to prove to me that which already is a matter of my own consciousness, or which exists with the certainty of infallibly implied truth in the dictates of the intelligence? Why devote an argument to prove that matter exists in space, or that events occur in time, or that effects imply a cause, or action an actor, or thinking a being that thinks?

Intuition is the test of truth, and the arbiter of knowledge. But for this, demonstration would be without conviction, and logic valueless and impossible. What satisfaction can we get from any efforts of logic beyond the insight of our minds, of the truth as reasoned out or stated? Thus all knowledge and conviction, on the last analysis, arise out of, and are resolved into, intuitions. And they must begin in self-evident principles of truth. We apprehend them in the insight of the in-

telligence, and advance from them, and but for them advance would be impossible. They are not proved, but seen in their own light, by the insight of reason.

This is not faith, though faith and trust in the things thus seen and signified is consequent and reasonable. It is not testimony to us, but apprehension by us. It is not testimony from the senses, but it is perception by them. It is apprehension and knowledge through them. It is the insight of the intelligence in the only possible way of consciousness and sense; and we believe the things thus made known, for the best of reasons, because we see them to be true. We take testimony from others and use it for what it is worth, but here we see and have the original types and methods of knowledge, and give them credence as such. And we perceive that matter is effect, and recognize it as merely inert, unconscious, impersonal effect, without sense or reason, and appropriate and use it as such. It is created, and not absolute in its being; it is, because it was made, to be, and could not have been otherwise; and if we deny the intuitions of mind in this, then is all knowledge impossible, and science a misnomer from the beginning.

So in the sphere of mind, though here we rise above nature, and take in the peculiar elements of the supernatural. Mind is cause *per se*, and yet but a limited, finite, created, dependent cause in us. It has no creative power, and must itself have been created. It is itself an effect, finite and dependent in its being and power. It could not create one particle of the dust of the earth. It had a beginning, and a creation, and puts on all the types of dependence, responsibility and allegiance. It is consciously an effect, and humble in its dependence, as the offspring of one who created and upholds and sustains all things.

3. *Something always was.* This follows infallibly from the fact that something is. How get the existent, without the ever-existent? How get the effect, without the cause? The scale of dependent causes does not help you. You must reach an original cause, which is in no sense an effect. Any

and all effects show this. The philosophic Paul saw this, and leaped at once, in his convictions and his argument, from the creation to an *eternal* Power, and with the utmost legitimacy and infallibility. We care not how difficult may be the idea of the always being; it is inevitable. Either deny everything, or admit that. If effects are, there is eternal cause. If anything is, something always was. You get your whole doctrine from the least mote as completely as from the largest universe. Nothing could be, unless something always was. That which had a beginning is an effect, and had a cause above and before it. That which began, is by reason of that which did not begin. Dependence proves independence; the derived, the underived; the created, the uncreated and absolute. You must accept, absolute, uncreated, eternal being, as the only stand-point for the existence of anything else. It is our inevitable postulate, if effects are, and the creation is. But these are, and there is a cosmos. As you cannot deny the one, neither can you the other. The logic is inexorable, the philosophy without mistake, the insight of reason obvious and perfect. You get the derived finite, by means of the underived infinite The (αιων), the always being, is the necessary complement of the doctrine of every being, action and thought. You can have nothing, or think of nothing, that does not involve it. The full and adequate conception of the *always being*, "without beginning of days or end of years," may not be expected of derived mind. We are an effect, and abide in the region and sphere of effects, and find it difficult to grasp that which is only cause, and itself uncaused. But that it is, admits of no doubt, "being clearly seen by things that are made"—and we repeat the thought.

4. *The always-being is eternal cause.* The always existing could be in no sense an effect, or find the reason and ground of its being in something else. Nothing else existed, to take on this relation to it. Its existence, like that of duration and space, is from eternity to eternity, "the same yesterday, to-day and forever," and is inherent cause. Whatever else exists is originated by this, and exists by its creative fiat. In

the existence of this, you reach the necessary ultimatum of being, as cause of all conception concerning it. Nothing is possible or conceivable beyond. The ultimate idea is eternal existence, as eternal, original cause—the originator of all else; but itself without origination and without beginning, and like space and duration, boundless, ceaseless. It simply is, and acts. We may not, in our sphere of derived existence, and under the laws of thought that must obtain in the region of cause and effect, be able to gain the full contents of such existence; but that it is, we infallibly know. We get it as a first truth of reason, from the laws of the intelligence, and the inevitable logic of the case. More we could not have; less there could not be, if even a mote or an atom exists.

5. *The always-being, the eternal cause, is* INTELLIGENT *cause.* Matter exists only as effect: its "vis inertia" is proved by the insight of reason and the senses. Mind only is cause, and is seen to be cause, by the dictate of consciousness. It may be dependent for its being, as in the case of finite, derived mind, but has in it the elements of inherent cause, in its self-activity and prerogatives of free-will. It has free personality, and the self-felt, and self-acknowledged power of causation and choice. It is a "causa causaus." All intelligence is such, and it is all the proper cause of which we know. If other modes of being are possible, they are not known or knowable, and are without relevancy or significance in this discussion, and could no way affect our position.

Intelligence, then, is the characteristic of the eternal cause. It is so "a fortiori." This is infinite, absolute mind, having in itself the elements of all power and cause. Mind has everywhere homogeneous characteristics and manifestations. It must have intellect, sensibility and will. These are integral to it, and include all that belong to it, or that is conceivable as in it. We may go from derived mind to the underived, and obtain from conscious manifestations, the elements of both. From what is in, and belongs to derived, dependent mind, we recognize what belongs to independent, absolute mind. The one is a derivative from the other, and like it, and

in correspondence with it. The forthgoings of the absolute will be in the direction of its own being, in giving birth to mind, and constituting it the offspring of its author. There will be mutual similarity and appreciation. They will correspond with each other, and we pass from the known to the unknown, as we step by the moon into the visible heavens. We legitimately take the chronological or the logical method, and pass from effect to cause, and from cause to effect, and we see in the eternal cause, not the reflection merely of our own intelligence, and mental constitution and energy, but the absolute and unfailing source and fullness of it. We come to the fountain head of all being, intelligence, and power. We arrive at the original, unlimited, independent cause; at the infinite mind, which was before all else, and by which all else exists. And we get this with the infallible certainty of demonstrative truth. We get the doctrine in consciousness, and by the light of our own intelligence, and we refer it legitimately, in its relations, to the original, absolute cause. There is firm footing. Intelligent cause finds its fullness and perfection in the original, eternal cause, and we behold in it the grand primal element and authorship of all else. There is "the hiding" of power, and there the counterpart and depositary of the intellectual characteristics, energies and manifestations of a created universe.

6. *The always-being is* RIGHTEOUS *cause.* Here we rise into the moral bearings of our subject more appropriately, and enter a sphere of truth that is thought to be less ascertained and obvious. We may then proceed with special caution, and be more deliberate in the conclusions to which we come, and we throw into the foreground of our position the following summary of thought comprised in it, as we ask, Is not rectitude the normal mode and state of the intelligence? Is not sin an apostasy from right? Could malevolence and wrong have an object in an independent, absolute, intelligent cause? What is the doctrine of conscience and of reason? What is the instruction of fact in the case? We may review these inquiries a little in detail, and see with what united force they

bear on the position, that the intelligent, eternal cause exists in eternal rectitude and truth.

(1) *Rectitude is the normal status of intelligence everywhere.* Mind is constituted in its elements and inherently adapted to right action under the influence of truth. Its nativity and growth, and harmony of being are in all righteousness, goodness and love. It feels outraged and wronged when committed to any other course. Its indigenous principles have their natural development, and play, and outgrowth, and consent of action in all goodness, and justice, and truth. Wrong grates harsh thunder in the chambers of the soul, and throws it into a state of uneasiness, self-accusation and discord. Wrong is essentially abnormal to the intelligence. It puts it out of gear in itself, and with all things else. It is an interference and a disruption. There is not an intelligent being that truly fellowships wrong, and that does not feel humiliated by it, or that is not ashamed of it, and that seeks not apology and excuse for it. Its presence begets self-reproach and a sense of guilt and unworthiness. Its indulgence brings on antagonism and warfare. It is unreason, as well as unrighteousness. It is without occasion, and without excuse. It is out of harmony with truth and the nature of things, and an apple of discord everywhere. It is so in the individual, in society, and through the universe. It is intellectual and moral disruption, suicide and ruin, and it would not be the status of original, absolute cause, or of anything made in its image.

(2) *Sin can be only by apostasy from right.* There is a logical difficulty in the way of conceiving wrong to be the normal state of the intelligence. Sin is transgression. It supposes law, and right, and righteous authority, and the behests of goodness and truth. Moral government is before it. It finds a nature of things established,—an order of being, to which it is disruption and discord. It is logically abnormal, and by priority of right. It is apostasy from the original, absolute cause, and cannot be of it, or possess its moral nature. It is dereliction and antagonism, and could not be in unity and agreement with the truth and verity of things.

But there is no opportunity or possibility of change, or apostasy in absolute cause. The conception of change would reduce it to limited, finite effect, and divest it of all elements of original, absolute cause. Besides, what should change it? and from what should it apostatize, but from itself? It has all knowledge and power always, and has in it no ground of change. This is conceivable in intelligent beings, only by change of view, by new considerations, through increase of knowledge, and the pressure of motives not before in the mind. Change has its genesis and analysis in the altered state, or circumstances of the being changed. This is a liability of derived, finite mind, which of necessity begins in ignorance, weakness and inexperience. It begins at the zero of knowledge, for knowledge is an experience, and not a creation. But, to it are confined all the attributes, incidents, and grounds of change. To the all-knowing absolute, they are impossible. "He is of one mind, and none can turn him. Changes in him would not be of the nature of intelligent action. The highest freedom would make it ever certain that he would be unalterably the same, yesterday, to-day, and forever." Change in finite mind will occasion change of treatment from the absolute, but this is only because of its own oneness and immutability. It will have moral government, for it is itself intelligent cause, and will administer it in perfect righteousness from its own inherent perfections. Such a government, so administered, is a perfectness on the part of absolute cause. Nothing else could be better, or be in its stead. This only is conceivable or possible in the absolute, and perfect freedom of absolute, intelligent cause. This is of its image, and in its likeness, and will be its method and forthgoing.

(3) *Malevolence would be without an object in original, absolute cause.* It would not be intelligent action there, and could have no place. Malevolence implies resistance, controversy, and ill-will. It is a normal state nowhere, and would have nothing to feed on in the absolute course. Simple goodness is not in itself an object of hate to any intelligence. Righteous authority must come in our way, and set up its claims on

us, when we have got off the track of obedience, or have resolved to serve ourselves, and have our own way; to be resisted and impugned by us. Sin is shy and apologetic. No one accepts it for its own sake. It has the verdict of no intelligent being in the universe. All are ashamed of it, and tender excuse for it, and seek to justify themselves in some way for its indulgence. "The wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the righteous are bold as a lion."

But what occasion has absolute cause for all this, and to turn to the deceits and craft of ungodliness? Wrong would have no object or apology there, and must be forever without ground or possibility. It is independent. It intuitionally knows all things, and is from eternity to eternity the same. It must recognize truth, and right, and blessing, as the only reason, and the opposite as only unreason and folly. Sin is always so, and absolute cause would see it, and thus regard it, and be at a perfect remove from it. It is conceivable only in the finite, and there only in misguided, mistaken, and perverse will.

(4) We advert to the *doctrine of conscience and the nature of mind.* The thought here is intimately blended with what has been already said. Mind is made for truth, and truth adapted to it. The conscience, with fair opportunity, corresponds to all righteousness, and eschews all wrong. It has a scorpion's sting for him who practices iniquity. It repudiates all wrong, and makes the way of the transgressor hard. Thus writes our great English dramatist:

> "Thrice is he armed who hath his quarrel just."
> —"'Tis conscience that makes cowards of us all."
> —"The thief doth esteem each bush an officer."

So again, on the other hand,

> "I feel within me
> A peace above all earthly dignities,
> A still and quiet conscience."

Sin seeks twilight and evasion. It is inconsistent and out of harmony with all mind, and is every way abnormal to the

innate principles of the intelligence. The greatest of modern scholars (Neander) has called it simply "unreason," and with this agrees all fact in the case. We know nothing of wrong but through apostasy. We have only to cease from it, in penitence and reformation, to recover our normal state, and put the powers of the soul into consent and harmony. All history agrees in this. The conflicts of the ages demonstrates this, and the sentiments, aspirations, and progress of the race. What is the advancing civilization of the world but a recovery, a resurrection, a plea, in behalf of associated humanity, as well as individual man, for that "righteousness which exalteth a nation, and against the sin which is a reproach unto any people."

But we do need more to evince the innate, moral rectitude of the absolute cause. It is the doctrine of all science and truth, of all logic and reason, and inevitable from the nature and history of mind.

7. *The always-being is infinite cause.* What shall limit it, and put it into the finite, and give it metes and bounds? Nothing is before it, or superior to it, or correlative with it. It must be unlimited and boundless, as are space and duration. To put it into the finite reduces it to a mere effect, subject to the accidents of time. The thing would only be absurd, and involve the denial of absolute cause altogether.

It may be difficult, and perhaps impossible, for us fully to grasp the contents embraced in infinite cause. The nature of thought and speech would seem to forbid it. We are derived beings and exist in the finite. Language is earthly and finite in its composition and history. It is essentially analogical. Our conceptions rise from the known to the unknown. We compare the infinite with the finite, and strive after the apprehension of it through that medium. They are not correlates. The infinite is a conception of the *pure reason*. It is apprehended through a negation of the qualities of the finite, as effect, and as existing by necessity, from the fact that the finite exists. It is the logical antecedent of it, and must be, if the finite is, and must be apprehended to be by the intelli-

gence, as the alone condition of the finite;—"being clearly *seen* by the things that are made, even its eternal power and godhead."

The infinite is, so to speak, the normal type of being. The finite is limited, partial and fragmentary it may be,—changing and evanescent, and exists by no necessary law. It has the characteristic or accident of more or less. It is the product of free will, and might not have been at all. It is the exception, and not the rule of being. Infinite existence was without it. It is in quality and amount only what it was made to be, by the creative fiat of eternal cause:—a few billions of worlds, perhaps, with people and products, their habitudes and mutations, their accidents and results. The grand law of being is in the ever-existing, unchanging, infinite.

It is difficult for us to conceive of either mode of being, and of the one no less than of the other. The finite is effect, and could exist only by reason of the infinite, and as its product. The doctrine of cause generates, necessitates the existence of the underived infinite. The finite is, by reason of the infinite and can only thus be, to give it being, and the qualities of finite existence. Finite it will be of course, it being created, and proclaims its logical antecedent and creator, in that which is not created or finite. It springs out of that as the offspring and manifestation of it, and its constant work.

Of the infinitude of original cause, it is enough for our position that we conceive of it, as we do of space and duration, as every way limitless and without bounds; or dependence or change, as in no way effect, but existing eternally as the same ubiquitous cause.

8. *The always-being, is self-existent, perfect being.* It depends on nothing else. It exists in self-sufficiency and perfection; independent and without imperfection in any respect. Imperfection is characteristic of the finite and dependent. Decay and change are its liabilities. It is subject to outside influences. It has been put into being and may be put out. It is not raised above a state of dependence: it could not be. Not so the great first cause. These elements would reduce it to an

effect, and put it in the finite. It must have been perfect in all respects, indestructible and exhaustless, or it would have come to nought, or never have been. It can have no element of decadence, exhaustion or change. Every attribute of it, must of necessity be perfect in its kind, and eternally the same, without variableness or shadow of turning; and these attributes are those of wisdom, goodness, and power,—all perfection, both natural and moral, infinitely and forever. Nothing other or different from this does the finite and created demand. If but a mote exist, all this is and must be true and always was. With perfect certainty and assurance we spring from the existence of a thought or an atom, to the existence of the uncreated, infinite, and eternal cause, with all the perfections of intellect and heart belonging to intelligent being.

9. *The always-being is God, the personal Jehovah, with all the attributes and prerogatives of the Godhead.* This is St. Paul's conclusion, and we arrive at it with the security and perfectness of pure truth. It has the infallibleness of a first truth of reason; clearly seen in the light of the intelligence itself.

Personality resides in the will. This is the executive faculty of intelligent being. It is cause and the only cause. Reason may be receptive only, and impersonal it may be in some of its aspects; the sensibility may be passive; but not so the will. That is the centralization of the personality, and the living and conscious agency of the mind. It is the life and energy of the acting, responsible agent. Here is where we abandon the abstract form of speech, and take the concrete. Here we give impersonation to our subject, and speak of cause as the investiture of the deity and the synonym of God, with all divine perfections infinitely, of both intellect and will. This is the "I AM" of Moses, and the Pentateuch, where it is referred to with philosophical exactness and comprehension. Accidental metaphysics cannot coin a more descriptive apellation. It is the always existing—the eternal present, embracing in a complete personality all the attributes and preroga-

tives of the one living and true God. It is revealed in the intelligence. Reason would cease her office not to observe it. Nothing is, or all this is. If any thing is, then God is, with all perfection of wisdom, power and goodness.

We need no special revelation to evince this, except as sin has obscured our vision. Indeed Moses must have accepted it as the dictate of reason, and known in the intelligence, and appealed to, as an indubitable first truth, for the verification of the message sent therewith. It must be the dictate of reason, or it would be no test or verification of the message, or of him by whom it is sent. It must be an undoubted first truth, or it could not thus be appealed to, or discharge its office in the connection. The process was wholly philosophical, passing from the known to the unknown. Thus the existence of God is nowhere made the subject of a communicated and verbal revelation: this it could not be. The conception of the being of God antedates, by necessity of relation, that of a revelation from him. One must have a friend, in order to hear from him, and recognize his being in accepting his communication. Thus a divine revelation will begin with stating the acts of God, and not with a disquisition to prove that he is. It will recognize everywhere his being, and make it the basis of its communications and declarations to the ignorant and misguided, as what they ought to know, and would, only as "through lust, they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, and changed the true God into a lie, and worshiped and served the creature more than the Creator, who is blessed forevermore."

Ignorance of God is an apostasy from the true and primeval knowledge of him. It is born of the lusts and vile affections of men, and is less allied to the head than the heart. God has not left himself without a witness in the intellect and conscience of man, and it is to that, that revelation appeals with its economy of instruction and grace. It is a restoration and recovery. It is needed only by reason of the fall, and has its design to gain us back into the harmony of our being, and into harmony with God.

Thus in review of our whole epitome of thought, the legitimacy of faith in the being of God is every way vindicated and obvious. It is the offspring of the intuitions of reason, and of inexorable logic. I believe in the existence of God as I do in that of anything else that I know to be. My faith, a confidence and trust in God, are the result of an intellectual apprehension of him, as of any other being, and not a baseless and unsustained sighing, or wish for that which we cannot "know." Faith is the result of evidence. It is the child of light in the understanding. The "Godhead" is clearly seen, through any manifestation in the finite. "God is light, and in him is no darkness at all." We have such proof of his being and perfections, as we have of no one else. Our bodily organs do not apprehend the real being of any one: the recognition is wholly mental. And we have more relations to God than to any one else, and over and above all, the relation of dependence, by which we see that his existence is the necessary prerequisite of any person or thing else.

We hold then, and by the most rigid logic, and the most assured and unquestionable methods of the intelligence, that faith in God is of all things most reasonable, and is commended to us by every possible avenue of knowledge. Spirit, of course, is not matter, and yet if we accept the revelation given, it is quite capable of taking on the forms of matter, as is true of ourselves. Bodily organs do not apprehend spiritual being, but the mind for which they act, does, and sees it with the certainty and perfectness of direct consciousness and conception. The commerce of mind with mind is, of course, intellectual, but nevertheless is real and appreciable. God recognizes us, and we recognize him. He holds intercourse with us in the communion, and fellowship, and love, and all the reciprocities of the infinite with the finite, and we give back the like responses and their counterpart. Finite mind is an emanation from the infinite, and in its image, and like it in its properties. God can communicate with it, intelligently and it can understand him and reciprocate the intercourse. This is the behoof and privilege of all finite mind. For this

was it made, and in this is its highest prerogative, excellence and glory.

And here lies the sphere of intelligent being ;—God with us and we with him and with each other, in the three categories of all possible knowledge and relationship :—the infinite—the finite, and the relation between them.

On this basis faith becomes truly the dictate of reason and the form of it. It is intelligently the gift of God and the handmaid of virtue. It receives meekly and with docility all divine communications, as not from an unknown source, but as from a known God and Father, who "has not left himself without witness," or left us in our orphanage without light, seeing that "he is not far from every one of us, for in him we live, and move, and have our being."

Nor in this do we unduly magnify the gift of reason, or the province of our intellectual being. What else would be true, or to be expected? If God be an infinitely perfect being, shall not that appear in his work, and especially in that crowning work of spiritual being in the finite? Shall it not be a respondent of the infinite reason and be capable of knowing as well as of loving and serving God? Must its devotion be to one unknown, and its worship be that of ignorance and mere dictation? How then could we be intelligent and responsible worshipers, or distinguish between truth and error in this department of knowledge? This power to know God is indispensable to both intelligence and morality. If we cannot know God, then by equal force of reasoning we cannot know other spiritnal beings, and all sense of obligation and duty will fade from the mind.

Sir William Hamilton and his followers mistake the relations of faith, and inaugurate a nomenclature on this subject which only confuses and bewilders. It is not true that because we believe the senses, therefore they are not methods of knowledge. It is because they are methods of knowledge and loopholes of the mind, by which it looks out upon truth and sees what is, that we believe them. What are they but the mind thus surveying the domain of truth, and gaining the ma-

terials of knowledge? and when, with these hints from consciousness, or the senses, we pass into the region of pure truth, what is more conceivable than the necessary being, perfections and relations of God, and the love and service we owe him? The faith that is not founded in knowledge, and that does not take the intellect into its conclusion, must indeed be suppositions, and arbitrary, and by consequence shadowy and unsatisfying, and well would it have been if distinguished writers on this subject had analyzed it with greater patience and accuracy.

But enough of the brief recital of truth designed in this article; and we close as we began, with a reference to the philosophical, as well as inspired, St. Paul, who, in the first chapter of his Letter to the Romans, as elsewhere, seems to have measured in few words the height, and depth, and length, and breadth of this whole subject, and left, "without excuse," all wavering and doubt concerning it.

Art. II.—THE FULLNESS OF THE TIME.

By J. J. Van Oosterzee, D. D., Prof. of Theology in the University of Utrecht.

Translated from the Dutch, by Rev. J. P. Westervelt, Princeton, N. J.

It is impossible for us to view in its proper light the appearance of the Son of God on earth, without having previously acquainted ourselves with the period in which he appeared on the stage of this world. An apostle of the Lord, who was accustomed to take a profound view of the development of God's counsel, has assured us that God sent his Son *in the fullness of the time*. It is our task to justify that declaration, and to make it, in the light of history, apparent, that the age

in which Jesus was born was eminently adapted to see the founder of the kingdom of God appear. A glance at the heathen, at the Jewish world, and at the mutual relation of both in the period of Augustus, will convince us as well of the susceptibility of humanity to the appearance of Christ, as serve to prepare the way for the explanation of the reception that he met with.*

On entering the heathen world, then, at the first superficial view, all seems to contradict the declaration that this field was ready to receive the seed of the kingdom. The most powerful nations, fettered and bent under the yoke of domination, adopt Rome's vices, and see, on the other hand, their own idols honored in the chief city of the ancient world. Among the conquerors luxury has ascended the throne, and the perilous art of enjoying life is refined and developed to a degree that seems, with its cultivators, to have deadened every feeling of necessity for something higher and better. Among the oppressed all elasticity seems departed, all courage extinguished, all higher life of the spirit crippled by the misery of the times. The schools of philosophy find numerous adherents, eloquent teachers, powerful patrons. The idol temples still stand well established, environed by a retinue of priests, visited by throngs of worshipers, protected by the power of the State against every assault. Is it, then, no partial prepossession for our Christian faith, when we call heathenism antiquated and exhausted? Is it not premature to maintain that under the blush of health we discover symptoms of decay and death on the countenance of the heathen

---

* Compare, besides what Neander, Gieseler and Hase, in the first period of church history, communicate on this important subject, Tholuck, *On the Being and Moral Influence of Heathenism;* Stirm, *Apologie des Christenth*, (1836) 7e Brief; Tzschirner, *Fall des Heidenth*, edited by Niedner, 1st vol. (1829); Kuhn, *der Gegensatz des Heidenthums und des Christenth. in der sittlichen Weltansicht*, in the *Tübinger Theol. Quartalschr.* 1841. II. S. 224–243; C. Schmidt, *Essai historique sur la Société civile dans le monde Romain et sur sa transformation par le Christianisme*, Strasb. 1853. Hagenbach, *Voord. over de gesch. d. Chr. Kerk gedurende de drie eerste eeuwen*, *Rott. bl.* 1–44, and especially Edm. de Pressensé, *Gesch. d. drie eerste eeuwen des Christend.* Utr. 1860, bl. 17–242, with the writers there cited. Finally, also, the important *Vorlesungen über neuest Zeitgeschichte*, of M. Schneckenburger, published after the death of the writer. Francf. 1862.

world? Let impartial history give the answer to these questions.

And then, as we glance at the *inward* condition of heathenism, we are at once struck with the developed *disbelief* in the truth of the same religion, which now more than ever seems to flourish. High was the degree of intellectual and moral refinement attained by many in this period. Philosophy had deeply felt and loudly acknowledged the absurdity of the earlier mythological representations; and the more the thinking spirit endeavored to penetrate the being of the Deity, the less could it acquiesce in the traditions and solemnities of the popular religion. The light kindled by Anaxagoras, Socrates, Plato, Zeno and others, shone not only on the initiated in their flourishing schools, but spread also its rays far and near in many houses and hearts of the people. Were there yet thousands who unreflectingly and servilely honored the earlier forms, they could not wholly close their ears and their hearts to the voice of truth that found so powerful an advocate in every one's understanding and conscience. A Plutarch, to whom none can deny moral and religious earnestness, was heard to assert "that, if the poetic doctrine of the gods must be literally understood, it must be spewed out of the mouth and publicly cursed." An Augustus dared affirm, "that Plato, who knew and earnestly censured the badness of the Grecian gods, much more deserved to be called God than those shameless ministers of sin." Strabo hesitated not to pronounce superstition a necessary evil, devised by statecraft, and only maintained by stupidity.* It is not, indeed, in itself so strange that voices against existing forms of religion make themselves heard. But that they are uttered so loudly; that they are not opposed but echoed; that those who raise them are regarded as the wisest and best men of their time, this already convinces us how greatly heathenism had, in the consciousness of countless numbers, outlived itself. A religion

* Plutarch *De Iside*, cap. 26. Augustinus, *De civ. Dei*, II. 14 Strabo, *Geogr.* 1, 2. Polyb. *Reliq.* VI. c. 56.

must indeed have sunk very low, above whose authority every intelligent man sought, as far as possible, to raise himself.

As faith is such a necessity of human nature as will take no denial, men cannot remain contented with unbelief. If no clear light arises on the inquiring mind, it enters on a new path of error, and loses itself in the mists of *superstition*. If ever history furnished for our contemplation a striking example of the truth uttered by Göthe: "Der Conflict des unglaubens und Glaubens bleibt das einzige und tiefste Thema der Welt- und Menschengeschichte," it was in these times. Men fled from beings in which they scarcely believed; conscience drove the sinner back to the temples and altars, from which his understanding kept him at a distance, and whilst his mouth denied the existence of the gods, his hand employed magic means to protect himself against their influence, and his heart trembled by reason of the visions of the night. Thus very many spent their lives in disconsolate unrest, while the earth around them was hung in somber crape, and the heaven above was hid as by dark clouds from their view. Could there be a stronger incitement to urgent desires for purer light and fresher air?

Faith is the moral lever of our acts. It is not surprising, then, that the fruits of morality fail when the tree withers and dies on which they must grow. The *deepest immorality* characterized the heathen world. We should, indeed, go too far, were we to assert that virtue had entirely forsaken the earth, when God commanded deliverance from heaven. However deeply sunk, never could all mankind efface the last traces of their heavenly nobility. Had the higher life been wholly dead and buried, there had also been an end to the susceptibility of the nations to receive the light of a higher revelation. It would be unjust to guage the depth to which, in general, morality had descended, by a Nero, Caligula, Messalina, and others. Civil virtues had, at Rome, been developed in high degree, and their whole posterity had not yet degenerated from former greatness. The moral strictness of the stoic school had not at once lost its influence. But is not

the high respect wherewith the age of Augustus mentions the names of a few noble spirits, a proof that they were exceptions from thousands, shining stars in a very dark night. It flowed from the nature of heathen religion, that the virtue it favored was extremely defective, the vice it fostered most alluring. The highest ideal of the Greeks, in their flourishing period, was æsthetic development; that of the Romans, political virtue and loyalty; but from the one stand-point pure morality, from the other true humanity, too often retired into the shade. Here moral turpitude was concealed and encouraged, and there was hardly a crime that found no extenuation or commendation in the conduct of the gods. There the crown of loyalty was the highest standard of human excellence, and every quiet virtue that did not enhance the national glory was regarded with the greatest contempt. Hence it was, that the female sex was oppressed, the lower classes trampled on, the moral education of children neglected. Humility was a virtue, in the fullest sense of the word unknown to heathenism, and self sufficiency the principle of philosophy. What Cicero somewhere said,* "that we must expect success from the gods, but wisdom and virtue must be procured by our own strength," was the tacit hypothesis on which every system was constructed. Was the flourishing of morality, even in the fairest periods of ancient history, obstructed by such obstacles, how rapid must have been its decline when the sun of Greece's glory disappeared, and Rome, made giddy by the prosperity of universal dominion, sunk into a whirlpool of licentiousness. Such was the state of things in the days in which Christianity appeared. Pleasure mounted the throne, shame departed from the heart. "All"—to use the words of Seneca†—"was full of vice and crimes; more was done amiss than could by violence be made good. An unheard-of fight of wickedness is fought. From day to day love to sin increases, and men are under less re-

* De nat. Deorum, III. c. 36.
† De Ira, II. c. 8, 9. Compare the Satires of Juvenal and Persius.

straint. Vice no longer even conceals itself, but makes its appearance publicly. So greatly has wickedness become public, and inflamed the hearts of all, that innocence has not only become rare, but does not at all exist. If you desire the wise man to be angry in that measure which the turpitude of the crimes demands, he must then not only be angry, but even become mad with rage." We need not raise the veil behind which the most abominable sins were concealed; sufficient, that in public was practised what is not even mentioned without blushing. To those who doubt whether the disease of sin had penetrated deeply enough to make such an extraordinary remedy necessary, as that which Christianity announces, we only put the question, whether they can without shuddering contemplate even the possibility that that malady should have continued for centuries longer, and infected all the arteries of the great body of humanity? And however little disposed to pronounce the highly praised virtues of the ancients nothing else than splendid sins, we cannot, however, deny that an age which not only endured, but also flattered, admired and deified the most abominable monsters of wickedness, has disgraced itself in the estimation of all that is pious and noble.

With this sad internal was joined a no less fatal *external* condition of many. *Civil calamities and misfortunes* were the preachers of repentance that God sent in advance of the proclamation of the gospel to purify, by storms and hurricanes, the atmosphere of the heathen world, so that the sun of righteousness might the more gloriously illumine it with the rays of celestial light. Were the miseries still concealed by the robe of luxury, in the metropolis of the world-empire, in the conquered provinces the wretchedness knew no bounds. The most rigorous despotism swayed everywhere its iron sceptre. The insolence of the plundering soldiers, who enriched themselves at the expense of the conquered, rapidly increased. Had one State after another seen all its glory succumb to the eagles of Rome, whole nations stood mournfully still by the ruins of their earlier greatness. A mere æsthetic, or purely

political form of religion, could not satisfy the suffering heart, where it pined away from inward dissension with the world and itself. To the fortunate their mythology might be adapted; to the unfortunate it had little that was attractive. The conquered saw their gods received by the conquering Romans among the objects of their adoration, and thereby withdrawn forever from their own national regard. The slaves of Rome looked for freedom, the citizens of the annihilated kingdoms for an imperishable dominion, and louder than ever did the heart ask from heaven a peace that earth could never give.

Where was the remedy for all these maladies? Religion could no longer offer it, she, who had been the fruitful mother of unbelief, superstition, and immorality. But even philosophy sat down perplexed. The human understanding had run through the circle in which, left to itself, it could move. Most of the schools that had proceeded from the Socratic, still found numerous adherents. But among all we are continually struck by the same fundamental tone, the feeling of dissatisfaction, of uncertainty, of hopelessness of ever coming to a fixed knowledge of the truth. Once departed from the popular religion, men but too quickly bid farewell to all religion. How many will in their heart have subscribed the word of Pythagoras: "Whether there are gods, is a question which I will as little answer in the affirmative as in the negative." Did the *Stoic* still allow mythology to retain apparently its right because he saw in its gods only emblems of the elementary forces of nature, on the other hand he destroyed by his pride all inward religious life, and became inhuman, because he would be superhuman.* The *Cyrenaic* school assumed, for the most part, a hostile attitude towards the existing religious belief. The *Epicurean* might not entirely abnegate the existence of the gods, it denied, however, all immediate relation between the higher and the material world, and though we will not judge of its worth by the morals of its later adhe-

*M. M. Von Baumhauer, *Diss. Litt. Stoicorum περὶ τῆς εὐλόγου ἐξαγώγης doctrinam exponens*, Traj. 1843. p. 58.

rents, its fundamental principles constrain us to subscribe to the opinion of Cicero,* "that Epicurus, in order to give no offence to the Athenians, left them the name of the gods, but deprived them of the gods themselves." The *middle* and *new Academy* preached boldly a wretched scepticism in the domain of theology, and esteemed probability the highest step to which human knowledge could ascend. And when we hear, even the father of Roman eloquence, not only pronounce the existence of the gods, problematical, but also hear him reckon† a future reward and punishment simply among the *probabilia*- then we have here less a personal opinion, than a conviction shared by many, which found in him its celebrated exponent.

One means remained to philosophy for propping up the sinking religion. It consisted in giving to mythology a deeper sense, and endeavoring to remove the offensiveness of its representations, by exhibiting them as allegories of profound and true ideas. It was above all the *new Platonic school*, that adopted this course, and endeavored to commend the myths as treasuries of a higher wisdom. But heathenism was no longer adapted to such an ideal conception, as it had already sunk to so remarkable a depth, and the multitude were here too ignorant, and elsewhere too indolent, to raise themselves to such a standpoint. Soon they were obliged to acknowledge to themselves, that they were in this way viewing the ancestral doctrines and solemnities in a light in which they were, originally, by no means intended, and even where this view obtained, the illumination and reformation of mankind were still but little advanced. Such a religious feeling, as with the Greeks, resolved itself almost wholly into appreciation of the arts, with the Romans into patriotism, could not possibly become the principle of a resuscitated and improved inward life. As just that was lacking in heathenism, which is the first thing to impart light and strength to every human heart, the positive assurance, founded on facts, of God's forgiving love, so

---

* De Nat. Deor. I, c. 30 et. 44.
† *De Nat. Deorum* in fine, *De Invent.* I. cap. 29.

it lacked also humanity in the sublimest sense of the word. It is not surprising, that a feeling of disconsolateness and helplessness was everywhere manifested. A Cato and Cæsar dared publicly confess, that the belief in an eternal existence was fabulous, and that on yonder side of the grave neither sorrow nor joy was to be expected.* According to the testimony of Philo, there was in his time a very considerable number of atheists and pantheists.† And who is not affected at hearing such a man as the elder Pliny, in his *Natural History*, make the undisguised declaration, "that all inquiry after a higher truth may be denominated ridiculous, and that it is to be doubted, which is more advantageous to mankind, the scepticism of some, or the disgraceful religion of others, yea, that this alone is certain, that absolutely nothing certain exists,‡ and that a more wretched, as well as prouder creature than man, does not exist." Little did the learned investigator of the book of nature and of history suspect, that when he wrote this, the light had already risen in the darkness!

Was the necessity of a higher revelation realized, and desires after it awakened, we must, however, by no means imagine that the heathen world stood on an eminence, that would render the reception of Christianity *easy*. Even if history did not teach the contrary, it might be readily inferred from the nature of the case, that also here collision and conflict were unavoidable. The people remained superstitiously cleaving to ancient usages and solemnities. As a competent critic rightly observes: "The very existence of heathenism was the ground of its continuance; what has already existed, and been in force for thousands of years, continues still for a long time, even when the ideas and necessities, out of which it arose, do not as formerly exist. Many are governed by an immemorial authority: the very antiquity of the existing worship passed for a ground of faith against the youthful Christianity. Two centuries lie therefore between the period

* Sallustius, *Bell Catalin.* Cap. 51 et 52.
† Philo, Ed. Pfeiffer, I. p. 263.
‡ Plinius, Hist. Nat. I. c. 7.

of the Antonines, in which the conflict was commenced, and the days of Theodosius, in which the victory was achieved."* Moreover the hierarchy did not forego its rights and claims. Religion was by countless strands most intimately united to the social and civil life. It found above all a powerful support in the so-called mysteries, which disappointed indeed the initiated, but yet continued to allure the ignorant by the promise of profounder knowledge of the truth. And still much more than the material power must the inward tendency of heathenism come in conflict with Christianity. There a purely sensual, here a purely spiritual worship. There, offerings and rites, here, abolition of all vain pomp. There, profound contempt of all Jewish superstition;† here, the doctrine: "Salvation is of the Jews." There, unbridled gratification of the lusts of the flesh, here, the requirement to crucify the flesh with its lusts. There, the school of philosophy the only way to the inmost sanctuary of truth, here, above that sanctuary the device written: "The wisdom of this world is foolishness with God!" There, an insurmountable wall of partition between Greeks and Barbarians, here, the principle: "One is your master, and ye are all brethren!" There, religion stamped by nationality, here, the watchword: "Our citizenship is in heaven." There, pride its attendent, here, humility its fairest ornament. There, a wide chasm between priests and laymen, here, all called to be priests of the Lord. There, earthly good the highest aim, here, eternal joy the most brilliant crown. It was indeed to be expected, that Christianity, appearing in such a circle, would have to maintain a severe conflict. And when we consider, among what people the Redeemer of the world appeared, how weak was the strength of his first witnesses, and how spiritual were the weapons wherewith they must assail unbelief and superstition, we are not surprised that the Light of the world was greeted with gladness by many that had sat in the shadow of death, but obstinately rejected by still more from love to the darkness.

---

* Tzschirner, a. a. O. S. 119.

† Gieseler, a. a. O. I. S, 53.

Great was the number of the thirsty who longed for the water of life, but numerous also the host of them who girded themselves for the most sanguinary combat. Also in Greece and Rome should Christ be for the rising of many, but also for the fall of very many. Jesus was born in a time in which Augustus on the throne of the Roman Empire exhibits* to us mankind under the influence of sensuality and pride. Jesus dies in the same year that Tiberius, freed from the fear of Sejanus, abandons himself to the greatest licentiousness and tyranny, and, in the fullest sense of the word, fears nothing more. Is not the first a striking emblem of the most urgent need of, the second a very significant presage of obstinate resistance to the founder of the kingdom of God in the midst of the heathen world?

If we turn our eyes to the Jewish nation, then the difference is great. Instead of the deification of nature we find the faithful worship of the only True, who had revealed himself through Moses and the prophets. The knowledge of Him is here the property, not of select priestly castes, but of the whole nation; his law is eternally held in honor; his temple is cleansed from the abomination of false gods. Here also are exhibited important phenomena, that elicit from us the declaration: "It was the fullness of the time."

Of the *civil* liberty of the Jews, there was in the days in which Christ was born, scarcely the shadow remaining. Degraded to a conquered province of the Romans, harassed by the arbitrary conduct of Herod, torn by internal dissension, the land of Judea was a scene of political wretchedness. Already, in connection with his ascending the throne, had Herod given proofs of cruelty and cunning. Concerned above all to

---

* See Dr. W. G. Brill, *Golgotha en het Kapitool, in de Gids*, 1845, IV. It speaks for itself, that what is said above does no injustice to the opposite side of the matter, the susceptibility of the heathen world to Christianity, upon the relative degree of development which they had thus far under the influence of God's preparatory grace attained. On the *Ahnungen* of Christian truth in many a heathen representation, compare what we wrote, *Christol* III, bl. 96–101, and the writers cited there, also Lubker, *Propyläen zu einer Theol. des Kluss Alterth.* in the *Stud. und Krit.*, 1861, III.

retain the favor of the Romans, he neglected every means to secure the love of his people, and had as little regard for their customs as for their religion. Ambitious and weak, revengeful and suspicious, proud and irresolute, he gave the nation as little reason to be contented with the present, as to cherish hope for the future. It is not surprising that the seed of insurrection, scattered by presumptuous hands, should shoot up luxuriantly on Palestine's uncultivated field. Judas, the Galilean, a teacher of the Jews, of so great influence that Josephus traces to him all the insurrections of later years, yea, even the destruction of Jerusalem, arose and plucked with his adherents Rome's eagle from the great gate of the temple. Sadoc, an adherent of the Pharisaic party, stood at the head of another mutinous sect. And however rigorously vengeance pursued the imprudent, constantly were they or others secretly prepared for another assault.

After Herod's death the kingdom was divided among his sons. Archelaus obtained Judea and Samaria, but after the breaking out of a new insurrection he was banished by the Romans, and his domain was governed as a province of the world-empire by their proconsuls, of whom Pontius Pilate was the fifth. Herod Antipas became tetrarch of Galilee and Perea, and though he may be called a less cruel tyrant than his father, his conduct towards John the Baptist and the suffering Jesus, soon showed that he did not disown the blood, from which he had sprung. Philip, the third son, received for his inheritance the Northern parts of the country beyond the Jordan, Iturea, and Trachonitis, and reigned till in the twentieth year of Tiberius. His subjects were certainly the least to be pitied, for he lived in peace with his brothers, and discharged the duties of his administration faithfully, however immoral otherwise in disposition, till he died childless and left his sceptre to Rome, that annexed his dominion to Syria. Thus was Palestine's political heaven overspread with clouds. The lofty courage of the Maccabean heroic age had long since departed. On the one hand was creeping baseness that bowed profoundly to Rome; on the other impotent rage that set it-

self constantly against Rome. Both exhibited their fatal operation, but inward and deep lived in the heart of the better disposed the desire for a Prince of David's house, who should redeem Israel "out of the hand of all his enemies."

Not less sad was the *moral* condition of the people. Did they steadfastly refuse, to their honor be it said, to follow the heathen mode of life, they could not however possibly withdraw themselves from its infectious influence. Sin had shortly before the Jewish state, according to Josephus, reached so terrible a height, that if the Romans had hesitated to conquer the land, an earthquake would perhaps have swallowed them up, a flood have drowned them, or fire from heaven have consumed them. "For," says he, "neither did any other city ever suffer such miseries, nor did any age ever breed a generation more fruitful in wickedness than this was from the beginning of the world." There were indeed better disposed persons, especially among the lower classes. The success of the Baptist serves as proof that in the breast of many the spark of something higher still glimmered, that could be fanned to a mighty flame. Also with the more respectable—a Simeon, Zacharias and others are examples—respect for God and his holy law had not yet departed. But such were only exceptions to a general rule. The national pride of descent and privileges rose continually higher. Thence proceeded the melancholy grudge against all who did not belong to the unadulterated seed of Abraham; thence the wretched conceit that it was sufficient to be a hearer of the law; thence the blind zeal for the letter of the law, which so lamentably misapprehended its spirit. Commerce, which was carried on more vigorously than before, brought the Israelite into closer contact with other nations, but became the fruitful mother of cupidity, usury, and dishonesty. And the language of Paul to the Jew, who thought he could be justified by works,* sketches for us in broad strokes an image of Israel's moral condition, that makes us involuntarily shudder, and not only

* Rom. xi. 17–29.

lets us see how deeply the malady had penetrated, which needed a deliverer from heaven, but also gives us the key to the seeming enigma: "He came unto his own, and his own received him not."

When we come to the contemplation of Israel's *religious* condition, the first thing that strikes us is the great *difference* between its then condition and that of former times. Mute was the voice of the prophets; vanished, the characteristics of the earlier theocracy; broken, the bond that century after century had united church and state. Their public worship was like a corpse from which the animating breath had just escaped, externally exhibiting still the old features, internally already assailed by a corroding decay. David's harp hung unstrung on the willows, and they who still raised themselves heavenward on the wings of sacred poetry, could only echo those transporting tones.* Did the Priests and Levites at an earlier period live on the revenues of the sanctuary alone; now they both possess considerable privileges and landed estates. Was once the law exclusive rule of faith and practice; now God's command was made of no effect by human institutions. The number of rites, festivals and sacred usages was thereby greatly increased. But if even the law could not give life, how much less tradition?

The religious condition of the Jews had, beyond doubt, its *favorable* side. We direct attention here, first of all, to the existence of the synagogues which, introduced into Israel after the Babylonian captivity as places of prayer, were seminaries of religious knowledge, and in the time of Jesus were not only found in Jerusalem, to the number of more than four hundred, but also in small cities. We further recall to mind here, the schools of the rabbis, or scribes, specifically those of Hillel and Schammai, two celebrated masters, who lived and worked a few years before Jesus' appearance. The little that is known of them with certainty, gives sufficient ground to regard them as men full of strict moral earnestness. The

* Luke i. 46–55. † Jost, Gesch. d. Isr. III. bl. 53.

first, above all, seems to have exercised a beneficial influence; and rabbinism was certainly, though it degenerated but too often into lifeless learning, a beneficent bulwark against the tendency of heathenism to sensuality of life. Yea, why should we hesitate to mention also, among the favorable signs of those times, the desire to convert heathens to Judaism, and to make that transition easy for them? Did the scribes often compass land and sea to gain a new son for Abraham, and did they not always make use of fair means, the aim was, and remained, laudable. Such a striving has ever been an evidence of religious interest, and could later prepare the way for the speedy extension of Christianity beyond the limits of Palestine. Finally, we should not overlook the fact, that the religious ideas had in this period received manifold *extension* and *development*. The hope of immortality, of which we meet with but comparatively few traces in Moses and the prophets, was, also under the influence of foreign ideas, constantly more generally spread. With the penetrating of the Greek language, Greek philosophy also became known to the Jews. Was the door here opened to the most arbitrary allegorical interpretation of the Scriptures; on the other hand the way was thus paved to penetrate from the letter to the spirit of the law, the people became capable of receiving new ideas, and Judaism lost something of its inflexible and rigidly defined forms.

But it is not to be denied that all this light possessed a melancholy *shady* side. Rabbinism led to literary caviling, and, in connection with learning, the spiritual life declined; Proselytism led to the blending of Jewish and heathen customs, and the Alexandrian philosophy to departure from the original Israelitish spirit. And, in addition to this, there were other unfavorable phenomena. Is dissension in itself detrimental to the cause of religion, with each of the different sects that we see prevailing among the Jews, we meet, moreover, with the most melancholy departure from it.

Rigid *orthodoxy* found in the Pharisaic party its representa-

tives.* The *Pharisees* (a name which they, as *separated* from the world, probably bore on account of their antique piety) seem to have arisen just after the Babylonian captivity. As an influential sect, they appear first a century and a-half before Christ. Eminent for learning, influence and numbers, (they amounted, according to Josephus, to not less than six thousand in the time of Herod) they secured a powerful party among the people, and acquired great political significance. By outward manifestation of piety, they captivated the ignorant multitude, and constrained those blind to follow blind guides. At their meals they observed the most rigid laws of purification; in prayer their bearing, in fasting their countenance, in giving alms the shrill trumpets at the corners of the streets, proclaimed their shining virtue. Their forehead was adorned with frontlets, containing sacred apothegms; the hems of their garments had written upon them the language of the sacred oracles, and from their lips resounded alternately long prayers and subtle interpretations of Scripture. Their doctrine, developed under the influence of tradition, was founded on the acknowledgment of God's unlimited government of the universe, by which, however, the freedom of human acts was not taken away. At the same time they accepted the existence of a spirit-world, and held firmly an immortality, where recompense of their piety awaited them. They do not seem to have believed a proper resurrection of the body any more than a metempsychosis. Their morality was wholly eudemonistic, and but too often degenerated into dry casuistry. If their heart was truly upright, this strictness might lead them to a lively apprehension of the impossibility of justification by works, and thus prepare them for Jesus' coming. But very many of them were, by worldly-mindedness, pride and hypocrisy, unsusceptible of faith in the Lord.

---

* See Winer, *Realwörterb.* on this Article. De Wette, *Bibl. Dogm.* § 167, 176, 182, 187. Hofstede de Groot, *Opvoed des Menschd.* III. (1847) bl. 328 en verv. *Bijbelsch Woordenb.* III. (1859) bl. 99 en verv. Finally C. E. Van Koetsveld, *Phariseën, Sadduceën en Herodianen*, 's Hage, 1862.

Over against these stand the *Sadducees*, who may be denominated politically an *aristocratic*, religiously an *ultra-liberal* party. Is also its origin from a certain Sadoc (the righteous) wholly uncertain, its existence is satisfactorily explained from the natural counteraction which the attachment of the Pharisees to oral tradition must meet from those who were of different sentiments. Thence it was, also, that their ideas in all things assumed a hostile attitude toward those of the Pharisees. The doctrine of a Providence, if not wholly denied, was at least placed considerably in the shade, and human freedom in an excessive light. They rejected not only the existence of angels and spirits, but also wholly the future life. In their morality they worked less on the desire of reward, and insisted more on an external fulfillment of the original Mosaic precept. Of two accusations meanwhile, the first relative to their belief, and the second to their walk, the one seems to be unproved, the other exaggerated. The first, that they adhered to the Pentateuch alone, and rejected the authority of the remaining books of the Old Testament, has been inferred from this that the Lord refuted their sceptical objections to the resurrection of the dead from the writings of Moses alone.* But the Lord did not, by simply using one proof, positively deny the authority of all others on their stand-point. He may also have chosen it purposely, because a consideration from Moses' law had just been proposed to him. Josephus moreover declares expressly,‡ that all the canonical books of the Old Testament were *universally* held as genuine. At a later period we hear the Pharisees adduce against them passages from other writings of the Old Testament, without their denying the demonstrative force or authority of those utterances. One of their number elsewhere even appeals to a Prophetic word for the confirmation of his opinion.§ And how could they, with such views, have re-

---

* Tertullian, De praescr. haeret c. 45. and Hieronymus ad Matth. xxii. 31; later still Olshausen and Neander.

† XXII: 24. ‡ Contra Apionem l. 8.

§ Gemara Sanhedrim, fo. 90, 2. Cholim, 87. Comp. Winer, in voce.

mained members of the Sanhedrim, yea, have been invested with the dignity of high-priest? Would the Pharisees never have upbraided them with that unbelief? We admit that their dogmatic system can hardly be reconciled with the acknowledgment of the authority of the whole Old Testament. But does not this difficulty remain, though we hold that they acknowledged only the Pentateuch? In them, also, are contained accounts of angelic apparitions, which render it well-nigh incomprehensible how they could deny the existence of a spirit-world. Just as little can we be reconciled to another accusation, which lays to their charge great licentiousness and immorality. The rank and wealth of many brought with them their peculiar temptations, and their meagre creed lacked the powerful motives to piety and virtue which the belief of immortality presents. Meanwhile their moral standpoint seems to have been, on the whole, no lower than that of the Pharisees, who were but too ready to suspect all of levity whose direction diverged from their moral rigorism. Josephus, at least, who belonged to the last named sect, and thus had no reason for palliating the vices of the Sadducees, expressly informs us that their morals were stricter than those of the Pharisees, and that not only where they were opposed to these, but also in their intercourse with one another. Their influence on the people was far less significant, and their number, too, was smaller, than that of their opposing party. Usually vehemently embittered against these last, they united, however, more than once with them in their combat with Jesus, their common enemy, especially in the last period of his public life. The Lord had certainly no less opposition to expect from them than from the advocates of rabbinical learning.

Much less is known to us of a third sect, the Essenes, whom we may regard as representatives of a dark *mystical* persuasion. As we never see them come forward in the period of Jesus' public life, only a single word respecting them. Having

---

* A. J. XXII. 9, 1. B. J. II. 8, 14.

arisen,* as it seems, simultaneously with the Pharisees and Sadducees, they escaped from social life and formed a kind of religious order, whose tendency was rigidly ascetic. They are the monks of the Old Testament. Maintaining themselves on the borders of the Dead Sea by agriculture and the raising of cattle, they applied themselves especially to the study of the healing art. Community of goods prevailed among them, riches were hated, poverty was regarded as meritorious, and even celibacy was advocated by some. In only one case was the oath allowed, at the initiation into their society, into which they were admitted only after a novitiate of three years. Theosophy, in which they were absorbed, lost itself but too often in vain dreams, and the higher holiness of which they boasted, was often the mother of the most melancholy pride. In what manner they treated the Lord, cannot be determined with certainty, owing to the want of historical reports. On their rigoristic stand-point they felt themselves perhaps more attracted to the Baptist, than to his exalted successor.

The sect of the *Herodians* was a party of purely political nature. It consisted probably of Jews, who, attached to Herod Antipas, held externally with the Romans. They certainly were for that reason hated by the people and the Pharisees. Do we find them entered once and again into alliance with these last against Jesus, this phenomenon is explained by the observation, that hostile powers often extend each other the hand where it concerns the assailing of an enemy equally dangerous to both. Thus the morning of the day on which Jesus died, saw the covenant of friendship renewed between Pilate and Herod.†

---

* Josephus, A. J. XIII. 5. 9. On the agreement and the difference between the Essenes and Pythagoras and the Therapeutae, compare Jost, II. bl. 364–374. It is not the place here to compare the different reports of Pliny, Philo, and Josephus, relative to the Essenes with each other and bring them into agreement. They are communicated in De Wette, *Archæologie*, S. 393, etc. We agree with those who assign to Josephus the first voice in the decision of the difficult question as to the nature and spirit of this sect. The *Syntagma trium script. de trib. Jud. sectis*, ed. J. Trigland, 1703, still remains the principal source.

† Matth. xxii. 16. Mark iii. 6.; xii. 13.

Do we after all this direct our eyes to the *people*, we see them under the influence of these different parties a prey to the deepest decline. Essenism deprived the nation often of its most useful and laborious citizens (according to Josephus there were more than four thousand Essenes) and called them to a life of contracted, fanatical musing. The Sadducees could not neglect to make, by word and example, a breach upon purity of faith and seriousness of life. The Pharisees above all oppressed the ignorant multitude as with an iron sceptre, and had sentence of excommunication and anathema ready for such as durst choose for themselves a way, not pointed out by their finger. Those blind ones misled by blind guides, strayed on the brink of the abyss, and lacked even the courage to seasonably return.

One other particular we may not pass by, as an unfavorable sign of the time, the animosity that continued to prevail between *Samaritans* and *Jews*. The former, probably sprung from the union of those who remained in their own land, when Israel was carried captive to Babylon, with the heathen colonists that came to inhabit the deserted country, exhibited a wonderful mixture of Jewish and heathenish customs. They bowed down indeed like Israel before Jehovah, respected the laws of Moses, and looked for a Messiah descended from Joseph. Their dwelling-place moreover in the fertile mountainous districts between Judea and Galilee, afforded opportunity for affable intercourse with the Jews. Overpowered like these by Rome, they shared in the hatred of Abraham's posterity for that mighty foe. But much greater was the aversion which they manifested towards each other, and wide was the chasm that separated them.

No Jew had extended to a Samaritan food, drink, or hospitality. The most heinous accusations, even those of idolatry, were made by the one party against the other. They even avoided the visiting of each other's country. That aversion testified, not only of lack of religious feeling, but at the same time oppressed the material and moral strength of the Israelitish state. The ruins of the desolated temple on Gerizim's

mountain top was the faithful image of the Mosaism of those days. They still contended about forms—but life had departed.

But we must yet direct attention to the *fundamental idea*, by which the religious faith of those times was distinguished, *the expectation of the Messiah's kingdom*, was now more than ever excited. We everywhere meet in the days in which the Lord appeared, the outlook to the coming of the Redeemer. Or can it be true, what has in our age not only been said, but the proof of which has also been attempted,* that with the Jews of this period, absolutely *no* Messianic expectation prevailed, and that the abstract idea of a *Messiah* arose in the brain of Jesus alone, whilst his adherents found it realized in him, and further enveloped it with historical forms. But such an opinion is so arbitrary and most highly absurd, that we deem it unnecessary to repeat what has already been advanced by others for its refutation.† Sufficient that its advocate with all his proofs has at most only made manifest, what no one doubted, that no universally accepted Christology existed in this period, or in other words, that no perfectly rounded image of the future Messiah with the same features presented itself to the imagination of all. Shall we, however, on that account deny the existence of a general, though it were in some respects an indefinite, expectation of a Messiah? Let then all those prophetic utterances be explained to us, which a sound exegesis sees itself forced to acknowledge as Messianic. Let it also be explained to us, why Josephus so distinctly alludes to those expectations.‡ Let it be explained, how later Jewish scholars came at the idea of a Messiah, if it were only a chimerical invention of the Christians who were inimical to them. Let it be explained why, according to the express declaration of Josephus,§ the Jews of that time on the

---

* B. Baner, Synoptiker, I. S. 391–416. † Ebrard, a. a. O. S. 651–669.

‡ Especially the manner in which he avoids the Messianic declaration of Dan. II: 34, by saying: "But I do not think it proper to relate it; since I have only undertaken to describe things past or things present; but not the things that are future." A. J. X. 10. 4. § *De Bell Ind.* VI. 5, 4.

ground of their sacred writings cherished the hope, that God would raise up out of the midst of them a Deliverer and World-ruler, which prediction that historian, from a desire to flatter, deemed fulfilled in Vespasian. That the acquaintance with these expectations among heathen nations, which is made sure by profane writers, is on this stand-point one of the greatest enigmas, needs hardly be intimated. Enough already respecting an opinion, that tears the new dispensation entirely loose from the old, that can be maintained only by the most arrogant arbitrariness, and that would not perhaps have deserved mention, had it not at the same time established our right to the question: What was the *nature* of the Messianic expectation which we see prevailing in this period among the Jews?

The answer to this question is far from easy. They who have taken the pains to examine the ideas of the Jews touching a future Deliverer, have not always properly distinguished between the representations of Jesus' contemporaries, and those of later scholars.* The New Testament gives but few hints respecting the opinions which prevailed relative to this subject, and in regard to these it often remains a question, whether the representations there met with, were merely individual or generally prevalent. What can here be established with any degree of certainty, amounts to the following: The Jews divided the entire history of the world into two principal periods, the present and the future. At the end of the first the coming of the Messiah has place, whose way, it was expected, would be prepared, and his coming announced by Elijah the Prophet, who was to appear a second time. The Jews expected Him from the tribe of Judah and the family of David, (the Samaritans on the contrary from Ephraim) and regarded Bethlehem as the place of his approaching birth. Of

---

*This applies particularly to Berthold's well-known *Christologia Judaeorum*, and to Gfrörer's *Jahrh. d. Heils.* But also after what has been more recently attempted, it cannot yet be asserted, that a clear and full light has been shed upon it. Compare what we wrote respecting it, *Christologie*, I. (1855) pp. 508–522.

an extraordinary birth by the Holy Ghost they seem not to have thought. Anointed with the Spirit of God, and richly furnished with higher powers, he should not only make an end to all religious disputes, and effect a restoration of religion and morals which had so sadly declined, but above all should shine forth in royal dignity. He should deliver Israel from the oppressive yoke of his enemies, yea, he should conquer all the earth for the sake of the chosen people, in order so to found a universal theocratic government. Then should a golden age of peace and happiness dawn, and Jerusalem's temple be the centre of a dominion, of which Israel should enjoy the glory and all the world the blessing. Moral improvement was, especially according to the better disposed, the condition of his manifestation. Hence it was that John's requirement of repentance excited as little surprise as it met with contradiction, and that still at the present day the Jews ascribe the delay of the Messianic period to their transgressions. That He should make reconciliation for the sins of the people, seems also to have belonged to the expectation of those days, at least among the most pious portion of the nation; but how they represented to themselves the mode of that reconciliation, is in the highest degree uncertain. Later Jews thought of a reconciliation by improvement of the people, by his intercession, or by seclusion after his birth.* Of reconciliation by a vicarious death, we find among Jesus' contemporaries but very few traces. It seems rather to have been the expectation of the multitude, that the Christ should remain forever, and reign for ages.†

The representation of the Messiah's person, that prevailed with most, was that he should be a true man, anointed to be a theocratic king, filled with the Holy Spirit, and invested with the most unlimited authority.‡ This representation was

---

* See De Wette, *Bibl. Dogm.* § 202, and the writers there cited.

† John i. 29. Comp. Luke ii. 34.

‡ Therefore said the Jew Tryphon in Justin Martyr in his *Dial.* c. Tryph. cap. 49: *πάντες ἐμεῖς ἠ τὸν χριστὸν ἄνθρώπον ἐξ ἀνθρώπων προσδοκῶμεν γενήσεσθαι.* The question: "Is not this the carpenter's son?" expresses indeed surprise at Jesus' lowly condition, but not that he had a human father.

wholly in accordance with the spirit of Hebraism, which so emphatically placed on the foreground the absolute unity of Jehovah, and distinguished him so sharply from the world, that the idea of a man, at the same time a partaker in truth of the divine nature, could here with difficulty find place. Some, however, expected that the king of the kingdom of God should unexpectedly appear, and in a mysterious manner, and that it should not be known whence he was. The Logos-conception we nowhere find among Jesus' contemporaries specifically brought into relation with the Messianic idea. The name of *Son of God* was usually given to the Messiah, not to express a supernatural, but the theocratic elevation of his person, as already under the Old Testament, that appellation was, in a weaker sense, given to men who were supports of the theocracy. The fundamental idea of Christianity that God in Christ has entered into personal relation with mankind, is no fruit of Jewish soil; it had entered into no human heart till it was revealed as *fact*.* That some of Jesus' contemporaries on ground of Dan. vii. 13, 14, represented† to themselves the Messiah as a supernatural and divine being, we deem incapable of proof. It was indeed generally expected of the Deliverer, that he would perform miracles, raise the dead at the last day, and hold the last judgment.

In the treatment of the evangelical history itself, we shall be able to discover the traces of all we have said. This can be uttered here as general truth, that the Messianic expectation in Jesus' time was different with different ones; that it was developed less by the light of the Old Testament, than modified by the circumstances and calamities of the times, and in the period of which we speak lived more than ever on the tongues of all, and in the hearts of all. We have also seen that each expected just that from the Messiah, which he deemed the most desirable, in order to heal the breach of Zion. The

* Dorner, a. a. O. I. S. 63.

† As is asserted by Strauss, *Dogmatik* II. S. 81; and De Wette, Bibl. Dogm. S. 171. The proof which the last mentioned supposes, he finds in the book of Enoch for the faith of Jesus' contemporaries, in a divine nature of the Messiah, appears to us in the highest degree dubious.

earthly-minded multitude panted for freedom, national glory, and sensual bliss: the better disposed hoped also, that He would teach them to serve God without fear, that He would also be a light to lighten the Gentiles, and would dispense spiritual gifts. The former, therefore, lent a ready ear to every seducer who dared pretend to be the Messiah, and who uttered the magic words: Liberty and Victory. The latter went bowed down under the deep declension of the times, and wished what Simeon prayed, that they might not taste death till they had seen the Lord's Christ. We meet, however, with none, with whom the expectation of higher blessing to be bestowed by the Messiah, was wholly free from earthly-minded prospects, and even to the wings of the hope that raised itself most purely towards heaven, cleaved the dust of this world.

And yet, how high stands the Jewish nation, even in its deepest decline, above the heathen world! Heathenism lies on its death-bed, and all the sages whose eyes were opened to discern the spirit of their age, expected soon to hear its knell. Mosaism too is antiquated, and they who took profounder views perceived that the existing form of religion no longer met the necessity of the present. But where the reflecting heathen sat down disconsolate on the ruins of the past, without hope for the future, the pious Jew stands with believing desire gazing at the signs of the times, and has an obscure but profound conviction that the present dissolution contains already the germ of a fairer restoration. The question: Watchman, what of the night? is at Rome the question of dull despondency, but in Palestine the expression of believing and panting desire. And while elsewhere the mists of ignorance, sin and misery, which have settled densely over the earth, are viewed as harbingers of an eternal night, for Israel, in the midst of that terrible darkness, the star of hope stands bright and high in the heaven.

We must yet direct attention to *the reciprocal relation of the Jewish and Gentile world* of those days, in order here also to clearly perceive the fullness of the time.

The separation between the two was incipiently removed. Had earlier high walls stood not only between Jews and Gentiles, but also between the Gentile nations themselves, each of which had its own religion, customs and notions, they were now incipiently leveled. As different streams empty into the same wide ocean, so the smaller states were now resolved into the great world-empire. It is known how widely extended this empire had become. It comprised at the time of Christ's appearance, Western Asia, Northern Africa, Southern and Western Europe. On all sides relations were formed and ways opened, not existing before. A universal peace reigned among the nations that bowed to the sceptre of Augustus. The temple of Janus was closed. In such a period the Prince of peace could appear, and one of his principal ambassadors, as Roman citizen, spread the gospel everywhere unhindered. The unity of *language* served no less to draw the cords more closely. The Greek had become the language of the whole civilized world, and, as Cicero somewhere assures us,* Greek books were read among almost all nations, whilst the Latin remained confined within narrower limits. Even among the Jews that language had penetrated, and though the Hebrew was and remained the language of the people, so that they listened with the greater attention to Paul at Jerusalem, because he used the language of the country, the knowledge of the Greek was sufficiently general among them. This means also was eminently adapted to promote the founding of the kingdom of God. Into this language the sacred books of the Old Testament had already been translated, and thus become accessible to thousands. The history of the ancient chosen people was known to Greeks and Romans, and with it not only the pure doctrine of religion, proclaimed by Moses, but also the Messianic expectation, preserved by his followers as a treasure. And the more faith in the heathen religion was undermined, the less they found in philosophy the peace they so eagerly sought, the more attentively did men listen to the

*Cicero, *Pro Archia*, cap. X.

word of consolation and hope that was here proclaimed. The Jews themselves were spread everywhere. Thousands of them dwelt in Babylonia alone, in Egypt still more.* Those scattered Jews (*διασπορά*) were as a fruitful germ cast upon the Gentile field. Not in vain had Alexander the Great transported a multitude of Abraham's sons to Alexander. Not in vain had his successor Ptolemy established more than a hundred thousand Israelites in his kingdom and granted them his high patronage. The temporal prosperity with which they were favored in foreign lands, they rewarded tenfold by helping to spread the light of the most beneficent knowledge. From their synagogues, from their temple at Leontopolis, went forth those rays of light which not a few received with eager eyes. If some Romans accepted the Jewish religion, others showed for the institutions of that nation high respect, and it is known that the emperor Augustus had a daily offering for his welfare made to the Deity that was worshiped at Jerusalem, and thus showed that he cherished respect for this foreign Religion. Even at Rome it belonged to those religions whose public worship was allowed and protected by the state (collegia licita). And the complaints of Seneca, Juvenal, and others respecting the prevailing superstitious religion of the Jews, are a striking testimony to their many-sided influence, and confirm what Philo has somewhere testified that the Jews were destined to become prophets and priests of all mankind. The proselytes of *the gate*, especially (who bound themselves less strictly to all the forms of Judaism than the proselytes of *righteousness*, who submitted to circumcision and all the prescriptions of the law) were eminently adapted to accept believingly the light of the gospel, even more than some Jews, who supposed that they already possessed the truth, which these still everywhere sought.

---

* Josephus, A. J. X. V. 3. 1., speaks of *οὐκ ὀλίγαι μυριάδες* in Babylonia. Compare Strabo, XIV. 12. Philo. *Legat. ad Caj.* p. 1051, and especially the well-known declaration of Seneca, *De superstition.* in Augustine *De Civ. Dei.* VI. 11 : "*eo secleratissimae gentis consuetudo invaluit, ut per omnes terras recepta sit; victi victoribus leges dederunt.*"

If we take all these circumstances together, it is manifest with how much right we exalt the wisdom of God in the choice of the time in which Christ appeared. We see all circumstances concur to make mankind ripe and fitted for his advent. Yea, so greatly is He centre and key of the history of the world, that we are not surprised at the declaration of the celebrated historian, Johannes von Müller: "I saw the greatest result brought about by the most insignificant means; I saw the relation of all the nations of Asia and Europe to that despised Israel; I saw religion appear just at the most fitting moment for its establishment. All events work together for the establishment and extension of this doctrine. Since I have learned to know our Lord, all has become clear to me. The light that blinded Paul on his way to Damascus, was not more marvelous to him than what I suddenly saw: the fulfillment of all expectations, the point of perfection of all philosophy, the explanation of all revolutions, the key to all seeming contradictions in the material and moral world: life and immortality."

Art. III.—RAPHAEL SANZIO.

By Rev. A. D. Gridley, D. D., Clinton, N. Y.

1. *Lives of the most Eminent Painters, Sculptors, and Architects*, translated from the Italian of Giorgio Vasari, with notes and illustrations chiefly selected from various commentators. By Mrs. Jonathan Foster. London: Henry G. Bohn, York st., Covent Garden. In five vols. 1850.

2. *Memoirs of the Early Italian Painters.* By Mrs. Jameson, author of "Characteristics of Women," &c. From the tenth English edition. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1859.

On sitting down to study the life and analyze the character of a distinguished genius, we confess to some degree of hesitation, lest we should thereby become disenchanted. Mont Blanc is better seen from the distant plain than from its own

rocky sides. In looking at a great picture, if we hold our eyes close to the canvass, we may get all its petty details, but we must stand further off if we would take in its grand outlines and catch its true meaning and purpose. Thus we may get so near a great mind that, while we learn the facts and dates that go to make up its history, we may yet lose sight of the real man and fail to catch his informing spirit.

Yet, on the other hand, it is a rational curiosity which seeks to learn all that it is proper and possible to know of the experience and life-work of the eminent dead. Taught from childhood to speak their names with admiring reverence, we would fain know *why* they are to be revered. Hearing their great deeds recited, we would learn how they came to accomplish so much, and wherein their strength lay. Was their greatness real, or only factitious? What are the legacies which they have bequeathed to posterity, and what the lessons which they teach? It is in such a spirit, and with such motives, that we would now survey the life and works of Raphael Sanzio, the greatest of painters.

The events of his life were few and simple. He was born the 28th of March, 1483, in the city of Urbino, Italy. His father, Giovanni Sanzio, was himself a respectable painter and poet, a man of cultivated mind and polished manners, and well fitted to foster and direct the genius of his only son. It is recorded to his credit that he would not allow his infant boy to be put out to a hired nurse, as was the general custom, but insisted that his own mother should nurse him. The cabin of a rude peasant he thought was not the safest place for the child's health, nor the best for his morals and manners. Alas! the mother who bore him died when he was only eight years old. It is believed that he remembered her with much tenderness, and in his Holy Families, painted in after life, sought to express his fond conception of the tie between a mother and her child. The genius of Raphael displayed itself quite early. Indeed, it is said that he assisted his father in his studio before he was eleven years of age. But Giovanni was not satisfied with being himself the only

teacher of his son; he wished to give him the best training which could be procured. Where should he look for a competent instructor?

The leading masters of that day were Leonardi da Vinci at Milan, Correggio at Parma, Titian at Venice, Francesco Francia at Bologna, and Pietro Perugino at Perugia. Leonardo and Pietro were his favorites, but between these his choice long hesitated. What would have been the influence of the first upon his young and impressible scholar? He was, perhaps, the greatest painter of the age. Breaking through the rigid rules and formal technicalities which had bound artists before him in dull routine, and which still held most of his cotemporaries, he returned to nature, and by a careful study of her laws advanced his art to a much higher point than he found it. His fresco of The Last Supper, the most widely known of his works, remains an evidence of his superior genius. But with all his endowments and attainments, he lacked mental balance and power of concentrated effort. He was fond of natural history, and devoted much attention to architecture and engineering, to music, poetry, and antiquities: in short, there was no subject of speculation to which he did not give more or less time and thought. Jarvis says of him: "Whatever he turned his mind to he promptly mastered. His weakness lay in the variety and range of his genius. Hence a craving to prove all things; a constant desire of experiment and new acquirements, begetting a certain instability of purpose, and frequent changes of pursuits, in any one of which he equaled or excelled his cotemporaries, without bestowing upon it the full measure of his capacity. In reality, he was embarrassed by his extraordinary mental wealth, and power of choice of greatness; whilst his special need was that concentrated ambition, which, fired by powerful passions, inevitably leads to grand undertakings and commensurate results."* Hence he became fitful and inconstant in his artistic pursuits, frittering away valuable time and

* Art Hints, p. 383.

power in side efforts, and accomplishing much less in this field of labor than might have been expected of him. Had Raphael become the pupil and companion of such a man, he would very likely have imbibed a measure of his inconstancy of purpose, and so have become less eminent in after life. Therefore we must needs admire the good sense of his father, and the wisdom of that Providence, which chose Perugino for his teacher instead of Leonardo.

Raphael was twelve years old when taken to Perugia. The works of his new instructor had at this time acquired so high a repute as to be eagerly sought for throughout all Europe, and commanded high prices. His style is represented as "simple, ideal, graceful, tender," and inspired at times with ecstatic feeling. He founded a school known as the Umbrian, from the range of mountains on whose western slope Perugia was built. His scholars, some of whom were artists of considerable repute, thought themselves highly honored by his presence and instructions. He taught them, it is said, that it was not enough to copy the exact lineaments of nature, but to infuse that resemblance with a loftier spirit, which should speak to the soul more than to the senses. It was to this famous teacher that his father brought Raphael, and here he remained, with only a few intervals of absence, until he was twenty years of age. His time was occupied, at first, in drawing from models and from nature, and in copying the works of Perugino. Diligent in study, ardently devoted to his calling, and determined to succeed in it,—such was the record which the teacher made of his pupil year after year. Following the bent of his master, his studies ran in the direction of the religious school. His copies of Perugino's designs were so accurately done, and so thoroughly imbued with his spirit, that before he was sixteen years old they were often mistaken for originals. In his own independent efforts, his favorite subjects were the Madonna and infant Christ. Several of these and a St. Catharine have been preserved to this day, and reflect the traces of Perugino's style, with here and there an improvement on his method. During one of his

teacher's long absences from home, Raphael went to Cita di Castello, where he produced several pictures; among them one called the Spozalizio, representing the marriage of Joseph and Mary, which may now be seen at Milan. Not far from this period, he painted also the Knight's Dream, now in the British National Gallery, the Agony in the Garden, and the St. Michael and St. George. These were all executed in what is known as his first or Peruginesque manner, and can easily be distinguished from his later productions.

The fame of great masters in other cities now began to reach him, and he longed to see their works, especially the cartoons of Da Vinci and of Michael Angelo at Florence. To Florence, then, he bent his steps. Here he formed the acquaintance of Ghirlandajo, Fra Bartolomeo, and other artists, all of whom, except Angelo, received him graciously. A new and wide field of effort and improvement now spread before him. The family of the Medici, who possessed a fine collection of ancient marbles, threw it open to all artists, and Raphael gladly seized this opportunity to study the antique. He also examined critically the frescoes of Mazaccio, and the designs of Da Vinci and Angelo. These new studies wrought a change in his style, producing what is called his second manner. Hitherto, his compositions had somewhat resembled mere collections of separate portraits placed in juxtaposition; now they became groups of men and women inspired with a common sympathy; his figures assumed an ease of posture and a graceful flow of movement which they had not known before. But, great as was his progress at Florence, it must not be supposed that his early study and practice at Perugia were of little account: they gave him the precision and accuracy of naturalistic art, on which to build the greater freedom and grace of the classical. His residence at Florence opened his eyes to new aspects of nature and unknown possibilities of art; it furnished him better models of study and comparison, and brought him into contact with other great minds, who fired his ambition and encouraged his hope of success. He did not servilely copy the productions of his senior

artists, though he learned much from them. Indeed, he made everything tributary to his improvement, "mingling and transfusing all his acquisitions, by the alchemy of his own mind, into new styles," and so returning to the world more and better than he received.

His friendship with Fra Bartolomeo was particularly tender, and continued unbroken till death. It was of mutual benefit, at least in one particular, the good Friar explaining to Raphael many of the mysteries of coloring, while he taught him in return the laws of perspective.

During his sojourn of about four years in Florence, he made two prolonged visits to Perugia; and Perugino, far from indulging jealousy at the rising fame of his pupil, received him with great cordiality. While here he painted several pictures—Christ borne to the Sepulchre, a Madonna, and several altar-pieces for the churches of the city. About this period, he painted in Florence numerous portraits, an altar-piece for the church of San Spirito, called La Belle Jardinière, and now in the Louvre at Paris; his Madonna of the Palm-tree, now in the Ellesmere collection; and his Madonna of the Goldfinch, now in the Florentine gallery. Soon after these came his St. George; the Entombment, now in the Borghese gallery; and the Portrait of himself, now in a public museum of Florence, and which has been made familiar to all eyes by engravings.

Raphael was younger than most of the leading artists of his time; indeed, he had risen up under their very shadow. He rose from poverty, and without the help of influential friends to foist him into notice. Whatever reputation he possessed was the fruit of real merit. The world soon began to discover his great abilities. He had not been to Rome to proclaim himself, but Rome heard of him, and his name was spoken with honor in her high places. Pope Julius II., on the recommendation of Bramante, his chief architect, invited him to the Holy City for the purpose of embellishing with frescoes the halls of the Vatican. A high honor this for a youth of scarcely twenty-five years, while, Angelo excepted,

other masters of great repute were passed without notice. The invitation of the pontiff was so urgent that Raphael was obliged to proceed at once to Rome, leaving behind him several unfinished works, which Ghirlandajo and Fra Bartolomeo consented to complete.

It is customary to associate the golden age of art with the brief pontificate of Leo X. He was indeed a most munificent and discriminating patron of all the arts; but it is a mistake to suppose that he originated all of those grand designs which were executed during his reign, and which gave it so much lustre, or that the wonderful progress of art in the 16th century was due solely to his fostering care and liberality. His predecessor, Julius II., though a warlike monarch, and ambitious chiefly to extend the bounds of the Holy See by the sword, was yet hardly less earnest in his encouragement of art. His tastes were doubtless less refined, and his views less liberal, than those of Leo, but he knew well that something beside military pomp was needed to give dignity and grace to a court. He desired, moreover, to link his name with the productions of those works of genius which were sure of immortality. Hence he chose learned men for his cardinals, and surrounded himself with the best sculptors, painters and architects.

Among his many schemes of greatness, was one for the rebuilding of St. Peter's, and another for the enlargement and embellishment of the Vatican. And it was for the prosecution of these and kindred works, that he sought the services of Michael Angelo and Raphael. Angelo had been engaged some time previous to the coming of Raphael, in planning and building a splendid mausoleum for the pontiff; but his long delays irritated his holy master beyond endurance, and the work was finally abandoned in mutual disgust. It was at this juncture that Raphael was called to Rome. The special work assigned to him was the decoration in fresco of that part of the Vatican known as the *Camere*. Painting in fresco opened a new and higher career for the artist. His productions in oil hitherto were not without defects of design and

execution, but when he entered this field of effort his hand acquired a greater freedom and boldness, in which the lighter elegancies and graces of art were subordinated to grandeur and sublimity.

For the walls of the first saloon of the Vatican, styled the *Camera della Segnatura*, he chose for his theme the glory of intellectual pursuits, and embodied it in allegorical representations of Theology, Poetry, Philosophy and Jurisprudence. In working out his design, he first painted four small circular pictures on the ceiling, which are allegorical, and designed simply as an index to the main pictures on the walls below. By the side of the figure symbolizing Theology is a representation of the Fall; next to Poetry is the Punishment of Marsyas; by the side of Philosophy is a female figure examining a globe; and near to Jurisprudence is a view of the Judgment of Solomon. Underneath these, on the four walls of the apartment, are the principal subjects. The scenes are historical. *Theology*, sometimes styled the Dispute of the Sacrament, consists of an assemblage of church dignitaries, seated in council, and deliberating on the mysteries of religion, while above them is a heavenly glory, with Christ presiding over a vast concourse of angels, patriarchs, martyrs and saints. *Philosophy*, sometimes called the School of Athens, is a grand portico, around whose steps and doorway are grouped the philosophers and sages of antiquity. Highest in this scene, and as representing intellectual philosophy, stand Plato, Socrates and Aristotle; at a lower point, and as representing the arts and sciences, we have Pythagoras, Archimedes, Zoroaster, and Ptolemy, the geographer; and alone, by himself, sits Diogenes, the cynic. *Poetry* brings us Mt. Parnassus, with knots of ancient and modern poets, with Apollo and the Muses in the centre. Homer and Virgil, Dante and Petrarch, the fountain of Helicon, and all the rest are here. The fourth wall gives us *Jurisprudence*, where Justinian is seen giving his civil code to the doctors for their revision; and not far away is Pope Gregory IX., setting forth the Canon Law. With the Pope are associated cardinals, and other eminent ecclesiastics, living and dead.

This series of paintings, now known as the "Stanza of Raphael," was a work of great labor. Critics of every generation have placed it among the best products of human art. As one who has recently visited Rome remarks: "In these pictures, which still glow with bright and steadfast colors, the art of painting was consecrated to its noblest uses, and achieved its grandest triumphs. Nothing can be more majestic, more elevated, truer to the simplicity of nature, and more free from the tricks of artistic effect than the style of these inimitable works." When these frescoes were finished, which it had required the constant labor of two years to execute, Julius was so well pleased with them that he ordered all the other pictures in the Vatican to be effaced, and the walls prepared afresh for Raphael. A compliment like this, however gratifying to the subject of it, could not fail to bring upon him the resentment of his brother painters, who yet knew that it was not attributable to his personal ambition, but rather to the impulsive temperament of the Pope.

With only a little delay, Raphael addressed himself to the composition of a new series of frescos, the main design of which was to celebrate the triumph of the church over her enemies. This is called the Stanza of Heliodorus, from the Expulsion of Heliodorus, which is pictured on one of the walls. The second scene is the Mass at Bolsena, the third is Attila terrified by a Celestial Vision, and the fourth, St. Peter delivered from Prison. On the ceiling are representations of the Sacrifice of Isaac, Jacob's Dream, and the Burning Bush. Our limited space forbids a description of these works: only it may be said that they are fully equal to the first Stanza.

The artist's fame rose with every performance, and he was overwhelmed with solicitations from private patrons. Among the commissions which he was able to execute at this time, mention is made of the portrait of Julius II., the Triumph of Galatea, and the Sybils del Pace, the two last of which were frescoes for the palace of Agostino Chigi, a rich banker of Rome, whose munificence to artists was hardly less than that of the pontiff himself. A characteristic letter of Ra-

phael, written to a friend at this period, is worthy of record here: "With respect to the Galatea," he says, "I should hold myself to be a great master, if there were in it half the merits of which you write; but in your words I cannot fail to perceive the partiality of your friendship for myself. To paint a figure truly beautiful, it might be necessary that I should see many beautiful forms, with the further provision that you should yourself be near to select the best; but seeing that good judges and beautiful women are scarce, *I avail myself of certain ideas which come into my mind.* Whether I have in myself any portion of the excellence of art, I know not, but I labor heartily to secure it." The modest self-depreciation of this letter is not the least of its merits.

While he was prosecuting thus successfully public and private works, Michael Angelo finished his frescoes of the Sistine Chapel, and they were thrown open to the public. Some spectators came only to mock, many to admire, and among these latter Raphael, who was filled with delight, and declared himself most fortunate in being permitted to live in the same age with this great Master.

About this time, certain critics discover a growing resemblance between the manner of Raphael and of Angelo. To which it may be replied, that the seeming resemblance involved no imitation; it was a resemblance which came from a common striving after excellence. At Rome, as at Perugia and Florence, Raphael was a close and untiring student of nature and the wide field of art, gathering up knowledge and skill from every quarter. He could not do otherwise. It was the nature of his mind to seek after excellence wherever found, and to incorporate it into the substance of his varied attainments. He also improved upon his acquisitions. So that, though his style may have been modified by other masters and schools, his individuality remained to the last. And if he gained knowledge and inspiration from others, so, and much more, did others learn from him. In Angelo's works, almost unapproachable as they are, there was yet a certain exhibition of brute force, of overstrained intensity and cold grandeur,

which few observers can wholly admire. Raphael's designs gained somewhat in energy and sublimity by the study of these compositions, but he could not adopt the same style. Instead of that, he improved upon it, and cultivated what Angelo lacked, viz., grace, beauty, refined expression, purity, superhuman dignity and sweetness.

Before the second Hall of the Vatican was completed, Pope Julius died, and was succeeded by Leo X. A pontiff of such liberal tastes could do no otherwise than carry out the unfinished plans of his predecessor, and project new ones. Gladly, too, would he have employed the services of so famous a master as Angelo, but the great Florentine was so perverse and irrascible that the Pope determined to dispense with his aid. Raphael was instructed to proceed with the embellishment of the other apartments of the Vatican. The one known as the Loggie—a series of galleries surrounding an open court—he resolved to adorn with subjects taken from the Old Testament. This was not the work of a day. To qualify himself for it, he read much in ancient history, and thoroughly informed himself in the manners and customs of Eastern nations. He also sent artists into Asia Minor to make drawings of oriental scenery and costumes, and to collect whatever information would help to illustrate his subjects. In the final painting of his numerous scenes, he was aided by other artists and by his scholars.

This unbounded success brought him wealth as well as fame, He was now at the height of his greatness. He built himself a mansion in that quarter of the city, known as the Novo Borgo, and his friendship and society were courted by the leading statesmen and authors of the day. Leo treated him as a personal friend, and placed him on a footing of social equality. Young artists flocked to him from all parts of Southern Europe. As he went daily to the Vatican, to superintend his works, he was escorted by a train of fifty or more students, the admirers of his genius and imitators of his style. On a certain morning, as this brilliant retinue passed by the house of Angelo, the latter called out derisively:—"You

march with a grand train, like a general." "And you," retorted Raphael, "go *alone*, like an executioner,"—the only ungracious speech which is recorded of him. Painters of wide repute in other cities came to Rome to inspect the works of which they had heard such marvelous reports. Even Leonardo da Vinci and Fra Bartolomeo, older by many years than Raphael, were not too proud to visit him. The latter could not find words to express his admiration; and his own mind received such an impulse that on returning home he executed some of the best paintings which ever came from his hand.

On the death of Bramante, Raphael was appointed superintendent of the construction of St. Peter's. This great enterprise, however, did not prevent him from devoting the intervals of his labor to minor productions. Of his smaller pieces, dating from about this period, are his Madonnas of the Pearl, of the Fish, the Seggiola, and the dell' Impannata. Among his easel pictures are the St. Cecilia, the Nativity of our Lord, and Christ bearing his Cross. Several portraits also belong to this period, the most noted of which are those of Leo the Tenth, of Joanna of Arragon, Beatrice of Ferrara, and the Fornarina, supposed to be the likeness of a beautiful Roman lady to whom he was too fondly attached. His picture of Christ Bearing his Cross, which was painted for the monks of Monte Ovieto, in Palermo, Sicily, had an adventure which is worthy of recital. Soon after being finished, it was dispatched to its destination by sea. But a storm drove the vessel upon the rocks, and sunk everything to the bottom except this painting which, being securely packed, floated about, and finally drifted unharmed into the Gulf of Genoa. The inhabitants of the coast found it, and were overjoyed on becoming so easy possessors of such a beautiful prize. In the excess of their delight they could not keep it secret; and when the news reached the ears of the monks, they came and carried the painting to Sicily, "where," as Vasari observes, "it has more reputation than Mount Etna itself."*

---

* 3 : 40.

After the several halls of the Vatican had been embellished with frescoes, Leo desired to decorate the lower walls of the Sistine Chapel with rich tapestries, the designs to be prepared by Raphael, and the tapestries to be woven in the looms of Flanders, in silk, and wool, and gold. This work was undertaken with the painter's usual industry, and accomplished with his usual success. That the tapestries might be of the highest possible excellence, he elaborated the drawings from which they were to be worked, with great care. The cartoons, eleven in number, and illustrating Scripture themes, were painted in distemper and sent to Arras, in Flanders, where they remained until the time of Charles the First, when, by the advice of Rubens, they were purchased for the English government. They now occupy a gallery in Hampton court palace. For executing these designs, Raphael received four hundred and thirty-four gold ducats (about $3,000), while the manufacturer of the tapestries was paid fifty thousand ducats. They were each between fourteen and eighteen feet long, and about twelve feet high, the figures being above life-size. On being brought to Rome, the tapestries were suspended against the walls of the chapel, underneath the sublime frescoes of Angelo. The effect was grand, above expectation, and when the doors were thrown open to the art-loving Romans, they could not refrain from loud applause.

The after history of these works deserves mention in this place. During the sack of Rome by the French, in 1527, they were carried away to France, as part of the spoils of war. In the reign of Pope Julius the Third, they were restored by the Duc Montmorenci, with the exception of a single piece representing the Coronation of the Virgin. In 1798, they were again plundered by the French, but before reaching France, they were sold to a Jew in Leghorn, who finally transferred them, for a consideration, to Pius the Seventh, who restored them to their proper places.

Not far from the period now under notice, Raphael produced one of his finest works, and one that has taken strong hold of the popular heart, viz., his Sistine Madonna, painted for

the convent of St. Sixtus. Not only in first class engravings, but in cheap lithographs and woodcuts, we have all seen the Holy Mother and Child standing upon the clouds, with St. Sixtus and St. Barbara on either side, and the two cherubs below.

No man constituted like Raphel could remain insensible to female charms. Courted, flattered, living in luxury, in the midst of a corrupt city, where celibacy was esteemed a virtue, it were not strange if his amours sometimes overstepped the bounds of propriety. Some of his biographers resent all intimations of this sort; but we do not find sufficient proof that he lived altogether above reproach. He was never married, and formed no permanent attachments among the cultivated and beautiful ladies by whom he was surrounded. The cardinal Bibienna offered him his niece in wedlock, with a handsome dowry, but as she had not been the choice of his heart, he declined betrothing himself until after long delay, and then, alas! the fair Maria died before the nuptials were celebrated. Leo had indirectly promised him a cardinal's hat, and it is surmised that his expectation of this appointment led him to postpone matrimony.

When Raphael was made superintendent of the building of St. Peter's, he anticipated greater satisfaction and higher honor as an architect, than he had gained as a painter. He did not affect to despise painting, as did Angelo, declaring that it was work suitable only for women and idlers; he wished rather to combine the two kindred arts, and to bear away the palm in both. The re-building of St. Peter's afforded him just the opportunity he desired. As we have already seen, this was one of the original projects of Julius the Second. By his order, Bramante had begun to clear away the ruins of the old Basilica, that he might build on the same site the grandest of Christian temples. On the death of Julius and of Bramante, this work was resumed by Raphael under appointment of Leo. The labor of removing the old structure and gathering materials for the new, occupied several years. At this time, little was known of the architectural and artistic treasures of an-

cient Rome which lay buried under the dust of centuries. But as Raphael proceeded with his explorations, one vestige after another of classic art was brought to light and awakened great interest in further researches. He now conceived a new and important scheme, which was nothing less than a thorough examination and measurement of the whole area occupied by the ancient city, the excavation and disinterment of buildings and valuable relics, and the drawing of plans and models by which to represent the old architecture as it appeared in the days of Augustus. This was a most congenial labor, and was pursued with zeal and that conscientious thoroughness which marked all his undertakings.

One more production of Raphael's pencil—and it was his last—remains to be mentioned, viz., the Transfiguration, designed originally for the cathedral church of Narbonne, in France. As has already appeared, Michael Angelo was jealous of the fame of his rival, and chagrined and mortified at the unfavorable comparisons sometimes made between them. As Raphael was proceeding with his work of the Transfiguration, Angelo resolved to measure his powers with him, confident of an easy victory. And here we may observe that this practice of publicly competing for artistic supremacy was nothing new. Ten years before, Leonardo and Angelo had contested for the prize of superiority in cartoons for the Town Hall at Florence, a contest which excited a wide public attention, and in which Leonardo carried off the honors. In the present case, Angelo's conduct seems to have been hardly honorable. He did not enter the lists publicly, but attempted to raise up another painter who, by *his* assistance secretly given, should outstrip and humble his great rival. Conscious of his own superiority in design, he was yet aware of his relative feebleness in coloring. And so, that there might be no hazard of failure, he plotted with one Sebastiano del Piombo —a Venetian painter of the school of Giorgione, and in high esteem for the richness and warmth of his colors—engaging him to finish the painting of which he himself should privately furnish the drawing. Now, the world shall see that an artist

of even moderate repute, can excel the boasting Raphael Sanzio! Before commencing this work, the Raising of Lazarus, he designed two other pictures, which were painted by Sebastiano, and greatly admired. But this was only skirmishing; it was merely training his faculties and those of Sebastiano to work in concert for a combined engagement with his great competitor. When the painting of Lazarus was finished and set up for exhibition by the side of the Transfiguration, he intrigued for permission to decide upon the merits of the two productions! One could hardly believe this allegation, so unworthy of the great Master, did not Vasari, his own pupil and biographer, confess it. Suspicion was early excited by the undue interest shown by Angelo in Sebastiano's success, and at length all the facts were disclosed. When the matter came abroad, Raphael quietly observed: "I rejoice at the favor Michael Angelo does me, since he shows that he thinks me worthy to compete with himself and not with Sebastiano." It was partly the suspicion of this combined attempt to outstrip and humble him that led Raphael to gather up all his strength into one grand effort. Angelo's subject, the Raising of Lazarus, was a better theme for pictorial representation than Raphael's, as it admitted of greater dramatic effect. And yet, when they were publicly exhibited side by side, the palm of excellence was awarded to Raphael's. The former is now in the National Gallery, London, a work of no ordinary merit, but an object of little regard; the latter holds high court in the Vatican at Rome, and the reputation is world-wide. It is the one painting above all others to which travelers from every land resort, that they may behold the highest possible achievements of human art.

Certain critics complain of its want of unity. The glorified forms in the air above, it is said, constitute one picture, and the agitated group of mortals at the foot of the mountain, another. But a little inspection shows that the two scenes are essential parts of one design; each needing the contrast of the other, and made the more impressive by it. In the scene above, Christ hovers in the air, surrounded by an effulgence

of light. "He was transfigured before them, and his face did shine as the sun, and his raiment was white as the light." The figures of Moses and Elias float in the atmosphere, as if drawn up and attracted by their Lord. The three disciples on the Mount prostrate themselves in adoring awe. The scene at the foot of the hill is connected with that at the top by the many hands uplifted and pointing to the Saviour. And the broad masses of shade in the lower scene heighten the effect of the bright portions above. They are also connected symbolically; for, while the lower scene represents the condition of the world under the power of sin and Satanic influence, the upper reveals a promise of deliverance in the person of the divine Saviour. Could Art have done a nobler work than thus to give mankind an epitome of the gospel, and to make its last great effort in honor of Christ!

Raphael's career was destined to be short, as it was brilliant. Possessed of a delicate constitution, his life had also been spent in close study and intense mental activity. Ambitious to excel, and then to maintain his high position, he overworked himself, and exhausted his stock of vitality faster than it could be replenished. It would not be strange, either, if the luxurious style of living prevalent in the court of Leo tended to beget physical enervation, rather than masculine vigor. The immediate cause of his sickness and decline was a cold contracted by exposure after rapid walking in the streets of Rome. A fever ensued, which his overtasked energies could not resist, and which was only aggravated by the mal-practice of his physician. A fortnight of illness, and all was over. He had not given the finishing touches to his painting of the Transfiguration; he had not completed his survey of the topography and antiquities of the city; his career as an architect was only just opening before him; when suddenly the light of his genius was put out. He died on Good Friday, the day of his birth, just thirty-seven years old. His body lay in state at the head of the long apartment where he had painted the Transfiguration hanging upon the wall above him, in the full glow of its recent colors. When his scholars and personal

friends looked in upon the scene, they burst into tears and loud lamentations. Crowds of rich and poor came to witness his burial.

"When Raphael went,
His heavenly face the mirror of his mind,
His mind a temple for all lovely things
To flock to and inhabit; when he went,
Wrapt in his sable cloak, the cloak he won,
To sleep beneath the venerable dome
By those attended who in life had loved,
Had worshiped, following in his steps to fame,
('Twas on an April day, when nature smiles,)
All Rome was there. But ere the march began,
Ere to receive their charge the bearers came,
Who had not sought him? And, when all beheld
Him where he lay, how changed from yesterday
Him, in that hour cut off, and at his head
His last great work; when, entering in, they looked
Now on the dead, then on the master-piece,
Now on his face, lifeless and colorless;
Then on those forms divine that lived and breathed,
And would live on for ages; all were moved;
And sighs burst forth, and loudest lamentations."

He was buried in the Pantheon, by the side of Maria di Bibienna, to whom he had been betrothed.

The biographers of Raphael make little mention of his early education. It would seem, however, that such a father as his would not have neglected his mental training. During the eight years of his life at Perugia, doubtless the study of books in science and general learning occupied a share of his attention. It is known that he was well versed in history and poetry, and composed occasional sonnets. His letters are written in polished language. His researches in the department of antiquities, sacred and secular, and his varied studies in the literature of his profession, must have furnished him with large stores of knowledge. At the time of his death he was gathering materials for a comprehensive history of Art.

His social qualities were remarkable. The countenance shown in his portrait indicates gentleness and refinement of feeling, slightly touched with poetic melancholy. Nature had endowed him with sweetness of disposition, and the circumstances of his life were so ordered as little to disturb his

placid serenity. His affectionateness and generosity were illustrated in his devoting his first earnings for two years to the support of his step-mother and sister. At Perugia, Florence, and Rome, he made friends of all whom he met. For his early teacher, Perugino, he ever retained the warmest regard. And when Pope Julius ordered the paintings of all preceding artists in the Vatican to be destroyed, to make room for frescoes by Raphael, the latter interceded for the preservation of at least the works of Perugino. Instead of disparaging the productions of other masters, in order to exalt his own, he aimed simply and evermore at excellence. Learning something from others, he offered to teach those who would learn from him. He helped young artists in their studies, freely giving them his own designs, and not seldom laying aside his own works to aid them in theirs. That wordy chronicler of the painters, Vasari, hardly overstates the truth when he says of Raphael: "The power was accorded to him by Heaven of bringing all who approached his presence into harmony: an effect inconceivably surprising in our calling, and contrary to the nature of our artists. Yet all of every grade became as of one mind, once they began to labor in the society of Raphael, continuing in such unity and concord that all harsh feelings and evil dispositions became subdued, and disappeared in his presence; every vile and base thought vanishing before his influence. At no other time has such harmony prevailed. But this was caused by his surpassing all others in courtesy as well as art." To have thus commanded the love of his professional rivals, some of whom were older than himself, is proof of great dignity of character, goodness and wisdom. The exception to this in the case of Michael Angelo, is not so surprising when we consider the proud and overbearing spirit of this master, conscious of great abilities and ambitious of artistic pre-eminence. With Raphael, though by no means a perfect man, amiability, like his æsthetic feeling, was instinctive. It cost him little effort to be gracious and courteous to everybody. Yet again, it is highly to his credit, that, considering the flatteries he received from

the great and the learned, and the wealth and fame he acquired, he was not lifted up with pride, but in all changes of fortune continued modest and amiable to the last. A man of such a spirit must have possessed an inner life as fruitful of happiness to himself as it was beautiful in its outward expression. His sentiments, hopes, joys, sorrows and aspirations have found scant record in books, but many of them are inscribed on the pictured halls of the Vatican, and on the walls of palaces, churches, convents and galleries of art throughout Europe.

As to his relative position as an artist, we only repeat the judgment of centuries in placing him in the first rank. He could not have raised the standard of art so high above the low state in which he found it, or have accomplished such an amount of work in so short a life, without possessing pre-eminent abilities and great energy of character. It will not be maintained that he surpassed all others in specific fields of art. Angelo, and perhaps Da Vinci, excelled him in force of conception and scope of design; Titian, in brilliancy of coloring; Fra Angelico, in spirituality of expression; yet when the sum of gifts and attainments is considered, Raphael's completeness will lift him above all rivalry. And this is the more remarkable, since he attained this eminence before he had passed middle life.

Great as was his genius, he never supposed that it would ensure him success without labor. He seems to have adopted the definition of genius by a modern writer, as the capacity to work. Indeed his laboriousness gave the jealous Angelo occasion to say that his success was owing more to hard study than to genius. In his early Umbrian life, he showed "indescribable energy and application," learning whatever he could from books and nature, and from the instructions of Perugino. So at Florence, where the field of observation was so much wider, his mind expanded to embrace and profit by his opportunities. So also at Rome. It was no light thing for him to stand in the presence of genius, living and dead: it quickened his thoughts, fired his ambition, and spurred him on to

constant and earnest endeavor. On receiving any new commission, he at once sat down to the needful preparatory study, devoting to it weeks, and sometimes months in succession; and when he drew out his designs he gave them the highest bent of his faculties. This, in brief, was the history of his life, and was the secret of his success. Not that genius alone, or labor alone, would have made him the prince of painters, but labor united with genius; labor lifted up and inspired by genius, and genius controlled and made practical by labor.

It is a noteworthy circumstance that Raphael Sanzio and Martin Luther were born the same year, in Central Europe, and only a few hundred miles apart. The one contributed largely to adorn and make illustrious the Church of Rome, the other strove as earnestly to pull it down. What judgment shall be passed upon their respective lives and works? Shall we say of Raphael that he perverted his powers, and that his life was useless? Not so. For while some of his productions have given to the world false ideas of Christianity—just as some of Milton's poems have done—yet, on the whole, his works have been fruitful of good. His cartoons for the Sistine Chapel, his frescoes in the Vatican, and numerous other paintings, illustrate many of the great facts and truths of religion held in common by the universal church, and teach them to the world, age after age, with barely less impressiveness than it could be done by printed book or the human voice. Why not believe that such great artists, and poets likewise, are in a sense inspired of God to do a special work? Not a few excellent hymns have been written by men whose lives were far from religious. Shakspeare, for whose moral character no high claim will be set up, has written sentences which compel us to feel that surely a Divine breath spoke through him, and that he was half unconscious of what he uttered. The architects of the old cathedrals "builded better than they knew." So we feel as we survey the life-work of such men as Raphael; they were in God's hand, led and controlled by him; and, though far from perfection, we cannot help feeling that they were raised up to do a great and good service for the race.

In concluding this article, we might refer at length to the criticisms which have been made on several of Raphael's works; but our space will allow only an allusion to one which seems the best sustained, viz., that touching the anachronisms which appear in the accessories of many of his paintings. In the Sistine Madonna, for example, we have St. Sixtus with his robes and triple-crowned hat, on one side of Mary, and St. Barbara and the tower on the other. Those good-natured cherubs in the foreground we are rather glad to see there. In the Madonna of the Fish, we have, beside our blessed Lady, St. Jerome in cardinal robes, and the angel Raphael and the youthful Tobit. In several of his larger works, he introduces the faces of living popes, cardinals, and other personal friends into his groups of historical personages who lived centuries before. Now, to our unsophisticated eyes, it seems in questionable taste thus to trifle with the dignity of art, and to construct historical paintings which in their parts are historically untrue.

But such, we suppose, was the fashion of the times, and Raphael wished to please his munificent patrons, and to glorify holy Mother Church. It will be said, too, that these licenses were taken only in the subordinate parts of his pictures, and do not affect their main purpose. Therefore we will not press our complaint. How can we indulge in petty fault-finding, in the presence of such overshadowing excellencies? As we said at the beginning of these pages, we would rather survey Mont Blanc from the plain than from its sides. And so will we continue to look at Raphael, not only not disenchanted, but with increased admiration for his genius and his works.

Art. IV.—THE REFORMED CHURCH OF FRANCE.

[This article is extracted from *The British Quarterly Review* for April. It presents an admirable sketch of the present ecclesiastical crisis in the Reformed Church of France. The previous portion of the article reviewed those points in the history of this church, during the present century, with which we are more familiar; showing its position under Napoleon, the depressing influence of its dependence upon the State, and the progress of opinion in respect to the separation of Church and State, to which question the ecclesiastical contest now converges more and more. The services of Samuel Vincent, of Vivet, and of Adolphe Monod, are correctly appreciated. At the time at which our extracts begin, the *Archives du Christianisme* was vigorously propagating the evangelical cause; and *Le Semeur*, edited by M. Lutteroth, was conducted in the spirit of Vivet, advocating the separation of Church and State. M. F. Monod stated the motto of the Evangelical party in the National Church, in the following form: "We will act with the consistories wherever we can, without them if we find it necessary, and against them if they compel us so to do." The journal *Le Lien* edited by the elder Coquerel, defended the support of worship by the State from the rationalistic point of view. *L'Espérance* was the organ of the orthodox party, which approved of the union of Church and State. The orthodox party had also now become so strong that they could form the *Society for Promoting the General Interests of Protestantism* on such a basis as to exclude the Rationalistic party. The *Central Evangelical* Society, of an earlier date, also promoted evangelical views. Such was the general state of the church at the time that this narrative opens. The account of Guizot's course, and the extracts from his remarkable oration, will attract special interest.—Editors.]

Such was the position of French Protestantism when the Revolution of 1848 burst forth. This unlooked-for convulsion threw everything into uncertainty. Institutions the most deeply rooted tottered under the stormy wind now passing over the whole European continent. But it was soon perceived that the new Republic would be very lenient, and would interfere but little with the constitution of French society. After the first moments of terror, the extreme partisans of the union of Church and State were re-assured. Many of them, no doubt, regretted having, in an official meeting held at Paris three months after the events of February, urged the convocation of a Synod. When once decided, however, it could not be adjourned; and in the month of September, 1848, the first Synod of the Reformed Church in the

nineteenth century was convened. The elections, in the absence of precise laws, were marked by numerous irregularities; but it was certainly, on the whole, a fair representation of the churches. As the Synod had not been sanctioned by the Government, none of its decisions had the force of law. Its importance was therefore simply moral; but in this point of view it was not small, since the project of organization which it laid down has remained like a stake in the ground, by which the road since traversed may be measured. The first question discussed was that of the constitutional basis of the Reformed Church of France; and the subject was treated by MM. F. Monod and Agenor de Gasparin with a precision which left nothing to be desired. They demanded that the Synod should decree the principle that the Reformed Church, as a whole, like the Christian Church, rests on a confession of faith. The discussion was very full and very animated. The Rationalistic party took up its old theme of universal toleration. The majority of the orthodox, feeling very sure that the Assembly would not vote a confession of faith, asserted that the traditional belief of the Church had never been abrogated, and that it was adequately expressed in the confession of faith as well as in the liturgies. One is surprised that such an argument should have been allowed; for of what avail is a document which really binds no one in a wholly moral society? It is the present belief that one requires to know; not that of former generations. Under the inspiration of these different motives, the following order of the day was voted: "The Assembly, seeing that it is proved on examination of the papers of the Consistorial Assembly that the generality of churches have expressed the wish that its deliberations should not touch upon dogmatic questions, and also that it is evident from the discussion in which it has just engaged that the moment has not yet arrived to disturb the *statu quo* in this respect, reserves these questions, and resolves that a commission shall be immediately named to prepare the plan of an address to the churches as a preamble to a subsequent project of administration."

The address voted was a vague homily woven of Scripture texts well known to be understood in different senses by the various members of the Assembly. But it was no such equivocal document that could pass for a profession of Christian faith in a Synod where, according to the vigorous expression of M. F. Monod, the distance between one party and another was as great as that between two different religions. All that was gained was that the confession of faith of La Rochelle was virtually laid aside; that it would no longer have the force of law, and would bind no one in the Church unless it should be placed at the head of a new project of organization. It was thus that the representatives of the Church ratified the elimination of the rule of doctrine and discipline which the State had in fact abrogated on occasion of the dismissal of M. A. Monod. The confirmed *statu quo* involved the absence of any dogmatic basis, since the pastors were nominated and approved without any profession being legally demanded, each consistory acting just as it liked in this respect. An evangelical consistory would of course be directed in its choice by the known convictions of a candidate; but of any general or ecclesiastical rule there was not a trace. Now, even if we suppose that, at the time of the treaty with the State, the legislature had explicitly ratified the confession of faith and the rule of discipline (which was not the case,) still the vote of the Synod of 1848 was sufficient to establish that the old doctrinal rule had been legally set aside. As to the constitution which resulted from the deliberations of the Assembly, it would be useless to dwell on it, since it has never been brought into operation. We will confine ourselves to stating that the synodal system was re-established, but that nothing appears among the characteristics of the Synod implying the existence of a confession of faith. What is more important is, the absence of all religious conditions in the electoral regulations. This is the essential point of the significant Article No. 2.: "The elders shall be named by the Protestants aged twenty-five, who have been for a year in the church, can prove their first communion, and recognize the Bible as the Word of God,

and the only rule of faith." It was, moreover, understood that this last clause should merely be read from the pulpit without the electors being required to express their individual assent. Such a regulation in a church in which the interpretations of the essential doctrines of the Gospel were radically different one from another, had no real efficacy. A man was qualified to enter on the pastoral office by having his diploma, being a Frenchman, and receiving consecration from seven pastors. The greatest blessing that has fallen on the Reformed Church of France was that the sanction of Government was not obtained for this miserable project, devised, no doubt conscientiously, as the best that could be procured from so mixed an assembly, but which sanctioned the equivocations and imperfections of a false position. The true meaning of the project was shown by the resignation of MM. A de Gasparin and F. Monod. The latter, pastor of the most important church in France, unhesitatingly abandoned his fine position, because his conscience no longer permitted him to serve a Church which had, of its own free will, sanctioned an irregularity intolerable in his eyes. This resignation is one of the acts most honorable to contemporary French Protestantism; for whatever judgment we may form of it from an ecclesiastical point of view, we cannot but accord to it unreserved admiration if we estimate at their true worth disinterested sacrifices to truth and to conscience.

It was shortly after these events that the free churches already existing in France formed a synodal association, founded on the double principle of the separation of Church and State, and the individual profession of faith. This organization, amid many difficulties, is still in full vigor. Nor is it a fact of small importance, that an independent Church should exist, resting on true principles, and serving as a vanguard to the Evangelical party. It offers a safe refuge, and at the same time a practical lesson, amidst the gloomy struggles of the present day.

From 1848 to 1851, the Reformed Church returned to the old system; the new organization not acting for a single day,

and the consistories continuing to be recruited from the most highly taxed of the community. But all was changed after the events of December 1851, which placed France for some months under a dictatorial rule. No one knew at night what would be decreed on the morrow. Those who enjoyed surprises may have found something to compensate them for the loss of political liberty. One fine morning, March 26, 1852, the Reformed Church of France awoke constituted anew, without having to grope through all the difficulties of a long deliberation. There could be no question of synods in an organization born under the inspiration of the *régime* of December, which no one will accuse of an exaggerated tenderness for deliberative assemblies. Councils of presbyters replaced the local consistories, and were themselves connected with the general consistories. The electoral law established universal suffrage, without requiring any conditions but those of age, residence, a certificate of first communion, and a vague profession of attachment to the established worship. There was here evidently no adequate guarantee for evangelical faith. The councils of presbyters were to be partially renewed every third year. This fine system was completed by the establishment of a central council chosen for the first time, at least by the State, which was to mediate between the churches and the civil power. The characteristics of this new body were not clearly defined. It might easily become despotic. At all events, it was the cause of great anxiety to all who were concerned for the liberties of the Church. This was not the case with the leaders of the Rationalistic party. They found it very convenient to have a sort of civil magistracy at the head of the Church, since they were very sure that it was not from that side that they need apprehend the introduction of disturbing religious reforms. A most animated discussion marked the conferences held at Paris in the spring of 1852. The Evangelical party demanded from whence had come "this thunderbolt," and with whom had originated this re-organization which the Government would never have devised for itself. Strange sayings were repeated that had been uttered

before witnesses, implying that a Government which had done away with a political assembly might also, at its pleasure, change the organization of a Church. It was, in fact, very well known whence the first idea of the decree had come, and no one would need other proof of this who observed from what party it received expressions of affection that had all the blindness of paternal feeling. It seemed like a repetition of the famous judgment of Solomon.

But it was in vain to discuss or to protest. The decree was in full force. The debates at this period turned rather upon its applications. The Evangelical party sought to reduce the powers of the Central Council as far as possible, while the rationalists openly demanded their extension. This latter party committed a great imprudence. Its chief leader, the pastor A. Coquerel the elder, published a project of discipline, which contained the two following articles: "Art. 166. The Central Council is composed of thirty-one members; that is to say, ten pastors in office, twenty elders, and the subdirector of all public worship that is not Catholic." "Art. 167. The ten pastors are named by decree. Each consistory places one of its lay members on the general list of the hundred and five elders presented by the consistories; the Government chooses the twenty lay members of the Council who are named by decree, as is also the president." In other words, a Government Commission was to rule the Church instead of its own Synods. And this is what men dared to demand in the name of liberalism! The Church is surrendered to the civil power, because it is feared that, left to herself, she should awake and commit the intolerable presumption of professing a definite faith and ordering her own discipline. The Evangelical party was induced, by the attitude of its adversaries, to demand more urgently the re-establishment of the Synods. There was one moment, indeed, when the rationalistic party appeared to join in this movement, but the agreement did not last long. The partisans of doctrinal anarchy soon recognized that the Synods would be dangerous for them, and they hesitated not to abjure the most glorious tradition of

their Church by opposing the re-establishment of its most necessary institutions. This question of Synods provoked very animated discussion, which had the advantage of showing to what extent Rationalistic liberalism was prepared to sacrifice the freedom of the religious community to the civil power, provided that power would guarantee its own safety; that is to say, the continuance of that ecclesiastical disorder which permitted the co-existence of radical divergences within the same Church.

We have now reached the most agitated period of the ecclesiastical crisis; but in order to understand its true character, we must look at the theological crisis which arose in France nearly fifteen years ago. If the old Rationalistic party had remained such as it had been for forty years,—faithful, that is, to a dull and frigid supernaturalism,—it would not have caused the scandals and aroused the opposition which have made so great a stir in modern times. We shall regard the theological crisis only in its relation to the ecclesiastical one, for it would, of course, be impossible to describe it fully in a few pages.

The old Rationalism had come from Geneva, and had preserved its prudent and moderate character, uttering no rash negations, but contenting itself with quietly taking out, or at least passing over, the tragic and sublime side of revelation—all that the Bible calls the foolishness of the cross. Superficial minds accordingly imagined that it was unjustly charged with assailing the essence of Christianity. As it led to no scandals, a goodly number of pious men, attached to the Evangelical faith, thought that they ought not to declare open war with it, and that an equilibrium should be maintained between the two parties. With a clear conscience, they yielded to compromises that were full of danger for the future. They occasionally voted for pastors well known for their attachment to the rationalistic party. But after the year 1852 all was changed. The prudence and timidity of the Genevan theology was followed by German boldness. A stormy breeze

from Germany passed over the minds of men, and they were led by degrees to extreme negations,—to that point, *i. e.*, where all positive religion is at an end. The first shock of this new movement was given by a very important event, which occasioned violent debates. This was the resignation by M. Edmond Scherer of his professorship of theology at the Oratoire at Geneva, in which his colleagues were MM. Gaussen and Merle d'Aubigné. This act is well known to have been induced by a letter on the Holy Scriptures, in which the learned theologian decidedly rejected the notion of any special inspiration for our sacred books.

To comprehend the sense and bearing of this important act, which led to consequences so momentous, we must cast a rapid glance at the condition of French Protestant theology at this period. We need not speak of the rationalistic party, which had not then got beyond a supernaturalistic Socinianism. Unanimity on all points no longer existed in the Evangelical camp, as at the beginning of the revival. There was, undoubtedly, a general agreement in accepting the great essential doctrines of Christianity; but while some interpreted these doctrines in the strict sense of the orthodoxy of the revival, which had been but a reflection of that of the seventeenth century, others had felt the necessity of widening their doctrinal system. They rightly deemed that the human and moral element was not sufficiently recognized by the reigning theology, which presented the dogma of predestination without any modification, and identified inspiration with an absolute *théopneustie*. These moderate views were traceable to Vinet, in the countries where French was spoken, and in Germany to the Evangelical liberal theology represented by such illustrious men as Neander, Tholuck, Julius Müller, Ullmann, and Dorner. It is important to prove that what has since been wrongly called the third party, was already constituted before the theological "left" had engaged in the conflict; for this fact shows that the change did not arise from a compromise, but from a deep and serious need of the mind and spirit. Therefore is it that we find this party in the present day fully

developed, pursuing its work with faith and courage, and continually drawing into its ranks those who wish neither to renounce the everlasting Gospel, nor to abstain from the earnest and conscientious treatment of the questions originated by modern thought. M. Scherer, after having first professed rigid orthodoxy, attached himself later to the liberal evangelical party, and from his vast learning, and his admirable talent as an ingenious and pointed writer, became one of its most eminent representatives. He exerted immense influence over the students of the Oratoire, and defended the cause of Christian individualism in his journal, *La Réformation*, with a zeal often implacable, but always brilliant. The views dominant in the Oratoire at Geneva were those of the old orthodoxy, with all its most characteristic features. The celebrated historian of the Reformation, M. Merle d'Aubigné, had not been required by the nature of his work to define his opinions with so much precision as his venerated colleague, M. Gaussen,—a man distinguished alike for his qualities of mind and heart, and universally regarded with most affectionate respect. His well-known work on "La Théopneustie" stated the dogma of plenary inspiration with a strictness such as our Reformers had never known, refusing even to a moderate religious criticism all its legitimate rights. M. Scherer's letter contained an energetic protest against these exaggerations; but it was easy to see in it the first symptoms of a reaction, which might lead very far if it were not held under restraint. The shock through the religious world was great, but no one expected the crisis that would follow. There was very soon founded at Strasburg a "Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie," conducted with superior talent by MM. Colani and Scherer.

It was not known as yet how far they were going. At first, it seemed that nothing was intended but a scientific journal in which the opinions of all sides might be represented. The adherents of the Evangelical liberal theology gave therefore their support to the new "Revue." But the good understanding could not last long. It soon became evident that on one very grave point MM. Colani and Scherer separated them-

selves from the great Christian tradition—that they held very lightly by the eternal Divinity of Christ. On the question of authority, they advocated an absolute subjectivity, admitting even that, in case of opposition between the individual conscience and Christ, the former must be obeyed. The "Revue de Théologie" very soon cast away the opinions which would have served it for ballast, and spread all sail towards new shores. It raised at one and the same time all the problems, critical and metaphysical, which had disturbed the theology of Germany during the last half-century, and it did this with the precision and subtlety of the French mind, boldly dispersing all vagueness and obscurity. This sudden invasion of the negative German science produced a great sensation, especially on youthful minds, thrown without preparation into the vortex. From criticism the "Revue" passed to metaphysics. It had begun by elevating the conscience to supreme authority. A breath of mysticism pervaded its first writings, even when their conclusions were negative. But by degrees this influence disappeared, and the name of reason was wholly substituted for that of conscience. The notion of the supernatural gradually subsided. M. Scherer's last article in the "Revue" may be regarded as his farewell to theology, and it is the farewell of a gloomy sadness, ending in scepticism. He has since devoted himself altogether to pure literature, and has become the rival of M. de Sainte Beuve, in a system which may be called *Nihilism*, since it admits not in theory any definite principles, starting from nothing to arrive at nothing, and asking if all be not an infinite illusion. From this moment theology has no claim to inquire into the labors of M. Scherer. He has placed himself on a shifting ground, where we can neither reach nor follow him. His old friends have continued the work that had been begun, but without the enthusiasm that marks new undertakings. The "Revue" has not since excited the same lively interest that formerly secured for it so great an influence. Its editor, M. Colani, has only written in it at rare intervals. If he has not followed M. Scherer to his furthest point, he has more and more resolutely eliminated

the supernatural element from religion, and he has been followed in this path by almost all his fellow-laborers. It is strange that in this negative belief, two systems, once so different, have met at last,—the bold and mystical spirit which created the "Revue de Théologie," and the old Genevan and French rationalism. This fusion is one of the characteristic signs of the position of men's minds. It was not possible that the mitigated rationalism which flourished in calmer days should long resist the new influences that had just arisen. It tried hard through some of its recognized leaders to maintain its former position. After the resignation of M. Scherer, MM. Munier and Chenevière, professors at Geneva, published refutations of his letter, in which they defended the authority of the Holy Scriptures. Some years later, M. Coquerel the elder, brought out a "Christologie," rather Arian than Socinian, and in which the favorite theses of supernaturalism were put forth. But how could the party, as a whole, defend itself against the new theology? It was only connected with a supernaturalistic Christianity by an external tie that touched not the heart or conscience. On another side it had always asserted the unlimited freedom of religious thought. How then should it say, "Hitherto shalt thou come, and no farther?" Moreover, it was not burdened with much science, while the new school had a vast amount of learning always ready for use. It is not surprising, therefore, that the "Revue de Théologie" should have gradually absorbed the old rationalistic party. No alliance succeeded better than this, in an age when every kind was tried. Let us remember also, that orthodoxy in its various gradations furnished its contingent to the new rationalism, and has, indeed, given it some of its boldest champions. It has not, however, been itself broken up, like the old rationalism. It has had defections, but has not lost its colors in the fight. Never, on the contrary, did it own more adherents than at the present day.

We must allow, however, that the rationalistic party—or the Liberal party, as it prefers to call itself—has advanced with great strides in the path of transcendental negations. It

would be unjust indeed to attribute the same opinions to all its adherents; but of what account are individual divergencies when it is once well understood that even the few who have kept somewhat behind the rest, by retaining some shreds of the great Christian tradition, attach no importance to them, since they give the right hand of fellowship to those of extreme views, and show themselves always disposed to plead their cause in an ecclesiastical point of view. We are warranted, therefore, in disregarding these slight differences, which exert no influence over the progress of minds. The progress of the rationalistic party reminds one of a steéple-chase, each one recklessly trying to get before the others. In order to give some idea of what we may call this *fever* of *negation*, it will be sufficient if we mention some significant publications. After M. Scherer, and since his recent movements, M. Albert Réville has been the most marked man in the camp. He presents a striking example of the transformation that has been wrought in the old rationalism. The son of a venerable pastor, who during the whole course of his ministry decidedly promoted supernaturalism by his words and his writings, and who was the friend of Archbishop Whately and the translator of his works, M. Albert Réville began his course in the same direction. But he soon broke through his leading-strings, and took up his position by writing witty and learned articles for the journal *Le Lien*. His genius took a high flight. Gifted with a remarkable fluency of style, a mind at once lively and singularly logical, he speedily became one of the most influential members of the theological "left,"—one indeed of its recognized leaders. He was fortunate enough moreover, thanks to his talents, to get into the "Revue des deux Mondes," which, of all French literary journals, has the largest circulation. And he mounted this rostrum, from which he could be heard so far, to maintain the most decided naturalism. We shall not be doing him an injustice if we say that what was most characteristic in his opinions was precisely the denial of all supernatural elements in religion. This is not with him a principle that has to be extracted by argument

from a mass of other ideas, but one which he constantly and openly advocates. The laws of nature are in his view a permanent and necessary mode of the Divine activity, and cannot therefore have been superseded in any case—the supernatural would be the *super-Divine!*—which implies an obvious contradiction. Henceforth Christianity is nothing more than the natural evolution of humanity. This humanity appears on the surface of the globe. How? No one knows. It first exhibits itself physically—animal life predominates in its early stages. By degrees it rises through all successive religions till it reaches its ideal in the man Jesus, in whom the Divine idea shines forth in all its brilliance. Thus all fundamental doctrines vanish—the fall as well as the redemption—and nothing is left to us but a wholly human religion. We are not attempting to criticise the system, but only stating its essential bearings. This, then, is what M. Albert Réville teaches in his numerous writings, what he preaches with force and clearness in the churches of France that are open to him, when, leaving his own church at Rotterdam, he frequently makes tours among them in compliance with the numerous requests addressed to him. The same denial of the supernatural is said to be found also in the writings of M. Pécaut, who has made himself universally respected by the religious tone of his mind, maintained throughout the varying phases of his doctrinal notions. He published in 1859 a book entitled "Le Christ et la Conscience," in which, not content with removing every miraculous element from religion, he questioned the perfect sanctity of Jesus Christ; and tried to show that the Scripture words could not rightly be applied to Him: "He was in all things like as we are, *yet without sin*." The issue of M. Pécaut's system was to reduce the true religion to the elements of a theism without dogma or miracle. He maintained the same thesis in a second book entitled "Le Théisme Chrétien," published in 1864. In this as in the former work he confessed that there was no place in the actual Church in its present state for views such as his, and gave his readers to understand that a new framework must be created for doctrines so new.

His first book had been criticised in the rationalistic camp, which had hitherto insisted on the person of Christ as being the centre of religion. The notion of the ideal man which M. Réville had set forth, was rudely assailed by this bold attack against the moral perfection of Jesus. The second of M. Pecaut's books on the contrary was received by the party with eulogiums, with one exception. He was reproached for wishing to teach his doctrine outside the Church. Why did he not assert the unlimited freedom of religious thought? M. Pécaut seems to have been convinced by these fine reasonings, for in his last work, "De l'Avenir du Protestantisme," he openly claims his place within the limits of official Protestantism. He maintains that his views have as much right as any others to be produced within the Church, and that in fact through them alone will the Church be able to realize the grand future to which it is destined. This new position which M. Pécaut has taken up is of very great importance, for it denotes to what extent public opinion has advanced in this direction. That which would have appeared some years ago an unwarranted presumption, is now regarded as a matter of course. The work of M. Théophile Bost, a Belgian pastor, on Liberal Protestantism, teaches the same doctrines, and puts forth the same pretensions in a tone incomparably more assuming. This book and the Catechism of M. Réville may be regarded as the last word that has been heard from the party, and this—the last word—is still the denial of the supernatural; it is a sort of mitigated stoicism, tinged with a slight biblical coloring. The younger M. Coquerel, who had for a long time believed in the supernatural, has lately written a book, "Les Transformations du Christianisme," in which, without denying miracles, he asserts their utter inutility, and reduces religion to a simple moral development going on through incessant fluctuations under the gracious and purifying influence of Jesus Christ. It is quite certain that at the present hour the consistent naturalists have the preponderating influence in the Liberal camp. The most popular preachers—those of whom the party most loudly boasts—the most openly

deny the miraculous. Such are M. Fontanés (of Hâvre), Pellissier, and Réville. The fact is patent and incontestable. Theirs is the grand Christianity, that which is to reconcile the age and the Gospel, and to which all superior minds unconsciously belong. Miracles and dogmas are useless excrescences, from which we must as soon as possible deliver the essence of religion, which consists simply in love to God and man. It is a sacred ether,—a divine and impalpable breath which, since the time of Jesus, has passed over the human soul. It must be confessed that, in studying these preachers of the Liberal School, it is impossible to discover anything but this under the flowers of their rhetoric, making, however, one exception in favor of M. Colani, who preaches duty with a manly energy, but without giving it its needful supports. It is incontestable that the extreme views are those chiefly represented in the journals of the ecclesiastical "left." M. Etienne Coquerel, the clever editor of *Le Lien*, has not concealed his convictions, but has repeatedly declared that he repels the notion of the supernatural. Some of his fellow-workers (his brother especially) have not gone so far ; but it is certain that the journal defends at all points and against all opponents those "good Christians" who do not admit a single miracle, and that M. Réville is one of its most constant and distinguished contributors. *Le Disciple de Jésus Christ*, conducted by M. Martin Paschaud, has for a long time dropped all concealment. Its estimable editor has reduced Christianity to what the last century called "natural religion." When M. Pécaut's book appeared in 1859, openly denying the perfect holiness of Christ, M. Martin Paschaud expressed in his journal his hope that the approaching jubilee of the Reformation would be celebrated in the spirit of this excellent work. Since then this journal—in which MM. A. Réville, Pécaut, Fontanés, and Théophile Bost are the principal writers—has not ceased to unfold to every breeze the banner of natural Christianity. A small journal, also, entitled *Le Protestant Libéral*, has taken on itself to disseminate among its numerous readers the most daring negations, under a lively and piquant

form. It aims to render these amusing, teaching the astonished public, for example, what to think of the apostles who spent their time in disputes among themselves. Let it not be forgotten that this denial of the supernatural appeared in the Church at the very moment when in the most perfidious manner Christianity was attacked from without, when the "Vie de Jésus" by M. Renan was selling by thousands of copies, and when the principal political journals were ranging themselves under its banner. We can understand the importance that would at such a time attach to internal assaults in the eyes of believers who think, whether rightly or wrongly, that Christianity is no longer a religion when deprived of the supernatural element. We have thought it desirable to give a just notion of the circumstances under which the ecclesiastical crisis had to be encountered, for it owed in fact its chief importance to the growing complications of the theological crisis.

We shall now proceed to concentrate our attention upon the last two years. During this time the electoral struggle has assumed an extraordinary animation. Two facts, however, belonging to a previous period, must be noticed, one of which is the foundation of the universal Christian alliance, which essayed to melt into an equal insipidity all shades of religion—Catholic, Protestant, and Greek—but has never succeeded in exciting the least interest. Undertakings of this kind, which propose to secure the union of creeds by suppressing all their definite, manly, and vigorous character, and would thus bind together not affirmations but negations, not strength but weakness, are doomed to unproductiveness, and must speedily fade and die away. The same is not to be said of the second creation of the Rationalistic party; we mean the *Union libérale*, a vast association composed exclusively of laymen, having no other object than to work for the triumph of emancipated Protestanism. The first principle of this union is that no standard should exist, or at any rate should be displayed in the Church, but that of free inquiry, and this should cover all opinions with its shadow. *L'Union libérale* is, as it were,

the incarnation of the preaching of the elder M. Coquerel. Above all, it is a great electoral engine, designed to overpower the Evangelical party in the ballot, which decides the direction of the Church of Paris; for it is there that its efforts are mainly concentrated, though some shoots have been struck in the provinces. We may notice, also, the animated discussion raised by the question of a new translation of the Bible. No one asserts the excellence of the existing translations, but the Liberal party wished that the Protestant Bible Society should edit the version made at Geneva in 1834, and regarded by the orthodox with much suspicion. The majority of the committee having voted in favor of the proposal made by the Liberal party, a schism ensued, and was followed by the formation of a new Bible Society for the Evangelicals—this schism furnishing another illustration of the incompatibility of the two parties.

We will turn now to the beginning of the year 1864. We know what was the state of the general mind, for we find ourselves in the very midst of the doctrinal crisis which we have described. The Evangelical party could not witness calmly the bold attempt to exchange the everlasting Gospel for a gospel without miracles. It believed, with reason, that as concerns the safety of the Church, those who allow Theistic Naturalism to be preached within it, are no less dangerous than those who preach it themselves. It was under these circumstances that the council of presybyters at Paris was called on to deliberate about renewing the license of the younger M. Coquerel, who for several years had been assistant to M. Martin Paschaud. We may well regret that the first measure of ecclesiastical severity should have fallen on a man who inspired general esteem and sympathy. M. Coquerel was the favorite preacher of the Liberal party, and he deserved this favor by his sustained and attractive talents, and by a remarkable faculty of rendering his sermons interesting without transgressing the dignity of the pulpit. All that could be charged on his preaching amounted to certain omissions—important ones indeed—but he had never attacked from the pulpit the

fundamental dogmas of Christianity. Yet, under his simple elegance and the fervor of his manner, the holy savor of evangelical Christianity could not be found, although the orator had maintained his belief in the supernatural, and distinctly preached the resurrection of Jesus Christ.

To refuse to renew his license would be therefore to take a very bold step, the effect of which upon public opinion would be immense, for it would amount to a declaration that the time for a compromise was past. Let us recognize at the same time what no one can gainsay,—*i. e.*, that M. Coquerel, moderate as he had shown himself as a preacher, had openly taken up the defence of the Liberal party; that he had accepted and advocated its thesis of universal toleration, and had committed himself to its support in the pulpit, and, above all, in the journal *Le Lien*. He was indeed the most approved representative of the party, not in its extreme tendencies, but in its average opinions. The Consistory was required then to decide whether it would of its own free will give the sanction of its vote to views, which the majority of its members believed to be morally dangerous to the Church. Nor must we forget that in this important affair there could be no question of recourse to the civil power, for it devolved entirely on the Consistory to decide as the last appeal. There was, therefore, no interference to be expected from the State—nothing need be considered but the welfare of the Church. No one has ever questioned or could ever question the legality of the measure by which the Consistory refused to maintain M. Coquerel in his position of assistant minister. It has only been asserted that in a Church united to the State, and divided into two almost equal parties, satisfaction should have been given to both. But this is only an argument of expediency. If the majority of the Consistory really believed that the continuance of the licence was dangerous for the Church, it was bound to act as it did—its duty was to follow the right to the end. But it was certainly taking the first step in a path full of dangers. The attempt to reconstruct a church of Christian profession within the forms of a national establish-

ment, could not but issue as we shall see it did. It mattered not, however; it was right that the experiment should be made, and whatever were the clamors and protestations raised against it, the Consistory did certainly obey the most solemn requirements of the Christian conscience in risking its own existence by so decisive an act. We shall find that by the very necessities of the conflict, a notion of a Church very different from that which had hitherto been found sufficient, was gradually to prevail in the minds of men. For the Church as a school would be exchanged a Church consisting of Christian professors. Only the more distinctly this, the true notion, should be defined, the more would the obstacles be felt which arise from the union with the State.

Scarcely was the consistorial decision known in Paris when the most violent storm burst forth. A petition was presented with numerous signatures; protests poured in from all parts of the country. Nothing could be more comprehensible than this agitation, for the Liberal party was struck to the heart, and the conflict of opinion was touching its culminating point. Pastoral conferences of two kinds are held every spring at Paris on occasion of the annual meetings of the different religious societies—the one called General, because it comprehends the pastors of all denominations; the other composed exclusively of pastors connected with the national establishment. One subject only could be discussed in the spring of 1864—that, namely, which filled and excited all minds, and which had been brought before the public attention by the important act of the Consistory of Paris in regard to the younger M. Coquerel. The measure itself could not indeed be discussed, but only the principle which had inspired it, and this principle involved the grave problem: "Ought the Church, or ought it not, to rest upon definite beliefs, or should it throw itself open to all opinions?" This is what was debated from different points of view at the two conferences. The general one opened on Tuesday, the 5th of April. The question that was discussed during three days was thus stated: "Are not the existence of a Church and the rights of believ-

ers compromised by unrestricted liberty in religious teaching?" The debate was marked by extraordinary animation on both sides. The Evangelical party in the national Church no less than in the Independent one asserted very strongly the necessity that a Church should have a dogmatic basis—a common rule accepted by all. "I demand," said M. Bersier, "if one can conceive of a Church without such a basis. I ask how a Mormon or a Spiritualist shall be prevented from preaching his doctrines, or a Puseyite from raising his altar and lighting his tapers, in our churches. Much has been said of the rights of pastors. I am here to assert the rights of the laity. A political journal has put forward a thesis on this subject which has not been disavowed: it is that a pastor who has received his license is answerable to no one—it is the license that constitutes the pastor. Well, I say that this is the most frightful tyranny that has ever been dreamed of. A priest is at least answerable to his bishop, but a pastor would find himself in the position of the doctor in *Le Malade Imaginaire*—those who give him his diploma saying to him, 'I confer on you the power to teach whatever you wish. Attack the faith of your fathers—mutilate the Bible—tread the liturgy under foot—do anything you like—you are free!'"

The Liberal party has not indeed ventured to claim unrestricted liberty in teaching: it would have been too flagrant an absurdity; but this concession was reduced to nothing by declarations such as that of the pastor Cruveilliér: "We preach the truth as we find it in the Bible, interpreted by our reason and our conscience;" or that of the Pastor Vidal: "We are asked where are the limits of truth? For my part, I have two: my first is the Word of God; my second, conscience." In other words, every one in a given church has the right to teach that which in the Scriptures is suited to his conscience; which means that there are no definite beliefs at the basis of the religious community. "I will answer you frankly," said the pastor Collins. "Of limits placed by man we will have none—absolutely none; neither pope, nor council, *nor synod*. The authority of a book I recognize; but that any one should

come and say to me, in the name of a book, "You shall teach this or that," I will not permit. Where, then, shall be the element of order? It shall be in liberty itself—in the name of a Christian Church united to Jesus Christ."

"This, then, is clear. No Church has the right to impose any other rule on its teachers than the vague assertion of the authority of the Scriptures, not venturing even to define what that authority is. It is evident that, even at a time when doctrinal differences are so profound, a shelter so elastic will include them all. MM. Rognon, Bersier, Dhombres, and G. Monod, responded forcibly to these sophisms. They showed that, if it is true that no Church has the right of imposing a rule of faith on any man, or of placing itself between him and the Holy Scriptures, it is yet both the right and the duty of every Church to declare distinctly what is in its view the fundamental basis on which it ought to rest—to say what it believes to be essential in matters of doctrine, and, like every association that wishes to endure, to claim respect for that which we may call its social conscience. The debate went on amid a real tempest, so over excited were all minds. One of the orators of the "left," the minister Lombard, called forth the most earnest protestations when he declared that prudence dictated to a pastor to keep his private opinions to himself at the time of public worship. There is no Protestant assembly, thank God, that would let pass the theory of mental reservation, without lively indignation. And yet we shall find that such a theory was adopted and defended by a small portion of the Liberal party. It is but just, here, to make a marked exception in favor of the pastor Leblois, who declared, in full conference, that he understood the name Son of God as applied to Jesus Christ in the same sense as that in which we apply it to ourselves.

At length the following motion, drawn up by M. Rognon, was carried by a large majority:

"The Conference, after having deliberated on the question placed on the order of the day, by the motion of the pastors

Bersier and Dhombres, and thus expressed: 'Are not the existence of a Church and the rights of believers compromised by unrestricted liberty in religious teaching?'

"Considering that for some years opinions have been put forth in works of every kind, by the periodical press, in political journals, and even in manuals of religious instruction, under the names of pastors and professors of theology, which assail not only the fundamental principle of the divine authority of the Scriptures, hitherto recognized by all the Churches of the Reformation, but also the most elementary principles of Christianity:

"Considering also that the writers referred to question the authority of the greater part of the Saviour's teaching, as it has been preserved for us in the Gospels; ignore or deny his supernatural birth, his miracles, and, above all, his resurrection; overthrow not merely the Christian idea of the creation of man in the image of God, and of his fall, but the very foundations also of natural religion, by weakening the belief in the Divine personality and in the future judgment:

"Considering, finally, that the authors of these negations justify themselves by alleging that it is of the very essence of a Protestant Church to admit of unrestricted freedom in religious teaching,—is of opinion, on the motion of the pastor Rognon, that as to what concerns the very existence of a Church, the free expression, whether by preaching or by any other public and official means, of the doctrinal opinions of the pastors, has for its legitimate and necessary limit the beliefs professed by the religious community to which these pastors owe their call:

"That, as to what pertains to the rights of believers, the authority which their sacred office gives to the pastors is entirely dependent on the conformity of their instructions with the teachings of the Bible, and particularly with the fundamental doctrines of the divinity of Christ and of Redemption, which doctrines the universal church has always regarded as unquestionably contained in the Holy Scriptures, and which are expressed in all Protestant liturgies; and that, con-

sequently, it is an abuse of power, and an act of spiritual tyranny, to take advantage of the position of a minister of Christ, and of a Christian church, to propagate directly or indirectly contrary doctrines."

We must not forget that this resolution, coming from an assembly which has no official character, and which is composed of members of different churches, has only a moral value, and could exert no influence over the position of the Reformed Church. The resolution passed at the conferences composed of pastors of the Established Church alone is no doubt of greater importance; but even that could not alter existing facts, nor arm the ecclesiastical bodies with a new right to repress doctrinal disorders. The following motion, made by M. Pédézert, professor at Montauban, was first inscribed on the order of the day: "I propose to the Conference to declare that the Reformed Church of France is possessed of positive doctrines, and of official bodies charged with causing them to be respected."

Professor Pédézert maintained, in a pointed and eloquent discourse, that these positive doctrines were found, first, in the liturgies, and afterwards in the consciences of the people. The pastor Louis Vernes defended the same thesis with great force of argument. He showed that the liturgies of the Reformed Church, and particularly the Apostles' Creed, contained an explicit declaration of the great Christian doctrines; and that the consistories which, according to the decree of March, 1852, were bound to watch over the maintenance of the liturgies, were also obliged in doing so to guard the safety of the Church's doctrines. Nothing could be more logical on condition that the consistories consent to fulfill their vocation; but if they be so constituted as to afford no guarantee of fidelity to these doctrines of the liturgy, how is it possible to avoid the disorders now lamented? There must be, at all costs, a tribunal of appeal—a superior authority. Without synods no real reorganization can be effected. This is what M. Jalabert, formerly professor at Nancy, the most moderate

orator of the Liberal party, demonstrated with great ability in a wise and forcible discourse: "We are not," said he, "in a normal condition. We have not the synod, which would be the crown of our religious edifice. Suppose that the Church were constituted in a complete manner; from a decision of the council of presbyters we might appeal to the consistory; from that to the provincial synod; and from the provincial to the general synod, which gives expression to the conscience of the Church." The intervention of M. Guizot in the debate produced a great sensation. With his commanding eloquence, he supported the following motion, which was carried by a large majority:

"We, the undersigned, pastors and elders of the Reformed Church of France, assembled in conference at Paris, according to established usage, on occasion of the annual public meetings of our different religious societies, deeply grieved and troubled in spirit by the doubts and denials which have for some time been put forward with regard to the fundamental basis of the Christian religion,—

"Consider it an incumbent duty towards God, towards our Lord Jesus Christ and our Church, to state aloud our common strong conviction on this subject.

"The Christian doctrines especially assailed of late are—1st. The supernatural acting of God in the government of the world, and particularly in the establishment of the Christian religion. 2ndly. The divine and supernatural inspiration of the sacred writings, and their supreme authority in matters of religion. 3dly. The eternal Divinity and the miraculous birth, as also the resurrection, of our Lord Jesus Christ, God-man, Saviour and Redeemer of men.

"At the same time that these fundamental doctrines of the Christian faith are disputed or formally denied, it is maintained that the Reformed Church neither has nor ought to have any positive dogmas, and that every pastor is free to profess within the church itself all his individual opinions.

"We consider these negations altogether destructive, both of the Christian religion and of the Reformed Church. We

have absolute faith in the supernatural acting of God in the government of the world—in the Divine and supernatural inspiration of the sacred writings, as well as in their supreme authority in matters of religion—in the eternal divinity and miraculous birth, as also in the resurrection, of our Lord Jesus Christ, God-man, Saviour and Redeemer of men. We are convinced that these foundations of the Christian religion are also the foundations of the Reformed Church, which has positively recognized them as such throughout its liturgy, and which, in accordance with the universal Church, publicly professes its faith in them as summed up in the Apostles' Creed.

"We hold the great principle of religious liberty as strongly as any one, and we hold it not for ourselves alone, but also for those who differ from us. In virtue of this principle, every one is free to profess his belief, and to unite himself with those who hold the same; but we cannot conceive what kind of Church that would be which should have no common faith, and in which the most different or even contrary opinions might with impunity be professed. Such a state of things would not be the enjoyment of religious liberty, but the destruction of the religious community, which needs, even more than other societies, a deep and earnest sympathy. The Reformed Church of France is an ancient and organized religious society; it possesses vital principles and historical institutions; and even in the prolonged absence of synods it has, in its consistories and its councils of presbyters, legal authorities, the right and the duty of which it is to maintain its principles, and this in virtue of the laws of the State as well as of its own discipline.

"The Reformed Church recognizes the sacred books alone as the rule of its faith, and it has never admitted, and can never admit, that those who dispute the divine and supernatural inspiration of those books, and their supreme authority in matters of religion, are none the less authorized to speak and to teach in its name.

"We have full confidence that, in thus expressing our deep common convictions, we express the sentiments of the great

majority of the members of our Church, while we remain ourselves constant to the faith of our fathers, and to the dignity and stability of the Church which they founded."

"This," said M. Guizot, "is not a confession of faith; it is simply the declaration of our own belief. We aspire only to a free and moral influence." The illustrious orator then, after explaining that he had not wished to insist especially on the points of doctrine more particularly assailed at present, thus concluded his admirable speech:

"I hasten to the end. I do not wish to prolong beyond measure this discussion, which opens before us subjects so vast and far-reaching. I shall say one word only touching the organization of our Church and the authorities established within it. It is desired that the pastor should be the sole interpreter of the faith; the Bible and the individual conscience of the pastor—to these the right belongs. Let the pastor explain the Bible as he understands it, and no one can demand more. But this would be the suppression, the abolition of the Reformed Church herself. It is one of the essential characteristics and of the great results of the Reformation of the sixteenth century, that it did not leave religion under the exclusive rule of the ecclesiastical society, but gave to the laity, to all believers, a place and a part in the government of the Church, side by side with the clergy. The authority resides in assemblies in which pastors and laymen sit together to deliberate and to decide. Let us beware of allowing this grand feature of our Church to be changed—faith and liberty would suffer alike.

"I will only, in conclusion, call your attention to one fact, and it is the principal fact of the present crisis. Look around you. The assault on the bases of the Christian faith is being made everywhere—in Germany, in Switzerland, in Holland, in England, in France. People say they are not afraid; neither am I, provided that the defence answer to the attack—provided that believers remain not inert and indolent in the presence of unbelievers who are ardent and active. I have full confidence in the Christian cause, but men are the instru-

ments of God. It was through the faith and labor of the first Christians that God founded the Christian religion; it is by the faith and labor of Christians now that that religion should be defended. We have before us a great crisis and a great work—greater indeed than we can appreciate. In the struggle that we are maintaining—in the crisis through which we are passing, we are the vanguard of Christianity: all Christian communions follow behind us. Let us show that we are up to the level of this great work, and firmly resolved on its accomplishment."*

We do certainly attach very great importance to this remarkable declaration, and all the more because the statement of principles proposed by M. Guizot was intelligently preferred by the assembly to the vague address of the Synod of 1848, the simple adoption of which was demanded by Professor Jalabert. We must, however, remember that the conference of May, 1864, had no legal character; that it was not formed of delegates of the Church, and represented only itself. It confined itself, indeed, to indicating the object to be attained; but the expression of the desires of so numerous an assembly was a moral fact that will have its effect on the future doctrines of the Church. It in no way changes, however, its present condition. It does not replace on its basis the essential dogmas of the Christian faith. It does not modify its actual constitution or remove its patent disorders. Nothing proves this better than what took place at Nîmes, at the pastoral conferences held there on June 1st of the same year. The proportion of rationalistic pastors is known to be much greater in the south of France than in the north. It was the avowed intention of the leaders of the party to make a counter-manifestation, which should be a response to the Paris manifesto. But it was needful to be sure of a majority. This was why they revived an article from the regulations of the conferences of Le Gard, which had long fallen into disuse,

* All these quotations are taken from the pamphlet published in 1864, under this title, "Les Conférences pastorales de Paris en 1864."

by which a voice in the deliberations was refused to all the elders of churches who did not belong to the council of presbyters of Nîmes. This dismissal of the laity from a discussion touching the faith of the Church was, on the part of the champions of liberalism, at once a great scandal and a serious mistake. It certainly avoided the chance of a minority; but the party that lent itself to such a measure, so opposed to the true spirit of the French Reformation, incurred the just reproach of desiring liberty only for the promotion of doctrinal disorder. It would, indeed, be but too convenient to cover the most audacious negations with a fold of the pastoral robe, refusing to the elders the opportunity of expressing their views, under the pretext that theology belongs only to the clergy. The Evangelical members of the assembly could not consent to this decision. They withdrew in a body, and determined to found a conference of their own. The Liberal party, thus left master of the ground, unfolded its banner in peace. After refusing the evening before to acknowledge the Apostles' Creed as the expression of the universal faith of the Christian Church, it opposed to the manifesto of Paris an address of the same kind as that of the Synod of 1848, lavish in pious phrases, but not involving the admission of any supernatural fact, or of any dogma. All this unction was pure waste, for the world knew well what was meant by these texts so loosely sewn together that every interpretation and every negation might easily pass between them.

The most important fact at the close of this year 1864, so fruitful in agitations, was the inauguration at Alais of the Evangelical Conference of the South, formed after the stormy debates at Nîmes. This manifestation was more important than that of the conferences at Paris in the spring. The incompatibility between the two portions of Reformed Protestantism had become so absolute that they could no longer even deliberate together. The Church was effectually divided. In opposition to the Church of free thought, the Evangelical Church was constituted. The division was, however, of course but for a time, since, as long as the official forms are not aban-

doned, the two parties must encounter one another again. But no matter: the schism was morally effected and openly declared. The conference at Alais, by the rules of its constitution, took for its basis a doctrinal rule at once broad and precise, and demanded its ratification by all the members, lay and clerical. The essential article of this rule is thus expressed: "Founded on the double basis of the faith and organization of the Reformed Church, the conference professes, on the one side, a faith in the supernatural as attested in the inspired books of the Old and New Testaments, summed up in the Apostles' Creed, and finding its supreme manifestation in the person of our Lord Jesus Christ, very God and very man." Suppose this article to be inscribed on the front of the Reformed Church, instead of being merely the rule of a conference, and you have the Church at once in its normal condition. Assemblies such as those of Alais must contribute effectually to prepare for this future, but do not, any more than those of Paris, supply a remedy for the doctrinal anarchy in the official establishment. This anarchy is rather proved than removed by declarations such as those of Paris and Alais, the very need of which springs from the fact that the old confession of faith and the old discipline are virtually abandoned.

Were there any doctrinal authority in exercise in the Established Church, we should fear to weaken it by such declarations.

We have seen the importance attached by the Evangelical party to the apostles' Creed at the conferences of Nimes as at those of Alais. It was not that they maintained the apostolic origin of this summary of the faith, which is only a development of the baptismal formula gradually added to during the first three centuries. But it had the advantage of being accepted by all Christian churches, as expressing the facts that constitute the everlasting Gospel, and bringing out in bold relief the idea of the supernatural, which was more and more forsaken by liberal Protestantism. Forming as it does an integral part of public worship, it seems to protect it

against the invasion of the rationalistic naturalism. Not that it can really do much, at any rate in the present phase of the crisis. On two occasions scrupulous persons had been known to give in their resignation for the simple reason that they no longer found in the Creed the expression of their faith. The adherents of the liberal party now read without believing it, under pretence that no one any longer accepts it without special interpretations, and also that the pastor in repeating it is the impersonal voice of the Church. M. Réville has defended this idea in an ingenious article in the "Revue de Théologie." Some of the pastors of this party precede the reading of the Creed by a form of words in which they ask of God to enlighten our faith—thinking in this way to harmonize duty and sincerity. These subtleties are beyond us. We cannot understand how *I believe* should ever signify, *I believe not*. We do not impeach the honesty of the persons who lend themselves to such equivocations, since they avow them aloud; but surely nothing could more clearly prove the confusion of men's minds than these practices. A cry of intolerance was raised because the Consistory of Paris refused the elder M. A. Coquerel two assistants proposed by him, on the ground that they did not distinctly assert their adherence to the Creed. This respectable body could not, however, have acted otherwise. Let the question be asked of any jury of men of upright conscience, strangers to the Church conflicts, and one may safely leave to them the verdicts.

This discussion regarding the assistants, and violent debates raised by the refusal of the council of presbyters to suffer M. Réville to supply the pulpit of the Oratoire for M. Martin Paschaud, occupied the close of this year, 1864. Preparations were being made on both sides for the grand battle of the elections, which would renew by one-half the presiding bodies of the Church. These elections took place throughout France in the month of January, 1865. At Nîmes, at Bordeaux, and at Hâvre, they were to the advantage of the Liberal party, as also in some smaller churches. The Evangelical party counted numerous triumphs in the departments. Taken

altogether, however, the forces were almost equally balanced, with a slight advantage on the side of the Evangelicals. The ultimate result has not modified the respective positions of the opposing parties. But every one felt that the great stake was at Paris. We have already adverted to the electoral law laid down by the decree of March 26, 1852. We have seen that, in order to be an elector, it is necessary, first, to be thirty years of age before the 31st December of the year in which the name is inscribed; secondly, to have by the same period lived two years in the parish, if a Frenchman, and three, if a foreigner; thirdly, to be subject to no incapacities entailing the loss of the electoral right in politics; fourthly, to prove admission to the holy communion; fifthly, to declare oneself a frequenter of public worship; and sixthly, in case of marriage, to have received the nuptial benediction in the Protestant Church. Conditions touching belief strike us by their absence from these regulations—the fate of the Church is left entirely to the chances of an election. This is the radical defect in the present organization of Reformed Protestantism. The Consistory of Paris added no religious clause to these conditions; it had not indeed any right to do so, but it made certain rules for maintaining, as strictly as possible, this insufficient electoral law. Thus, every one is now obliged to be entered individually in the parochial register before a commission named for the purpose, and a residence of two years is required of proselytes. There is nothing in the additions to contradict the decree, or really to limit its applications. They called forth, notwithstanding, strong remonstrances on the part of the Liberals, who even appealed to the minister and professed to have sufficient grounds on which to reverse the elections.

Nothing can give an idea of the violent excitement of this electoral period. To the journals already existing other small ones were added in profusion. Each party in the Church multiplied its agents in order to assemble its adherents. Every evening the electors collected together in all parts of Paris. The political journals took sides—the democratic ones under-

taking the defence of the Liberal party, but not without leading it into some dangers by an imprudent frankness. *Le Siècle* and *Le Temps* openly asserted that the choice lay between natural and supernatural Christianity. No immediate effect could evidently result from the elections in an ecclesiastical point of view, since, so long as the electoral law lasts, the principle of anarchy will continue also. But not the less was it very important to prove to which side the great Church of Paris inclined. The Liberal party did not shrink from the most extreme measures; it brought men up to the election, honorable men no doubt, but who had made a public profession of atheism or of Pantheism. And yet it was in the minority in the January election, though it is true that it had only thirty-five votes less than its opponents, and that a new election was required for the illustrious statesman who consecrates his green old age to the defence of Christianity. The fight was most vehemently resumed around the name of M. Guizot. The Liberal party did not hesitate to attack his past political life, which had no connection with this religious question, and the Evangelical party was wrong in suffering itself to be led on to this ground. At the election of the 5th of March, M. Guizot triumphed, but with a majority of eleven only, which left the Church of Paris divided into two almost equal portions.

A result such as this was not adapted to extinguish the internal conflicts, and accordingly they continued with redoubled animation, as might be seen at the last conferences at Paris, in the month of April, 1865. The national conferences contented themselves with ratifying, by a second vote, the declaration of principles made the preceding year, in spite of violent protests from the "left." The general conferences were especially instructive, as showing what the Church would become, if once given up to the Liberal party.

A resolution had been brought before the assembly, in the name of the Evangelical party, to this effect: "The assembly recognizes that no Christian Church is possible without an explicit belief in the resurrection of Jesus Christ."

The following was the response presented in the name of the Liberal party, and countersigned by fifty-six pastors or elders:

"On the question raised by the conference, 'regarding the tie that connects Christian evidence and doctrine with the fact of the resurrection of Christ,' the undersigned pastors and laymen, considering that the miracle of the resurrection of Christ has long been regarded as indispensable to confirm his divine mission, and to ensure the immortality of believers; but that this miracle, such as it is described under different forms in the Gospels, is subject to considerable historical difficulties; that these difficulties are not unacknowledged by any earnest mind, whatever views it may hold in other respects; that there are now found in all Protestant churches, and in our own especially, men who have been led by the impartial study of the New Testament narratives, to question or even to deny the reality of the event under consideration, without their faith in their divine Master being thereby shaken or diminished; that it is impossible, therefore, to attach to a fact, open to so much controversy, the importance which orthodoxy persists in attributing to it; that indeed the modern religious conscience, instructed in the school of Christ himself, and slowly developed during eighteen centuries of Christian education, has learned, on the one hand, not to make the divinity of the Master's teaching dependent on his corporeal reappearances; and, on the other, to regard, as independent of that fact, the certainty of eternal life, so that faith should rest for the future, not on the doubtful arguments of critical erudition, inaccessible to the simple believer, but on the evidence of truth itself;—declare that, divided among themselves on the historical question, they are fully agreed in distinguishing between that question and Christianity itself, and resting the simple and living demonstration of faith on the accordance of the holy words of Christ with the principles and wants of the human soul."

We fancy we are dreaming when we read declarations such as these signed by pastors! To assert that it matters little

whether or not one believes in the resurrection, which is indeed merely an accessory in Christianity—this is not only to separate oneself wholly from all the past of the Church, but also to shock the common sense of men generally. We can understand how the Gospel may be rejected on the ground of the resurrection ; but how any one can pretend to admit the one, while denying the other—this is what confounds the mind.

The document of the fifty-six sufficiently explains the energetic reistance of the evangelical portion of the Church, which could not consent to see the ecclesiastical establishment made, as it were, a bed of rest on which Christianity might die in peace.

We have yet to trace one last episode of this long crisis, which is still far from its close. We refer to the proposition made by the Council of Presbyters at Paris to demand the resignation of the pastor Martin Paschaud, giving him a pension of six thousand francs. The matter is still pending before the Minister of Public Worship. The Council and the Consistory take their position on the following grounds: They first advert to the pastor's prolonged ill-health, causing him out of the twenty-five years of his ministry at Paris to supply but two years of full service. In this condition he has not wished for any other assistant than the one whom the Consistory had prohibited, but for whom he has repeatedly and urgently asked. He is also reproached for the hostility which he has always shown to the majority of the Consistory, opposing its decisions from the pulpit, and choosing the most marked men of the Liberal party for his supplies. Finally, they complain of his doctrinal opinions (though without defining them precisely) as in flagrant opposition to the faith of the Reformed Church. This measure brings us to the violent debates of last year. Protests and counter-protests succeeded one another in the religious journals, and the political press again interposed with passionate articles, some of which were decidedly abusive. To the decision of the Consistory, M. Martin Paschaud and his party opposed in respect of facts

the following assertions: Firstly, If once the accused pastor have resumed his service, and consented in case of absolute incapacity to have his place supplied at the will of the Consistory, the conflict is at an end. Secondly, In a church divided into two almost equal portions, pastors siding with the minority of the Consistory do nothing unseemly in supporting their party. Thirdly, This divided state of the Church ought to hinder the Consistory from taking such extreme measures as amount in fact to a trial on the ground of doctrine. In the matter of principle and of legality, they appeal to the irremovability of pastors. They do not dispute the right of suppression in extreme cases, but such a measure demands very serious grounds, and must follow a well-known legal course. It is quite another thing from a compulsory resignation, not provided for by the law. This last measure breaks up a pastoral career quite as effectually as the former, without being connected with so careful an examination, affording a guarantee for its justice. On this last point, the apology of the Consistory, expressed with much ingenuity in a memorial in which the hand of an illustrious statesman is plainly to be recognized, appears to us but little satisfactory. From the fact that a punishment so extreme as suppression may in certain cases be inflicted, it does not follow that a lighter punishment, not provided for by law, must be also legally justifiable. Thus, the Minister of War may, in specified cases, order the dismissal of an officer, but he cannot pension him off. It seems to us that wise heads may be divided on this question. On the other hand, the Liberal party is singularly hampered by its own previous exploits in respect of dismissal. It is visibly embarrassed when the name of Adolphe Monod is mentioned —especially in an affair connected with M. Martin Paschaud, for no one has forgotten his part in the crisis of the church of Lyons. The Liberal party has a beam in its eye in respect of pastoral irremovability, of which it has made very light on several occasions when it was itself in power. It makes a great distinction between the non-reëlection of the younger M. Coquerel as assistant Minister, and the proposal to pension

off M. Martin Paschaud, since, in the former case, the Consistory acted in its spiritual capacity, without having recourse to the State, while in the latter it is obliged to submit to the civil authority a trial regarding doctrine. We are told that it could not do otherwise, considering the constitution of a Church united to the political power. If synods existed, there would be in the Church itself a tribunal which would judge according to fixed rules established by a wholly spiritual power. In the absence of this ruling body, the State is at once the tribunal that judges, and the power that executes. It is constrained to decide questions of doctrine and of conscience, and this is peculiarly difficult without the existence of a confession of faith or a rule of discipline. The evil is immense, and brings fully into light the defects of the present system, while it singularly complicates the praiseworthy attempt of the Evangelical portion of the Reformed Church to reconstitute the religious community on its true basis. The question of its reorganization has just been debated by the Senate, on occasion of the petition of a pious and zealous layman of the church of Hâvre, M. F. de Conninck, in which he demands the provincial synods which the law of Germinal, An. X., had retained. We do not believe that the re-establishment of this intermediate machinery would be of the slightest use, for the provincial synods would only be consistories somewhat enlarged. That which most deeply offends us, in this deliberation of the Senate, which turned not merely upon the external organization of the Church, but upon doctrines also, is to see these great matters of the soul and the conscience debated in a political assembly. This debate had been truly Byzantine in its character, recalling the time when religious parties, orthodox or Arian, sought each by turns to pull the robe of Constantine, and draw the imperial power to their side. The Senate gave a vote unfavorable to the Evangelical party, and then passed disdainfully to the order of the day. We are almost tempted to congratulate the party on a check which will strengthen its repulsion from the dangerous help of the civil power inter-

fering in religious matters. This state of things makes us believe that the ecclesiastical crisis is approaching its decisive moment; for when both sides have come to demand that the State shall cut a knot so delicate, the blessed day cannot be far off, when the Christian conscience shall decide it at a single stroke, breaking the bond which unfortunately for them now unites the two powers, spiritual and temporal.

Let us sum up what we have been saying, and then conclude. The Ecclesiastical debate borrows all its importance from the doctrinal one, which divides the Protestant Church as a whole into two camps. It is certain that this debate touches the very foundation of religion, and that the question is, which shall triumph—supernatural Christianity, or that which dares to call itself natural. The whole of one portion of the Reformed Church defends the everlasting Gospel with energy, carrying a standard broad enough to cover the different shades of faith, without wishing (if we except some persons of extreme views, far behind the rest) to assail the legitimate freedom of Christian thought. We need not say how fully we are in accordance with this party, or with what sympathetic interest we follow their course in the struggle, in which, moreover, all true Christians of every Church have a part.

The doctrinal discussion could not but connect itself with the Ecclesiastical conflict. Two parties so different could not encounter one another in the same system of forms without clashing. The shock was felt first in the domain of theory, the two ideas of the Church being as distinct one from the other as natural and supernatural Christianity. In the view of the Protestantism which calls itself liberal, the Church has no other basis than that of free inquiry; it is not an association founded on a definite belief, but a school open to instructions of every kind. According to evangelical Protestants, the Church is a religious community founded on an explicit profession of the Christian faith. In the heat of discussion, through the fire of battle, this notion has fixed itself more

and more definitely, as may be seen in the opinions expressed at the conferences of Paris, and, above all, in the constitution of the conference of Alais, which demands a profession of faith on the part of laymen as well as pastors. On this point also we are profoundly in sympathy with the Evangelical portion of the Reformed Church. It will evidently take further steps in this path; for since the presiding bodies no longer recruit themselves, but are supplied by elections, the direction of the Church depends on the religious and moral state of its members. It is not enough, then, to have noble institutions on paper,—a confession of faith written down, and pastors bound to teach in conformity with it; it is needful also that the electors—that is to say, the private Christians—should give pledges to the faith of the Church, which has no other security than an individual profession. It is certain that the whole Evangelical portion of the Reformed Church is advancing in this direction, and this is certainly what it understands by the re-establishment of discipline.

The two parties, completely different in their conceptions of Christian doctrines and in their notions of a Church, seek to have their respective views carried out in ecclesiastical practice. The debate is unfortunately complicated here by an abnormal condition of things, which prevents it from finding its issue. Legally speaking, the Evangelical party has not means sufficient to reconstitue the Church on its true basis. It is, no doubt, armed against certain exaggerations and offences. The liturgy and the ordering of public worship suffice to prevent flagrant negations, or, at least, give the right to condemn them. But we all know that flagrant negations are rare in the Christian pulpit. What there is greatest need to guard against or to repel is the cautious denial of the essential dogmas of Christianity, and these cannot be prevented with no rule of faith and no officially accepted discipline. Now we have shown that nothing of the kind exists at present in the Church. We pay very little heed to archæological researches in this matter. It avails us little to know whether the confession of La Rochelle has been formally ab-

rogated or not. Either way, it is abrogated in fact—no one would think of signing it now; it binds neither pastors nor laymen. The electoral law of 1852 suffices of itself to prove this. The possession of a Church is not claimed, like that of a material property, by exhibiting old parchments. Thus, in the absence of a general and recognized rule, each particular Church governs itself; and the words of Pascal may be here applied—*Orthodoxie au Nord, Hétérodoxie au Midi.* The anarchy is complete. Moreover, the official belief of a Church like that of Paris may vary from one year to another, everything depending on the chances of elections. Such is our present position.

The Liberal party finds this state of things most admirable; it can effect in security, under the protection of the State, the most radical revolutions. This protection is, indeed, the condition of its existence. It refuses synods, therefore; for nothing would give it more ground for alarm than that the Church should govern itself. It is otherwise with the Evangelical party, that aspires to the synodal system, knowing well that the Church through its delegates has alone the right to re-establish the rule of faith which would put an end to the existing anarchy. In the meantime it tries, according both to its right and its duty, to gain the ascendency in the elections, and to overpower decided rationalism wherever it has a majority. Nothing could be better, so long as it is not obliged to have recourse to the direct intervention of the minister of public worship, which would in the present state of things be infinitely more hurtful than useful, for the reasons which we have indicated.

We desire most earnestly that the synodal system may be tried as a great experiment; but will it remedy all evils? We do not believe that it will, so long as the union with the State shall endure. How, indeed, shall the first truly representative synod be convoked? It would probably be done according to the present electoral law, for the civil power could not impose other conditions without entrenching on the future deliberations of the assembly. The first synod would thus re-

flect the actual disorder of the Church. It would be divided; how then should it elaborate an adequate rule of faith? Compromises such as those of the address of 1848 are no longer possible. Nothing would be more fatal than to rest contented with a vague and insipid profession; yet, if anything else were produced, the synod would be at once divided. It may be asked, might there not possibly be a majority of the orthodox? Granted. But, even in that case, what should be done with the minority, which would still be a considerable party? What should the State do with the minority, for it could not refuse to recognize honorable citizens who pay a tax for public worship like the rest? No one will seriously admit the idea that the Church of free thought might be supported side by side with the Evangelical Church. The State will never enter on a course such as that. It will rather get rid of all exaggerations and imprudences, and seek to attain a vague ground of agreement. Suppose the best—that the evangelical party has triumphed—no one can predict its continued triumph from the events of the present time. Sooner or later there will be trials on the grounds of doctrine. To whom, then, shall those who demanded synods address themselves? They will appeal to the State, and the evils which they thought to avoid will all recur again. But we are reasoning on a hypothesis that is far from being realized, for in order to the re-establishment of Synods in France there must be such changes in the sphere of government as shall soon necessitate the separation of Church and State. In that direction lies the future, and no other. We only wish it were the present instead. Suppose that the Evangelical party, weary of so many disorders, so many delays, harassed by obstacles always probable in a system of universal suffrage, without religious conditions, should say, "We have waited long enough; we can no longer admit of contradictory teachings, amid that overflow of infidelity which is the shame and misery of our age. We need a rule of faith, a Church worthy to call herself Christian, a synod by which she may be represented. Let us conquer on the ground of liberty that which the State will never give. Let us re-con-

stitute the Church of our fathers, which does not appear to have had for its characteristic feature the support and protection of the State. Let us renew the grand tradition of a common faith. Let us take at our own risk that which will never be bestowed, and content ourselves with having Jesus Christ for our Ruler and King." Suppose the Evangelical Reformed Church thus re-established by an act of heroic courage. All is now changed. The useless and irritating agitation of a desperate controversy is abandoned; assiduous efforts to recruit the electors are no longer needed. Effective Christianity is substituted for worldliness and routine religion. We need no longer wait the good pleasure of a minister of State to supply the most urgent and sacred exigencies of the spiritual life. It shall be seen now of what faith is capable when left to itself,—how inexhaustible are its resources. It shall be seen also into what annihilation the rationalistic party will fall when thrown upon its own zeal, and having no object for its ancient bitterness, the intestine war being ended. Here is greatness, power, sacred and all-conquering enthusiasm.

It were needless to ask, if we in England desire this glory for the Reformed Church of France. We wish, for her own honor, that she should resolve of herself to perform this courageous act, without waiting for the social necessities that must sooner or later bring the full liberty of souls. We are not romantic on this subject of free churches; for it is a system that has its difficulties and its dangers, and that calls for persevering labor. During more than two hundred years we have put this principle to the test on this side of the channel. The churches of France are now learning at a rough school, and making a difficult experiment. English Congregationalists recognize with sympathy their sufferings and their imperfections, but there is no other solution for the ecclesiastical question in existing circumstances. Let us not forget, moreover, that the constitution of a free Presbyterian Church, independent of the State, would put an end to many of the troubles and difficulties of the Reformed Church in France, uniting in a new harmony the principles of authority and liberty. This Church

will be eventually formed, we are assured. Everything tends to it—both the progress of light and the accumulation of difficulties. We shall watch every step which leads to its inauguration with the warmest interest ; nor will our friends within or beyond the National establishment be offended by our sympathy with that, which if realized, must be fruitful in Christian life and true spiritual liberty.

Art. V.—THE NAME OF THE LORD.

By Rev. J. M. Johnson, Hanover, N. J.

Careful readers of the Bible must be struck with the manner in which the word "Name" is used in reference to God and Christ. It is presented as the object of prayer and praise, and of the affections of love, fear, faith and hope. It is made the reason for divine and human action. Reverence for it is the subject of one of the ten commandments, and one of the seven petitions of the Lord's prayer. It occurs in the Bible nearly three hundred times. Such frequent and significant use of the term must be for some important purpose. The object of the present essay is to aid in the discovery of that purpose by an examination of Scripture usage, in the belief that a study of the subject will give more definite ideas of God and Christ ; more impressive views of the third commandment, and first petition of the Lord's prayer, and show what is the proper devotional use of divine titles ; in a word, that it will reveal a living and abiding charm in the "name of the Lord," whether applied to Jehovah or Jesus.

It must be remembered at the outset, that the word Name signifies far less in modern times and languages than it did in the times and languages of the Bible. Now, names are arbitrary appellations, having neither meaning nor object except to distinguish individuals. Then, they were descriptive of

the characters of those who bore them, or commemorative of some incidents of their birth or history. Some Scripture names were given prophetically, describing future characters or events, e. g., Jedediah, John, Jesus, Jezreel. Sometimes God changed the names of individuals to indicate some change of character or relation, e. g., "Abram" to "Abraham," or "High Father" to "Father of a multitude," "Jacob" to "Israel," or "Supplanter" to "Prince with God." Parents are almost always represented in Scripture history as giving significant names to their children.

With such facts before us, showing how much was made of names as given to men, by both God and men, we cannot but feel that when "name" is applied to God it must mean something more than a personal appellation, it must be intended to awaken and keep alive in the mind some important ideas and peculiar emotions. This the usage of Scripture abundantly confirms.

The first particular mention of the "name" of God is found in the account of the calling of Moses when his mission was stated to him. Moses felt the necessity of being able to give a definite description of him who sent him. Therefore he said, "When I come unto the children of Israel and shall say unto them, the God of your fathers has sent me unto you, and they shall say to me, what is his name, what shall I say unto them? And God said unto Moses, I am that I am, and he said, thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, I am hath sent me unto you. And God said moreover unto Moses, thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, The Lord God of your fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob hath sent me unto you, this is my name forever, and this is my memorial unto all generations. Moses thus received two divine titles which he was directed to use to confirm the faith of his people; the one descriptive of self-existence, the other of peculiar relations to the patriarchs, and suggestive of gracious manifestations to them. These titles expressed to the people the all-sufficiency of God and their interest in him secured by covenant with their fathers.

Afterward, when the increased cruelties of Pharaoh caused the people to complain, and Moses to despond, God encouraged him thus: "And God spake unto Moses and said unto him, I am Jehovah, and I appeared unto Abraham, and unto Isaac, and unto Jacob, by the name of God Almighty; but by my name Jehovah, was I not known to them. And I have also established my covenant with them, ... and I have remembered my covenant. Wherefore say unto the children of Israel, I am Jehovah, and I will bring you out, etc., and ye shall know that I am Jehovah your God, I am Jehovah." Thus the name Jehovah was authoritively announced as furnishing sure ground of hope in the promises of God.

In immediate connection with the giving of the law, God warned Moses against idolatry, and gave directions for his worship, and then adds: "In all places where I record my name I will come unto thee and I will bless thee." This giving a locality to the "name" of God, is several times referred to as a matter of great importance. "Unto the place which Jehovah your God shall choose out of all your tribes to put his name there, even unto his habitation shall ye seek." David, in preparing materials for the temple, sought to build a house to the name of Jehovah. Solomon, in his prayer at the dedication of the temple, pleaded for the fulfillment of the promise, "My name shall be there," and God answered, "I have heard thy prayer, I have hallowed this house to put my name there forever." Hence Jerusalem was afterwards known as "the city which Jehovah had chosen out of all the tribes of Israel to put his name there," and the temple was called "the dwelling-place of thy Name."

Again, believers are described by the exercise of various affections for the name of God. "Let them that love thy name be joyful." "A book of remembrance was written for them that feared the Lord and thought on his name." "To you that fear my name shall the sun of righteousness arise." "They that know thy name will trust in thee."

Again, prayer and praise are described as directed to the name of God. "Quicken us and we will call upon thy name."

"Whosoever shall call on the name of the Lord shall be saved" "They shall call upon my name and I will hear them." "All the earth shall worship thee, they shall sing to thy name." "Sing unto God, sing praises unto his name." "I will bless thy name forever and ever."

Again, The regard of God for his name is given by believers as a reason and plea for his mercy. "He leadeth me in the paths of righteousness for his name's sake." "For thy name's sake pardon mine iniquity." "Help us, O God, for the glory of thy name, and purge away our sins for thy name's sake."

God gives the same reason for the exercise of mercy. "For my name's sake will I defer mine anger." "I wrought for my name's sake that it should not be polluted before the heathen."

The name of God is used for benediction. "The name of the God of Jacob defend thee." It is made the ground of hope. "In the name of the Lord we will set up our banners." All obedience to God is summed up in this, "that thou mayest fear this glorious and fearful name, Jehovah thy God."

From these illustrations it is plain that "the Name of the Lord" is not a mere circumlocution for God himself. In many instances the substitution of the appellative God, for "the name" will make nonsense, e. g., "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord in vain;" and "Hallowed be thy name." How absurd to read, "thou shalt not take God in vain," "Hallowed be God." And in such passages as, "They that know thy name will put their trust in thee," where knowledge of the name is made a reason for trust in the person. The passages are few in which such substitution can be made without weakening their force. What definite ideas ought we then to attach to the phrase "Name of the Lord?"

We find an answer to this question in one of the most remarkable scenes in the life of Moses. He had been interceding for his rebellious people, and received not only assurance of mercy for them, but a particular promise for himself. Thus encouraged, he made a farther request. The more he knew

of God the more he desired to know, and he asked, "Show me thy glory." His petition was granted in these remarkable words: "I will make all my goodness pass before thee and I will proclaim the name of Jehovah before thee." The fulfillment of this promise is thus described: "And the Lord passed by before him and proclaimed Jehovah, Jehovah, Elohim, merciful and gracious, long suffering, and abundant in goodness and truth; keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity and transgression, and that will by no means clear the guilty." These titles and qualities describe the name, the goodness or excellence, and the glory of God. With new conceptions of the majesty of God, Moses bowed his head towards the earth and worshiped with a deeper devotion than ever before. From this illustration we learn that the word "Name," as applied to God in the Bible, signifies generally his "manifested excellence;" not merely that by which he is designated, but that revelation of his perfections which is conveyed by all the methods in which he has made himself known. The simple articulate sounds employed in any or all the divine titles, do not constitute "the name" of God, except in a very inferior and limited sense; the sum of all the ideas conveyed by those titles constitute "the name." The word and ordinances of God reveal him, but they are not his name; what they reveal of his excellence is his name.

Bearing this in mind we can understand why so many titles are applied to God in the Bible. Some of them are descriptive of single perfections, e. g., "The Almighty," "The Merciful," "The Holy," "The Just;" and it is remarkable that almost all the abstract qualities of his nature are thus used as personal titles.

Some of them are descriptive of relations to men, e. g., "God of Abraham," "King," "Judge," God and Father of the Lord Jesus Christ, "Father of the fatherless," "God of the widow." "Father in heaven," etc. And it is also remarkable that most of the relations subsisting among men are used in some way to describe relations between God and men. Let us now apply the idea that the Name of God is his manifested excellence.

1. To places and edifices as the dwelling place of his Name. The tabernacle, the temple, and Jerusalem were so designated, not because God was there personally present as no where else, nor because he there listened to prayer as no where else, but because he there established his worship, consisting of such services, and involving such instruction and revelations, as made his perfections known, and kept his people acquainted with his excellence.

2. Apply the idea to knowing, loving and fearing "the Name of the Lord," as designating true believers. Surely these terms imply something more than the exercise of such emotions towards any divine title. They must signify such an admiring regard for the manifested excellence of God as flows from an intimate acquaintance with his perfections as revealed by himself.

3. Apply the idea to prayer and praise directed to "the Name of the Lord." Calling upon his name is not simply addressing him by his titles, but is an intelligent exercise of faith, in invoking the perfections and pleading the relations expressed by those titles, as Elijah did when he said, "Jehovah, God of Abraham, Isaac and of Israel, let it be known this day that thou art God in Israel." Praising the name of the Lord is not repeating his titles in sacred song, but expressing admiration of his revealed excellence, and holding it up to the admiration of others, e. g., "O Jehovah, our Lord, how excellent is thy name in all the earth," i. e., the universal manifestation of the divine perfections in the works of Creation and Providence call for praise.

4. We see how "the Name of the Lord" is ground of confidence and hope, e. g., "The name of Jehovah is a strong tower, the righteous runneth into it and is safe;" i. e., the righteous trust in the known perfections of God and feel secure. "I will wait on thy name," i. e., I will hope in thy perfections.

5. We see how regard for the Name of God is a reason for mercy and judgment. "For his name's sake" means not merely for his own sake, nor for his own glory, but for the sake of

what he has already done; the previous display of his perfections which would be dishonored or repudiated by a failure to fulfill his promises.

"It shall be to the Lord for a name" is spoken of the happy results of Messiah's reign. "So didst thou lead thy people to make thyself a glorious name," is given as a reason for the miracles of Egypt and the wilderness. In these and similar instances the design of miraculous and merciful interventions was to illustrate the perfections of God to the apprehension of intelligent creatures.

6. We see the force of those passages which describe sin and sinners according to their treatment of the Name of the Lord. "If we have forgotten the name of our God" describes gross sin as consisting in not paying due regard to manifested divine perfections. "Pour out thy wrath upon the kingdoms which have not called upon thy name," shows the guilt of prayerlessness to lie in contempt of the divine perfections, manifested as the reason for human confidence. "The Lord will not hold him guiltless that taketh his name in vain." The use of whatever represents divine excellence, without due reverence, is aggravated sin.

We now turn to the use of "the Name," in the New Testament.

1. Christ applies it to God in the same way as it is so frequently applied in the Old Testament: "Father, glorify thy name"—i. e., cause thy perfections to be honored through me; "I have manifested thy name"—i. e., I have made known thy perfections.

2. In the form of baptism, the recipients of the ordinance are consecrated to the Trinity as holding the relations and perfections implied in the titles, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and these relations and perfections are invoked in their behalf.

3. The name of Christ is presented as the object of trust, and the source and means of salvation—e. g., "In his name shall the Gentiles trust;" "To them that believe on his name gave he power to become the sons of God;" "There is none other name given among men whereby we must be saved."

4. Christ bids his disciples use his name as the all-prevailing plea at the throne of grace: "Whatsoever ye shall ask in my name, I will do it." Hence calling upon the name of Christ is made the peculiar distinction of believers: "With all that in every place call upon the name of Jesus Christ, our Lord."

5. The Name of Christ was the subject of apostolic preaching: "And when they believed Philip's preaching the things concerning the kingdom of God and the name of Jesus Christ." Hence the sin of impenitent hearers of the gospel lies in this, "They believe not in the name of the only begotten Son of God."

6. The apostles labored, suffered, and hazarded their lives, for the sake of the Name of Christ: "They departed from the council, rejoicing that they were counted worthy to suffer shame for his name;" "I am ready to die at Jerusalem for the name of the Lord Jesus."

Now, it must be remembered that all the titles applied to Christ in the Bible are descriptive and highly significant—e. g., "Prince of Peace," "Son of David," "Son of God," "Son of Man," "Immanuel," (God with us) "Christ," (anointed one) "Jesus," (Saviour) "Light of the World," Bread of Life," and many others, to the number of nearly one hundred. Surely these were used to convey vivid conceptions of the person, character and relations of the Redeemer. Therefore, all that is signified by these titles, and not one or all of the titles themselves, constitutes his Name. Hence, reference to his Name is not mere reference to him as an individual, but to all that his titles import. To believe in his Name, is to trust in his perfections, works and promises. Not to believe in his Name, is to discredit all that is revealed of him. To call upon his Name, is to invoke the exercise of his power and mediatorial office. To plead his Name, is to urge all that he is and has done as a reason with God. Hence the usual conclusion of prayer, "for Christ's sake," is amazingly significant if used intelligibly. To preach the Name of Christ, is to set forth his character, relations and doings. To suffer and die for his Name, is to give the strongest proof of confidence in, and attachment to, all that is revealed concerning him.

In a few instances the Name of Christ is used as synonymous with authority: e. g., "In my name ye shall cast out devils;" but they are few.

If the foregoing views are correct, they suggest some important practical lessons:

1. They show the necessity of habitual study of the manifestations of divine excellence. The fervor of our devotional exercises depends upon our conceptions of what God and Christ are and have done. Faith, joy, hope, prayer, praise, conversation, service, will all be weak or strong, faint or fervent, just in proportion to our present impressions of God and Christ. Hence the necessity of constant communion with the perfections of God, through his word, works and ordinances. Hence the impossibility of a vigorous piety without constant intellectual effort. Facts concerning God must not only be stored in the memory, but be kept influential, so as to act upon the affections. To grow in grace, we must grow in the knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ. Hence the necessity of teaching and preaching what constitutes the Name of the Lord. Correct ideas of the manifested excellence of God must be the aim of all religious instruction.

2. We learn what use is to be made of divine titles in devotion. The spirit of the third commandment is violated by the frequent, unmeaning repetition of the titles of God in prayer; but the evil is to be corrected, not by omitting divine titles, but by using them intelligently. He who attaches the true meaning to Lord, God, Christ, Jesus, etc., will not repeat them carelessly, though he may use them very frequently. When our Lord forbade vain repetitions, he implied that there were repetitions that were not vain. The devotional parts of the Bible show frequent use of the divine titles, but so as to quicken devotion, and give expression to its greatest fervency.

In some of the Psalms the name Jehovah occurs in almost every sentence; e. g., in the 25th, 27th, 29th, 100th, and other very significant titles are connected with it: "I will love

thee, O Lord, my strength;" "The Lord is my rock and my fortress, and my deliverer, my God, my strength, in whom I trust," etc. Obviously the Psalmist used such expressions to set God distinctly before him as the object of his faith and delight. The Saviour uses the term Father frequently in his intercessory prayer. These illustrations show that it is natural to fervent piety to repeat often those divine titles which suggest and describe the divine perfections and relations which are the ground of faith and hope. As the loving child fondly repeats the names, father, mother, so will the loving Christian fondly repeat the titles which represent the perfections of his God and Saviour.

3. The inquiry is suggested, Do we, in our private and public devotions, rightly use "the Name of the Lord?" Do we conceive fully of what is meant by, "For thy name's sake," "For Christ's sake?" Do we mean what we say when we use these pleas? Do we use the divine titles so as to adore and trust in "the Name of the Lord?"

Art. VI.—THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ST. LOUIS.

The General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America met in the First Presbyterian Church of the city of St. Louis, in the State of Missouri, on Thursday, May 17, 1866, and was opened with a sermon by the Moderator of the last Assembly, Rev. James B. Shaw, D. D., of Rochester, N. Y., on Psalm lvi. 2: *Oh Thou that hearest prayer.* The study of prayer was enforced in an earnest and impressive manner, under the different heads: (1.) God does hear prayer. (2.) While God does hear prayer, yet he oftentimes answers his followers in an unexpected way. (3.) Sometimes the answer comes in an unwelcome way. (4.) Prayer is the same thing now that it was in the earlier days of the church. The subsequent proceedings of the As-

sembly, it may be remarked, partook, to an unusual degree, of this spirit of prayer; one hour before the regular sessions of each day was spent in prayer; and there were frequent meetings of a practical and devout character. The meetings held by the Elders also helped to give a right tone to the Assembly.

The Rev. Samuel M. Hopkins, D. D., of Auburn Theological Seminary, was elected Moderator on the second ballot. Rev. John W. Bailey and Rev. Stephen Bush were chosen temporary clerks. The whole number of ministers and elders in attendance was somewhat over two hundred—not quite so many as last year.

Two subjects engrossed much of the time and thoughts of the Assembly: the Church Erection cause, and the question of Reunion with the other branch of the Presbyterian Church, which held its sessions in the same city, in the Second Presbyterian Church. Due attention was given to all other questions, but these were most prominent.

THE CHURCH ERECTION FUND.

The Report presented the following summary of the doings of the Committee during the past year:

"During the year there have been received twenty applications for aid, amounting to $7,525, thirteen of which were for loans, amounting to $6,075, and seven for donations, amounting to $1,450. Ten of the applications for loans were granted, amounting to $4,675; three, amounting to $1,400, were refused; one of these required the loan to be in gold; by the other two it appeared that after obtaining the loan the congregation would not have the amount necessary to complete their building; they were informed as soon as the deficiency should be provided for, their application would be granted. Four of the applications for donations, amounting to $750, were granted; three, amounting to $700, were refused; one of these absolutely for reason that the aid required was for the purpose of paying a debt which had been contracted in 1858; one as premature, it appearing from the application that, after obtaining the required donation, the congregation would not have the amount requisite to complete their building. They were informed that as soon as this deficiency should be provided for, their application would be granted. The other application for a donation was refused for the reason that it was not in due form, and the amount ($300) asked for, exceeded the amount limited by the plan of donations. In one case, after the application for a donation had been granted, the congregation refused to execute the bond and mortgage required by the plan, and have not availed themselves of the grant.

"These applications were from eleven Synods—five from the Synod of Missouri, three from the Synod of Minnesota, two from each of the Synods of New York and New Jersey, Illinois and Wisconsin, and one from each of the Synods of Genesee, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Wabash, Peoria, and Alta California.

"There have been received during the year from forty churches on account of loans, $5,394 22; from sixty-five churches on account of donations, $839 07; and from thirteen churches for interest, $986 58, making a total of $7,210 87.

"The last General Assembly directed this Board to procure the written opinion of eminent legal counsel as to the powers of the Assembly in respect to the Church Erection Fund, especially in reference to the question, whether having received this fund "as a special trust," and in 1854 committed the custody thereof to a Board of Trustees, incorporated by a special statute of the State of New York, the Assembly have the power so to alter the Church Erection Plan, as to make an absolute gift of the increase of the fund beyond the sum of $100,000, for the purpose named in the first article of the plan. The Board were directed to report such opinions to this Assembly, with the addition of any recommendations which they might deem expedient.

"In compliance with this direction of the Assembly, the Board have obtained, from three eminent counsel, written opinions, which are herewith submitted. None of the gentlemen had any knowledge of the opinions of the others; in fact, neither was aware that any other opinion excepting his own had been, or would be, obtained. It would be seen that they differ in their views of the power of the Assembly over the fund, all agreeing, however, in this: That the fund can never be used excepting for the objects set forth in the first article of the plan.

"By the first opinion, in the order in which they are presented to the Assembly, that of the Hon. Wm. Strong, of Philadelphia, a Judge of the Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania, it is insisted:

"1st. That the General Assembly has power to direct donations of that portion of the fund which may be in excess of the sum of $100,000, for the purpose described in the first article of the plan; but that they have no power to make, or direct the Board of Trustees to make, donations of any portion of it.

"2d. That the Assembly has no power to make or direct any *absolute* gift of even the increase or excess above $100,000, if by *absolute* gift is understood gift without requiring security upon the church property for the return of the money with interest, in case of a change in ecclesiastical relations of the church aided.

"3d. That no alterations of the plan can be made which will authorize donations without requiring such security.

"4th. That the plan may be so altered as to dispense with any requisition of security that an annual collection in behalf of the fund shall be taken up in the churches to which a donation is made, but the church will still be under obligation to take up such a collection, independent of any such security being given.

"By the second opinion, that of Daniel Lord, Esq., of the city of New York, it is insisted:

"That the General Assembly, by the requisite vote, may direct the whole of the fund at any time existing to be applied in donations; that while there is no discrimination to be made between the increase or accumulation of the fund, as to the application of it, or the retaining of it,

yet that it is in the power of the General Assembly, by the requisite vote, to apply the fund to the designated objects without limiting it to the advances which must be returned.

"By the third opinion, that of Marshall S. Bidwell, Esq., of the city of New York, it is, on the contrary, insisted:

"1st. That the amount raised for this fund was received by the Assembly in trust as a permanent fund; that it must be preserved inviolate; that it cannot be diminished or impaired; that the General Assembly, therefore, cannot directly or indirectly give away or dispose of the fund, nor any part of it; that this restriction is fundamental and irrevocable, and that it is anterior to, and independent of, the plan.

"2d. That the fund cannot be used excepting for the object named in the first article of the plan, the aiding of feeble congregations in erecting houses of worship; that this restriction is also fundamental and irrevocable; that while it is recognized in, yet it does not derive its force from, the plan.

3d. That the law imposes upon every person or body holding the fund in trust, the obligation to keep the fund invested in proper securities, which, in the State of New York, embrace only Government stocks and mortgages upon unencumbered real estate; that the General Assembly cannot absolve the trustees of this obligation.

"4th. That, subject to the above restrictions, the General Assembly by the requisite vote, may make any changes in the plan, and thus alter the manner of administering it.

"5th. That the permanent fund is not confined to the sum of $100,000, but embraces all increase of it above that amount, whether by donations, bequests or by unemployed interest, and that such increase is subject to all the conditions of the original fund.

"6th. That it was the duty of the trustees of the fund, in the absence of any specific directions thereto, to add to the fund all the accumulations of interest from time to time, as received, and that if such accumulated interest has been added by the trustees to the fund, it has become an integral part of it, and is subject to the same exemption from change or diminution as appertains to the other parts of the fund; that it is one fund, a unit; not two or more funds—a permanent fund, which cannot be impaired by revocation, donation or otherwise, and which it is the duty of the trustees to preserve inviolate.

"The Board have carefully considered these diverse opinions, and will only add that they trust the time will never come when, for the purpose of judicially settling the powers of the General Assembly over the fund, a resort shall be had to law, the proverbial uncertainty of which has received a new illustration in the opinions herewith submitted to the Assembly.

"It is certain that the donors of the fund intended to inaugurate just such a scheme of benevolence as this, and thus far in its management the Board have not in any particular violated any of the principles contended for in these opinions; and it certainly will be safe to continue to administer the fund substantially upon the same principles which have heretofore obtained, enlarging or diminishing the amount of loans and donations, and their terms, as the exigencies of the congregations to be aided from time to time may require."

The Committee submitted to the Assembly certain amendments to the plan, allowing loans to be made to the extent of

$750, and donations to the amount of $300; both to be secured by bond and mortgage. They also reported that an appeal to the churches for a supplemental fund had only resulted in a debt for expenses above receipts to the amount of $68 11.

The condition of the Fund, May 1st, 1866, was this:

Amount of loans to churches, secured by bonds and mortgages	$ 32,046 70
Amount of donations to churches, secured by bonds and mortgages	15,013 18
Amount of call loans and temporary investments	77,425 45
Interest earned thereon to date	1,072 02
Cash in bank	1,942 17
Total	$127,499 52

By the Report of the treasurer it further appeared that during the past year, the loans to churches were only $2,775, the donations to churches only $400; while the expenses of administering the fund were $1,845; the installments received from churches on account of their bonds and mortgages, and interest on the same, and on account of donations were $7,219, or about three times the amount loaned. This exhibit made it apparent, that though the Fund has undoubtedly been administered with fidelity, and in conformity with a strict construction of the plan, yet it is not doing its proper work. The receipts in call loans and temporary investments, with interest, amounted to over $200,000. Some change was imperatively required. The churches do not like to use the fund as it has been administered; they can get better terms elsewhere. Other denominations are outstripping us, because they pursue a more liberal policy in this matter. The whole subject was carefully reviewed by the Standing Committee on Church Erection, of which Dr. T. M. Humphrey, of Chicago, was Chairman, and, after full deliberation and discussion, they brought in a report and recommendations, which were finally adopted by the Assembly by a very large vote. The chief points in their report are the following:

"By the twelfth annual report of the Trustees of the Assembly's Church Erection Fund, it is painfully apparent that this fund is but imperfectly

accomplishing its original design. The amount of the fund in 1856 was 100,000 dollars. Now, after ten years' use, it has increased to over $127,000, $80,000 of which, at least, remain in the hands of the Board, subject to the call of the churches. Year by year the applications for aid become fewer. But $2,755 were taken from the treasury last year, in the form of loans, and but $400 in the form of donations. Meanwhile the receipts from the churches, on account of loans, donations and interest, have been over $7,000, which added to the interest accruing on the fund itself—nearly $5,000—constitute an actual increase of the unemployed fund, after deducting expenses, etc., of about $7,000.

"There is an imperative call for a modification of the plan of administering our Church Erection Fund, and this call becomes the more imperative when we consider that the rapid extension of the lines of traffic has made cities of villages, and villages of hamlets.

"Your Committee believe that could the whole fund be immediately scattered among our feeble churches, in the form of donations, without interest or return of any kind, while the churches aided should remain in our connection, the effect would be most happy. This we believe to be desired by many on the floor of this Assembly. Were such a course possible, we should favor it. But a careful examination of the whole case, has brought your Committee to the stubborn conclusion, so often reached by others who have surveyed the same ground, that such a disposition of the fund was rendered impossible by the very terms on which it was collected. It was to be a *permanent* fund. To destroy its permanency would be a breach of trust which might and which ought to be legally resisted. The legal opinions submitted to the Assembly by the Board of Trustees, place this position beyond reasonable dispute.

"The question, therefore, is, how the mode of administering the fund shall be so changed as to make it most useful to the churches. After mature deliberations, your Committee recommend the abandonment of the system of loans, and the adoption of that of donations upon the following plan, viz:

"1. That the whole of the fund now in the hands of the Board, together with such receipts as may return in fulfillment of pledges from the churches already aided by loans and donations, and together with whatever may be hereafter contributed to the fund, be securely and permanently invested.

"2. That the accruing interest be annually distributed by the Board on proper conditions and in proper proportions, to churches applying therefor, in the form of donations without interest and without pledge of return, except in case the church or congregation thus assisted shall cease to be connected with the General Assembly, or their corporate existence shall cease, or their house of worship be alienated, except for the building or purchase of a better house of worship.

"Your Committee cannot but regard it as a providential indication of the wisdom of these proposed changes that they have been suggested to several different minds without concert, and that they have been regarded with favor before this by those high in position in our Church, as will be seen by reference to the report of the special Committee to whom this whole subject was referred by the Assembly of 1863.

"Your Committee would also recommend to the Assembly to consider the expediency of appointing a General Secretary of the Board, whose duty it shall be to discharge the functions in this Board which are discharged in the Committee of Home Missions by its Secretary."

The Committee, in submitting their report, presented also an amended copy of the plan, and proposed various changes, to conform the plan to the arrangement recommended in their reports.

The adoption of these recommendations by the Assembly gives, in some respects, a new character to the fund. The amount now reported, under the head of "call loans and temporary investments," will be invested as a permanent fund; the same course will be taken with what is hereafter received for the loans or in return of donations. The interest of this fund will be given to the churches, and go to pay the expenses of the Committee. The chief condition of the donations will be, that the church buildings shall not be alienated from the Assembly; and it is also held that the churches aided are morally bound to return the amounts given, by collections, as fast as they become able to do so. A General Secretary will also be appointed to solicit funds for this, as for our other ecclesiastical objects. It is thought that at least $35,000 will be needed for the coming year. It is also expected that the expenses of managing the fund may be materially reduced.

This action of the Assembly, it is believed, will take a stumbling-block out of the way of our progress. As fast as our Home Missionary Committee organize churches, our Church Erection Committee ought to put them in the way of erecting a house of worship. The success of the labor of the former Committee is ultimately dependent upon the efficiency of the latter.

HOME MISSIONS.

The Report of the Committee on Home Missions, by the Secretary, Dr. Kendall, is an able document, that ought to command general attention. It discusses the rapid increase of population at the West; the laws which regulate its movements, making particular mention of the rapid extension of railroads at the West; the Pacific Road, and the vast mineral regions of the West, and the great influx of foreigners into the country. Prairie, forest and minerals attract the people, and where railroads are built, there people go.

The tendency to the centralization of population was also noticed. Never did the great cities of the world grow so rapidly as now. Great centres opened at the West, that for a brief time must have missionary aid; and this depletes and drains the East, and makes a demand for aid to the feeble and decaying churches there.

An encouraging view of religious progress and reconstruction in East Tennessee and Missouri was given. About forty missionaries have been employed in these two States, who have labored on the whole with encouragement and success.

Elsewhere at the South but little has been done. But some efforts among the *Freedmen* have succeeded well.

The obstacles to the work were said to be as follows:

1. *The Lack of Ministers.*—The ministers are too few to meet the demands of the people. More men could be located in one month than all the theological seminaries have turned out in a year. There is no limit to the work if the ministers were plenty.

2. *Lack of Church Edifices.*—The report insists that the Church is not awake to the importance of this matter, and it shows how much the Baptists, Congregationalists, Methodists, Unitarians, and Episcopalians are doing in the case, and urges the Assembly to devise some method to build churches, especially for all the feeble but promising congregations at the West.

3. *Lack of Funds.*—The Treasurer's report shows that less than $92,000 have been contributed, but $106,000 expended during the year. Such a state of things cannot last. The report shows that the Church is able to contribute much more, and calls on the ministers and people to redouble their energies to meet the demand. Only about eight hundred churches of a total of one thousand five hundred in the body had contributed anything during the year.

The whole working force in the missionary field has been three hundred and eighty-five men; fifty-eight more than last year. Six of these have died.

The statistics of the year are encouraging. About fifty churches have been formed, three thousand five hundred souls converted; three thousand two hundred and forty have united with the churches.

The Assembly was deeply interested in this subject, whose claims are so urgent and growing. It was resolved to raise $120,000 during the coming year; and this amount is the least that should be thought of.

The Standing Committee on Home Missions, Dr. Knox Chairman, presented an elaborate report on the subject, emphasizing the need of a great increase in the ministry, and in can-

didates for the ministry; the necessity of providing places of worship with greater liberality; and the duty of a higher standard of giving. Some of our encouragements in doing this work were thus set forth:

"There is no department of effort into which we have entered with any vigor, upon which God has not shed his approving and inspiring favor. Witness to this blessing attending our special effort in behalf of East Tennessee, in a discouraged and distracted church reinspirited, dispersed congregations regathered, in pastors settled over long vacant parishes, and the revival of religion experienced in unprecedented power. Witness the story told by delegates from all parts of the land, of the descending and quickening Spirit. Even the labors employed on behalf of our foreign population, usually regarded as far from hopeful of access, have not been without significant results. The Presbytery of Newark, after a sixteen years' experiment among the Germans, have now as its fruits six churches organized on a Presbyterian basis, all but one provided with houses of worship, with settled pastors, good congregations, a vigorous prospective growth, and an healthful, positive influence going out upon the surrounding population in behalf of Sabbath observance, temperance, social order, and every moral and spiritual interest. The example thus set us by Newark Presbytery, and already emulated by Philadelphia and Cincinnati, should rebuke the prevailing skepticism on this subject. There is a grave responsibility laid upon us here, and we may not shrink from it. Let us remember that while the Irish immigration is fed by a home supply of six and a half millions, the German springs from a fountain of forty millions. Not to care for this industrious, enterprising and acceptable people, is to take very poor care of our own interests."

THE PUBLICATION COMMITTEE.

The report was presented by the Secretary, Rev. John W. Dulles, and shows a gratifying progress; the receipts from all sources were over $50,000. The subject of colportage was also enforced. The *Presbyterian Monthly*, which has been begun under good auspices, was recommended to the attention of the churches. It represents all of our Permanent Committees. Among the works issued the past year, Dr. Brainerd's admirable memoir of John Brainerd, the Social Hymn and Tune Book, which is not printed fast enough for its demand, Bower's Daily Meditation, and Knox's Love to the End, are particularly worthy of a wide circulation.

FOREIGN MISSIONS.

The report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Missions, Dr. Walter Clarke Chairman, spoke in decided terms of our

altogether satisfactory relations with the A. B. C. F. M. The number of our missionaries has been reduced one sixth in three years; in 1863 we had 56, now, only 47. The amount of our contributions were greater than the previous year: $112,000, including legacies, $140,000.

EDUCATION FOR THE MINISTRY.

The number of students in Union Theological Seminary was 130, graduates 32; in Auburn, 40 students, 12 graduates; in Lane, 24 students, 4 graduates. The number of students aided last year was 135; 62 in theological seminaries, 60 in colleges, 13 in academies. The receipts of the year were $18,700; balance on hand at the beginning of the year, $1,750; at the close of the year, $900. A large increase in the number of candidates for the ministry is the most pressing need of our church.

MINISTERIAL RELIEF.

The report of Dr. Butler on this subject shows decided progress. Six thousand three hundred dollars was the sum contributed this year against $3,600 given the previous year. Mr. Wm. Knowles has donated $3,400 to the Committee, which is not immediately available. One hundred and thirty persons were helped last year, against forty-four helped the year before. The Committee had been able to give a prompt and cordial response to all applications properly brought before them. The number yet to be heard from was, of course, great, and the Church needs to be fully aroused on the subject. The report stated several very interesting cases which had come within the sphere of the Committee's usefulness, showing how greatly this benevolence had been needed. The balance in the treasury was $1,605.

SABBATH SCHOOLS.

A Permanent Committee on Sabbath-schools was organized by the Assembly, consisting of the following persons: James B. Shaw, D. D., Grosvenor W. Heacock, D. D., Charles Hawley, D. D., William E. Knox, D. D., Samuel M. Campbell, D.

D., Rev. Charles P. Bush, Rev. William A Niles, Rev. Marvin R. Vincent, Rev. Charles E. Knox, Ralph Wells, E. F. Huntington, Geo. W. Parsons, Josiah P. Bailey, Truman P. Handy, Samuel Field. The object of the Committee is thus set forth in the report of Rev. Henry Fowler:

1. To supervise the Sabbath-school literature of the Church, in co-operation with the Permanent Committee on Publication.
2. To issue circulars which may help the cause, and use other appropriate methods of the press.
3. To collect data, and from facts to work out practical theses, which may assist pastor's, superintendents, and teachers in the Sabbath-school work.
4. To promote the establishment of Sabbath-schools in localities needing them, within the bounds of the Assembly, among the freedmen of the South, and the Germans of the West, in co-operation with the Permanent Committee on Home Missions.
5. To promote the Sabbath-school cause in heathen lands in co-operation with the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions.
6. To promote the establishment of Sabbath-schools in Mexico, Central America, France, Italy and Germany, in co-operation with the American and Foreign Christian Union.
7. To promote the increase of the ministry through influences brought to bear upon the Sabbath-schools, and thus prove an auxiliary of the Education Committee.

The subject of *Manses and Pastoral Libraries* was presented by Dr. Butler, and Mr. Joseph M. Wilson, and the following resolutions were adopted:

1. Resolved, That this General Assembly direct its Presbyteries to send to the churches under their care, a pastoral letter of inquiry, and suggestions with reference to the provision of a manse and a library for the use of the minister in charge of each congregation.
2. That the Presbyteries be requested to embody in a report to the next General Assembly any information that may be obtained in the answers to the proposed inquiry, with their judgment concerning the creation of a manse fund, and also any practical suggestions appertaining to the subject matter of manses and ministerial libraries.

Mr. Wilson's valuable Presbyterian Historical Almanac was also commended to their liberal support.

THE STATE OF THE COUNTRY.

A Committee to present a Report on the State of the Country was appointed, consisting of Rev. N. S. S. Beman, D. D., Henry B. Smith, D. D., William Hogarth, D. D., Rev. Thomas Brown, of East Tennessee, Rev. Henry Fowler, and Judges

Allison and Williams, Hon. J. A. Foote, F. V. Chamberlain and R. Scarritt. Their report, read by Dr. Smith, and adopted by the Assembly with great unanimity, was as follows :

"This Assembly records its devout gratitude to Almighty God, that he has delivered us from the calamities and horrors of civil war, and restored peace throughout our borders.

That he has so far quelled the spirit of secession that the supreme and rightful authority of our beneficent National Government is now restored in all our States and Territories, and we remain, as we were intended to be, one Nation, with one Constitution, and one destiny;

"That he has so overruled the progress and results of this unparalleled conflict as to make it manifest that our republican institutions are as well fitted to bear the stress and shock of war, as to give prosperity and increase in times of peace;

"That, by his wise and constraining Providence, guiding us in ways we knew not, he has caused the passions and wrath of man to enure to the welfare of humanity, so that a whole race has been emancipated from an unjust and cruel system of bondage, and advanced to the rights and dignity of freemen; so that now involuntary servitude, except for crime, is illegal and unconstitutional wherever our national authority extends;

"That he gave to our people such a spontaneous, impassioned, and unbought loyalty—a loyalty that can neither be forced nor feigned—such resolute and abiding faith, and such a supreme consciousness of our national unity, that we were able in the darkest hours to bear with cheerful patriotism our heavy burdens and our costly sacrifices, so that our very sacrifices have knit us more closely together and made us love our country more;

"That he has purged and enlightened our national conscience in respect to our national sins, especially the sin of slavery; and has also made us recognize more fully than before the reality of Divine Providence, the sureness and justice of retribution for national guilt, and the grand fact that a nation can be exalted and safe only as it yields obedience to His righteous laws;

"That he bestowed such grace upon our churches and ministry, that with singular unanimity and zeal they upheld our rightful Government by their unwavering testimony and effectual supplications, identifying the success of the nation with the welfare of the church;

"That, above all these things, he has, according to his gracious promise, watched over his church and kept it safe during these troublous times; so that not only has our American Christianity been vindicated, our faith and order maintained intact, and our Christian benevolence enhanced, but our purposes and plans for the future have been also enlarged in some proportion to the need and growth of our country; while to crown all these favors with his special benediction, he has also, in these latter days, rained down spiritual blessings in abundant measure upon so many churches all over the land.

"This Assembly, while humbly recognizing these judgments and mercies in the past and the present, also bears testimony in respect to our urgent needs and duties as a nation, in view of the new era upon which we are now entering, as follows, viz:

"1. Our most solemn national trust concerns that patient race, so long held in unrighteous bondage. Only as we are just to them can we live

in peace and safety. Freed by the national arms, they must be protected in all their civil rights by the national power. And as promoting this end, which far transcends any mere political or party object, we rejoice that the active functions of the Freedmen's Bureau are still continued, and especially that the Civil Rights Bill has become the law of the land. In respect to the concession of the right of suffrage to the colored race, this Assembly adheres to the resolution passed by our Assembly of 1865, (Minutes, p. 42): 'That the colored man should in this country enjoy the right of suffrage, in connection with all other men, is but a simple dictate of justice. The Assembly cannot perceive any good reason why he should be deprived of this right on the ground of his color or his race.' Even if suffrage may not be universal, let it at least be impartial.

"2. In case such impartial suffrage is not conceded, that we may still reap the legitimate fruits of our national victory over secession and slavery, and that treason and rebellion may not enure to the direct political advantage of the guilty, we judge it to be a simple act of justice, that the constitutional basis of representation in Congress should be so far altered as to meet the exigencies growing out of the abolition of slavery; and we likewise hold it to be the solemn duty of our National Executive and Congress to adopt only such methods of reconstruction as shall effectually protect all loyal persons in the States lately in revolt.

"3. As loyalty is the highest civic virtue, and treason the highest civil crime, so it is necessary, for the due vindication and satisfaction of national justice, that the chief fomenters and representatives of the rebellion should, by due course and process of law, be visited with condign punishment.

"4. The Christian religion being the underlying source of all our power, prosperity, freedom and national unity, we earnestly exhort all our ministers and churches to constant and earnest prayer for the President of the United States and his constitutional counsellors; for the Senate and House of Representatives in Congress assembled; for the Judges in our National Courts; for those that bear rule in our Army and Navy, and for all persons entrusted with authority; that they may be endowed with heavenly wisdom, and rule in the fear of the Lord, and so administer their high trusts, without self-seeking or partiality, that this great Republic, being delivered from its enemies, may renew its youth, and put forth all its strength in the ways of truth and righteousness, for the good of our own land and the welfare of mankind.

"5. And we further exhort and admonish the members of our churches to diligent and personal efforts for the safety and prosperity of the Nation, to set aside all partisan and sectional aims and low ambitions, and to do their full duty as Christian freemen; to the end that our Christian and Protestant civilization may maintain its legitimate ascendancy, and that we become not the prey of any form of infidelity, or subject to any foreign priestly domination; that the sacred interests of civil and religious freedom, of human rights and justice to all, of national loyalty and national unity, may be enlarged and perpetuated, making our Christian Commonwealth a praise among the nations of the earth, exemplifying and speeding the progress of the kingdom of our Lord and Saviour, Jesus Christ."

JUDGE STRONG'S REPORT ON PASSING JUDGMENT ON ABSENTEES.

One of the ablest documents presented to the Assembly was a Report made by a Committee appointed last year, con-

sisting of Drs. Fisher and Brainerd, and Judges Strong and Allison, on the following overture:

"When the Judiciary have proceeded, in accordance with chapter IV., section 13, of the Book of Discipline, to take the testimony in the case of an accused person, may they proceed to *pass judgment* thereon as if he were present, or shall he be left simply under censure for contumacy?"

The Report was read, and ably advocated by Judge Allison; it was drawn up by Judge Strong. Some of the points made were these:

"The question thus presented is exclusively one of power. It is not whether, in all cases, it is advisable that a Church judiciary should proceed to a final determination of the case, nor is it what has been the usage in some of the tribunals of the Church, but it is strictly, what does the Book of Discipline authorize? It is freely admitted that a long course of usage under a statute is no inconsiderable evidence of the meaning of the statute, but it must be a usage growing out of the enactment itself, and claimed to have been authorized by it. Mere neglect to exercise powers conferred is no proof that they were not granted.

* * * * * * *

"Contumacious disobedience of citations is a distinct offense, punishment for which is entirely collateral to discipline for the cause that induced the commencement of the process. It is contempt of the lawful authority of the Church, and suspension for it is summary punishment for the collateral offense alone. Neither directly nor indirectly is it an expression of opinion respecting the delinquent's guilt or innocence of the charge preferred originally against him. Suspension for contumacy would be proper, without regard to anything beyond it. It is quite conceivable that an accused person may willfully disobey citations, and yet be innocent of the charges made against him. It certainly would be an anomaly in any judicial proceeding to hold that a penalty inflicted for a collateral offence vindicates the law against another and possibly much greater crime.

"If, therefore, the defined ends of discipline are to be secured, a Church session must have power to proceed to trial and judgment, though the accused person refuse to obey the citations duly served upon him, and it is not to be concluded without clear evidence that means given to secure those ends are inadequate. When the meaning of the language used in the fourth chapter is sought, the best guide to it will be found in the paramount intention the language was designed to subserve. The directions given must be construed consistently, with that intention, to further, rather than to defeat it. Looking then to the sections of the fourth chapter, and regarding them as part of a system designed for the purposes above mentioned, to be interpreted so as to harmonize with those purposes as well as with each other, the conclusion seems inevitable that whenever an accusation has been made against a church member, and a Church judicatory has entered judicially upon its consideration, and obtained jurisdiction by service or citations upon him, it may go on to final judgment, though he refused to obey the citations.

* * * * * * *

"Taking all the sections into consideration, and regarding them as parts of one system, as having reference to the same subject matter, and designed to secure the ends avowed, the Committee are constrained to regard them as applicable to the course of proceeding through all the stages of trial, alike in cases where the accused does not appear in obedience to the citations as when he does. In both the judicatory is empowered to proceed to trial and to final judgment.

"To this conclusion an objection has sometimes been urged that, at first mention, seems to have some plausibility. It is, that trial of a person in his absence, and the rendition of judgment against him, are in conflict with common right and justice; that even criminal courts in State governments do not try offenders in their absence, and that ecclesiastical courts ought to avoid *ex parte* proceedings. The objection aims less at the power of a judicatory, as recognized by the Book of Discipline, than it does at the policy of exercising it. But it misapprehends what are acknowledged common right and justice, what are the proceedings of courts of law and equity in analogous cases, and what are *ex parte* proceedings. Nowhere is it held that a man may not deny himself his plainest rights. While he may not be tried for an alleged offence without having an opportunity to be heard, he has no just cause to complain of a trial to which he has been summoned by a tribunal having jurisdiction, and which he has persistently refused to attend. In such a case, it is he who has thrown away his own rights. They are not taken from him. This is a principle universally recognized in courts of civil law and of equity, and such courts go further: they construe a refusal to obey process requiring an appearance as a substantial confession of the complaint, and they render judgment accordingly. It is true State courts, having criminal jurisdiction, do not try persons for crimes and misdemeanors in their absence. This is for two reasons. They have power to compel attendance, which ecclesiastical courts have not, and the punishments they inflict affect the life, the liberty, or the property of the convicted criminal. In fact, they concern the life or the liberty of the accused, for even if the penalty be only a fine, its payment is usually enforced by detention in custody until satisfaction be made. But ecclesiastical tribunals can pronounce no judgment that touches either the life, the liberty or the property of the accused. Their sentences are peculiar. Indeed, it is asserting a false analogy to assimilate a trial before a Church session to an indictment and trial in a criminal court. It bears a much stronger resemblance to proceedings very common in courts of law, in which members of associations or corporations are called upon to respond for some alleged breach of corporate duty, for which they are liable to be punished by the imposition of penalties, or by a motion from membership. In such cases, when the person summoned refuses to obey the mandate of the writ, courts proceed at once to dispose of his case and render final judgment. No one ever supposed that by so doing injustice was done, or that any right of the accused was invaded. Much less can he complain who has been cited to answer an accusation taken into judicial cognizance by a Church judicatory, and who has contumaciously refused to obey the citation, if the tribunal proceed to try the case, presuming nothing against him but contumacy from his refusal, but founding its judgment solely upon the testimony of witnesses. This objection, therefore, when examined, seems to be without substance.

"In conclusion, it remains only to recommend, as the opinion of the

Committee, that the overture be answered by a declaration of the Assembly, that, in the case proposed, the judicatory may proceed to trial and final judgment, as if the accused were present."

The Assembly accepted and adopted this Report.

THE FREE CHURCH OF SCOTLAND.

A letter was received from Sir Henry Wellwood Montcrieff, Bart., D. D., Principal Clerk of the Assembly of the Free Church of Scotland, and communicated to the Assembly by Dr. Hatfield. A Committee was appointed to prepare a reply, consisting of Rev. Henry B. Smith, D. D., Edwin F. Hatfield, D. D., and Judge Allison.

The letter was seconded by an address from the Rev. James McCosh, D. D., LL. D., the well-known metaphysical writer, who came with testimonials from leading representatives of the Free Church, and was most cordially welcomed by both Assemblies. His sermons and various speeches gave new interest to the meetings of both Assemblies. In his address to our Assembly he said, in substance, that he did not come officially as a delegate from any church; but, wearied with his writings and his classes, having visited repeatedly the Continent, and not feeling inclined there again, he felt a longing to spend his vacation in visiting some new country, that he might have a glimpse of the future that is before the world. He had taken part with this great nation in its great struggle. In his little field of influence, both as an author and speaker, he had declared his attachment to the cause, and had never for a moment doubted of our success. He was anxious to see the country engaged in the great work of reconstruction. Such were the motives which induced him to come to this country; but when it became known among his friends that he was about to proceed to the United States, he received communication after communication, asking that he might accomplish another end. The Evangelical Alliance had a meeting for the special purpose, and enjoined upon him to say to American Christians how much it was desired, on account of that Alliance, that the American and British churches should be

brought into a more thorough understanding and unity. His friends forwarded to him the letter which had been read by the Stated Clerk. He had been received by the two bodies that have met in this place in a way altogether disproportionate to his position as an individual, but nevertheless he accepted it all because he knew it proceeded from genuine and loving hearts, and because he regarded it as a declaration of respectful feeling towards the British churches. He would take care to repeat this to the British churches, and he knew the general body of them will receive it with joy. He declared that America and Great Britain was bound together by strong bands—were one in race, one in liberty, and one in the love of education, and especially, and above all, one in believing in one God and one Saviour; that the Presbyterians in both countries were one in faith, discipline and polity generally. He referred to the troubles of the Church of Scotland, and to some facts of his own history, illustrating what the churches of Great Britain had had to contend with, and passed to the present condition of the churches. The Free Church of Scotland, though not a numerous body, had contributed for the year ending May 1st, 1865, the sum of £350,000 for the support of the Gospel; had set going a general sustentation fund for poor congregations, a benevolence institution by Dr. Chalmers, which had been carried on with great vigor and liberality, and to which the Church contributed in 1865, £180,000, and in twenty-two years ending May, 1865, the total sum of £6,000,000. The Free Church of Scotland has been instrumental in bringing about a state of things that looked to the union of all the churches of like faith and government, not only in the United Kingdom, but in the Colonies, and the speaker took the opportunity to say that the British churches were most anxious to be in some way officially connected with the Presbyterian bodies in this country, by having delegates reciprocally accredited to the General Assemblies, who might have a voice and a vote on the more important questions of general interest to the Church.

The letter received from the Free Church of Scotland is as follows:

To the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States, N. S.

"DEAR CHRISTIAN BRETHREN:—We take advantage of the meeting of our General Assembly, at present convened, to greet you cordially in the name of the Lord. We feel constrained to do so in consequence of the singularly momentous character of recent events in your country, and of their mighty influence on your respective churches. It may be premature to say much, as the echoes of war have scarce yet died away, and the future may be, in other ways, as eventful as these four years of conflict; but without anticipating Providence, we have a plain Christian duty to discharge, in consequence of what falls already within the province of history.

"God has assuredly been speaking to your country by terrible things in righteousness. The plowshare of war has gone deep into the soul of your people. You have been long familiar with scenes of bloodshed, such as the world never saw before, and we pray God, if consistent with his holy will, it may never witness again. But, even in this respect, good has come out of evil; for the agony and ruin of war have opened up to you many new fields of Christian philanthropy. We refer in particular to the work of your 'Christian Commission,' with its rich provision for the temporal and spiritual wants of your soldiers and sailors; and we hope that all churches shall profit by this noble exhibition of Christian love in a singularly arduous and self-sacrificing sphere of labor.

"We have special pleasure in referring to the sympathy lately awakened on behalf of America among all classes in Britain, by the assassination of your great and good President; and we adore the Most High, who has thus turned one of the blackest crimes of our age into a means of softening down asperities of feeling, of correcting grave misunderstandings, of fusing the hearts of nations in love, above all, of calling forth in full measure the prayers of Christ's people on this side of the Atlantic on behalf of your sorely-stricken land. We rejoice that your country is to have rest from war, and that the restoration of peace is to be followed by the abolition of slavery. No words could better express our views than those of your lamented President, written in April, 1864; 'I claim not to have controlled events, but confess plainly that events have controlled me. Now, at the end of three years' struggle, the nation's condition is not what either party, or any man devised or expected. God alone can claim it. Whither it is tending seems plain. If God now wills the removal of a great wrong, and wills also that we of the North, as well as you of the South, shall pay fairly for our complicity in that wrong, impartial history will find therein new causes to attest and revere the justice and goodness of God.' The divergence of sentiment and action formerly existing between you and us as to this question thus ceases, and we give the glory to Him, who is righteous in all his ways and holy in all his works. As there is really nothing now to prevent a complete and cordial understanding between the British and the American churches, we take the earliest possible opportunity of giving utterance to this conviction and desire of our hearts. Our prayers shall rise with yours to the throne of grace in asking for your rulers and your people all heavenly wisdom in dealing with one of the weightiest social problems ever presented to any country for solution. We shall watch with the liveliest interest the future history of the negro race within your borders; and you have our best wishes for

the success of every scheme bearing on their temporal or spiritual welfare. We are by no means forgetful of our former share of National guilt as to negro slavery, and it would ill become us to judge you harshly or unadvisedly. But, it is right and proper that we should encourage you by our British experience—for the abolition of slavery in our West India Islands removed a great stumbling-block out of our path—it led to a marked quickening of the public conscience—it gave our country a far higher Christian place among the nations, and it enabled all the churches to proclaim with fullness and sincerity the gospel of salvation through Him, who came to undo the heavy burdens and to break every yoke. We have no doubt that your churches will be ready to follow where Providence now points the way.

"As the General Assembly of the Free Church of Scotland, we have every cause to reciprocate sentiments of brotherly kindness and charity toward members of the same Presbyterian family with ourselves. We must all feel the necessity for closer fellowship between churches that have a common language, a common ancestry, a common faith. Presbyterianism would thereby become vastly more influential for good. It would bulk more largely in the eye of Christendom and every section of our ecclesiastical commonwealth would get enlargement of heart by partaking of the heritage of truth and grace common to all. We beg to add that the greatest advantage would follow from the occasional visits of accredited deputies from your churches to us, and from us to you. We have much to learn from your varied schemes of Christian usefulness in dealing with a state of society so different from ours; and we know from the testimony of Dr. Duff and many others, that in the field of heathenism there are no missionaries of more truly apostolic spirit than those sent forth by the churches of America. You on your part might also find it not unprofitable to study the working of Presbyterianism in Scotland, fragrant as our beloved country is with the memories of the martyrs, and earnestly contending, as it still does, for the faith once delivered to the saints. We must not forget, however, that there are other churches beyond the circle of Presbyterianism, with which we desire to cultivate a spirit of concord, and from the field of whose experience we seek to gather like precious fruit. Let us provoke one another to love and to good works. Let us strive, as in the fire, to prevent at any subsequent time the possibility of estrangement between our respective nations. Let us pray that the same blessed spirit, poured down so largely on your land during the period of your revival, may become the living bond of unity and peace between us. And let us ever realize the solemn fact that, humanly speaking, the Christian interests of the world hang mainly on the efforts put forth by Christ's people in Great Britain and America.

"And now, dear breathren, we beseech the God of all grace to overrule these shakings of the nations for the upbuilding of that kingdom which cannot be moved; and we affectionately commend you to Him who will give strength to his people, and who will bless his people with peace. For of him, and through him, and to him, are all things—to whom be glory forever and ever. Amen.

"Signed in name and by authority of the Free Church of Scotland, at Edinburgh, the thirtieth day of May, in the year one thousand eight hundred and sixty-five, by James Begg, D. D., Moderator of the General Assembly of the Free Church of Scotland."

In behalf of the Committee appointed to answer this letter, Professor Smith presented the following resolutions, and reply to the letter, which were adopted by the Assembly:

The General Assembly of the Free Church of Scotland, in a letter bearing date May 30th, 1865, having proposed to us a closer fellowship by "occasional visits of accredited deputies" from our respective churches, and the same proposal having been confirmed in the address of Rev. James McCosh, LL. D., therefore,

Resolved, That this Assembly accede to this proposal for an interchange of deputies on such specific terms as may hereafter be designated, and that two deputies be appointed to represent our Church at the next General Assembly of the Free Church of Scotland, in Edinburgh, May, 1867.

Resolved, That the Committee having in charge the correspondence with the Free Church of Scotland, be authorized to make this appointment in the name of the General Assembly.

Resolved, That we tender to the Rev. James McCosh, LL. D., our sincere thanks for the able and eloquent manner in which he has discharged his office as virtual, if not technical, representative of the Free Church of Scotland; that we offer him the assurance of our personal honor and regard; and that we pray for his continued and unceasing success and influence in the great and useful labors to which his life is devoted.

The General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States, (N. S.) in session in the First Presbyterian Church in the city of St. Louis, Missouri, May 28th, 1866, to the General Assembly of the Free Church of Scotland, greeting:

Dear Brethren: The most welcome letter of your venerable Assembly, bearing date Edinburgh, May 30th, 1865, and subscribed by your Moderator, the Rev. James Begg, D. D., has been received by our Assembly with heart-felt gratitude and approval. We warmly reciprocate your affectionate Christian salutations, and respond with lively emotions to your expression of sympathy and confidence, and to your proposals for a closer fellowship. Though separated by broad ocean, we are bound together by no ordinary ties. No Church of another land has a stronger hold than yours upon our love and honor. The one reformed faith is our common heritage. We express that faith in the same symbols; we have, in essence, the same Presbyterian polity; and we are equally engaged in kindred Evangelical labors at home and abroad. There are also between us many ties of a common ancestry; we venerate the names of your early reformers; our ministry are still instructed by the reading of your great divines; our faith is strengthened by the bright example of your heroic martyrs, who fought a good fight for religious and civil liberty; and in your special conflicts and sacrifices for a Free Church, you have had,

these twenty years, our constant and warmest sympathy. We honor the high wisdom and extraordinary liberality which have made you prosperous and strong, and the new testimony you have given to the self-sustaining power of the Christian Church, when contending for its righteous liberties. It is a good thing that the sacred fire kindled by the old covenanters is still burning in the heart of Scotland, and that their flaming torches have been handed down from sire to son. In all these things, dear brethren, we do rejoice, yea, and will rejoice.

It is then, with no ordinary satisfaction, that we have received your proposal for an interchange of accredited deputies between our churches, as occasion may serve. As you will see by an accompanying Minute, this Assembly has unanimously resolved to appoint two such deputies to represent us before your venerable Assembly in May, 1867. They will, in due time, be named and commissioned, and we bespeak for them a fraternal welcome. We also invite you to send deputies to our own Church, at its next session in the city of Rochester, in the State of New York, May, 1867, assuring them a most cordial reception.

We have this year been favored with an address made in your behalf, by the Rev. James McCosh, LL. D., of Belfast, Ireland, who came to us with ample testimonials from several of the honored ministers of your Church. Already known to us by his elaborate and thoughtful works, so important in relation to the great conflict between Christianity and some of the forms of modern infidelity, he hardly needed any external recommendation to insure him an attentive hearing. His eloquent and sympathetic words have drawn us to you by the cords of a common faith and love.

The sympathy you express in the calamities and sufferings brought upon us by our recent war, in the assassination of our beloved and venerated President Lincoln, a martyr to the cause of human freedom, and your fervent congratulations upon the abolition of slavery throughout our States, as well as your wise suggestions, derived in part from your British experience in respect to the future condition of the negro race, call for our grateful recognition. These things have weighed, and still weigh upon the mind and the conscience of this Nation. God has guided us by his wonder-working Providence, bringing good out of evil. He has sorely chastised us for our National sins, and we bow in penitence, yet in trust, beneath His mighty hand. He has indeed caused the wrath of man to promote His own high purposes of grace and wisdom, and in the difficulties and perplexities that still beset our path, in the vast social and political, as well as religious problems, that we are called upon to solve, we humbly invoke, and rely upon His wisdom and grace. Here, too, we feel assured that your prayers will mingle with ours.

You say that "the divergence of sentiment and action formerly existing between us, on the question of slavery, has now ceased," and, "as there is really nothing now to prevent a complete and cordial understanding between the British and the American Churches, we take the earliest possible opportunity of giving utterance to this conviction and desire of our hearts." We thank you for these words; we unite with you in the petition for the removal of all estrangement and the establishment, not only of our old, but even of a better and nearer friendship. And because of this our common wish and purpose, we are emboldened to say to you, with the utmost Christian frankness, as well as affection, that during the progress of our recent and terrible struggle for the very life of our nation, involving as it did by a vital necessity the emancipation of the slaves, we have

at times been deeply pained and grieved by the apparent indifference of the British Churches to the great principles and the manifest moral issues that were here at stake. From the beginning of the great rebellion, our American Churches, as with one voice, proclaimed the real nature of the contest. Our own Assembly never faltered or wavered in the declarations, that it was essentially a conflict between freedom and slavery, and that national unity was neces ary to national freedom. And we shall ever more regret that in our darkest days, when we were in travail in the throes of a new birth, and when sympathy woul i most have cheered our hearts, we had, with few exceptio·s, such slight encouragement from those so nearly allied to us in faith and in the fundamental principles of civil and rel gious liberty. But those dark hours are past, nevermore, we trust, to return, and we are glad that the clouds are dispersing, and the mists vanishing away, and that we are coming to see eye to eye, and to know better each other's hearts and minds.

You allude to the interest with which you "shall watch the future history of the negro race within our borders." The views of this Assembly on some of the points herein involved are set forth in a declaration just adopted on the state of the country, a copy of which will be sent to you. The freedom of that unhappy and long-suffering race has been bought at a great price of blood and treasure. Slavery is now prohibited by an amendment to the Constitution. The civil rights of the freedmen have been secured by law. Other guarantees will doubtless follow in due time. This nation is under the most solemn responsibility as to the future destiny of this class of its citizens. Meanwhile, our chief reliance must be on those social, moral and religious influences which alone can make men fit for freedom and truly free—and which alone can fully restore the Union of the States, and bind us together in a common brotherhood.

In these troubled times, even when the horrors of war were upon us, the Great Head of the Church has given us fresh occasion to magnify his faithfulness. Our American Churches, no less than our Republic, have emerged from this conflict still strong in their faith and order. The principles of our American Christianity have received a new vindication. Our benevolent contributions have been constantly increasing. And we are now girding ourselves for the great task that is laid upon us, especially in our Southern and Western States, among our freedmen and our emigrant population, and against the progress of Romanism, of materialism, and of a false rationalism, in humble reliance, as we trust, upon the grace and wisdom of Him who will not leave us if we lean upon his mighty arm and follow the guidance of His all-wise Providence. An increased desire for Christian union, too, has been kindled throughout our land. Many of our Churches, also, have been visite l with fresh outpouring of the spirit of grace, showing that the Lord is at work amongst us as of old.

We, too, desire with you in a special manner, a closer fellowship between the Presbyterian churches in our own and other lands. We are glad to see the movements in this direction in England and Scotland, and in your colonial dependencies. The same spirit is at work among ourselves. The two great branches of the Presbyterian Church in this country are drawing nearer together; this year they have touched each other, and each of our Assemblies has appointed a Committee of Conference and Reunion. Our Deputies will inform you of the progress of this desirable object. And we fervently hope that here, as never before, all

Christian Churches may forget their lesser differences and unite together, so far as possible, in the great work of the Lord.

Dear brethren, beloved in the Lord, we send to you these, our Christian salutations, beseeching you to pray for us. We commend you unto God, and to the word of His grace. May the one Great Head of the Church bless you with all spiritual blessings. May our Churches and our lands live in amity and unity. May we all live for the Glory of God in the kingdom of his Son, our Lord, to whom be praise forever. Amen.

THE REUNION OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCHES.

The fact that both Assemblies met in the same city facilitated the projects for reunion, which have been so generally discussed during the two past years. They came to understand one another better. The circumstances of the country and the times, and the needs of many of our weaker churches, also tended in the same direction. Many of the past issues are dead and buried. The zeal for doctrinal strife has abated. Congregational tendencies have been eliminated from the so-called New School. The Old School has been purging itself from complicity with Southern institutions. The Old and New Schools are united at the South. The Old School Assembly at St. Louis fought a good fight against that small and vanishing minority who cannot give up their sympathy with Southern treason and slavery, though both these are practically abolished: and this drew the majority into closer affinity with us.* All the propositions, in fact, in respect to

* On this subject we make the following extract from the Pastoral Letter of the Old School Assembly:

"One other topic demands our consideration. In consequence of the rebellion and slavery, and of the deliverances of the five preceding Assemblies thereupon, one presbytery in the church, and some one hundred or more ministers and elders, have set themselves against these deliverances by ecclesiastical action, or formal organization, and have published their schismatical doctrines to the world. The disapprobation by ministers and members of the acts of the General Assembly, when expressed in proper terms and spirit, and with due acknowledgment of subordination to its authority, is a right which belongs to every one under its jurisdiction. The General Assembly claims no infallibility: but it possesses a clear authority derived from the Lord Jesus Christ, and its acts resulting from such authority are to be respected. No combination of ministers or members may properly be formed within the bosom of the Presbyterian Church for the purpose of openly resisting the authority of the General Assembly, and of setting at naught and contemning its solemn decisions, while the individuals composing such combinations still claim all the rights and privileges of ministers and members; much less may any lower court of the church thus repudiate the Assembly's authority, and still claim and exercise all the powers of a court in good standing. The prin-

reunion came from the Old School, and were most manly and cordial in their tone. Dr. Stanton, the Moderator of their Assembly, in the first week of the session, replying to our honored delegate, Dr. Nelson, said:

"I can respond most heartily, and I think the vast majority of this Assembly can respond also to the sentiment that we are drawing nearer together than we have been during this generation, or since this division occurred; and I may express on my behalf, and I trust on behalf of a large majority of this Assembly, that we hope the time is not distant when we shall not only be, as I am confident we now are, one in spirit, but one by organic law; and that then these two branches of the great Presbyterian family may stand forth in one solid phalanx against error and corruption.

"You have intimated, and undoubtedly it is true, that in the providence of God it is not yet quite clear as to the time and the manner in which this organic union may be brought about. Many have supposed that, from the simple fact that the two Assemblies met in the same city, (the meeting being determined without concert between them,) that the time had come when there should be an organic union; and they have

---

ciple which would admit this would prove destructive of any government, secular or religious, for it is the essence of anarchy. Notwithstanding this, several Presbyterians have openly declared that they will not regard the Assembly's authority, especially the acts of the last Assembly concerning the terms of receiving ministers and members from the Southern Presbyterian church. We trust that upon further reflection they will reconsider such action, and again show a proper subordination. One presbytery, however, that of Louisville, in the Synod of Kentucky, adopted a paper in September last, called a 'Declaration and Testimony,' which arrays itself against all the deliverances of the five Assemblies from 1861 to 1865, enacted upon slavery and rebellion. This paper has been signed by certain ministers and elders in other presbyteries and synods, chiefly in the Synod of Missouri. The present Assembly felt called upon to take decisive action in the premises. This paper exhibits organized rebellion and schism within the bosom of the church, whose design is to resist the authority of the General Assembly. It pronounces the last five Assemblies guilty of heresy, schism, and virtual apostacy. Such an organization, with such aims, bringing such charges, and animated by such a spirit as the said paper exhibits, the Assembly could not overlook. The simple question presented was, whether a single subordinate court, with such individuals of other presbyteries as might join it, should be allowed to carry on its schismatical and rebellious schemes with impunity, and still claim and exercise all the rights of a court, and the individuals concerned have all the rights of office-bearers in the church accorded to them, while openly defying the General Assembly; or whether the Assembly, which represents the whole church, should require due subordination and respect to its authority. The signers of the said paper openly avow their determination to continue agitation against the solemn acts of the last five Assemblies, until they shall bring the church, through action of the General Assembly, to their views, or, failing in this, they declare that they may feel called upon to abandon the church.

"In this posture of affairs the Assembly could not hesitate in its duty. It censured all the persons who have signed the "Declaration and Testimony,' deprived them of the right to sit in any church court above the session, and cited them to the bar of the next General Assembly. This measure was clearly justified, and was demanded for the purity, peace, and order of the church."

expected that that organic union might now be formed. I hope, before we adjourn, a low me to say, and if it shall meet the views of the body you represent, I hope you, before you adjourn, may initiate measures (perhaps beginning here, and being responded to by you) looking to a more close fellowship in all our relations, and ultimately, as soon as the providence of God may open the way, to an organic union. And now, as the time for adjournment has passed, I will close my remarks. I believe I have expressed the sentiments of a vast majority of this Assembly, to show you that we heartily sympathize with you in all your efforts to promote the cause of Christ, and we congratulate you on all the success you have attained."

During the next week two joint meetings of a religious and fraternal character, were held, with the most auspicious results. On Monday evening (May 21st) the church in which the sessions of the Old School were held was filled with an animated throng, who responded heartily to all that was said about Christian fellowship, by the two Moderators, Judge Chamberlain, Dr. McCosh, Dr. Parker of Newark, and Professor Smith. It was an impressive occasion. At the conclusion, the whole audience rose, as if spontaneously, in response to a resolution affirming that reunion was desirable and practicable. At the united Communion service, in Dr. Nelson's church, a still deeper feeling of Christian fellowship was engendered; two brothers, one from each Assembly, Dr. Humphreys of Danville, and Dr. Humphreys of Chicago, symbolized the fraternity of the two bodies. On Saturday Dr. Gurley and Judge Clark made felicitous addresses to our Assembly, to which the Moderator responded in appropriate terms. Dr. Gurley's weighty words were enforced by his presentation of the following resolutions from his Assembly:

"*Resolved*, That this Assembly expresses its fraternal affection for the other branch of the Presbyterian Church, and its earnest desire for the reunion at the earliest time consistent with agreement in doctrine, order, and polity, on the basis of our common standards, and the prevalence of mutual confidence and love, which are so necessary to a happy union, and to the permanent peace and prosperity of the united church.

Resolved, That it be recommended to all our churches, and church courts, and to all our ministers, ruling elders, and communicants to cherish fraternal feelings, to cultivate Christian intercourse in the worship of God, and in the promotion of the cause of Christ, and to avoid all needless controversies and competitions adapted to perpetuate division and strife.

Resolved, That a Committee of nine ministers and six ruling elders be appointed, provided that a similar Committee shall be appointed by the

other Assembly now in session in this city, for the purpose of conferring in regard to the desirability and practicability of reunion, and if, after conference and inquiry, such reunion shall seem to be desirable and practicable, to suggest suitable measures for its accomplishment, and report to the next General Assembly."

This was immediately followed by the presentation of the following Report from the Committee on the Polity, Dr. H. B. Smith, Chairman, to which all the overtures on the subject of reunion had been referred:

"These overtures, Nos. 5 to 15, were from the Presbyteries of New York 3d and 4th, Dubuque, Greencastle, Athens, Steuben, Alton, Monroe, Keokuk, Long Island, and Trumbull. All these Presbyteries, with different degrees of urgency, recommend to this Assembly to initiate or respond to proposals looking to an entire reunion of the churches represented by the two General Assemblies now in session in the city of St. Louis.

"The General Assembly now in session in the Second Presbyterian Church of this city have also adopted resolutions appointing a Committee to confer with a similar committee of our own Church in regard to the desirableness and practicability of such a reunion.

"Your Committee recommend to this Assembly the adoption of the following resolutions:

"*Resolved*, That this Assembly tender to the Assembly representing the other branch of the Presbyterian Church, its cordial Christian salutations and fellowship, and the expression of its earnest wish for a reunion on the basis of our common standards, received in a common spirit.

"*Resolved*, That a Committee of fifteen, nine of whom shall be ministers of the Gospel, and six elders, be appointed to confer on this subject, in the recess of the Assembly, with the Committee to be appointed by the other General Assembly, and to report the result at our next General Assembly.

"*Resolved*, That we enjoin upon this Committee, and upon all our ministers and church members, to abstain from whatever may hinder a true Christian fellowship, to cherish and cultivate those feelings and purposes which look to the peace and prosperity of Zion, the edification of the body of Christ, and the complete union of all believers, especially of those living in the same land, having the same history and the same standards of doctrine and polity.

"*Resolved*, That a copy of these resolutions, with the names of our Committee, be sent to the other General Assembly, now in session in this city."

The Report of the Committee was unanimously adopted amid applause and demonstrations of great satisfaction.

The Committee of Conference appointed by our Assembly consists of the Rev. Drs. Thos. Brainerd, William Adams, Edwin F. Hatfield, Jonathan F. Stearns, P. H. Fowler, J. B. Shaw, H. I. Hitchcock, of Ohio, R. W. Patterson, and Henry

Nelson; and of Judges Allison and Williams, E. A. Lambert, T. P. Handy, R. W. Steele, and W. H. Brown, Elders.

The Committee appointed by the Old School consists of Drs. Krebs, Beatty of Ohio, Backus, Gurley, Montfort, Howard, Schenck, Reed, and Brown of Chicago; and Elders Sey, McKnight, Galloway, Clarke, Strong, and Beatty of Kentucky.

This weighty subject is thus brought into a position in which definite and decisive action must be taken upon it. Both Assemblies will have full confidence in the wisdom and Christian spirit of the Committees that have been appointed. There is ample time for deliberation and discussion. These Committees have a difficult and momentous work to accomplish, in its ultimate bearings second in importance to no subject now before the Christian churches of this land. There are some undeniable difficulties in the way. There must be concessions on both sides. But no local or merely personal interests ought to be allowed to stand in the way of reunion, if both churches are really so near together in doctrine and polity, in heart and mind, as to make it practicable. And no terms must be insisted upon by either side that look like dictation, or that will infringe upon the self-respect of either body. Practical difficulties as to Boards and Committees can be disposed of, if the main question is satisfactorily adjusted. Some constitutional changes may also be necessary, that the united Assembly may not be a too unwieldy body, and unfit to do the work of a Church Court. Perhaps a Commission, to sit in the recess of the Assemblies, may be found advisable for the more important judicial cases. And proper care should also be taken so to define the province and rights of the General Assembly that it shall not transcend its peculiar and special sphere, and become a legislative and executive instead of a judicial body. It might also be well to have some arrangement by which the Assembly, through its proper officers, shall be able to continue some of its functions during the eleven and a-half months in which it is not in session.

The future history and fortunes of Presbyterianism in this country, and on this continent, are deeply involved in the re-

sult that will now be reached. If it is successful, the smaller Presbyterian churches will probably before many years coalesce with us; and an impulse will be given to all the denominations in the line of Christian union and reunion, counteracting the extreme tendency to subdivisions that has hitherto existed. If it fail, the attempt cannot probably be renewed under equally favorable auspices for many a year to come, if ever. We are, in fact, deciding the question, whether Presbyterianism in this land is to be split up into local, provincial synods and assemblies, or whether we can really have an American Presbyterian Church, stretching all through the country. The Southern churches will doubtless for a time remain separate; and it is better that they should do so; but bye-and-bye, when the passions of the war are lulled, we may hope that, if we be reunited, they will come back, in a better mind, to the old fellowship.

If we cannot reunite, we shall be left to struggle on, doing our work side by side, in perpetual rivalry in all the new States, Territories and towns, so rapidly rising up. And meanwhile other, more wise and flexible, denominations will be united, will stretch each as one body through the whole country, while we are contending with each other. The Episcopal Church, the Methodists, the Baptists, the Congregationalists, and the Roman Catholics, are, or will become, united, compact and national churches. Must we be left to division on points of polity and doctrine, which it is difficult for any but the initiated to understand? Slavery is out of the way. Old jealousies are dying out. The spirit of returning love and unity is abroad in our churches. United, we can do a work for Christ, second to that done by no church in the United States. Every wise Christian man, who loves his Church and his land, will pause long before he speaks the word that would hopelessly sunder those two great churches that are now holding out to each other the hands of amity and unity.

NARRATIVE ON THE STATE OF RELIGION.

We have room for only a bare extract of Dr. Taylor's interesting Report on this topic:

Eighty-nine out of the one hundred and ten Presbyteries on the roll had forwarded their annual reports for examination. One hundred and thirteen churches were reported to have enjoyed revivals of religion during the previous year, and in response to the prayers of the churches, two hundred and fourteen revivals were specially mentioned this year. The subjects of the work had been mainly youths between twelve and twenty. Many of them had begun in, but they had rarely been confined to the Sabbath-schools. The chief agencies of the work had been "the ordinary means of grace." The revivals had been most fruitful in churches under the care of settled pastors. The in-gathering is still going forward. Six Presbyteries give an aggregate of one thousand and forty-eight additions by profession. A number of churches had doubled their membership, several had received over two hundred on profession of faith, since their revivals began. The eye of faith could see many promising omens of the continuance of the work. Three thousand five hundred conversions were reported by our home missionaries; fifty churches have been organized, and many old churches resuscitated. Noticeable in the narratives a strong desire for reunion with the other branch. In some places, where the Spirit of God has been poured out the most abundantly, the work of revival begun in an open and bold attack of all the most prominent vices of society. The Sabbath-schools were mentioned as being in a very flourishing condition. Churches had generously contributed in the efforts for religious education among the freedmen.

The benevolence of the church is shown to be somewhat on the increase; the aggregate of its contributions is larger than during any previous year, yet the standard of giving is below the ability of the Church as a whole. The lack of means to build churches is the great drawback in the frontier States. Looking at the condition of the Church from either a worldly or a religious stand-point, its prosperity appears greater than at any previous period.

An excursion to the famous Iron Mountain are among the pleasant incidents of this session of the Assembly. The day was fine; the members were in a highly patriotic, and Christian, and cheerful mood; and Dr. Nelson was an admirable master of ceremonies. The time was chiefly spent at Pilot Knob, on account of the greater breadth of view. Just below was the fort so gallantly defended by General Ewing with his six hundred men, against the confederate ten thousand under Price; one of the most gallant actions of the war. Across the plain is Shepherd's Mountain, abounding in magnetic ore, 600 feet high, covering an area of 800 acres. Pilot Knob is 581 feet above the plain, covers an area of 360 acres, and contains, it is estimated, 13,972,773 tons of pure iron; its ore has about 75 per cent. of iron. Six miles nearer St. Louis is the Iron Mountain, 228 feet high, with an area of 500 acres, and estimated to contain (we hardly dare write it down) 239,187,-

375 tons of pure iron. They might have left out the 375 tons in the estimate; but we suppose they wanted to be very exact.

The hospitality of St. Louis did not seem to be taxed by the presence of even the two Assemblies. It was certainly cordial and bountiful. That beautiful city, freed with its State from the depressing influence of slavery, is destined to a grand career, in that most magnificent valley of the world. What a boundless opportunity is stretching out before our land and our churches! What a work we have to do! Who can think upon it without having his pulse stirred, and his heart enlarged, and his thoughts elevated! We are laying the foundations of the greatest empire this world has known. We are to help in planting a Christian civilization in these wide and teeming plains, in these boundless valleys, along these majestic views, along the whole line of the iron road that will now bind us to the Pacific coast. We must be up and doing. We must send every dollar and every man that we can into these inviting fields, to sow the seed and reap the harvest. Some of our young men will see the population of this land doubled. Our little ones may see it reach a hundred millions. And, under God, the church of this generation is to decide the question, whose shall be that increase. Never were the responsibility of any churches so great, as is that of our American churches now; never were any churches called to give so much, and to do so much in the same span of life. But if Christ be our leader, and we follow in his steps, the end is sure.

Art. VII.—CRITICAL NOTES ON RECENT BOOKS.

THEOLOGY.

The Church of England a Portion of Christ's one Holy Catholic Church, and a Means of Restoring Visible Unity. An Eirenism, *in a Letter to the Author of* "The Christian Year." By E. B. Pusey, D. D. New York: Appleton & Co. 1866. pp. 395. Dr. Pusey, in this interesting Letter, discusses the points of difference between the Roman and the Anglican Churches, in a conciliatory, not to say a compromising, spirit. To the

papal supremacy, the Mariolatry of the Church of Rome, and to some of its superstitious observances, he presents decisive objections from history, reason and Scripture. A certain primacy of honor he would be willing to concede to the Roman See, but not its claims to temporal authority. On the score of doctrine he is willing to make large concessions. He says, on p. 37, "there is not one statement in the elaborate chapters on Justification in the Council of Trent, which *any of us could fail of receiving;* nor is there one of their anathemas on the subject which in the least rejects any statement of the Church of England." One of these anathemas is directed against those who say "that justifying faith is only trust in the Divine mercy remitting our sins on account of Christ, and that faith alone justifies." This is the Protestant ground, and on this point Dr. Pusey has abandoned the position of the Reformers.

The work, though not very methodical, contains much that will interest those who wish to ascertain the current of English thought. As an *Eirenism* to the papacy it cannot avail much; for the Church of Rome must maintain the articles to which Dr. Pusey objects. But it may facilitate the transition of Anglicans to Rome. This will probably be its only practical effect.

The Temporal Mission of the Holy Ghost: or, Reason and Revelation. By Henry Edwards, Archbishop of Westminster. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1866. pp. 274. By Reason, Archbishop Manning means all in modern thought that runs counter to the claims of the Roman Catholic Church; by Revelation, he means all that that Church enjoins in matters of truth and doctrine. And the object of his work is to show, that the only way of settling the conflict between the two is for all of us to accept the doctrine of papal infallibility. This is a thesis as easy to state as it is difficult to prove; but the proof is made easy, consisting chiefly of assertions and illustrations. Dr. Manning can write at times with force and eloquence; but he does much better in sermons than in controversial discussions. This work contains an unqualified endorsement of the whole ultramontane theory. In one passage he alludes to our country, saying, that "democracy is going to pieces before our eyes." But this was probably written while the rebellion was still flagrant.

Christian Unity and its Recovery. By John S. Davenport. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1866. pp. 119. This contribution to the question of the recovery of Christian unity is from a devoted member of the "Holy Catholic Apostolic Church," commonly called Irvingite. Many of its arguments against sectarianism, and against the Roman Catholic and Episcopal projects of reunion and unity, are excellent; and its position that we should have one body, one spirit, one hope, one Lord, one faith, one baptism, is undoubtedly scriptural. Whether this is to come through a new, supernatural revival of the apostleship, is a different question. The tone of the discussion is excellent.

A Hand-Book of Christian Baptism. By R. Ingham. London. 1865. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. pp. 624, closely printed. If anybody wants to see about all that can be said on the Baptist side of the question, How much water must be applied to a person in order to make him a real member of the visible church? he will be abundantly satisfied even before he has quite got through this thick volume. It is apparently an exhaustive Hand-Book of the matter, compiled with great assiduity,

and written in a good spirit. Some of the concluding reflections on "Charity, with respect to Strict and Close Communion," are worthy of consideration. We hope bye-and-bye to see published an equally extensive and much more learned thesaurus, from the other side, which has been written by a minister of our church, and which we know to be a work of careful and solid erudition.

Sermons and Expositions. By the late JOHN ROBERTSON, D. D., *Glasgow Cathedral. With a Memoir of the Author, by the* REV. J. C. YOUNG. A. Strahan: London and New York. 1865. pp. lxxiv. 306. Dr. Robertson was born in Perth in 1824, and died in 1865, ere he had completed his forty-first year. He was in early life distinguished for his quick and careful scholarship, and had brilliant success as a student at St. Andrew's University. He was first settled in 1848 in the parish of Mains, and in 1858 succeeded Principal Macfarlan in the Cathedral Church, Glasgow, where he remained till his early death. His power was in the careful study and the earnest thoughtfulness of his written discourses. He had little of the artificial aids to oratorical success, but he was eminently successful. His style is simple, grave and straightforward; his thoughts are clear, orderly and impressive. But there is more about him than this. He penetrated to the heart of the Christian system, and avoided the mere technicalities of orthodoxy, and so got hold of the deepest wants and best sympathies of the Christian. His two sermons on the Indwelling Christ, and that on the Value of the Simple Elements of Christianity, are in the main admirable. His sermons, too, grow in a living way out of the texts. The volume is a profitable one. It is published in a solid and tasteful style.

The Living Temple, or Scriptural Views of the Church. By JOHN S. STONE, D. D. New York: A. D. F. Randolph. 1866. pp. 354. Dr. Stone is now Lecturer in the Divinity School of the Protestant Episcopal Church in Philadelphia, and it is refreshing to read his candid, wholesome and scriptural views about the nature of the Church, in contrast with the pretensions of exclusive High Churchmen. The above work is a revision and enlargement of his well-known volume on "The *Church Universal*," published some years ago. His appeal as to the nature of the Church is at first directly to the Scriptures, and not to tradition. Of the latter he says: "We cannot receive any exterior documents, or authority, as necessary and sufficient to determine, with infallible certainty, what are the otherwise undiscoverable doctrines of the Bible, without thereby elevating those documents, or that authority, to a certainty and a value above those of the Bible itself." He shows clearly that the Church, in its most general idea, is "the congregation of the faithful;" and that though Episcopacy (in his view) may be needful to the well-being, it is not necessary to the being, of the Church. He shows, too, most convincingly, that the early English reformers adopted this view, and willingly recognized the "orders" of the continental reformed churches; and that they did not do this from ignorance of patristic history, nor from a transient sympathy, but from a settled, rational and scriptural conviction. While conceding this, Dr. Stone is still warmly attached to the faith and order of his own communion. The volume is timely, and will do good. It is handsomely brought out by the publisher.

BIBLICAL LITERATURE.

JOHN P. LANGE'S *Critical, Doctrinal and Homiletical Commentary on the*

Scriptures. Edited by P. Schaff, D. D. *Gospel of Mark, by* Lange. *Revised, with Additions, by* Prof. Shedd, pp. 167. *Gospel of Luke, by* J. J. Van Osterzee, D. D,, *of Utrecht. Translated, with Additions, by* Dr. Schaff, *and* Rev. C. C. Starbuck. pp. 405. Both in one volume. Charles Scribner and Co. New York. 1866. This solid volume is the second one of the American addition of Lange's Bible Work. The first is already in its sixth edition. Three others are in the press and will probably be published during the year. The works now published have the same general characteristics with the volume on Matthew, which has been so cordially welcomed. Dr. Shedd has carefully revised the Edinburgh translation of Lange's work, and added judicious notes and criticisms. Dr. Schaff translated and edited the first three chapters of Luke's Gospel; the rest of the book is translated and edited by a thorough scholar, the Rev. C. C. Starbuck. Considerable additions are made to the criticism of the text and to the exegetical notes, which increase the value of the work. Dr. Van Osterzee, the author of this commentary on Luke, is, perhaps, the ablest of the Evangelical divines of Holland: his contribution to Lange's Bible Work (viz. besides Luke, the Pastoral Epistles, the Epistles to Philemon, and the Doctrinal and Homiletic Divisions of the commentary on James) are among the best of the series. He is more lucid, compressed and definite than Lange, and does not lack warmth and unction. His exposition of Luke takes rank with the very best.

It is a matter of congratulation that so substantial and costly a work has already met with such general favor. This second volume is fully equal to the first in its merits, and ought to have a like success.

How to Study the New Testament. The Gospels. The Acts of the Apostles, By Henry Alford, D. D., Dean of Canterburg. Alexander Strahan: London and New York. pp. 355. The interesting and learned suggestions, as to the profitable study of the New Testament, contained in this volume, were first published in *Good Words*, and are now reproduced in a more permanent form. The object is to show the English reader the exact meaning of the original in contrast with the common English version, where the latter is defective; to explain difficulties, harmonize discrepancies; and, in short, to make the Gospels and Acts more intelligible. The Dean allows many difficulties to stand without attempting a solution, and is generally quite free in his criticisms. On many of the contested points, he will of course be contested. But he is an honest and candid critic. Some passages betray the marks of careless writing, though the general style of the book is simple. It will be found a valuable help to study.

PHILOSOPHY.

An Examination of Mr. J. S. Mill's Philosophy: being a defence of Fundamental Truth. By James McCosh, LL. D, New York: R. Carter and Bros. 1866. pp. 434. Mr. Mill's attack on the intuitional school seems likely to meet with sturdy and able refutations. Dr. McCosh, though by no means a one-sided partisan of Sir William Hamilton, is a zealous opponent of Mr. Mill's peculiar theories, and in this large volume has subjected them to a thorough and satisfactory examination. In twenty-one chapters he reviews carefully and candidly all the leading questions debated by Mr. Mill in his examination of Hamilton, and comes on all the main points to judicious and conclusive results. Some of his analy-

ses and discriminations show a high degree of philosophic insight. The chapter on Body, for example, brings out the different theories of perception in a clear and convincing manner, and effectually demolishes Mr. Mill's general theory, as well as exposes his manifold inconsistencies. So, too, the question of Causation is well handled; and the logical theories of the inductive philosopher are keenly scrutinized.

The work is written in a flowing and popular, as well as in a conspicuous style. It will take rank, we think, alongside of any of the author's previous productions, and raise his reputation as a philosopher. It is a good thing, too, to hear such high and vital topics debated in so calm and courteous a style.

HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY.

Life and Letters of FREDERICK W. ROBERTSON. Incumbent of Trinity Chapel, Brighton, 1847–53. Edited by STOPFORD A. BROOKE, M. A. 2 vols. Boston. Ticknor and Fields. 1865. The interest of this biography centres in the character of the subject of it, and not in the skill of the biographer. There are few who, during the last eight or nine years, have become familiar with that series of sermons, bearing the name of Mr. Robertson, which, first ushered in unheralded, in a modest duodecimo volume, so interested us by their freshness of thought, their earnestness, their somewhat unusual selection of topics and mode of treatment, there are few of these we say, who have not often longed to know something more of the author. Who was he? What had been his training and discipline? What else had he done besides preaching these attractive discourses? With what wing of the English church did he officiate? for, singularly enough, from his sermons we could not exactly tell in what division of that body, which allows wide diversities of views within its communion, to place him. These volumes, in a measure, answer these questions.

Mr. Robertson was born in 1816. His early and strong preferences were for a military life, his father having been a captain in the Royal artillery. Disappointed in this, he turned to the clerical profession, was educated at Oxford, and ordained deacon in 1840. He at once entered upon his duties,—first at Winchester,—with an almost ascetic zeal. He devoted much time to Sunday-schools. He practiced austerities. He restricted himself from all but necessary expenses, and gave the rest of his income to the poor. For a year he almost entirely abstained from meat, and kept aloof from society. He thoroughly studied the works of Jonathan Edwards: pondered over the "Imitation of Christ," and read daily the lives of Henry Martyn and David Brainerd. He spent much time in prayer, systematizing his petitions, having one class of subjects for each day of the week. From Winchester he removed to Cheltenham, and thence, after some years of service, to Oxford, from which he went to the sphere of his most active and influential service at Trinity chapel, Brighton. Here his vigorous thought, his warm and generous sympathy, his active efforts, opened a way for him, and gathered a large congregation of hearers. His voice was charming, his action dignified, his manner self-possessed, and though the idea of being a popular preacher was most distasteful to him, he of necessity drew to himself a great body of interested hearers.

In the latter part of his life he somewhat turned away from the evangelical side of the English church. What were the causes of this, we do not know, nor exactly the nature or extent of the change in his opin-

ions. It seems to us rather a functional disturbance, if we may so speak, than involving an organic modification; the result of a dislike of men or measures, or what seemed narrowness, or harshness, or unwisdom, rather than a fundamental rejection of his early faith.

Mr. Robertson was of the most sensitive and delicately organized nature, full of courage and high spirit, one to be easily touched and deeply wounded. With all his physical vigor, he was subjected to most painful attacks of disease; with all his intellectual life and brilliancy, he suffered the deepest mental anguish. The causes of all this are not clearly developed in these volumes. The hints and allusions, which may be clear to an English reader, are dark to an American, so that we hesitate in our judgment.

The most attractive parts of these volumes are the letters where the author reveals his own soul. They are bright, thoughtful, and charming, abounding in good sense and discriminating suggestions. The occasional literary opinions and criticisms in which he indulges, are not their least attraction. These are always fresh and suggestive; often starting our minds on a new train of thought, or leading to a perception of new beauties.

In his later years Mr. Robertson was vexed and pained by opposition where he did not expect it, and distrust from those who once were friendly, but this did not disturb the deep interest with which we follow the earnest and beautiful, though incomplete and sad life, of one whom we cannot help loving. With all his fine genius, and penetrating insight, and sincerity, and high purpose, he seems to us to have been, during his late life, in that transition state through which minds of similar delicate nervous organization are sometimes made to pass before settling upon an immovable foundation. With more years and greater quiet, we should have looked for a return to his early faith, if he ever really essentially swerved from it, and a more serene and assured confidence. But perhaps so intense a life could not last long. He died on the 15th of August, 1853, at the early age of thirty-seven. S. G. B.

A History of New England, from the Discovery by Europeans to the Revolution of the Seventeenth Century. By JOHN GORHAM PALFREY. 2 vols. Hurd and Houghton: New York. 1866. pp. 408. 426. Dr. Palfrey's larger work, in three volumes, entitled *History of New England during the Stuart Dynasty*, is here compressed into two, making an admirable manual of the history of the ancestors of about one-third part of the present white population of the United States, chiefly the descendants of the 21,000 Puritan Englishmen who came to this country before the Long Parliament of 1640. They form the most homogeneous and enterprising part of the whole population, and their influence has determined, more than that of any other portion, the general character and fortunes of the country. The New England history is divided by Dr. Palfrey into three periods of 85 years each, the 19th of April curiously giving the incident on which the division is made in 1689, 1775, and 1861. The present volumes are devoted to the first period.

Dr. Palfrey writes in the true spirit of a New Englander, yet with candor and justice. He defends the Puritans, but with a wise reserve on some points. Though not himself in sympathy with many of their ecclesiastical and theological views, he manifestly aims at impartiality. And he has produced a work, far superior to any of the popular accounts we have hitherto had. Much of the coloring of the old times is faithfully reproduced: and the social, as well as the political and ecclesiastical char-

acteristics of the primitive New England Puritans, are well delineated. The volumes are brought out by the publishers in an attractive and substantial style.

Lectures on the History of the Jewish Church. Part II. From Samuel to the Captivity. By ARTHUR PENRHYN STANLEY, D. D., Dean of Westminster. New York: Scribner and Co. 1866. pp. 656. This continuation of Dean Stanley's Lectures on the history of the old dispensation, is fully equal in the absorbing interest of the narrative to the previous volume. The mode of treatment is not that of a dry record of historic events, but rather an animated picture of historic scenes and of the actors in them. And Israel under its Kings is a worthy subject for a great historic artist. In all that concerns the external characteristics of the scenes, Dr. Stanley is entirely at home. The human motives and aspects of the events are brought out in bold and full relief. The divine element is not made as prominent as it is in the Biblical narrative. The divine interposition is not denied: miracles are allowed: but still the supernatural element is kept in the back-ground.

The critical student of this History will often find himself at a loss, as to the precise opinion entertained by the author, on many of the most difficult and debated points. He wavers as to the authority to be ascribed to the sacred text. It has manifestly with him about the same position with the annals and traditions of other nations, and not a special value as an inspired record. Dean Stanley makes as free use, for example, of the Septuagint where it differs from the Hebrew, as of the Hebrew original itself, and he is content with vague views where criticism demands greater definiteness. As a critical work his history cannot be compared with Ewald. But it is a picturesque and even brilliant narrative of the course of events in a form adapted to a deep popular impression.

History of England from the Fall of Wolsey to the Death of Elizabeth. By JAMES ANTHONY FROUDE, M. A. Vols. V. VI. New York: Scribner & Co. 1866. These two volumes continue Mr. Froude's noble history from 1547 to 1559, from the death of Henry VIII. to the death of Mary. They exhibit in a striking way the same characteristics which we have noticed in giving an account of the previous volume; the same fullnes of facts; a like impartiality in construing the facts; the same easy and continuous flow of the narrative. Mr. Froude's work is in almost every point of view a real addition to the history of England, in the most important period of that history—in its transition to those institutions which have made Great Britain so truly great and powerful. We intend to recur to these and the other volumes, giving a fuller account and estimate of them, when the reprint of the work shall be completed. Mr. Scribner deserves all encouragement in bringing such a beautiful edition within the reach of American scholars.

Life of Benjamin Silliman, M. D., LL. D., late Professor of Chemistry, Geology and Mineralogy in Yale College, Founder and Editor of the American Journal of Science and Arts, etc. By GEORGE P. FISHER, Professor in Yale College. 2 vols., crown 8vo. With fine Portrait and other illustrations. New York: C. Scribner & Co. 1866. This is the biography of no ordinary man and is full of interest and instruction. It is especially valuable as containing a full history of his labors in connection with the College with which his name is identified for more than half a century. Besides this historical narrative the volumes are ex-

ceedingly rich in reminiscences of distinguished personages, with whom Professor Silliman had personal intercourse or maintained correspondence. His letters to and especially from his many correspondents, among which were Chancellor Kent, Fenimore Cooper, Carl Ritter, Humboldt, Agassiz, Lyell, Murchison, Herschel, Mantell, and others equally celebrated, form a very remarkable and deeply interesting feature of the work. Prof. Fisher has discharged the delicate task assigned him for the most part with judgment, drawing the materials, and generally the language of the Memoir, from the reminiscences, diaries and correspondence prepared to his hand.

The Women of Methodism: Its Three Foundresses. By Abel Stevens, LL. D. New York: Carlton and Porter. 1866. The sketches here given of Susanna Wesley, the Countess of Huntington, and Barbara Heck, with brief notices of their female associates and successors in the early history of the denomination, are exceedingly interesting. Prepared at the request of the "American Methodist Ladies' Association," and denominational of course in its character, the book is still highly instructive to the general reader.

Dr. Stevens, who is thoroughly informed on this subject, briefly traces the influence of the Methodistic movement on the Nonconformity of England, and shows the active and commanding genius of woman in its accomplishment. Wesleyan Methodism was virtually founded by Susanna Wesley, the mother of Charles and Samuel; Calvinistic Methodism, by the Countess of Huntington, in co-operation with Whitefield; while to Barbara Heck belongs the honor of initiating the unparalleled career of American Methodism. The remarkable character of these women has been influential in the world for good to an extraordinary degree.

The Missionary Jubilee; an Account of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the American Baptist Missionary Union, May, 1864. With Commemorative Papers and Discourses. New York: Sheldon and Co. 1865. pp. 500. This is a volume of great value, not only as illustrating what the American Baptists have done for Foreign Missions, but also as showing their services in helping build up a manly Christian literature and educational and benevolent institutions in the country. After a full account of the Jubilee services in Philadelphia, we have an excellent discourse of Dr. Caldwell on the Missionary Resources of the Kingdom of Christ; Dr. Stow, on the Early Missionary History; Biographical Sketches, by Drs. Stow and S. F. Smith; a chapter on the Use of the Press in Missions; Missions in Relation to Denominational Growth, by Rev. K. Brooks; Missions in Relation to Denominational Belief and Polity, by Rev. Dr. S. Bailey; Missions in Relation to Educational Institutions, by Rev. Dr. H. J. Ripley; Development of the Benevolent Principle in the Baptist Denomination, by Dr. Babcock; Literature of American Baptists, by Rev. Dr. Wm. Crowell—a full and convenient summary, not elsewhere to be found; and other papers. The whole number of missionaries appointed has been 192, and 194 female assistants; of these 102 are deceased. In the Asiatic Missions, 200,382,898 pages of works in different languages have been printed, besides three millions in the Indian Missions. The contributions of the American Baptists for evangelizing purposes for the last fifty years amount to $15,579,220, of which about three millions stand to the account of Foreign Missions. Such an exhibit of faithful Christian work gives high promise for the future. This numerous and powerful body of Christians has a great work before it in this and in other lands.

Temperance Recollections, Labors, Defeats, Triumphs. An Autobiography. By JOHN MARSH, D. D., Secretary of the American Temperance Union. New York: Scribner. 1866. This work of Dr. Marsh is the best and most authentic history of the Temperance Reform in this country that has been published. It is written in a candid and truth-loving spirit. The author is a veteran in the service, and is thoroughly acquainted with his subject. The volume deserves to have a wide circulation. The friends of the cause could not do it a better service than to aid in promoting it.

The Presbyterian Historical Almanac, and Annual Remembrancer of the Church for 1865. By JOSEPH M. WILSON. Vol. VII. Philadelphia: Joseph M. Wilson. 8vo. pp. 407. The character of this "Almanac" is by this time so well known as not to need a description. It is an invaluable compendium of statistics of the whole Presbyterian family, and every pastor, church session, and intelligent Presbyterian ought to possess a copy of it. Mr. Wilson shows a degree of enterprise and industry in the preparation and publishing of this work, which certainly deserves not only commendation but pecuniary remuneration; and this can only be secured by securing a goodly circulation for his annual volume.

PRACTICAL RELIGION.

The Appletons publish another excellent work by Dr. EDWARD M. GOULBURN, entitled *The Idle Word*, (pp. 208,) made up of short essays, originally in the form of sermons, on the gift of speech, and its employment in conversation. Among the topics considered are, the connection of speech with reason, the heavenly analogy of this connection, the definition and characteristics of "idle words," and hints for the guidance of conversation. The tone of the book is thoughtful and devout, and the practical directions are equally free from vagueness and exaggeration.

The Christian's Daily Treasury. By EBENEZER TEMPLE. Boston: Gould and Lincoln. 1866. pp. 432. The call for a second edition of this work is good evidence of the estimation in which it is held. It is made up of texts with brief and pertinent comments for each day of the year. Its use cannot fail to be of great benefit. The sentiments are evangelical.

Battle Echoes; or, Lessons from the War. By GEORGE B. IDE, D. D. Boston: same publishers. 1866. pp. 325. The religious aspects of our late war are brought out in this volume in a series of eloquent and forcible meditations and addresses. A patriotic and Christian spirit pervades and gives tone to the work. These religious lessons of the war we are but just beginning to learn, and they cannot be too impressively set forth.

The Young Lady of Pleasure. American Tract Society: New York. pp. 316. In a series of plain and familiar letters, the evils of a life devoted to the love of pleasure are forcibly depicted; the means are also indicated by which the vicious tendencies of our present social life, especially in the case of young ladies, may be guarded against and overcome. Christian mothers, and fathers, too, should ponder these wise suggestions. The evil aimed against is rapidly growing.

A Hand-Book of Scripture Harmony. New York: A. D. F. Randolph. 1865. pp. 94. This is a convenient and useful manual, containing directions for reading the whole Bible in chronological order. The arrangement of the Old Testament is taken from Dr. Townsend's well known

work; the Harmony of the Gospels is from Dr. Robinson; and the Acts of the Apostles and Paul's Epistles are arranged on the authority of Dean Alford. The whole Bible, too, is divided into subjects.

Hymns for the Sick Room. New York: Randolph. 1866. pp. 130. The selections of hymns in this volume are very appropriate for all the exigencies of the sick room. It is a collection of hymns, and not of poems, and it will be found a source of comfort and strength to all who are in sorrow. Texts of Scripture, meditations and prayers are interspersed. Like all of Mr. Randolph's works, this is issued in an attractive style.

The American Sunday School Union has published two excellent works, brought out in good style: *Children's Party; a Day at Uplands*—a series of short tales and poems for children; and *Isa Graeme's World*, pp. 360, founded on fact. The latter story is exceedingly well told, and breathes throughout a healthful and elevated religious spirit. Such books cannot fail of doing good to a large circle of readers.

The Presbyterian Publication Committee have added some valuable works to their growing list, among which we note the *Social Hymn Book*, being identical with "The Social Hymn and Tune Book," which has become deservedly popular, (the tunes omitted) to adapt it to the lecture-room, prayer meeting and family. *Dutch Tiles*, or Loving Words about the Saviour. By Emma S. Baburk. *What to do.* By E. L. Llewellyn. *Niff and his Dogs.* And *Black Steve*, or the Strange Warning. By Martha Farquharson. The latter a strange and harrowing story of crime and hypocrisy; the others interesting Sunday-school Books. "What to do" will especially interest the young folks.

Sure Words of Promise; the Soul-Gatherer; The Cross of Jesus; by Rev. Daniel Thompson; and *Plain Words*, by Charles John Vaughan, D. D. These four neat and tasty volumes (Carlton and Porter) are all on subjects of deep and general interest. Practical in cast, thoroughly evangelical in spirit, earnest and often vigorous in expression, they are books which the Christian may feed upon, and which all classes may read with profit. They are printed on tinted paper, uniform in size and binding, and would be a valuable addition to any Sunday-school library.

Six Months among the Charities of Europe. By John De Liefde. 2 vols. Alexander Strahan: London and New York. 1865. This celebrated English house has established a branch in this city, which brings its numerous publications directly to the notice and within the reach of the American public. The present work is an unpretending yet deeply interesting account of the rise, progress, and glorious results of the leading institutions of Germany, which are engaged in the work of Home Missions. The author spent six months in personally inspecting and acquainting himself with the history of twenty-six of these, and in reference to fifteen of them he gives us the benefit of his labors. He writes not in the spirit of criticism, but in full sympathy with the agencies and actors of whom he writes. The Institutions described are: The Deaconess House, at Kaiserwerth; Father Zeller's School, at Beuggen; The Deacon House, at Duisburg; The Asylum for Discharged Prisoners and Neglected Men, at Lintorf; The Establishment for Indigent Children, at Newhof; The Asylum for Poor Children, at Disselthat, and at Neukirchen; The Orphan House, at Lahr-Dinglingen; Pastor Heldring and his Establishments, near Hemmen; Agricultural Colony, at Rijssett; The Blind School, at Ilizarh; The Agricultural Colony, at Sainte Foy; Establishment of M. Bost, at Laforce; and The Deaconess Institution, in

Paris. The history of some of these, as here simply related, brings out the power of faith and prayer, and the efficiency of individual effort when nobly directed, in a most wonderful manner. This Inner Mission work has been of inestimable worth to the States of Germany during the last fifty years, the first great necessity for which was made painfully manifest by the wars of Napoleon, filling the land with widows and orphan children: it has done much to counteract the spirit of Rationalism and to revive the Evangelical faith and life there.

GENERAL LITERATURE.

Social Life of the Chinese. By Rev. Justus Doolittle. With one hundred and fifty engravings. 2 vols. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1866. The author of this valuable work on China spent fourteen years, as a missionary, at Fuhchau, in the service of the American Board. He has therefore enjoyed the best of opportunities to acquaint himself with the inner life of this peculiar people; and we hesitate not to say that since the appearance of Williams' Middle Kingdom," no work on China equals this in the amount of exact and reliable information which it gives as to the customs, opinions, social life, and religious belief and practices of this singular people. A large part of the contents of these volumes originally appeared, in 1861–4, in the *Chinal Mail*, a newspaper published at Hong Kong. On his return to this country, Mr. D. was strongly urged by many of the most intelligent residents of China (English and American) to republish them in this country. The only regret is that the author could not have found the time to subject them to a more thorough and careful revision, and a systematic arrangement, which would have greatly added to the interest and value of the mass of facts which are here gathered up. But even in its present state, the work is a highly important contribution to a better understanding of that ancient, anomalous and little understood nation. The numerous illustrations, chiefly derived from photographic views, and from pen and ink sketches drawn by Chinese artists, are not the least novel and interesting feature of the work.

Thirty Years of Army Life on the Border. By Col. R. B. Marcy. New York: Harpers. 1866. pp. 452. This volume is handsomely got up, and fully illustrated, and contains vigorous and attractive accounts of Indian life upon the western plains; a trip across the Rocky Mountains in winter; descriptions of rare plants and animals; striking incidents from the lives of officers and army men and frontier men. It is a very interesting volume.

Shakspeare's Delineations of Insanity, Imbecility and Suicide. By A. O. Kellogg, M. D. New York: Hurd and Houghton. 1866. pp. 204. Dr. Kellogg's experience as physician in the State Lunatic Asylum, Utica, N. Y., is turned to good account in this valuable criticism of Shakspeare. It illustrates by ample citations the great dramatist's acquaintance with the abnormal mental states; and shows that treatment of these diseases which is confirmed by modern science.

Esperance. By Meta Lander. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1866. pp. 336. The author of this novel is favorably known by her previous works, "Marion Graham," etc. The aim of Esperance is to show how a true religious faith can be maintained under the most trying temptations, and to illustrate its influence over even the most abandoned. The author shows, especially in the more simple scenes and characters, de-

cided talent in her descriptions and delineations. In depicting the seductions and wickedness of fashionable life, she is not perhaps as happy or as instructive. There is considerable inequality in the merit of different parts of the volume. Esperance maintains a marked individuality. A sufficient variety of incidents and situations engages the interest of the reader throughout the course of the narrative.

A Noble Life. By the author of John Halifax, Gentleman. Harpers.

Half a Million a Year. By Amelia B. Edwards. Harpers.

Both these novels are by highly popular authors, and are sure to command numerous readers. The former, by Miss Mulock, (henceforth to be known as Mrs. Craik,) is a story of very great interest. The lesson it inculcates is one of great moment, and her way of teaching it is happy and effective. Sir Guy is a character as rare as it is noble—living solely for others—rising above the disabilities and infirmities of his nature, and devoting time, wealth and position to doing good in a modest and unostentatious way. Would there were more such noble lives!

Miss Edward's new work, while not equal to her "Barbara's History," is one of decided merit. The tone of both is unexceptionable.

The Maiden and Married Life of Mary Powell, afterwards Mistress Milton. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1856. pp. 271. Those who know this charming volume will welcome it in this beautiful reprint; those who do not, ought to make haste to read it. It is a gem of a book.

The True History of a Little Ragamuffin. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1866. A striking novel, made up of scenes in that class of society which is attracting increased attention from the philanthropic.

Gilbert Rugge. A Novel. Ay the author of "A First Friendship." New York: Harpers. 1866. An interesting tale.

Citoyenne Jacqueline; a Woman's Lot in the Great French Revolution. By Sarah Tytler. London and New York: Alexander Strahan. 1865. pp. 499. This is a charming tale of life in France, giving minute and characteristic descriptions of local and domestic scenes and relations; and heightened to a tragic interest by the fortunes of the leading characters in the midst of the horrors and crimes of the French Revolution. It is a deeply interesting volume.

Walter Goring. A Story. By Annie Thomas, author of "Dennis Donne," "On Guard," etc. Harper's Library of Select Novels. No. 265. The novels of Annie Thomas are attracting considerable attention. The plot of this one runs in the ways of love and intrigue, without any very strict regard to either conventional or moral rules.

The Toilers of the Sea. A Novel. By Victor Hugo. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1866. Fertility of invention, startling combinations, a rapid movement of the plot, and vivid descriptions, characterize all of Victor Hugo's romances; and this last one gives ample evidence that his genius is not flagging. It is marked, too, by the humanitarian tendencies that run through all his writings.

American Presbyterian and Theological Review.

NUMBER XVI.

CONTENTS OF THE OCTOBER NUMBER, 1866.

Page

ART. I. THE DIFFERENT SPECIES OF SERMONS, AND THE CHOICE OF A TEXT..... 515
By WILLIAM G. T. SHEDD, D. D., Professor in Union Theological Seminary.

II. JESUS CHRIST AND CRIMINAL LAW..... 537
By REV. E. BALLANTINE, Prof. in Lane Theological Seminary.

III. THE SANDWICH ISLANDS MISSION AND ITS CALUMNIATORS..... 550
By JOSEPH TRACY, D. D., Boston, Mass.

IV. THE ATHANASIAN CREED..... 584
By PHILIP SCHAFF, D. D., New York.

V. THE POLITICAL CRISIS..... 625
By GEORGE L. PRENTISS, D. D., New York.

VI. DIVINE REVELATION..... 646
Translated from the German of Dr. Rothe, by J. W. NEVIN, D. D., Lancaster, Pa.

VII. THEOLOGICAL AND LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.... 660
Germany..... 660
France..... 664
Holland and Belgium..... 666
Italy..... 666
Scandinavia..... 667
Switzerland..... 668
England..... 669
United States of America..... 670
Mexico and South America..... 671

CONTENTS OF OCTOBER NUMBER (CONTINUED).

		Page
Art. VIII.	NOTES ON RECENT BOOKS	671
	Dr. Robinson's Bible Expositions	671
	History of Julius Cæsar	672
	Home without Hands	672

EDITORIAL NOTE.

We regret that the unexpected length of some of the articles in this number, compels us to defer to the January number a large number of Book Notices, and the *Index and Title-Page* to the current volume. *These will be sent to all our subscribers in the January number of* 1867.

BUSINESS NOTICES.

We send bills in the present number to our subscribers who are still in arrears—some for *several years*. A *prompt* remittance is respectfully solicited.

1867.

The next number will begin a new volume, and will be issued on the 1st. of January. Hereafter the paper and press-work of the Review will be greatly improved. The price will remain $3, *to all who pay for the next year before the 1st. of January.*

Wanted.—The January number for 1865, for which $1 will be paid.

FOR SALE.

We have still one set complete of the American Theological Review, 1859–1866, substantially bound, price $26; and one of The Presbyterian Quarterly, 1852–1866, price $45.

Address J. M. SHERWOOD, Box 1383, or W. SHERWOOD, 654 Broadway, New York.

PUBLISHER.

New York, Oct. 1, 1866.

THE

AMERICAN PRESBYTERIAN AND THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

NEW SERIES. No. XVI.—OCTOBER, 1866.

Art. I.—THE DIFFERENT SPECIES OF SERMONS, AND THE CHOICE OF A TEXT.

By William G. T. Shedd, D. D., Professor in Union Theological Seminary.

In classifying sermons, it is well to follow the example of the scientific man, and employ as generic distinctions as possible. It is never desirable to distinguish a great many particulars, and elevate them into an undue prominence by converting them into generals. That classification, therefore, which would regard the "applicatory" sermon, the "observational" sermon, and such like, as distinct classes, only contributes to the confusion and embarrassment of the inquirer. The three most generic species of sermons, are the *topical*, the *textual*, and the *expository*.

The Topical Sermon is one in which there is but a single leading idea. This idea sometimes finds a formal expression in a proposition, and sometimes it pervades the discourse as a whole, without being distinctly pre-announced. Topical sermons are occupied with one definite subject or topic, which can be accurately and fully stated in a brief title. South preaches a discourse of this kind from Numbers, xxxii. 23:

"Be sure your sin will find you out." The proposition of the sermon is this: "Concealment of sin is no security to the sinner." The leading idea of the discourse is, the *concealment* of sin; and the particular idea in the hearer to which this idea in the sermon is referred is, the idea of *happiness*.* The concealment of sin is incompatible with the soul's peace and enjoyment; and the positions by which the idea or proposition of the sermon is led back to this fundamental idea in the moral condition of the hearer are these: 1. The sinner's very confidence of secresy is the cause of his detection. 2. There is sometimes a providential concurrence of unexpected events which leads to his detection. 3. One sin is sometimes the means of discovering another. 4. The sinner may unwittingly discover himself through frenzy and distraction. 5. The sinner may be forced to discover himself by his own conscience. 6. The sinner may be suddenly smitten by some notable judgment that discloses his guilt, or, 7. His guilt will follow him into another world, if he should chance to escape in this.

The topical sermon is more properly an oration than either of the other species. It is occupied with a single definite theme that can be completely enunciated in a brief proposition. All of its parts are subservient to the theoretical establishment of but one idea or proposition in the mind of the hearer, and to the practical realization of it in his conduct. In the case of the textual sermon, as we shall see when we come to examine it, there is less certainty of unity in the subject, and consequently less in the structure of the discourse. And the expository sermon partakes still less of the characteristics of oratory and eloquence.

Inasmuch as the topical sermon approaches nearest to the unity, and symmetry, and conveyance to a single point, of the oration proper, it is the model species for the preacher. By this is meant that the sermon, ideally, should contain one leading thought, rather than several. It should be the embodiment of a single proposition, rather than a collection of sev-

* Theremin: Rhetoric. pp. 72–75.

eral propositions. It should announce but one single doctrine in its isolation and independence, instead of exhibiting several doctrines in their interconnection and mutual dependence. The sermon should preserve an oratorical character. It should never allow the philosophical or the poetical element to predominate over the rhetorical. The sermon should be eloquence and not poetry or philosophy. It should be a discourse that exhibits singleness of aim, and a converging progress towards an outward practical end.

It is for this reason, therefore, that we lay down the position, that the topical sermon is the model species for the sermonizer. If he constructs a textual sermon, he should endeavor to render it as topical as is possible.* He should aim to pervade it with but one leading idea, to embody in it but one doctrine, and to make it teach but one lesson. In constructing an expository sermon, also, the preacher should make the same endeavor ; and although he must in this instance be less successful, he may facilitate his aim, by selecting for exposition only such a passage of Scripture as has but one general drift, and conveys but one general sentiment.

The importance of this maxim may be best seen, by considering the fact, that sermons are more defective in respect to unity of structure, and a constant progress towards a single end, than in any other respect. But these are strictly oratorical qualities, and can be secured only by attending to the nature and laws of eloquence,—to the rhetorical as distinguished from the philosophical presentation of truth. Too many sermons contain matter enough for two or three orations, and consequently are not themselves orations. This is true of the elder English sermonizers, in whom the matter is generally superior to the form. Take the following plan of a sermon of South (in oratorical respects, the best of the earlier English

* This is not to be attained by making the plan a mixture of topical and textual,—by stating a proposition, and following with a purely textual division. The plan should be textual, but the style and movement of the discourse should be distinguished, so far as possible, by unity, simplicity, and progressiveness, —that is, by oratorical or topical qualities.

preachers) on Jer. vi. 15: "Were they ashamed when they had committed abomination? Nay, they were not at all ashamed, neither could they blush: therefore they shall fall among them that fall: at the time that I visit them they shall be cast down, saith the Lord." It is a topical discourse. The theme or proposition is: "Shamelessness in sin is the certain forerunner of destruction." The sermon contains sixteen pages, of which only four and a half are filled with matter that, upon strictly rhetorical principles, goes to establish the proposition. The first three quarters of the sermon are occupied with an analysis of the *nature* of "shamelessness in sin." The discourse is shaped too disproportionately by the category of truth,—a category that is subordinate, and should not be allowed so much influence in the structure and moulding of an oration.* The consequence is, that this sermon possesses far less of that oratorical fire and force so generally characteristic of South. It is not throughout pervaded by its own fundamental proposition. It does not gather momentum as it proceeds. There is no greater energy of style and diction at the end than at the beginning. It is clear; it is instructive; it has many and great excellencies; but it lacks the excellence of being a true oration,—a rounded and symmetrical discourse, pervaded by one idea, breathing but one spirit, rushing forward with a uniformly accelerating motion, and ending with an overpowering impression and influence upon the will. This discourse would be more truly topical, and thus more truly oratorical, if the proportions had been just the reverse of what they now are; if but one fourth of it had been moulded by the metaphysical category of truth, and the remaining three-fourths by the practical idea of happiness; if the discussion of the nature of shamelessness in sin had filled four pages, and the *reasons why* it brings down destruction, or unhappiness, upon the sinner, had filled the remaining twelve.

The Textual Sermon is one in which the passage of Scrip-

* THEREMIN: Rhetoric, Book I. Chap. X.

ture is broken up, and either its leading words or its leading clauses become the heads of the discourse. For example, Rom. xiv. 12: "So then every one of us shall give an account of himself to God." might be the foundation of a discourse upon human accountability. The divisions are formed by emphasizing the leading words, and thereby converting them into the divisions of the sermons as follows: 1. An *account* is to be rendered. 2. This account is to be rendered to *God*. 3. *Every one* is to render this account,—mankind generally. 4. Every one of *us* is to render this account,—men as individuals. 5. Every one of us is to render an account of *himself*.

It is not necessary that the words of the text should be employed, as in the example given above. The substance of the separate clauses may be made the divisions, and the sermon still be textual. Barrows has a sermon founded on Eph. v. 20: "Giving thanks always for all things unto God." The plan is as follows: 1. The duty itself,—giving thanks. 2. The object to whom thanks are to be directed,—to God. 3. The time of performing the duty,—always. 4. The matter and extent of the duty,—for all things.

What are sometimes termed "observational" sermons, are also textual. The following taken from a plan of a sermon by Beddome upon Acts ix. 4: "Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me," will illustrate this. The observations upon this text are suggested either by the text as a whole, or by some of its parts. 1. It is the general character of unconverted men to be of a persecuting spirit. This character is suggested by the text as a whole. 2. Christ has his eye upon persecutors. This observation is also suggested by the text as a whole. 3. The injury done to Christ's people, Christ considers as done to himself. This observation is suggested by a part of the text,—by an emphasized word in it, "why persecutest thou *me*." 4. The calls of Christ are particular. This observation is suggested by a part of the text,—"*Saul, Saul*."

There are two things requisite to the production of a good textual sermon, viz: a significant text, and a talent to discover its significance. The text must contain distinct and

emphatic conceptions to serve as the parts of the division. In the text given above, Rom. xiv. 12, "So then every one of us shall give an account of himself to God," there are these distinct and emphatic ideas: (*a*) An account. (*b*) A Judge. (*c*) Humanity generally. (*d*) The individual in particular. (*e*) Personal confession. These fertile conceptions are full of matter, and the skill of the sermonizer is seen in the thoroughness and brevity with which he exhausts them and their contents. Upon the number, variety, and richness of such distinct and emphatic ideas in a text depends its fitness for textual discourse.

Again, the text, in case it does not contain a number of such conceptions, needs contain a number of distinct positions, or affirmations, to serve as parts of the division. There may be no single conceptions in a text suitable to constitute the plan of a sermon, while there are several statements in it, direct or implied. Take, for example, Ps. xc. 10: "The days of our years are threescore years and ten: and if by reason of strength they be fourscore years, yet is their strength labor and sorrow: for it is soon cut off, and we fly away." The single conceptions in this text are not weighty enough to constitute heads in a discourse, but the affirmations, the positions, the statements implied in it, are. This text, treated in this way, would furnish the following divisions of a textual sermon; 1. Human life, however lengthened out, must come to an end. 2. Human life, at longest, is very short. 3. That which is added to the ordinary duration of human life is, after all, but little to be desired.

The second requisite in order to the production of a good textual sermon is a talent to detect these emphatic conceptions, or these direct or indirect positions in a passage of Scripture. A preacher destitute of this talent will pass by many texts that really are full of the materials of textual sermonizing. He has no eye to discover the rich veins that lie concealed just under the dull and uninteresting surface. If a text is so plain that he needs only to call out the leading words,—if the formation of the plan is merely a *verbalizing*

process,—he can, perhaps, succeed in constructing a textual discourse that will probably be common-place, because its structure is so very evident and easy. But the number of such texts is small, and the range of such a sermonizer must be narrow. A tact is needed in the preacher to discover the hidden skeleton. This tact will be acquired gradually, and surely, by every one who carefully cultivates himself in all homiletic respects. Like all nice discernment, it comes imperceptibly in the course of training and discipline, and therefore no single and particular rule for its acquisition can be laid down. It must be acquired, however, or the fundamental talent for textual sermonizing will be wanting. Moreover, this tact should be judicious. It is possible to find more meaning in a text than it really contains. The Rabbinic notion, that mountains of sense are contained in every letter of the inspired volume, may be adopted to such an extent, at least, as to lead the preacher into a fanciful method that is destructive of all impressive and effective discourse. This talent for detecting the significance of Scripture must be confined to the gist of it,—to the evident and complete substance of it.

The Expository Sermon, as its name indicates, is an explanatory discourse. The purpose of it is, to unfold the meaning of a connected paragraph or section of Scripture, in a more detailed manner than is consistent with the structure, of either the topical or the textual sermon. Some writers upon Homiletics would deny it a place among sermons, and contend that it cannot legitimately contain enough of the oratorical structure and character to justify its being employed for purposes of persuasion. They affirm that the expository discourse is purely and entirely dialectic, and can no more be classified with the connected and symmetrical productions of oratory and eloquence, than the commentary or the paraphrase can be.

But while it is undoubtedly true that the expository sermon is the farthest removed from the oration, both in its structure and in its movement, it is not necessary that it should be as

totally unoratorical as a piece of commentary, or a paraphrase. An expository discourse should have a logical structure, and be pervaded by a leading sentiment, as really as a topical sermon. And it ought to be certainly free from the dilution of a mere paraphrase. It should have a beginning, middle, and end, and thus be more than a piece of commentary. In short, we lay down the same rule in relation to the expository sermon that we did in relation to the textual: viz, that it be assimilated to the topical model as closely as the nature of the species permits. But in order to this assimilation, it is necessary to select for exposition, a passage, or paragraph of Scripture that is somewhat complete in itself. The distinction between expository preaching and commentary, originates in the selection, in the former instance, of a rounded and self-included portion of inspiration, as the foundation of discourse, while in the latter instance, the mind is allowed to run on indefinitely, to the conclusion of the book or the epistle. The excellence of an expository sermon, consequently, depends primarily upon the choice of such a portion of Scripture as will not lead the preacher on and on, without allowing him to arrive at a proper termination. Unless a passage is taken that finally comes round in a full circle, containing one leading sentiment, and teaching one grand lesson,—like a parable of our Lord,—the expository sermon must either be commentary or paraphrase. And if it be either of these, it cannot be classed among sermons, because the utmost it can accomplish is information. Persuasion, the proper function and distinguishing characteristic of eloquence, forms no part of its effects upon an audience.

Even when a suitable passage has been selected the sermonizer will need to employ his strongest logical talents, and his best rhetorical ability, to impart sufficiently of the oratorical form and spirit to the expository sermon. He will need to watch his mind, and his plan, with great care, lest the discourse overflow its banks, and spread out in all directions, losing the current, and the deep strong volume of eloquence. This species of sermonizing is very liable to have a dilution of

divine truth, instead of an exposition. Perhaps, among modern preachers, Chalmers exhibits the best example of the expository sermon. The oratorical structure and spirit of his mind enabled him to create a current in almost every species of discourse which he undertook, and through his Lectures on Romans we find a strong unifying stream of eloquence constantly setting in, with an increasing and surging force, from the beginning to the end. The expository preaching of this distinguished sacred orator is well worth studying in the respect of which we are speaking.

Having thus briefly sketched characteristics of the three species of sermons, the question naturally arises: To what extent is each to be employed by the preacher?

The first general answer to this question is, that *all* the species should be employed by every sermonizer without exception. No matter what the turn or temper of his mind may be, he should build upon each and every one of these patterns. If he is highly oratorical in his heart and spirit, let him by no means neglect the expository sermon. If his mental temperament is phlegmatic, and his mental processes naturally cool and unimpassioned, let him by no means neglect the topical sermon.

It is too generally the case, that the preacher follows his tendency, and preaches uniformly one kind of sermons. A more severe dealing with his own powers, and a wiser regard for the wants of his audience, would lead to more variety in sermonizing. At times, the mind of the congregation needs the more stirring and impressive influence of a topical discourse, to urge it up to action. At others, it needs the instruction and indoctrination of the less rhetorical, and more didactic expositions of Scripture.

And this leads to the further remark, as a definite reply to the question above raised, that the preacher should employ all three of the species, in the order in which they have been discussed.

Speaking generally, it is safe to say that the plurality of

sermons should be topical,—pervaded by a single idea, or containing a single proposition, and converging by a constant progress to a single point. For this is the model species as we have seen. The textual and the expository sermon must be as closely assimilated to this species as is possible, by being founded upon a single portion of Scripture that is complete in itself, and by teaching one general lesson.

Moreover, textual and expository sermons will not be likely to possess this oratorical structure, and to breathe this eloquent spirit, unless the preacher is in the habit of constructing proper orations,—unless he understands the essential distinctions between eloquence and philosophy,—unless he feels the difference, and makes his audience feel the difference, between the sacred essay and the sacred oration.

Next in order, follows the textual sermon; and this species is next in value for the purposes of persuasion. Easy and natural in its structure,—its parts being either the repetition of Scripture phraseology, or else suggestions from it,—the textual sermon should be frequently employed by the preacher.

And, lastly, the expository sermon should be occasionally employed. There is somewhat less call for this variety, than there was before the establisement of Sabbath-schools and Bible-classes. Were it not that these have taken the exposition of Scripture into their own charge, one very considerable part of the modern preacher's duty—as it was of the Christian Fathers and the Reformers—would be to expound the Bible. Under the present arrangement of the Christian Church, however, the ministry is relieved from this duty to a considerable extent. But it is not wholly relieved from it. It is the duty of the preacher occasionally to lay out his best strength in the production of an elaborate expository sermon—which shall not only do the ordinary work of a sermon, which shall not only instruct, awaken and move, but which shall also serve as a sort of guide and model for the teacher of the Sabbath-school and the Bible-class. Such sermonizing becomes an aid to the instructor in getting at the substance of the Scripture, and in bringing it out before the

minds of the young. Probably the preacher can take no course so well adapted to raise the standard of Sabbath-school and Bible-class instruction in his congregation, as by occasionally delivering a well-constructed and carefully elaborated expository discourse.

By employing, in this manner, all three of the species, in their relation and proper proportions, the preacher will accomplish more for his people, and for his own mind, than by confining himself to one species only. As the years of his minority roll on, he will bring the whole Bible into contact with the hearts and consciences of his audience. Divine revelation will, in this way, become all that it is capable of becoming for the mind of man, because all its elements will be wrought into the mass of society. The preacher himself will perform all his functions, and not a portion only. He will instruct and awaken, he will indoctrinate and enkindle, he will inform and move, he will rebuke, reprove and exhort. In short, he will in this way minister to the greatest variety of wants, and build up the greatest variety and breadth of Christian character in the church.

After this analysis of the different varieties of sermons, we pass, next, to the consideration of their foundation. A sermon is built upon a passage of Scripture, which is denominated a *text*. This term is derived from the Latin *tex tum*, which signifies woven. The text, therefore, etymologically denotes, either a portion of inspiration that is woven into the whole web of holy writ, and which, therefore, must be interpreted in its connection and relations, or else a portion of inspiration that is woven into the whole fabric of the sermon. We need not confine ourselves to either meaning exclusively, but may combine both significations. A text, then, is a passage of inspiration which is woven primarily into the web of Holy Writ, and secondarily into the web of a discourse. By uniting both of the etymological meanings of the word, we are led to observe the two great facts, that the subject of a sermon is an organic part of Scripture, and therefore should not

be torn away alive and bleeding from the body of which it is a vital part; and, secondly, that the subject or text of a sermon should pervade the whole structure which it serves to originate and organize. If this definition of the text be kept in mind, and practically acted upon, it will prevent the sermonizer from treating it out of its connection with the context and the general tenor of revelation, and will lead him to regard it as the formative principle and power of his sermon, and to make it such. The text, then, will not be tortured to teach a doctrine contrary to the general teachings of inspiration, and it will be something more than a motto for a series of observations drawn from a merely human source, the preacher's own mind.

The custom of founding religious discourse upon a text has pervaded ever since there has been a body of inspiration from which to take a text. In the patriarchal age religious teachers spoke as they were moved by the Holy Ghost, without a passage from the canon of inspiration, because the canon was not yet formed. Noah was a "*preacher of righteousness*," and probably reasoned of righteousness, temperance, and judgment to come, much as Paul did before Felix, without any formal proposition derived from a body of Holy Writ. As early as the time of Ezra, however, we find the Sacred Canon, which during the captivity had fallen into neglect, made the basis of religious instruction. Ezra, accompanied by Levites, in a public congregation "read in the law of God distinctly, and gave the sense, and caused them to understand the reading."* Our Saviour, as his custom was (conforming undoubtedly to the general Jewish custom), went into the synagogue on the Sabbath day, and "stood up for to read" the Old Testament. He selected the first and part of the second verse of the sixty-first chapter of Isaiah for his text, and preached a sermon upon it, which fastened the eyes of every man in the synagogue upon him in the very beginning, and which, notwithstanding its gracious words, finally developed their

* Nehemiah viii. 6–8.

latent malignity, filled them with wrath, so that they led him to the brow of the precipice on which their city was built, that they might cast him down headlong,* The apostles also frequently discoursed from passages of Scripture. Peter, soon after the return of the disciples from the Mount of Ascension, preached a discourse from Psalm lxix. 25, the object of which was to induce the Church to choose an apostle in the place of Judas.† And again, on the day of Pentecost, this same apostle preached a discourse founded upon Joel ii. 28–32, which was instrumental in the conversion of three thousand souls.‡ Sometimes, again, the discourse, instead of being more properly homiletic, was an abstract of sacred history. The discourse of Stephen, when arraigned before the high priest, was of this kind.§ The dense and mighty discourse of Paul on Mars Hill, if examined, will be found to be made up, in no small degree, of statements and phrases that imply a thorough acquaintance with the Old Testament. They are all fused and amalgamated, it is true, with the thoughts that came fresh and new from Paul's own inspiration, and yet they are part and particle of the earlier inspiration under the Jewish economy.

The homilies of the early Christian Church, in the post-apostolic age, were imitations of these discourses in the Jewish Synagogue, and of these sermons of the apostles. They became more elaborate and rhetorical, in proportion, as audiences became more cultivated; and, on the other hand, they became less exultant, both in matter and in form, in proportion as the church became ignorant and superstitious. But during all the changes which the sermon underwent, it continued to be founded upon a passage of Scripture, and to contain more or less of Scripture matter and phraseology. Melancthon does indeed mention, as one of the inconsistencies and prodigious errors of Popery, that the Ethics of Aristotle were read in church, and that texts were taken from his writings. Still, as

---

* Luke iv. 16–28.
† Acts i. 15, sq.
‡ Acts ii. 14–36.
§ Acts vii. 2–53.

a general thing, the ministry, whether scriptural or unscriptural in its character, has in all ages since there has been a collected Sacred Canon, gone to it for the foundation of its public discourse. That, at this time, there is less likelihood than ever before of this custom becoming antiquated, is one of the strongest grounds for believing that Christianity is to prevail throughout the earth. We have now the strongest reason for believing that to the end of time, wherever there shall be the sermon, there will be the Bible; and that wherever there shall be homiletic discourse, there will be a scriptural basis for it.

The following reasons may be assigned for selecting a passage of Scripture as the foundation of the sermon:

1. The selection puts honor upon Revelation. It is a tacit and very impressive acknowledgment that the Scriptures are the great source of religious knowledge. Every sermon that is preached, throughout Christendom, in its very beginning, and also through its whole structure, points significantly to the Divine Revelation, and in this way its paramount authority over all other literature is affirmed. No sermonizer could now take his text from a human production, even though it should contain the very substance, and breathe the very spirit of the Bible, without shocking the taste, and the religious sensibilities of his audience. This fact shows that the practice of which we are speaking, fosters reverence for the Word of God, and that it is consequently a good one. 2. The practice of selecting a text results in the extended exposition of the Scriptures to the general mind. Sermonizing, while it is truly oratorical, in this way becomes truly expository. The sermon is a regularly constructed discourse, and yet, when it is founded upon a text, and is pervaded by it, it contains more or less of commentary. In this way the general mind is made acquainted with the contents of Revelation. 3. The sermon, when based upon a text, is more likely to possess unity, and a methodical structure. If the preacher should give no one general direction to his mind by a passage of inspiration, the sermon would degenerate into a series of remarks which would

have little use, or apparent connection with each other. Like the observations of a person when called upon, without any premeditation, to make remarks in a public meeting, the sermon, though religious in its matter, would be more or less rambling in its manner. Without a text, the sermonizer would be likely to speak what came uppermost, provided only it had some reference to religion. And the ill effects of this course would not stop here. The sermon would become more and more rambling, and less and less religious in its character, until, owing to this neglect of the Scriptures, it would eventually become dissevered from them, and the sacred oration would thus become secular. 4. The selection of a text aids the memory of the hearer. It furnishes him with a brief statement which contains the whole substance of the sermon, and is a clue to lead him through its several parts. We all know that the hearer betakes himself to the text, first of all, when called upon to give an account of a discourse. If he remembers the text, he is generally able to mention the proposition, and more or less of the trains of thought. 5. The text gives authority to the preacher's words. The sermon, when it is really founded upon a passage of inspiration, and is truly pervaded by it, possesses a sort of semi-inspiration itself. It is more than a merely human and secular product. The Holy Spirit acknowledges it as such, by employing it for purposes of conviction and conversion. A merely and wholly human production, properly secular eloquence, is not one of those things which the Holy Ghost "takes and shows unto the soul." A truly Scriptural discourse, provided we do not strain the phraseology too far, has much of the authority of Scripture itself.

The following are some of the rules that should guide in the choice of a text: 1. A passage of Scripture should be selected towards which the mind at the time spontaneously moves. Choose a text that attracts and strikes the mind. The best sermons are written upon such passages, because the preacher enters into them with vigor and heartiness. Yet such texts are not always to be found. They do not present themselves

at the very moment they are wanted. Hence, the sermonizer should aid nature by art, should cultivate spontaneity by prudence and forethought. He should keep a book of texts, in which he habitually and carefully writes down *every* text that strikes him, *together with* all of the skeleton that presents itself to him at the time. Let him by no means omit this last particular. In this way the spontaneous movements of his mind will be on record. The fresh and genial texts that occur, together with the original and genial plans which they suggest, will all be within reach. A sermonizer who thus aids nature by art will never be at a loss for subjects. He will be embarrassed more by his riches than his poverty.

2. A text should be complete in itself. By this, it is not meant that it should be short. No rule can be given for the length of a text. The most that is required is, that the passage of Scripture selected as the foundation of the sacred oration, should, like the oration itself, be single, full, and unsuperfluous in its character. It should be single,—containing only one general theme. It should be full,—*i. e.* not a meagre and partial statement of this theme. It should be unsuperfluous,—*i. e.* not redundant in matter that would lead the sermonizer into trains of discussion and reflection, foreign to the one definite end of an oration.

Texts must vary in length from the necessity of the case. As a general rule, however, they should be as brief as is compatible with completeness. Short texts are more easily remembered. They are more likely to result in concise and effective sermons,—in sermons that are free from prolixity, and that converge constantly to a single ultimate end. Sermonizers, like Latimer and South, who are distinguished for a rapid, driving method, affect short pithy texts like the following: "Lying lips are an abomination to the Lord." "He that walketh surely, walketh uprightly." "The wisdom of this world is foolishness with God." "So that they are without excuse." "Be sure your sin will find you out." Again, preachers, like Alison and Blair, who are distinguished not very much for vigor and effectiveness, but for a clean, neat, and elegant

method, select brief texts like these: "Thou art the same: and thy years shall not fail." "In your patience possess ye your souls." "Can ye not discern the signs of the times?" "Thou hast made summer and winter." "What I would, that I do not." "Unstable as water thou shall not excel." It will be found to be true generally, that in proportion as a preacher's mind is awake and energetic, and the public mind is also awake and active, texts become brief, and sermons become direct and convergent. The texts of the sermons preached by the German and English reformers are short and frequent.

Besides being easily remembered, a short text allows of emphatic repetition. Some sermons become very effective by the reiteration of the inspired affirmation at the conclusion of each head. In this case, the text becomes a clincher. It fastens, like a nail in a sure place, all that has been said by the preacher. The affirmations of the preacher are *nailed*, to use a phrase of Burns, with Scripture.*

3. A text should be chosen, from which the proposition of the sermon is derived plainly and naturally. Sometimes a preacher desires to present a certain subject, which he has revolved in his mind, and upon which his trains of thought are full and consecutive, and merely prefaces his sermon with a passage of Scripture which has only a remote connection with his theme. In this case, the relation of the sermon to the text is that of adjustment, rather than that of development. Having made selection of a passage from which his proposition and trains of thought do not naturally flow, he is compelled to torture the text into an apparent unity with the discourse. Rather than take this course, it would be better to make the text a mere motto, or title, and not pretend to an unfolding of a scriptural passage. But there is no need of this. The Bible is rich in texts for all legitimate sermons, for all propositions and trains of thought that properly arise with-

* And even ministers, they ha'e been kenned
In holy rapture,
A rousing which at times to vend,
And nail 't wi' Scripture.

in the province of sacred as distinctive from secular eloquence. Let the preacher take pains, and find the very passage he needs, and not content himself with one that has only an apparent connection with his subject.

But when the passage selected is a true text,—*i. e.* a portion of Scripture out of which the proposition, trains of thought, and whole substance of the discourse are *woven*,—let the preacher see to it, that he derives from it nothing that is not in it. His business is not to involve into the text something that is extrinsic, but to evolve out of it, something that is intrinsic. Hence, a text should be of such a character as to *evidently* furnish one plain and significant proposition, and to allow of a straight-forward, easy, and actual development of it.

4. Oddity and eccentricity should be avoided in selecting a text. There is more need of this rule now, than formerly. The public mind is more ludicrous in its associations, and more fastidious in its taste, now, than two centuries ago. In the older sermonizers, applications of Scripture are very frequent, which involuntarily provoke a smile in a modern reader, but which in their day were listened to with the utmost gravity by sober-minded men and women. The doctrine of a double sense, together with a strong allegorizing tendency, in both preacher and hearer, contributed to this use of Scripture which seems to us fanciful and oftentimes ludicrous.

Illustrations of this trait are without number. Dr. Eachard, whose volume gives a very lively picture of the condition of the English clergy at the close of the seventeenth, and the beginning of the eighteenth century, furnishes some curious examples of this eccentric spirit, both in the choice of texts, and in drawing out doctrine from it. He tells us of a preacher who selected Acts xvi. 30: "Sirs, what must I do to be saved," and preached upon the divine right of Episcopacy. "For Paul and Silas are called 'Sirs,' and 'Sirs' being in the Greek κύριοι, and this, in strict translation, meaning 'Lord,' it is perfectly plain, that at that time Episcopacy was not only the acknowledged government, but that bishops were peers of the realm, and so ought to sit in the House of Lords."

Another preacher, in the time of Charles II, he says, selected for his text the words: "Seek first the kingdom of God," and drew from them the proposition that kingly government is most in accordance with the will of God. "For it is not said, seek the *Parliament* of God, the *Army* of God, or the *Committee of Safety* of God; but it is, seek the *Kingdom* of God." Another preacher took Matthew i. 2: "Abraham begat Isaac," and argued against pluralists and non-residency in the ministry: "For had Abraham not resided with Sarah his wife, he could not have begot Isaac." Another sermonizer selected Isaiah xli. 14, 15: "Fear not thou worm Jacob, . . . thou shalt thresh mountains," and drew the inference that the worm Jacob was a threshing worm. In the same vein, another preacher takes for his text Isaiah lviii. 5: "Is it such a fast as I have chosen? A day for a man to afflict his soul? Is it to bow down his head like a bulrush?" and deduces the proposition that "repentance for an hour, or a day, is not worth a bulrush." Still another preacher selected his text from Psalms xc. 19: "In the multitude of my thoughts within me, thy comforts delight my soul," and preached upon election and reprobation, deducing the proposition, "that amongst the multitude of thoughts, there was a great thought of election and reprobation."* Similar examples of eccentricity in the choice and treatment of a text, have been handed down from other sources. An aged New England minister, during the colonial period, once preached before a very unpopular deputy governor from Job xx. 6, 7: "Though his *Excellency* mount up to the heavens, and his head reach unto the clouds, yet he shall perish forever like his own dung." Another preached to the newly married couples of his congregation, upon a part of Psalm lxxii. 7: "And abundance of peace so long as the *moon* endureth." Dean Swift is reported to have preached the annual sermon to the Associated Tailors of Dublin, upon the text: "A *remnant* shall be saved." Among his printed sermons, there is one upon Acts xx. 9: "And there sat in the window a cer-

* Eachard: Works, 66 et al.

tain young man named Eutychus, having fallen into a deep sleep: and while Paul was long preaching, he sunk down with sleep: and fell down from the third loft, and was taken up dead," which thus begins: "I have chosen these words with design, if possible, to disturb some part in this audience of half an hour's sleep, for the convenience and exercise whereof this place, at this season of the day, is very much celebrated."*

Such instances as these, however, are very different from that quaint humor of preachers like Hugh Latimer, and Matthew Henry, which is so mingled with devout and holy sentiment, as to lose all triviality, and to make only a serious impression. The following from the commentary of Henry, while it raises a smile, only deepens the sense of the truth conveyed. Commenting upon the requirement of the Mosaic law that the green ears of corn, offered as a meat offering, must be dried by the fire, so that the corn might be beaten out, Henry remarks, that "if those who are young do God's work as well as they can, they shall be accepted, though they cannot do it as well as those that are aged and experienced. God makes the best of green ears of corn, and so must we."†

A disputed text should not be selected as the basis of a discourse. This rule applies more particularly to doctrinal preaching, yet it has its value for sermonizing generally. The preacher should choose the very plainest, most significant and pointed passages of Scripture as the support of his doctrinal discourses. He is then relieved from the necessity of first proving that the doctrine in question is taught in the passage, and can devote his whole time and strengh to its exposition and establishment. The less there is of polemics in sacred oratory, the better. The more there is of direct inculcation, without any regard to opposing theories and statements, the more efficient, energetic, and oratorical will be the sermon. The controversial tone is unfavorable to the bold, positive, unembarrassed tone of sacred eloquence. Disputed texts

* Swift: Works XIV. Sermon 10.
† Henry: Com. on Leviticus iii. 14.

should, therefore, be left to the philologist and the theologian. When these have settled their true meaning, so far as it can be settled, such texts may be employed to corroborate, and to illustrate, but not to build upon from the foundation.

By this it is not meant that the preacher has no concern with such passages of inspiration. The preacher is, or should be, a philologist and a theologian, and in his study should examine such passages, and form a judgment in respect to them. But let him not do this work in the pulpit. The pulpit is the place for the delivery of eloquence, and not of philology, or philosophy, or technical theology. The rhetorical presentation of thought is the mode which the preacher is to employ, and nothing more interferes with this than the minute examinations of criticism, and the slow and cautious processes of pure science.

This maxim is also valuable, not only in reference to strictly doctrinal preaching, but to all preaching. The text is, or should be, the key-note to the whole sermon. The more bold, the more undoubted and undisputed its tone, the better. A text of this character is like a premonitory blast of a trumpet. It challenges attention, and gets it. It startles and impresses by its direct and authoritative announcement of a great and solemn proposition. Nothing remains then, but for the preacher to go out upon it with his whole weight; to unfold and apply its evident undoubted meaning, with all the moral confidence, and all the serious earnestness of which he is capable.

The inference to be drawn from these reasons for the selection of a passage of Scripture as the foundation of a sermon, and these rules for making the selection is, that the greatest possible labor and care should be expended upon the choice of a text. As in secular oratory, the selection for a subject is either vital or fatal to the whole performance; so in sacred oratory the success of the preacher depends fundamentally upon the fitness of his choice of a text. The text is his subject. It is the germ of his whole discourse. Provided, therefore, he has found an apt and excellent text, he has found his sermon substantially.

All labor, therefore, that is expended upon a text is wisely and economically expended. Every jot and tittle of painstaking, in fixing upon paper a congenial passage of Scripture, and in setting up all of the skeleton that presents itself at the time; every jot and tittle of painstaking in examining the passage in the original Hebrew or Greek, in studying, in these same languages, the context, and all the parallel passages; every particle of care in first obtaining an excellent text, and then getting at and getting out its real meaning and scope, goes to render the actual construction and composition of the sermon more easy and successful. Labor at this point saves labor at all after points.

The preacher should make careful and extensive preparation in respect to pulpit themes. His common-place book of texts should be a large volume in the outset, and, if he is faithful to himself and his calling, he will find the volumes increasing. Instead of buying the volumes of skeletons that are so frequently offered at the present day, the preacher should make them for himself. It was formerly the custom, in an age that was more theological than the present, for every preacher to draw up a "body of divinity" for himself,—the summing up and result of his studies and reflections. Every preacher knew what his theological system was, and could state it, and defend it. And, although at first sight, we might suppose that this custom would lead to great diversities of opinion among the clergy, it is yet a fact, that there never was more substantial and candid unity of belief, than among the Calvinistic clergy of England and the Continent, during those highly theological centuries, the sixteenth and seventeenth. There was no invention of new theories, but the old and established theory, the one orthodox faith of the Christian church, was made to pass through each individual mind, and so come forth with all the freshness and freedom of a new creation. "He who has been born," says Richter, "has been a first man, has had the old and common world lying about him as new and as fresh, as it lay before the eyes of Adam himself." So, too, he who, in the providence and by the grace of God, has

become a theologian and a preacher, has no other world of thought and of feeling to move in, than that old world of Divine Revelation, in which the glorious company of the apostles, and the goodly fellowship of the prophets and preachers thought and felt; but if he will open his eyes, and realize where he stands, and by what he is surrounded, he will see it as his predecessors saw it, in all the freshness of its real nature, and in all the magnificence of its actual infinitudes. Whether or not, the preacher imitates this example of an earlier day in regard to theologizing, he ought to in regard to sermonizing. Let him not rely at all upon the texts and skeletons of other preachers, but let him cultivate this field by himself, and for himself, as if it had never been tilled before. Let him pursue this business of selecting, examining, decomposing, and recombining textual materials, with all the isolation and independence of the first preachers, and of all the great original orators of the Christian church.

Art. II.—JESUS CHRIST AND CRIMINAL LAW.

By Prof. E. Ballantine, of Lane Seminary.

Did our Lord, when brought into contact with the officers of the law and the courts of justice, ignore the principles and rules of criminal law, as they are generally received, or did he recognize and observe them?

The answer to this interesting question must be drawn from the combined histories of the evangelists. That we may not be drawn aside to incidental questions, we shall follow the arrangement of events as given in Robinson's Harmony. We notice only those passages which bear on the point before us, and discuss them only so far as they bear on that point; passing by, with a kind of violence to our feelings, the abundant and rich material which they furnish of a general character, in order that in the end their total significance may be the

better appreciated, and thus our Lord himself be better understood, and more highly honored.

Jesus was arrested in the garden of Gethsemane; it was about midnight. "Then Judas, having received a band of men and officers from the chief priests and Pharisees, cometh thither with lanterns, and torches, and weapons. Jesus, therefore, knowing all things that should come upon him, went forth and said unto them, Whom seek ye? They answered him, Jesus of Nazareth. Jesus saith unto them, I am he. As soon then as he had said unto them, I am he, they went backward and fell to the ground. Then asked he them again, Whom seek ye? And they said, Jesus of Nazareth. Jesus answered, I have told you that I am he. If, therefore, ye seek me, let these go their way." (John xviii. 3–8.)

Observe, now, that Jesus, thus brought suddenly into contact with the law and its officers, did not flee, or hide, or try to confuse them in regard to his identity. "He went forth," stepped forward toward them, and frankly declared himself. He used, moreover, a precision and formality of language, quite unlike his ordinary manner, but entirely in keeping with the style and manner of legal processes. That this precision and formality were not accidental, but designed and significant, is shown first, by the fact that Judas's kiss made them unnecessary to his identification, and second, by the fact of the full and formal repetition of the whole after the interruption made by the temporary confusion of his captors. In his words to them, when they came up the second time, "I have told you, (*i. e.* already) that I am he," Jesus chides their delay in taking him, as inconsistent with the promptness appropriate to their business, and hints at a consciousness of the injustice of that business as its cause. He then puts in a legal plea for the safety of his friends. "The law seeks only the criminal: it interferes with none other. If therefore ye seek me, let these go." By this last word also he surrenders himself to their hands.

In this new situation Jesus thus showed that he understood the course and demeanor which are proper, both for arresting

and arrested parties, observed them himself, and pointed them out to his captors. He was dignified, frank and courteous in manner, formal and precise as to the process of arrest, ready and right in his legal positions, in behalf both of himself and of his disciples.

"Then the band and the captain, and the officers of the Jews took Jesus and bound him." (John xviii. 12.) Jesus submitted quietly, but Peter could not see his master treated like a felon. He "drew his sword and struck a servant of the high priest, and smote off his ear. Then said Jesus unto him, Put up again thy sword into his place." (Matth. xxvi. 51, 52.) "And Jesus answered and said, Suffer ye thus far. And he touched his ear and healed him." (Luke xxii. 51.)

Jesus thus rejected the assistance of the sword against the administrators of the law. He taught that violent resistance to arresting officers is not the right course. These are not the place, nor the time, nor the parties, nor the means, for the assertion and the maintenance of the citizen's liberty. He acknowledged all this promptly to the officers, guaranteed that the resistance should go no farther, deprecated their vengeance on the offender, and conciliated their forbearance by the miraculous cure of the wound. Law officers have their rights, which are to be regarded by the citizen. An act of an accessory, if allowed, is the act of the principal. A wrong step taken by one of the parties, should be promptly retraced, acknowledged, and made good. An arrested man may suffer, but must not do wrong. All this was expressed by the words and actions of Jesus in these first moments of his arrest, and while strong men were tying his arms and held him fast. In circumstances so calculated to excite and confuse, he was clear, ready, and impartial, in regard to what was legally right and wrong in the circumstance.

This is made more clear by that which immediately followed. The unjust arrest, though submitted to, was not to pass without a protest from the prisoner.

"Jesus said unto them, Are ye come out as against a thief, with swords and with staves to take me? I was daily with

you in the temple teaching and ye took me not." (Mark xiv. 48, 49.)

He objects to the place, the time, and the mode of his arrest. It did injustice to himself, his character, and his course of life. The sly thief, or skulking burglar, who hides from the light of day, and from the sight of men, may perhaps be sought and taken thus. But a man like himself, who appeared daily in the places of public resort teaching the people, without arms or armed attendants, and always deporting himself peaceably and quietly, such a man has a right to a different kind of treatment from the officers of the law. They, when commissioned to arrest such a one, should meet him in the places of his public walks, and there serve process upon him. There was no need in his case of a posse, much less of an armed one. A citizen who respects the government, and obeys the laws, will not resist the exercise of legal authority. Public sentiment will sustain that authority when rightly exercised; and the same public sentiment is, on the other hand, the safeguard of the innocent citizen, of which he ought not to be deprived. A clandestine seizure, except in the case mentioned, implies, therefore, its own injustice. It is tyrannical, outrageous, and very likely irregular and unauthorized. "And are ye come out as against a thief?" You yourselves are doing a deed of darkness which will not bear the light of day and the knowledge of the people.

Thus Jesus speaks, when arrested, on the matter of arrests. He shows the right, while submitting to the wrong. He defends justice and law with energy and ability, and yields up himself.

He was now several hours in the hands of those who took him, enduring their abuse and the denial of Peter; and then at earliest dawn (Luke xxii. 66), was placed before the assembled Sanhedrim, the highest Jewish court. This court consisted of seventy members, and was presided over by the high priest. (Matth. xxvi. 57.)

This is a situation entirely new. Jesus is alone in the midst of his enemies, who are also his judges, who thirst for his blood,

and want only the forms of law to cover their violence. It was a situation calculated to appall and disconcert a prisoner. How did Jesus act in this trying situation?

There was manifest at once an awkward position of affairs. The court was constituted, the prisoner was at the bar, but no prosecutor appeared with charges against him. The attention of Jesus' enemies had been hitherto engrossed by the effort to secure his person. They must now procure material for an accusation. The quickest method appears to be, to interrogate the prisoner.

"The high priest then asked Jesus of his disciples and his doctrine. Jesus answered him, I spake openly to the world: I ever taught in the synagogue and in the temple whither the Jews always resort; and in secret have I said nothing. Why askest thou me? ask them which heard me, what I have said unto them: behold they know what I said." (John xviii. 19–21.)

These first words of Jesus before the Jewish court, are mighty in legal argument. His positions are these: A prisoner should not be asked to inculpate himself, especially one whose whole life has been in public: Those who have seen and heard him should be called to testify concerning him; and such do right when, being called on, they testify to facts: A man's past life should be his defence or his condemnation: A court ought not to seek by interrogating a prisoner for new matter of accusation: Such a proceeding is malicious and tyrannical.

Thus Jesus planted himself on great principles of law and justice, exposed the illegality and wrong of which the Judge was guilty, and challenged the production of competent witnesses against himself. He was legally master of the situation. This was so manifest and so embarrassing, that one of the subordinate officers slapped Jesus in the face, or on the cheek, saying, Answerest thou the high priest so? (John xviii. 22.) The court permitted the outrage. Jesus, not driven from his propriety, nor confused with regard to his rights, nor deterred from maintaining them, but quick in seizing an advantage, exposing a wrong, and making a retort, said,

"If I have spoken evil, bear witness of the evil: but if well, why smitest thou me?" (John xviii. 23.)

That is: If what he had said to the high priest was wrong, it would furnish the desired ground for a charge. Bear witness then of the evil I have been guilty of, and thereby relieve the embarrassment of the court, which is waiting for an accusation against me. But if I was right, then your blow was unmerited, and was simple abuse of a prisoner, who is under the protection of the court. How quick—how pointed—and legally how silencing! Jesus is still master of the situation. The court feels it, and yielding to the pressure, adopts the course which Jesus pointed out as the right one, namely, the production of witnesses.

"Now the chief priests and elders, and all the council, sought false witness against Jesus, to put him to death. But found none. Yea, though many false witnesses came, yet found they none. At the last, came two false witnesses, and said, This fellow said, I am able to destroy the temple of God and to build it in three days." "But neither so did their witness agree together." (Matth. xxvi. 59–61. Mark xiv. 59.)

And so long as testimony is being taken, Jesus is silent. He has no objection to make. And he has no occasion to interpose; for the whole proceeding breaks down of itself. Among the thousands who have daily seen and heard him, two witnesses cannot be found to testify as to one word or act which can be construed into a crime. The effort to make out an accusation in this way is necessarily abandoned. The prisoner should have been promptly discharged.

But the court does not mean to let its victim escape. The high priest, foiled in his second, returns to his first method of procedure, that, namely, of interrogating the criminal. "And the high priest arose, and said unto him, Answerest thou nothing? what is it which these witness against thee? But Jesus held his peace." (Matth. xxvi. 62, 63.)

Jesus' silence is expressive—it is that of unassailable right. He had three good reasons for not answering. First, the testimony was not sustained, as this new resort to interrogation

of the prisoner admitted. Second, the interrogation itself was wrong, as Jesus had shown before. Thirdly, Jesus knew well its artful and malicious design, and he was not called to be the tool of their malice against himself. "So, he held his peace and answered nothing." (Mark xiv. 61.) He understands both the proprieties and the expediencies of his situation.

Now, therefore, the Judge, driven to extremity, made a last effort.

"The high priest answered and said unto him, I adjure thee by the living God that thou tell us whether thou be the Christ the Son of God. Jesus saith unto him, Thou hast said: nevertheless I say unto you, Hereafter shall ye see the Son of man sitting on the right hand of power, and coming in the clouds of heaven. Then the high priest rent his clothes, saying, He hath spoken blasphemy: what further need have we of witnesses? behold now ye have heard his blasphemy: what think ye? They answered and said, He is guilty of death." (Matth. xxvi. 63–66.)

If we look at the course of Jesus, in this last scene in the Jewish court, simply in the light of legal rules, we may feel some difficulty. He had been interrogated twice before by the Judge: the first time he objected, the second time, he said nothing. Now, interrogated a third time, he answers, and his answer is made the ground of his condemnation. We may perhaps say, that having in the first two instances shown the right, he, in the third, submits to the wrong. Leaving this point for the present, we notice in this case the use of a judicial oath. Jesus was put under oath, and answered his judge under oath. We have then his example in regard to oaths in courts of law, in answering under oath at the bar of justice, in speaking the truth under oath, in swearing to one's own hurt, and altering not. We may, perhaps, put this answer of Jesus in the category of the confession of the truth before the tribunals of persecuting powers, and regard it as an example of the right course for those who should in all ages be brought before kings and rulers for his name's sake. When the alternative is presented (having not been sought,

but in the use of all right legal means avoided), when the necessity comes either by word to deny the truth, or by silence to disown it, or boldly to confess it before men, then the duty of the loyal Christian is to do as Jesus did—confess—though death must follow. Thus the faithful have done in all ages, having Jesus' example, and having also his promise, "Whosoever shall confess me before men, him will I confess before my Father which is in heaven."

We feel, however, that the course pursued by Jesus at this point cannot be fully explained, either by the rules of law, or on the principle of the open confession of the truth. The action has, we conceive, a higher significance, and more interesting relations. Take Jesus in the character which he here claims, as Christ the Son of God, and what are the parties and the situation in the scene before us? The high priests of Aaron's line have run their career as figures of the true. The last of them is in his seat, and has reached the last moment and the last valid act of his office. He is now to give place to the true and eternal High Priest, who is before him in the person of the prisoner. The highest ecclesiastical and civil council of the nation is in formal session, having been called together to act in this very case. This same high priest had shortly before, not speaking of himself, "prophesied that Jesus should die for that nation and for all the people of God." (John xi. 47–52, and xviii. 14.) And now, also, not speaking of himself, nor knowing the sacred import of the action, he requires Jesus, swearing "by the living God," to say whether he is the Christ, the son of God. Jesus understands the full import of the moment and the action: He therefore answers with an explicit affirmative, declaring himself to be the Son of God. As such he assumes formally before them the office and the duties of his high priesthood, and is thereupon adjudged by them to die, ostensibly as a blasphemer, but really as they intend, and as God intends, "for the people."

If this view of the transaction be correct, there was reason enough why Jesus should answer the judge even according to human rules of inauguration and investiture. The action was

not, in the strict sense, a legal one, but in the highest sense an official and governmental one. They "were made priests without an oath, but this with an oath," on earth as well as in heaven.

Jesus, having thus formally and before the highest authorities of the church, taken on himself his priesthood, submits quietly to the consequence. Having been condemned, and barbarously insulted and abused, he was "led away to Pilate," the Roman Governor, that the sentence of the ecclesiastical court may be confirmed and executed by the civil power.

Now, therefore, we have Jesus before a Roman court, there to pass again through the ordeal of a trial. Roman law and Roman courts of law stand higher than those of any other ancient people. How will Jesus, alone, without advocate or counsel, deport himself there?

As the charge of blasphemy against God will not weigh much at a Roman tribunal, the enemies of Jesus dextrously change their ground. "We found this fellow (they say) perverting the nation, and forbidding to give tribute to Cæsar, saying that he himself is Christ a king." (Luke xxiii. 2.)

"Then Pilate entered into the judgment hall, and called Jesus and said unto him, Art thou the king of the Jews? What hast thou done? Jesus answered, My kingdom is not of this world: if my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight that I should not be delivered to the Jews: but now is my kingdom not from hence. Pilate therefore said unto him, Art thou a king then? Jesus answered, Thou sayest that I am a king. To this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world that I should bear witness unto the truth. Every one that is of the truth heareth my voice. Pilate saith unto him, What is truth? And when he had said this he went out again unto the Jews, and saith unto them, I find in him no fault at all." (John xviii. 33, 35–38.)

This interrogation of the prisoner, if an official act at all, seems to have been only a preliminary one: the process itself is spoken of (Matth. xxvii. 12–14.) Pilate's object in the inquiry was to get information in regard to the case. It gave

Jesus the opportunity to make known his true character, and so his grounds of defence against the charge of the Jews; and he used the opportunity to this end. Answering in the free style of conversation, he appealed to his appearance and his want of supporters. Was this the style of a dangerous pretender to earthly royalty? He was a king—but not of an earthly kingdom—not one who interfered with existing civil powers. He was king of the Truth—a moral and religious teacher—ready to be the guide of every sincere seeker after truth.

By this explanation of himself, Jesus relieved the mind of his Roman judge from all grounds of suspicion. He set himself right where he was liable to be misunderstood injuriously. His kingship was a nice point to discuss with the Roman authorities; but he succeeded in making it understood. Pilate, an intelligent man of the world, acquainted with men and affairs, perhaps not altogether unread in Greek and Roman literature, nor entirely unacquainted with schools and teachers of philosophy and religion, seeing also the appearance and bearing of his prisoner, understands him and his accusers entirely, knows that he had been delivered up for envy, when entirely innocent of all seditious designs, and going out to the Jews, declares Jesus free of all fault. Thus Jesus has gained his cause, nay, received from his judge a public acknowledgment of his innocence.

Henceforth, therefore, through all the successive scenes of his experience, up to the moment of his being delivered to be crucified, Jesus was entirely silent. Even in the investigation proper, "accused of the chief priests and elders, he answered nothing." (Matth. xxvii. 12.) And when Pilate said, "Hearest thou not how many things they witness against thee," Jesus "answered him to never a word, insomuch that the governor marveled greatly." (Matth. xxvii. 13, 14.) He had made his cause clear to the mind of the judge, and awaited now the proof of the change made by them, or its rejection, by the judge himself in accordance with his previous declaration, or he was ready for the issue whatever it might be. Pilate also

sent him to Herod, and Herod "questioned with him in many words; but he answered nothing." (Luke xxiii. 9.) There was no occasion for his speaking; for Pilate, giving a history of all these proceedings, says, "I, having examined him before you, have found no fault in this man touching those things whereof ye accuse him; no, nor yet Herod: for I sent you to him; and lo, nothing worthy of death is found in him." (Luke xxiii. 14. 15.) The judge himself becomes an earnest pleader in his behalf. He offers to chastise him for their gratification, and then release him (Luke xxiii. 16); endeavors to take advantage in his behalf of the custom of releasing a prisoner at the feast (John xviii. 39); and foiled in this, spake "a third time, Why, what evil hath he done? I have found no cause of death in him." (Luke xxiii. 22.) And finally, "he took water and washed his hands before the multitude, saying, I am innocent of the blood of this just person." (Matth. xxvii. 24.) Certainly one on trial thus acquitted, defended, pleaded for by his judge, need not say a word in his own defence.

But Jesus did speak once more in answer to Pilate, in a final interview, which also appears to have been no part of the proper legal proceedings. The Jews, seeing Pilate so unwilling, to carry out their wishes, bring every possible means to bear upon him, and urge with the rest their own condemnation of him for blasphemy. "We have a law, and by our law he ought to die, because he made himself the son of God." (John xix. 7.) Pilate, awe-struck at this high claim of the prisoner, "went again into the judgment hall and saith unto Jesus, Whence art thou? But Jesus gave him no answer." Then saith Pilate unto him, Speakest thou not unto me? Knowest thou not that I have power to crucify thee, and have power to release thee? Jesus answered, Thou couldst have no power at all against me, except it were given thee from above: therefore he that delivered me unto thee hath the greater sin." (John xix. 8–11.)

Jesus replied not at first, for the question of the judge seemed to be a reopening of the case which he himself had so emphatically closed. The judge may swerve from the right

rule of procedure, Jesus will, by his silence, both maintain the right himself, and give a lesson to the judge. A prisoner acquitted, has nothing to do but await his discharge. At this silence of Jesus, Pilate coolly reminds him that it would be wise to treat his judge with deference, as his life and death were in his power. Jesus now replies, but not as a party on trial, nor simply as a party acquitted, but almost as the Final Judge of all. "God, by his providence, has put me in your hand, and for the exercise of your power you are responsible to him, and guilty too. But they are more guilty who are using you and your power to effect my death." A reply this, dignified, solemn and tender; a warning to his judge, who was just then yielding to pressure contrary to his conscience; a protest against the whole proceeding as malicious, and unjust; and thus a fit close of that which Jesus saw fit to do and to say, when taken and tried and condemned by the ecclesiastical and the civil courts.

In order now to make a proper estimate of the facts reviewed as they bear upon the object of our inquiry, we must keep in mind that Jesus did not, in these proceedings, act simply in the character of a citizen at the bar of justice. Even as such he might prefer, as have many other good men, to sacrifice personal rights and interests for the sake of objects deemed by him more important. Also, though in the hands of his enemies, he still acted upon occasion, as healer and spiritual guide of men. As High Priest also, nay, as the Lamb of God, self-devoted to sacrifice, he must present himself to our view in these scenes in aspects and acts extra-legal, and that too in closest connection with those which are of a strictly legal character. It was, for instance, no part of his plan to secure a final release. His words to Peter, when being found, "The cup which my Father giveth me, shall I not drink it?" show that he knew and accepted his fate. The higher objects and bearings of the sufferings and acts of Jesus Christ almost overshadow, by their importance and interest, these which we are considering.

But with all the abatements and modifications from these and other causes, the fact of a controlling influence of the great rules and principles of criminal law in the course of Jesus in his arrest and trials, is, I think, manifest. He does not appear in the history as a helpless sufferer accepting whatever may come; nor yet as a legal novice in the hands of shrewd and practiced men-at-law. He lays hold at each point of the great principles and rules of law applicable to the case, and presents and urges them with effect, exposing thereby the wrong course of his captors and of his judges. The points he makes, embrace in fact the elements of a true legal defence. Not once does he take a position which is legally wrong. If he fails to press any point of law to the utmost extent in his own behalf, it was not because he had not the necessary knowledge and ability. He was, as has already been said, master, legally, of the situation.

Such, then, are the facts as they appear in the history. Jesus understood, approved and used in his own case the great principles and rules of criminal law which are found embodied in the judicial systems of the civilized world.

Now, if this was so, we may reasonably ask, How is the past to be explained? "How knew this man the law, having never learned?" Grown up among the peasants of Galilee, having associated all his life with the common people, a healer and religious teacher, a man of peace, having probably never before been in a court of justice, "whence had this man this wisdom?"

They who cherish a deep reverence, and a sincere admiration for the law, its principles and institutions, may perhaps find that our examination throws new light on the character and the origin of the man of Nazareth: and those who believe that "Jesus is the Son of God," may, from the course which he pursued when taken and tried, be led to just conclusions in regard to the law and its institutions. He evidently came not to destroy the civil law—nay, by his example and conduct he established the law. In connection with all his other teachings and works of wisdom, power and love, while on the

earth, we have his instructions here also, and as to all other points they are worthy of the Son of God, the Maker and Ruler and final Judge of men.

This side of the character, and this part of the history and teaching of Christ, deserve a fuller study and an abler exposition. Many just remarks on the subject lie scattered in our biblical and Christian literature; but the whole ground should be examined, and the materials digested by a master hand. A Christian lawyer, one familiar with the principles and antiquities of his profession, and also at home in biblical studies, might thus assist the exegesis of the Bible in one of its most interesting parts, and do honor both to the civil law, and to the character and perfection of our Lord Jesus Christ.

Art. III.—THE SANDWICH ISLANDS MISSION, AND ITS CALUMNIATORS.

By Rev. Joseph Tracy, D.D.

In the year 1810, there was published at Oxford, in England, a volume of 190 octavo pages, entitled: "A Reply to the Calumnies of the Edinburgh Review against Oxford; containing an Account of Studies pursued at that University." No author's name graced the title-page; but it was well understood to be the work of a Professor of Poetry in that University, and to be published with the approbation of his colleagues in the Faculty.

The Review had said—alluding to Oxford—"Where the dictates of Aristotle are still listened to as infallible decrees, or where the infancy of science is mistaken for its maturity, the mathematical sciences have never flourished, and the scholar has no means of advancing beyond the mere elements of Geometry." And yet it was compelled to acknowledge, in its rejoinder: "We are aware that Oxford has to boast of Wallis, Gregory and Halley among its Professors, and that a

successor worthy of them is still found in the same University." The Review had also, in criticizing an Oxford edition of Strabo, spoken disparagingly of the Greek scholarship of that University.

Should not the vast services which Oxford had rendered to the cause of good learning for a thousand years,* the names of such professors as Wallis, Gregory and Halley, and the acknowledgment that they had then "a successor worthy of them," have been a sufficient reply to such a "calumny?" So many would have reasoned; but Oxford thought it better to defend herself by a formal, printed and published reply.

We assume that this is a respectable precedent. We assume also, that "His Grace the Lord Bishop of Oxford," "His Grace the Lord Bishop of Honolulu," and their associates, when they address public meetings, and write under their own signatures, professing to state facts, are as likely to be believed, and to injure those against whom they bear witness, as anonymous writers in a Scotch review. If these assumptions are correct, we are fully justified in replying to the "calumnies" of their "Graces" against the American Mission in the Sandwich Islands; even though the good character of the missionaries, and the good influence of their labors are as notorious as was the existence of respectable scholarship at Oxford in 1810. We tender this as our apology to our readers, for laying before them some proofs of facts which have long been well known to the whole Christian world, and to the missionaries, for writing anything which may be made to seem to imply, that their characters need any defense.

But are the calumnies against that mission of sufficent importance, in respect to the matters charged, to justify a reply?

Bishop Staley, of Honolulu, in the Appendix to his Pastoral Address, "delivered in his church on new years day, 1865," says, that the "Hawaiian type" of "piety," taught by that mission, is "a species of unctuous cant and glib familiarity

*Oxford claims to have been founded in A.D. 803, and revived, after the Danish Wars, by Alfred, in A.D. 886.

with sacred expressions, having no hold on the moral being." (p. 44). He asserts that "there was less of the fearful practice of polyandry and the corruption of girls in the heathen than in the Christian days of this people," and adds: "The change for the worse, I do not hesitate to say, has been greatly aided by Puritanism." (p. 51). In an address in the church of the Incarnation, in New York, he is reported, in one of the newspapers of that city, to have said, that "the morality of the Islands in Christian days is ten times worse than it was under heathenism." Being called to account for that assertion, he published a card, denying the accuracy of the report, and claimed to have said only about the same that we have quoted from his Pastoral Address. Upon this, the reporter publicly re-affirmed the accuracy of his report, and in that form it has gone out to the world, as Bishop Staley's testimony concerning the mission. And the *Colonial Church Journal* asserts that the labors of our Missionaries have "ended in failure, so far as the moral and religious character of the Hawaiians is concerned."*

If these statements are true,—if they are not "calumnies," the mission is a failure, a sham, and a nuisance. If they are believed, the reputation of the mission, and its usefulness, so far as it depends on its reputation, are at an end. In respect to the nature and gravity of the charges, then, the call for a reply is as complete as it possibly can be.

In claiming that the good character and usefulness of that mission are as evident as that there is respectable scholarship at Oxford, we do not state the case too strongly. Look at the facts: and first, in respect to religion.

When the first missionaries arrived, in April, 1820, the people of these Islands had, outwardly, no religion. They had been idolaters; but they had discarded their idols, burned or torn down their temples, and abolished the whole system as a visible institution; and they had adopted nothing in its place. The superstitions connected with their former idolatry still

* *Journal* for July, 1866, page 267.

haunted their minds, and tortured their hearts, and debased their morals.

The Missionaries began their work. In three years, they received one convert, Keopuolani, to the communion of the church. At the end of twelve years, they had received 577; in the next ten years, 29,651; in the next ten years, 12,325; and in the next ten, 8,802. No one who has any acquaintance with the work of collecting statistics, will suppose that these numbers are perfectly accurate; but they are as nearly so as carefully compiled statistics usually are, and any inaccuracy in them must be too small to affect the argument. These numbers, added together, make 51,556 admissions to full communion. Meanwhile, in forty years, the deaths of communicants reported and recorded had been more than 20,000; about 8,000 had been ex-communicated, many of whom had not been restored to the communion; and about 1,500 had, without change of faith or practice, been formed into a distinct organization.

In 1850, according to an official census, the native population was 82,203. According to the average annual rate of diminution for fourteen years then ending, it was 85,691 in 1848. The number of communicants that year was 23,796, or 27-77 to 100 of the whole native population. Calculating on the same principle, the native population in 1856 was 69,051. The communicants were 23,652, or 34-25 in a 100. On the same principle, we find the native population in 1863 to have been 65,653. The communicants were then, counting the 1,500 seceders mentioned above, 21,179, or 32-26 in 100.

And here it seems expedient to mention expressly, what all who are acquainted with Puritan churches know already, that these communicants were not persons who had merely been baptized, and therefore counted as church members. The number who had been baptized, including the children of communicants, was much greater. Nor were they merely persons who, after baptism, had learned to repeat certain forms of words, and practice or submit to certain ceremonies. They were all of them persons who, after examination, had been

deemed by the churches to be persons spiritually renewed in the temper of their minds; men and women who had given such accounts of their own thoughts and feelings in respect to themselves and religion, that they appeared to the communicants, who were their neighbors, and knew their characters for intelligence and veracity, to have repented of their sins, and to have believed on the Lord Jesus Christ, as the Scriptures require in order to salvation, and to give satisfactory evidence of the reality of that change by Puritan strictness of morals and Puritan habits of devotion, and who, after their admission, continued to exhibit the same evidence of Puritan piety—as otherwise they would have been cut off by excommunication.

To these, in order to estimate the whole number of Protestants in connection with the mission, must be added the number, often large, especially in the Sandwich Islands, who exhibited some indications of piety, but in whom, in their own judgment, or that of the church, the evidences of regeneration were not yet sufficiently developed to warrant their admission to the communion. We must add, also, large numbers of those who, though not supposed by themselves or others to have been the subjects of any spiritual change, yet admitted the truth of the doctrines taught by the missionaries, were more or less punctual in attendance on their instructions, and considered themselves members of their congregations. And yet again, we must add the yet unregenerate children of the communicants, who had generally been baptized, and the yet unbaptized children of the other classes just mentioned.

According to Dr. Mullen's "Statistical Tables for India and Ceylon in 1862," quoted by Rev. W. Ellis, the native Christians were 153,816; communicants, 30,249, or 19·66 in 100. In the missions with which Mr. Ellis himself has been connected, the communicants have been 20 or 25 in 100 of the "adherents to Christianity" as taught by these missions. In New England Puritan parishes generally, we believe that not more than one-third of the parishioners, including children, are communicants. In many, the proportion is much less. Assum-

ing one-third as the proportion of communicants to "adherents," or "native Christians," the whole number of natives connected with the missions must have been 71,388 out of a native population of 85,691 in 1848. In 1856, it must, on the same assumption, have been 70,956, while the native population was only 69,051; so that more than one-third must then have been communicants. In 1863, the number of "native Christians" connected with both branches of the mission must have been 63,537, out of a native population of 65,653; leaving 2,116 natives not under the instruction of the mission. Evidently in 1856, there had been large additions to the number of the communicants, including many whom it was afterwards found necessary to excommunicate. In 1865, the communicants, further reduced by deaths and excommunications, were reported as being 17,521. Counting both branches, and supposing both to have diminished in the same proportion, the whole number was 18,855, out of a native population of 63,699, or 29·6 in 100. The "native Christians" connected with both branches must have been about 56,565, if the communicants were only one-third of them; leaving 7,134 not under the instruction of the Puritan missionaries; either Roman Catholics, or Mormons, or adherents of the new "Reformed Catholic church," or unconnected with any church. Probably, however, many of them were persons who had been excommunicated, but were still under the care of the mission.

We repeat the remark, that these statistics may be slightly inaccurate. Among the communicants, some, though very few, may have been of foreign birth. Some admissions, excommunications and deaths, may have failed to be promptly recorded or reported. There may have been errors in the official census taken by the government. But there is no reason to suspect any greater errors than usually attend official statistics, collected and published in good faith. They show, beyond plausible cavil, that the people of the Islands had very generally attached themselves to the Puritan missionaries as their religious teachers, and that an unusually large proportion of them were communicants in the churches; members of these Puritan churches, "in good and regular standing."

Whatever any may think of Puritanism, whether it be good or bad, the gospel of Christ or "another gospel," the mission had been successful in teaching it. The missionaries, and those who sustained them, believed it to be the gospel of Christ in its purest and most efficient form. Their object was, to bring those Islanders to a hearty adoption of it as their religion, as the best means of promoting their well-being, both in time and in eternity. By the blessing of God on their labors, as they believed, and not by the help of the Devil, they had brought nearly the whole population of the Islands to think it worth learning, and put themselves under their instruction, and nearly one-third, a proportion scarcely paralleled in the history of missions, so to adopt it as to produce, in the judgment of those most competent to judge, a radical change of character. Their enterprise, in respect to its main object, instead of having been a failure, has been a most remarkable success.

And this success has been achieved in the face of a most violent, unscrupulous and persistent opposition. From the beginning, it had been opposed by immoral foreigners, chiefly English and American, because they hated the Puritan morality which it practiced and taught. It was opposed by some British subjects, because it was American and not British, and its success, they feared, might promote American interests, to the detriment of British.

Through their procurement, a Roman Catholic mission was commenced in 1827. The Jesuit missionaries, according to their own official reports, published in the "Annals of the Propagation of the Faith," managed to land and remain on the Islands by fraud and duplicity from the first; and after some of them had been sent to their brethren in California, permission for their residence was extorted from the government by French cannon. They have always been the bitter and unscrupulous opposers of the American mission. How many proselytes they have made, we have no means of estimating. From their own account of their own character for veracity, just mentioned, it is obvious that no reliance can be placed on

their statements. They count, as "Catholics," all whom they have baptized, and baptize all who are willing to receive that rite from them, whatever may be their characters. Such is their practice everywhere and always. Since that mission was commenced, the "Annals of the Propagation of the Faith" has given an account of some thousands of infants, made Catholics in the interior of China, by a process which it pronounced "beautiful." Certain women, whose religion was not known to their neighbors, professed skill in medicine; and when an infant appeared to be at the point of death, presented themselves, and requested permission, which was readily granted, to perform a short ceremony, to ensure the favorable effect of their medicine. The ceremony consisted in repeating the form of baptism in Latin, which none present understood, and sprinkling a little water on the sick child. In this way, according to the "Annals," the souls of many thousands of infants had been saved within a few years. Of course, if any of these infants lived, they were counted as members of the Roman Catholic church, though neither they nor their neighbors suspected it. How many such "beautiful" baptisms may have been performed in the Sandwich Islands, we know not. We know that some have joined them who had been excommunicated from the Puritan churches for immorality, and some who could not gain admission to them; and such have taken their children with them. If they have made any other proselytes, the fact has not come to our knowledge. Their bishop, in 1862, reckoned the whole population at 69,000, of whom 23,000 were "Catholics," 23,000 "heretics," and 23,000 "infidels."* By "heretics," he evidently means communicants in the Puritan churches, whose number he has given with an approach towards accuracy unusual in a Roman Catholic missionary. The other members of the Puritan congregations are his 23,000 "infidels." Thus he gives the Puritans two-thirds of the population, and claims one-third for his

* According to another statement, Catholics, 23,500, Heretics, 23,500, Infidels, 23,300.

own church; a claim utterly incredible, unless on the supposition of numerous secret baptisms, like those in China. The most credible estimate that we have seen, makes the Romanists about one-tenth as numerous as the Protestants: say five or six thousand.

Much later, we know not the exact date, came the Mormons. Their leading man in October, 1861, officially reported the number of Mormon adults at 3,580, besides 1,000 unbaptized minors over seven years of age. As their principal settlement is on the small grazing island of Lanai, which, in 1860, had only 646 inhabitants, having increased 46 in seven years, his statement must be an enormous exaggeration. Perhaps so many, by estimate, had at some time heard Mormon elders preach, or had traded with Mormons, or done something else for which they were claimed and counted.

Yet it is plain that, after deducting the probable number of Romanists and Mormons from the whole native population, the remainder will not be three times the number of Puritan communicants. Of the eight or nine-tenths of the native population of the Islands, who could not be enticed away from the instruction of the Puritan missionaries, more than one-third were members of Puritan churches, "in good and regular standing." As we have already stated, they had been admitted after examination as to their character for religious knowledge, piety and morality, and had practiced Puritan piety and morality so far as not to be excommunicated; though the discipline had been so severe as to excommunicate about 8,000 of those who had been admitted; so severe that some of those Puritan missionaries themselves, on reflection, feared that it had been too strict; so severe that the maligners of the mission hold it up to public abhorrence, as imposing unreasonable and intolerable restraints on the inclinations of the people. It is plain, therefore, that in the extent to which the Puritan mission had, in the face of all opposition and competition, secured the confidence of the people, and in the power of its teachings over the minds and lives of its adherents, the mission had been remarkably successful; immensely

more successful than any mission attempted by its assailants dares pretend to have been. The facts leave no opening for any objection against the mission's work, except objections against Puritanism itself.

Next, what have been the facts, concerning the influence of the mission on morals?

If the morals of Puritanism are better than those of Heathenism, what has already been shown is a sufficient answer. The facts that nearly one-third of the people maintain their regular standing in the Puritan churches, notwithstanding the conceded strictness of their discipline, and that far the greater part of the remaining two-thirds are firm adherents of the Puritan teachers, show a moral influence very great and very beneficial. But we need not rely on this exclusively.

When the mission commenced, idolatry had been demoralizing this people for many centuries, and was rapidly extinguishing it in the poison of its own vices. They had no idea of any God who loves righteousness and hates iniquity, and of course, no idea of a future retribution for good or evil deeds. "The long darkness of heathenism had swept away both the idea and the name of a Supreme Being, and had effectually annihilated from their minds all his attributes, leaving no just notion of holiness, justice, love or mercy, and had buried in oblivion every term expressive of even the simple sentiments of honesty and morality." Their language "was incapable of expressing, without much ambiguity and confusion, the common notions of right and wrong."* Their only rule of action, except their own inclinations, was the "thought," that is, the expressed will, of some chief, or the fear of some enemy. Gaming, drunkenness, theft, robbery and murder were common. The licentious intercourse of the sexes was unbounded. Men had several wives at the same time, and wives several husbands; and both changed them at their pleasure. This licentiousness was not introduced by foreigners. The first discoverers found it there. Some of the male

*Dibble's Sandwich Islands, p. iii.

chiefs proposed to get the iron on board of the ships by robbery; but Kamakahelei, a woman of high rank, proposed another way to obtain it. She sent her own daughter, Selemahoalani, and other women on board, to get it by "gratifying" the strangers. And thus this vicious intercourse with foreigners began. Capt. Cook was desirous to prevent it; but, "if the discipline of his own crew could have been strictly enforced, the eagerness of the women was not to be repressed."* So thoroughly imbued was the native mind with this vice, that neither men nor women could refuse an invitation to practice it, without feeling that the refusal was an act of meanness, to be ashamed of.† As might be expected when such were the relations of the sexes, infanticide was common. "It is estimated by foreigners who came first among the people, and had the best opportunity of judging, that at least two-thirds of the infants born, perished by the hands of their own parents."‡

An important witness, long resident among them, and with good means of information, thus sums up "the Hawaiian character in its general caste," admitting, however, a few "instances of a better disposition:"

"From childhood, no pure social affections were inculcated. Existence was due rather to accident than design. If spared by a parent's hand, a boy lived to become the victim of a priest, an offering to a blood-loving duty, or to experience a living death from preternatural fears; a slave not only to his own superstitions, but to the terrors and caprices of his chief. He was not to know freedom either in life or property; but in its stead a pitiless tyranny, reaping where it had not sown. To him existed no social circle to purify by kindly affections; no moral teachings enkindled a love of truth; no revelation cheered his earthly course, or brightend his future hopes. Theft, lying, drunkenness, revelling, treachery, revenge, lewdness, infanticide and murder were familiar to his youth, and too often became the practice of his manhood. Guilt was measured by success or failure. Justice was but retaliation,

* Jarves, p. 57. Bingham, p. 31. † Dibble, p. 127. ‡ Dibble, p. 128.

and the law arrayed each man's hand against his brother. Games and amusements were but means of gambling and sensual excitement. An individual selfishness which sought present gratification, momentary pleasure or lasting results, regardless of unholy measures or instruments, was the all-predominating passion. The most attractive quality of the Hawaiian—it cannot be called a virtue, was a kind of easy, listless good-nature, never to be depended upon when their interests or passions were aroused."*

When the mission was commenced, idol-worship had just been abolished, and the danger of being offered in sacrifice at the dictation of a priest, no longer existed; though an indefinite fear of the priest's vengeance still remained. In other respects, the description was still applicable.

And what is the state of morals there now? Is it, as "His Grace, the Lord Bishop of Honolulu" said at New York, "ten times worse?" Can "His Grace" form any idea of a state of morals "ten times worse?" If he can, must he not have a mind strangely fertile in the production of vile ideas? If not, must he not be a man who brings damaging charges against his neighbor, without affixing any definite meaning to his own words? But let us look at the facts.

As the Islands have now a regular government, printed statutes, and courts of judicature, which are courts of record, we may ascertain some of the facts on official testimony. We have before us the Biennial Report of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court for 1860; about the time when the mission of Bishop Staley was planned. From this it appears that the whole number of convictions for crime before all the Courts in the whole kingdom had been 4,007 in 1857; 3,364 in 1858; and 3,284 in 1859. Of these, 1,919 in 1857, 1,730 in 1858, and 1,573 in 1859, had been for drunkenness, which the Government would have suppressed very effectually, but for the introduction of French wines and brandies at the mouth of French cannon, by order of the French Government; having 2,088 in 1857,

*Jarves, p. 51.

1,614 in 1858, and 1,531 in 1859, as the number of convictions for other crimes. Of these convictions, the most numerous—589 in 1859, were for "adultery and fornication." If both parties were punished, as they ought to have been, and as the law requires, the whole number of instances of these crimes, judicially ascertained in the whole kingdom, was less than 300. Our readers, if we happen to have any in England, where adultery and seduction are no crimes, but merely trespasses, like injuries to any domestic animal, for which the trespasser is liable to pay to the injured husband or father such an amount of £. s. d. as a jury shall adjudge the damage to have been, may be surprised to learn that there were any convictions for such acts. But they should recollect that the Hawaiian criminal code, being prompted by a Puritan religion, is of a higher and stricter type than the English, and makes every transgression of the Seventh commandment a crime, punishable by law. It is a direct result of their being taught their religion by those whom "His Grace" the Bishop of Oxford calls "the descendants of the stern old Puritans of New England, if any thing, rather more severe, sour and vinegar-like, carrying with them the iron code of Connecticut, the most severe ever inflicted upon any people on the earth;" and their strictness against this very sin has been the principal provocation of those calumnies against the mission, which "His Grace" has seen fit to sanction with his Episcopal authority, and circulate at second hand—we hope, without understanding them.

Of the 942 other convictions in 1859, 185 were for assault and battery, 86 for affray, 5 for aiding seamen to desert, 1 for arson, 9 for burglary, 6 for cruelty to animals, 33 for disturbing quiet of the night, 57 for disorderly conduct, 2 for forgery, 123 for furious riding, 11 for gross cheating, 24 for gambling, 167 for larceny, 19 for petty larceny, 8 for murder, 8 for perjury, 4 for profanity, 14 for riot, 38 for Sabbath-breaking, 1 for selling on Sunday, 5 for vagrancy, and the others for various offences.

How much of this immorality was due to the presence of

foreign seamen, the Report does not inform us; but the proportion must have been large. In 1863, the foreign arrivals noticed in the Custom House Reports were, ships of war, 7; merchantmen, 88; whalers, 102; total, 197. The crews of all these vessels must have their time on shore, in which to compensate themselves by indulgence on land for months of restraint and privation at sea. Every body knows the demoralizing influence of such causes in London, Liverpool, New York; and in the comparatively small ports of the Pacific, where seamen commonly arrive after long voyages, they must operate with much greater intensity. Make fair deductions on this account, and then compare the result with equally minute and accurate returns from England herself, (if you can get them) and then say, whether Bishop Staley needed to leave his native land, to find a field for his labors in the cause of good morals, in the Sandwich Islands. Recall to mind the state of this people in respect to morals when the Puritan mission began its labors, and say whether, in this respect, that mission has been a failure, or a success.

With this official record before us, we shall not dwell upon the testimony of the Hon. R. H. Dana, an Episcopalian, of unquestioned Christian character, a lawyer, whose large acquirements, extensive practice, and various travels, have rendered him an unusually competent judge, and who says: "In no place in the world that I have visited, are the rules which control vice and regulate amusements so strict, yet so reasonable and so fairly enforced." "As to the interior, it is well known that a man may travel alone, with money, in the wildest spots, unarmed." We shall just mention that of Dr. Anderson: "I did not see a drunken native while on the Islands. The law forbids polygamy and polyandry, and they have passed away. Theft and robbery are less frequent there than in the United States. We slept at night with open doors, had no apprehension, and lost nothing. Licentiousness still exists outside of the church, and is one of the easily-besetting sins within it; but it now every where shuns the day, and is subjected to the discipline of the church. Nor do mothers

any more bury their infant children alive, nor children their aged and infirm parents."

But we must notice briefly, the latest proof that we have seen, that the labors of the American Missionaries have "ended in failure, so far as the moral and religious character of the Hawaiians is concerned."* The proof is, that certain statistics, collected by Mr. Manley Hopkins, show "that the number on the register of "public women" is 1-8 per cent. of the whole female population above 20; and that of those so registered, two-thirds are married women, some of whom continue to live with their husbands while leading a life of vice and infamy." "Two-thirds of the abandoned women are married persons! The thing is incredible, were it not attested."

On an arithmetical question, it is not wise to be frightened by an exclamation point. Let us look at this matter with calmness and care.

When the American Mission commenced its labors, all the women on the Islands were such as are now called "abandoned." They all lived what is now reckoned "a life of vice and infamy," even while living with their two or three husbands each, and their husbands, with very few exceptions, if any, did not object to it. Kamahamaha, it is said, wished to keep Kawhumanu to himself; but that was one of that remarkable man's peculiarities, and his prohibition does not appear to have included his other wives. Indeed, there is no reason to suppose that the idea of chastity, as understood throughout Christendom, existed in any Hawaiian mind. Now, "abandoned women" are "registered," and thus distinguished from others, as "leading a life of vice and infamy." This, itself, whatever the proportion so registered may be, shows a mighty advance towards universal purity. This one fact shows that the labors of the mission have not "ended in failure."

But let us look at the proportions. It does not appear why the number "registered" is compared with the whole num-

* *Colonial Church Chronicle*, London, July, 1836, pp. 267, 270.

ber above 20, making the proportion greater than if compared with the number above 18, or 16, or 14. There is some ground for suspicion, too, that these statistics really relate only to Honolulu, where the influence of foreign sailors is most pernicious, and not to the whole kingdom, as this writer seems to represent. But let all that pass. Consider, that 1-8 per cent is 18 in 1,000; and two-thirds of that number is 12 in 1,000. When the American Mission arrived, of 1,000 Hawaiian women, all were unchaste. Now, 18 of them are "abandoned women," and 982 of good character. Of the 18, "two-thirds," that is, 12, are "married women, some of whom," two or three perhaps, "continue to live with their husbands," and the rest have run away, or been deserted or discarded. What a change! Why, this alone is enough to pay for the "forty years' assiduous evangelizing—two entire generations born and bred in the Christian faith—public schools in every village—religious revivals almost every year—prayer-meetings innumerable," at which this writer sneers so loftily.

We repeat our challenge to the calumniators of the Mission. Let them show, if they can, that any mission of their own has been equally successful in promoting good morals. That the mission has been "a failure" in its influence on the intellect of the nation, its calumniators have shrunk from asserting. The facts are too palpable and too conclusive for even their audacity to brave. Bishop Staley himself says: "We have ever admitted the zeal and success of the Calvinist missionaries here, in spreading, partly by their own teaching, partly through the influence of the chiefs, that system which they believed to be the true gospel of Christ, in giving the nation a written language, in translating the Holy Scriptures, and in establishing schools." This concedes, that in its influence on the intellect of the nation, the mission has not been "a failure." It concedes, too, that in teaching what the missionaries believed to be the gospel, it has been no "failure." The attempt to take a part of the credit of this acknowledged "success" from the mission and transfer it to "the chiefs," is a palpable sophism, as the chiefs exerted no such influence till the missionaries taught them.

But let us again hear that very competent witness, Hon. R. H. Dana: "It is no small thing to say of the missionaries of the American Board, that in less than forty years they have taught this whole people to read and to write, to c'pher and to sew. They have given them an alphabet, grammar and dictionary; preserved their language from extinction; given it a literature, and translated into it the Bible and works of devotion, science and entertainment, etc. etc. They have established schools, reared up native teachers, and so pressed their work, that now the proportion of inhabitants who can read and write, is greater than in New England; and whereas they found these Islanders a nation of half-naked savages, living in the surf and on the sand, eating raw fish, fighting among themselves, tyrannized over by feudal chiefs, and abandoned to sensuality, they now see them decently clothed, recognizing the law of marriage, knowing something of accounts, going to school and public worship with more regularity than the people do at home, and the more elevated of them taking part in conducting the affairs of the constitutional monarchy under which they live, holding seats on the judicial bench, and in the legislative chambers, and filling posts in the local magistracies." "In every district are free schools for natives. In these they are taught reading, writing, singing by note, arithmetic, grammar, and geography, by native teachers. At Lahainaluna is the Normal school for natives, where the best scholars from the district schools are received and carried to an advanced stage of education, and those who desire it, are fitted for the duties of teachers." He also mentions, with just commendations, several other institutions; especially the Royal School for natives at Honolulu, and the College at Punahon, where he attended recitations in Greek, Latin, and Mathematics, and advised the young men to remain to the end of the course, instead of going elsewhere in the hope of better instruction.

As to the education of "the more elevated," it would be enough, could we lay before the reader the debates in the Convention of 1864, for revising the Constitution of the king-

dom, where native delegates showed a thorough knowledge of the principles of free government, and replied impromptu to members born and educated in England, France, and Germany, reminding them of the state of affairs in their native countries. On a proposal to restrict the right of suffrage to those having a certain amount of property or income, as a means of stimulating those excluded to improve their condition, Mr. Wana reminded his English opponent, that the experiment had been tried in England for 240 years, and they had poor-houses there still. Another native member reminded a member born in France who favored some restriction on the press, that if he were editing a paper in his native land, he would be liable to a "warning" for his first indiscreet expression, and to seizure and confiscation if he persisted in saying what the government did not like. But our limited space forbids, and we will only give two samples of the results of the influence of the mission on Hawaiian mind, and give them in the words of its calumniators.

In an "Occasional Paper of the Hawaiian Church Mission," published at London, Oxford, and Cambridge in 1865, we are told (page 38) that His Majesty Kamehameha IV. translated "the English Prayer-Book into the native language," with a Preface, which was published by the Christian Knowledge Society, with an Introduction, containing the following words: "It was a work which he was very competent to execute; for he must not be thought of as an uncultivated barbarian: he was a man of dignified presence, and graceful and winning manners, with the education and habits of an English gentleman. He had special qualifications for the task which he undertook, in a perfect knowledge of English as well as of his own language, the previous habit of literary composition, and the possession of a considerable amount of theological knowledge." "It may be necessary to assure the reader that the Preface is entirely the King's own work." "It is a remarkable production, when we consider that the writer was in the third generation from the murderous savages with whom Captain Cook's voyages have made us familiar, and that he acquired his knowledge of the doctrines of the Church of Eng-

land entirely from his own reading, without any one to guide or help him."

And did the Puritan system of education enable him to find a Queen, who was a "help-meet for him?" Some time after his death, his widow visited England. The London *Saturday Review*, of September 9, 1865, says of her: "All who have met her, unite in describing Queen Emma as a person endowed with very remarkable gifts. No one who has read her history could have been unprepared to meet a character of great goodness and gentleness. But goodness and gentleness, we are thankful to believe, are not yet lost among the intricate mazes of the most artificial society, and are compatible with widely different degrees of social experience. What no one was quite prepared for in a traveler suddenly, and for the first time, transported from a quiet group of Pacific Islands into the vortex of European life, was that even and well-developed balance of high qualities in which nature and position combine to produce that rare creature, the real *grande dame*—the indescribable combination of self-forgetfulness and self-assertion, of dignity and simplicity, of personal grace and mutual tact, which constitutes true queendom."

And this is from an article which expresses the bitterest hatred of "the gospel according to the Pilgrim Fathers," and the most decided unwillingness that the Sandwich Islands, with their "commodious harbors," "at the midway" of the "magnificent commerce" of the Pacific, should be "gobbled up by omnivorous yankeedom." It was not written in a spirit friendly to the American Mission, or anything American; and yet it bears decisive testimony to the good influence of those missionaries as educators. There is an abundance of similar testimony concerning the same royal lady; but this is enough.

Yet we must not forget to confess, before leaving this topic, that Bishop Staley, in his Pastoral Address, 1865, (page 13) charges the American missionaries with one omission which we cannot deny; an omission, as he thinks, most injurious to the morals and piety of the people. "Their old athletic games and *hulas* were from the first *tabooed*." (Not the mission-

aries, but the chiefs, as soon as they had learned to understand and appreciate the distinction between virtue and vice, *tabooed* such amusements as they knew to be productive of the latter.) "I do not know enough of those *hulas* and those games, to be able to say how far they were right or wrong. I am told some of them were very licentious, while others led to gambling and dissipation. Be it so. Were Christian games and Christian dances taught in their place?"

We confess, they were not,—by the missionaries. No one of them, we presume, ever surmised that it was his duty to teach dancing. Very possibly, not one of them was competent to teach it; as we think there is no professor of the saltatory art in any of the theological seminaries where they were educated. The knowledge of waltzes, cotillions, and the like, has reached Honolulu in some way; but we believe the missionaries cannot claim the credit of introducing them. But is not Bishop Staley in the same condemnation? Does he teach a dancing-school? Does any one of his clergy? We have seen no statement to that effect. And if not, is he not afraid that his "system" will "endanger," as he says that of the Puritans has done, through this omission, "a fearful amount of unreality and hypocrisy?" We advise him to look to this matter, lest, knowing the duty of a missionary to the heathen, as the poor Puritans did not, and still neglecting to do it, he be "beaten with many stripes."

When a heathen nation is converted to genuine Christianity, a change in the social and civil structure of that nation is an inevitable result. Relations, and consequent duties, of rulers to people, of people to rulers, and of people to each other, of which they formerly had no idea, and for which their old heathen system made no provision, are revealed to them. Rulers desire to govern, and the people have to obey and support the government on Christian principles, and for Christian purposes. Old usages, seen to be unjust or injurious, are discontinued; and new usages, seen to be necessary for the general welfare, are introduced. These changes may go on gradually, till the new code of usages, sanctioned by time and the

national approbation, becomes the acknowledged constitution of the realm, as in England; or the greatness and obvious urgency of the changes may be such, as to induce a deliberate reconsideration and re-arrangement of the whole frame-work of government, and the adoption of a new and written constitution, as in the Sandwich Islands. In such cases, especially of the latter kind, it is scarcely possible that the religious teachers, whose instructions have disclosed the want of a better form of government, should not be consulted as to the best methods of meeting that want. It has been so at the Sandwich Islands. The chiefs, as gradually enlightened by Christianity, first issued edicts, prohibiting certain immoralities; then issued a few rules for preventing injustice between man and man, and between chiefs and their retainers; and finally established the Constitution of a limited monarchy, with its King, House of Nobles, and House of Representatives elected by the people; its Prime Minister, Secretaries of the Treasury and other Departments, and its supreme and subordinate Courts, administering justice according to a written code, enacted by legislative authority. The constitution has been several times revised and amended; and some of the last amendments, in the opinion of many, both in that kingdom and elsewhere, were not improvements. Still, as it is now, it must be classed among the few good constitutions in the world. Few nations of Europe have one equally good; and in none, perhaps, are the laws and their administration better adapted to the real wants of the people.

In accomplishing these changes, some of the missionaries have been consulted; but they have sedulously abstained from interference, and have kept themselves aloof from this work as far as duty would permit. They doubtless knew, that among the benefactors of the human race, the judgment of the world assigns the highest ranks to legislators who are the founders of states. They were invited and urged to do that work, and earn that rank. But they had a still higher work to do; a work which the world, by its wisdom, knew not; the work of transforming ignorant, vicious, unprincipled heathens

into competent and conscientious legislators; and they did it. In respect to this indirect but inevitable result, the mission has been a success.

And as a result of all this success in promoting good morals, good education and good government, the arts, the industries, and even the elegancies of civilized life have sprung up, have taken root, and are growing. Of this, proof enough to convince any thinking person, may be found in the Custom House Returns for 1865: Total imports, $1,946,265,68; exports, $1,808,257,55; the difference being, of course, the profits on exported articles sold abroad, during or near that year. Of the exports, $1,430,211,82 were of Domestic Produce, the amount of which exported in 1864 was $1,613,328,81; in 1863, $744,413,54; in 1862, $586,541,87; in 1861, $476,872,74; showing a regular annual increase, which had continued, though with some irregularities, since 1846, when it was $301,625,00. Among these exports were 15,318,097 lbs. of sugar; 534,937 gallons of molasses, 7,882 gallons of syrup; 154.257 lbs. of rice, and 263,705 lbs. of coffee. Among the imports were clothing, hats, boots, valued at $130,796,47; crockery and glass ware, $11,478,45; dry goods, $393,863,53; fancy goods, millinery, etc., $58,224,63; iron and steel, $37,163,69; hardware, agricultural implements, tools, etc., $101,961,74; stationary, books, etc., $24,712, 09. Such a commerce,—the buying of such amounts of such articles for their own consumption, and paying for them by such products of their own labor, by a population of about 70,000, implies the pervasive presence of the arts and industries of civilized life.

We are aware that much of this commerce is managed by naturalized or unnaturalized persons of foreign birth, and some of the sugar and coffee plantations are their property. And we know, too, that others of those plantations are owned and managed by natives; and that, without the civilization resulting from missionary labors, foreigners could not have done what they have; nor could merchants, foreign and native, have sold for consumption, that large amount of such foreign goods, as appear on the Custom House Returns. That the

native laborers generally are comfortably and decently clothed, adequately fed, and enjoy the comforts and conveniences of civilized life necessary in that climate, nobody denies.

In the Constitutional Convention of 1864, in reply to a proposal to introduce some English usage, a delegate of German birth said: "He had no wish to be anglicized. The condition of the common people in England was lower than that of our natives." And he quoted a work of Joseph Kay, appointed by the University of Oxford, to investigate the condition of the lower classes, to show their depression, poverty, irreligion, and ignorance. No one of British birth attempted any reply. Attorney General Harris, a native of New Hampshire, to parry the argument, said that "the poor of England were so from over-population, want of land, the full supply of labor wanted, and sharp competition;" but no one attempted to deny the facts.

This remote but natural result of their labors shows that the Mission has been no "failure," but a decided success. And that the American Mission in the Sandwich Islands has been remarkably successful in all its direct objects and reasonably expected results, is well-known in England; among members of the Church of England; among prelates of the Church of England. Of the numerous proofs of this knowledge now on our table, we will use only one. We quote from the *Essex Herald* of October 24, 1865.

On the Thursday previous, "an important and influential meeting" was holden at Chelmsford, in aid of the mission of Bishop Staley. Queen Emma, then on a visit to the Bishop of Rochester, was present. She "entered the assembly room, leaning on the arm of the Bishop of Rochester, who escorted her to a seat by his side on the platform; the whole assembly rising at her entrance, and remaining standing until she had taken her seat." The Bishop presided, and made the opening address. Speaking of the American missionaries, he said:

"He did not know of anything at all in modern times to compare with the fervent, evangelizing spirit shown in this good work. They introduced schools; they formed a lan-

guage, so as to be able to reach and instruct the people's minds; they translated the Bible, and gave themselves in every way they could to the work; and finally, the result of their labors was, that Christianity was in a manner spread over the whole country. The people assembled every Sunday to hear the gospel preached to them; schools were established for the instruction of the young; and family prayer was introduced into the houses of those who had been brought into the faith. Thus they saw that a great work had been done, though the missionaries were of course constantly meeting with difficulties and drawbacks, and fallings-back on old feelings which were not entirely eradicated, such as the belief in witchcraft, which, he was told, was not wholly eradicated from some of our Essex villages." "And all this had been followed by a vast improvement in social order and legislation. They were enabled to introduce a vast number of measures, such as were adopted in civilized and Christian lands, and indeed the state of the country was totally changed, as was evidenced by courtesy and kindliness of feeling which pervaded the whole land, as compared with the former state of the people."

After answering several other objections to the Mission, he noticed one on which Bishop Staley delights to dwell. He said:

"Then it was said there was still a great extent of female degeneracy in those Islands. Perhaps this was true; but it was not fair to put it in that way. Let them look at the female degradation in our own large towns. He had served as a clergyman for twelve years in a London parish, and the degradation there of a like kind was of the most lamentable character. He served for a like period at Southampton; and he ventured to say that the state of things described by the writer referred to, who, he supposed, was speaking of the seaport of Honolulu, was not worse than the state of things in Southampton."

These statements, be it remembered, were made in the presence, and as the speaker and the hearers must have believed, with the approbation, of Queen Emma, who was herself a pu-

pil of the American Mission, and could not but know whether they were true. The good Bishop, as is manifest from other parts of his speech, then expected that Bishop Staley's mission would act in courteous and friendly co-operation with the American, and not as its opponent and calumniator.

And now, having shown that the impression which its adversaries have endeavored to make concerning the American Mission, its labors and results, is so directly and so grossly the reverse of truth, must we examine and expose the numerous items of which this false sum total is made up? Must we notice in detail, the assumptions of facts that never happened, the suppression of facts that are notorious, the exaggerations of some facts and understatements of others, the distortions, the misrepresentations, the sophistical inferences and "evil-surmisings," by which the calumniators of the Mission have sought to make their false conclusion appear true, or at least plausible? We decline the needless drudgery. That work has been abundantly done, in numerous publications, periodical and occasional, in the United States, in England, and at the Sandwich Islands. We would refer especially to two of them. One is, the Review of Bishop Staley's Pastoral Address, by Rev. W. D. Alexander, President of Oahu College; published at Honolulu in 1865. The position of the author gave him an accurate knowledge of many facts, not easily accessible to any but a resident at the Islands. The other is a pamphlet of 108 pages, by Rev. William Ellis, once a missionary in the Sandwich Islands, then, for some years, a Secretary of the London Missionary Society; since, well known in connection with Madagascar; and having personal knowledge of the earlier movements which have ended in the establishment of Bishop Staley's mission.

But the question will arise, By what temptations can "the accuser of the Brethren" have beguiled any body into this work of defamation? There have been several temptations; some of which throw such light on the general subject, that it seems worth while to mention them. The first is thus described by Mr. Jarves, in his History of the Hawaiian Islands,

(pp. 113, 114, 115) speaking of the time when the Mission was commenced, "and much later:"

"The native women were but too proud to form connections with white men; the white men were equally free in the gratification of their sensual appetites. The Temperance reformation was then in its infancy. The Pacific was notorious for its facilities for dissipation, and its lack of moral restraint." "The whites settled on the Islands were, with exceptions, it is true, a dissolute race, fostering in the natives the very habits they were too prone to indulge in by nature and by custom, but which the missionary steadily frowned upon as at variance with the morality of the gospel. Under the circumstances, the whites could not but feel reproved by their example, and irritated by their preaching. Hence arose an enmity towards the Mission, confined, at its commencement, to that class whose depraved appetites or selfish interests were affected by the increase of virtue and knowledge." "As that knowledge increased among the people, they inquired the cost of foreign merchandize, and drew comparisons between it and the prices of the traders. The result went naturally to diminish extravagant desires and to lessen the chances of extravagant profits." "At this juncture commenced the struggle between the two parties; the one to uphold morality, strengthen the nation, and implant civilization on the basis of the word of God; the other, with no avowed purpose of opposing these views, but with maintaining an influence favorable to their own less rigid principles, and friendly to their personal desires."

Mr. Dana, as he states in his letter already quoted, found the same class of men there in 1860. He says:

"I sought information from all, foreign and native, friendly and unfriendly; and the conclusion to which I came is, that the best men, those who are best acquainted with the history of things here, hold in high esteem the labors and conduct of the missionaries. The mere seekers of pleasure, power or gain, do not like their influence; and those persons who sympathized with that officer of the American Navy, who com-

pelled the authorities to allow women to go off to his ship by opening his ports and threatening to bombard the town, naturally are hostile to the mission."

These are the men who first invented and circulated nearly all the calumnies which the Bishops of Oxford and Honolulu have adopted and sanctioned. They first described the American missionaries as "severe, sour, and vinegar-like," and charged them with getting the control of the Government, imposing "the iron code of Connecticut," and forbidding innocent amusements. Mr. Jarves and Mr. Dana have correctly described the men, and their motives.

These men, in a few years, found that mere slander was not sufficent to arrest the progress of the gospel and its reforming influences. They needed the aid of a rival mission, less "severe, sour and vinegar-like." For this purpose they (the British Consul, Charlton, taking a leading part in the movement) procured the introduction of the Roman Catholic mission in 1827; and by their help that mission was enabled to maintain itself in the Islands and to make some progress. But gradually two difficulties showed themselves. One was, the dislike of the natives, generally, to Romanism. They disliked it, first, because of the fraud, falsehood, duplicity, and violence with which it had been introduced; and afterwards, because they found—to use their own language—that it consisted in "the worship of images and dead men's bones, and tabus on meat, just like the old religion of the Islands, which they had found to be bad and thrown away." The other difficulty was, that the establishment of a Roman Catholic mission, mostly French, gave the French Government too plausible a pretext for interfering with the affairs of the Islands; a pretext of which that government availed itself to an extent which seemed dangerous to British interests.

To meet these difficulties, another mission was needed, and circumstances favored its formation. The foreign population had increased to nearly 3,000, and that of Honolulu alone to about 1,600. Among them were families preferring the liturgical form of worship used in Protestant Episcopal churches.

The King wished to be a recognized member of some church, but did not exhibit those evidences of personal piety, without which no Puritan church would receive him to its communion. He was persuaded that the liturgical service of the Church of England was what he wanted. There was apparently reason to hope that a church using that service might exert a good influence among those foreign residents who had hitherto stood aloof from every form of religion on the Islands. For these reasons, many thought it desirable that a clergyman of the Church of England, of suitable character, should be induced to settle at Honolulu, that a house of worship should be built for him, and a congregation gathered.

With such views, and no other, apparently, a correspondence was commenced. Rev. Richard Armstrong, D.D., President of the Board of Public Instruction, formerly one of the American missionaries, wrote, Feb. 29, 1860, to the Rev. William Ellis, of London, requesting his co-operation. This was enclosed in a letter from Hon. R. C. Wyllie, Minister of Foreign Affairs, who had already, by the King's order, written to Manley Hopkins, Esq., Hawaiian Consul-General in London. Dr. Armstrong stated that the King took much interest in the subject, and would guarantee $1,000 of the $2,000 necessary for the clergyman's salary. He wrote: "I may add, also, that I address you at the request of several Episcopalians, who are among our best people. They want a man of evangelical sentiments, of respectable talents, and most exemplary Christian life." He requested Mr. Ellis to see the Bishop of London on the subject. Mr. Ellis caused these letters to be laid before the Bishop of London, who expressed his approbation of the plan, and his readiness to assist in carrying it out. In all this, there was no request, no appearance of a desire, that an English Bishop and clergy, or an English Mission of any kind, should, be sent to the Islands.* It, however, furnished an opportunity, which was greedily seized.

* The London *Patriot*, of November 16, 1865, says that "Mr. Wyllie, the Foreign Minister, has repeatedly affirmed that the king did not desire the services of a Bishop."

Somebody in England determined that the Islands should have a Bishop, and a clergy, and everything else that pertains to the Episcopal sect in England. A Committee was appointed, by whom, unless by themselves, and consisting of whom, we know not. A correspondence was commenced, in which we know not what was said ; nor do we expect to know. "Early in the year 1861," Bishop Staley says, the King "wrote an autograph letter to Her Majesty, Queen Victoria. Soon after it had been received, in the month of April, a debate took place in the House of Convocation of Prelates of the Province of Canterbury, on the subject of Missionary Bishops, in the course of which the Bishop of Oxford stated : "That the King of the Sandwish Islands was most anxious to see a Bishop of the English Church established in his dominions." How he learned the fact of the King's anxiety does not appear. The natural implication is, that it was expressed in his letter to the Queen ; but neither Bishop exactly says so.

The publication of that letter, and of the whole correspondence which led to it, has often been called for, but in vain. We are not allowed to know by what means His Hawaiian Majesty was induced to change his mind, and desire "a Bishop of the English Church ;" or how he was induced to change it again, and receive a Bishop, not "of the English Church," but of "the Reformed Catholic Church." We are not allowed to know how far he actually assented to the withholding of what he asked for and the giving of something else ; or how far he knew what was to be sent him, till it actually came and showed itself. One thing, however, much to his Majesty's credit, we do know, on the authority of the Bishop of Oxford, as reported by the Bishop of Honolulu. "His Majesty mentioned," apparently in that letter, "that according to the Constitution of his kingdom, no established church in the proper sense of the term can be formed there ; that all creeds are left free, to be supported by voluntary contributions." The letters which he received from England, then, contained something, to which he deemed this an appropriate reply.

The substantial correctness of our statement is proved by

the highest ecclesiastical authority in England. The Archbishop of Canterbury wrote to Dr. Anderson, September 28, 1860: "I find it to be quite true, that certain individuals have formed themselves into a committee, for the purpose of *taking advantage* of the proposal of the King of Hawaii, and with the *ultimate view* of establishing a Bishop on the Polynesian Islands." "It is altogether untrue, that the archbishop encourages the plan, of which, in fact, he was ignorant until your letter arrived."* Dr. Andersons's letter was dated September 3d.

Notice, that in September, 1860, the plan was that of a few "individuals" in England. It was, not to comply with the request, but to "take advantage of the proposal," of the king; and the purpose of sending out a Bishop was then not immediate, but only "ultimate." The plan was unknown to the archbishop, "Primate of all England," till he learned it by a letter from Boston; and it did not receive his approbation. There had yet been no request of the king for a Bishop.

The self-constituted committee, however, persevered in their work; induced the king to write something which they called a request; induced the Bishop of London to abstain from further opposition; obtained a license from the Queen, through Earl Russell, December 11, 1861, expressing Her Majesty's "royal will and pleasure," that the archbishop of Canterbury should "consecrate the Rev. Thomas Nettleship Staley, Clerk, Master of Arts, a British subject, to be bishop of the United Church of England and Ireland in the Hawaiian or Sandwich Islands, and all other of the dominions of the king of Hawaii;" and on the 15th of December, he was consecrated accordingly.

As we have said, we do not expect that the whole correspondence, leading to this result, will ever be made public. Those in whose custody it is, doubtless know that the suspicions which are abroad concerning its honesty, are less injurious to them than the complete knowledge of all the facts

* The story in the *Colonial Church Chronicle*, that the king sent such a request to the Queen and the archbishop in 1859, must, therefore, be a mistake.

would be; and therefore, notwithstanding all the calls for its publication, they keep it close.

We have intimated that political and commercial motives have had something to do with this movement. This has been often alleged, and indignantly denied by Bishop Staley and others. We are willing to accept their denial, so far as concerns themselves. Perhaps they are, in this respect, the mere unconscious tools of political and commercial schemers. Still, the intimation is true. We quote, first, from the London *Evening Standard*, of November 14, 1861.

"Ever since the accession of the present emperor of the French to his present position, he has cast longing eyes upon these important Islands. By every art of flattery, by costly presents, by threats and intimidation, it has been his endeavor to diminish the influence of Great Britain in these Islands. At the very moment the king of Hawaii learns the refusal of this country to allow of a bishop being sent to him, he will receive another valuable proof of the emperor's solicitude and attention. Concurrently with this, he is pressed to make the Roman church the established faith of these Islands, and every inducement is being held out to make this the religion of his own court. As English churchmen, we view, therefore, this interference of the Bishop of London with the greatest apprehension; but as English citizens, we confess to some feeling of alarm at the prospect that, a few years hence, the splendid harbor of Honolulu may become a French possession; that in the event of any war with France, the most valuable port in the North Pacific will be held by the enemies of this country. These are not merely imaginary or even remote possibilities, but a too probable result of the unwise and unaccountable refusal of the officers of the Crown to sanction the consecration of a bishop to these Islands."

This, it will be seen, was before the license for Bishop Staley's consecration, and before the Bishop of London had ceased his active opposition to it.

We next quote from the London *Saturday Review*, of September 9, 1865.

"It is very well to know that Providence has planted the Sandwich Islands just at the midway of that magnificent commerce which steam and modern enterprize have created in the wide Pacific, with the most commodious harbors, and a soil capable of producing a great abundance of the materials of subsistence. It is something more to realize the fact, that these Sandwich Islands, governed by a native dynasty, which has always shown itself peculiarly friendly to England, are one thing, and that the Sandwich Islands, gobbled up by omniverous Yankeedom, or by any other power, would be quite another thing." "Her task is, but to let England appreciate the fact, that there is one indigenous state, of civilized standing and of great commercial advantage to British commerce, which really does love the Union Jack better than the Stars and Stripes."

And lastly, we quote from a speech of the Bishop of Oxford, reported in the *Leeds Mercury:*

"And remember, there are peculiar reasons in the very position of these islands why we should make these efforts on their behalf. There are, *first of all, political and national reasons.* It is of the utmost moment to us that that friendliness which now exists in this people to us should be continued. They lie upon the very direct track of our ships from our new and growing colony of British Columbia especially, and there is no calculating the injury which might be done to English commerce if these islands were alienated from us, and in any future disturbed state of the world were possessed by enemies of this country; so that it is your interest, even as regards the things of this world, to found a branch of your church there, and, by that which is the most abiding and binding tie, to attach them in affection to yourselves."

In the presence of these proofs, the most impudent mendacity cannot deny that political and commercial motives have had something to do with the establishment of this bishopric.

Bishop Staley arrived at Honolulu, October 11, 1862, accompanied by two presbyters, and was followed by a third. They were cordially received by the king and queen. They

were also cordially received, so far as they allowed themselves to be, by the Puritan clergy. Within a month, one of them was invited to meet with some of them and some laymen for prayer. He consulted his Bishop, and declined, lest he should thereby "encourage people to suppose he did not consider Episcopal ordination as necessary for a Christian minister." They all took effectual care never to encourage any such supposition. It was important, for the accomplishment of their object, that they should do so. Bishop Staley then evidently felt, as he says in his Pastoral Address of 1865, (page 13) "that the church of which we are members, has something more to proclaim than was understood by the first evangelizers of these Islands. If not, I fully admit, we have no business here." To justify their presence, therefore, they must make that "something" very manifest.

And what is that "something?" It is not the Bible, translated into the language of the people. This, he acknowledges, that the "first evangelizers" have given. It is not "the great facts of the life, suffering and death of the Redeemer, the necessity of God's Holy Spirit to renew man's sinful nature." These, he acknowledges, they have taught. It is this: (pp. 14, and 16.)

"Theirs is the denominational, ours the Catholic view of Christianity. I do not use the word Catholic in the sense in which it is often used, as implying that all sects stand on the same footing, so far as their claims to teach God's truth are concerned—this is a perversion of the term—nor as synonymous with Roman. It is true, Rome arrogates to herself that title; we deny her not to be a branch of the church, though she has in many points sadly erred from the Catholic faith and the Catholic practice. I use the term as it was used in the first three centuries, (the purest age of the church) as applying to the one visible historic body, which has descended in unbroken continuity from the days of the apostles to our own. We believe that whatever good other societies of Christians have done, who have left that ancient apostolical organization, I mean the Episcopal, be they Meletians, Do-

natists, Independents, Methodists, etc., and we judge them not—God forbid—yet it is through that one visible body, the Catholic church, we can alone taste the fullness of God's love, and assure to ourselves the presence of Him who hath promised to be with it to the end of the world." . . . . "Now, the continuity of this Holy Catholic church, depends on the ordaining power of Bishops."

There it is. That is the "something," in addition to redemption by the blood of Christ, and regeneration by the Holy Spirit, and the Bible in the language of the people, to teach these precious truths, which the Bishop must bring, or he has "no business" in the Islands.

But who is this, that, in such "great swelling words of vanity," undertakes to represent the "Holy Catholic church" of all lands and all ages, and denies the "claims" of "all sects" but his own, "to teach God's truth?" He is the representative of the youngest, and as is generally understood, the smallest of the three principal subdivisions of one of the many sects that are to be found inhabiting the south end of an island on the coast of Europe; a sect which neither the Church of Rome, nor the Greek Church, nor even the Jacobites of Mesopotamia, though sedulously courted and humbly besought, will consent to recognize as anything but heretics and schismatics; a sect, too, containing a great multitude of excellent men and ministers of the gospel, who neither approve his plans nor believe his "something;" and in whose jndgment, therefore, he has "no business" where he is.

But what is his "something" good for? And is it needed at the Islands? If not, he may as well go home and labor at Southampton, which, according to the Bishop of Rochester, is as vicious, in one respect at least, as Honolulu; or at Liverpool, which has a still worse reputation; or in London, where there is many times more vice of every sort, than the whole population of the Islands could commit, if they should all the time "do evil with both hands earnestly." He says that, after all that has been done at the Islands, something more needs to be done; just as if that were not true of every place on earth,

and every place that will be on earth, so long as Adam's posterity continue to be born in his image. He must show more than this. He must show that the Puritan Mission has been "a failure." He must show that it has not done what we have shown that it has done, and what the Bishop of Rochester, in the presence of Queen Emma, testified that it had done. For this purpose, he and his partisans must collect and endorse, and send forth all the stale and oft-refuted slanders of the men described by Mr. Jarves and Mr. Dana; must strain their eyes to discover some other evil thing to say of the Puritan missionaries; and must fill out the picture with their own "evil surmisings."

Such have been the leading motives for the recent calumnies against the American Mission in the Sandwich Islands; and with this exposure, we leave the calumniators to their own reflection.

ART. IV.—THE ATHANASIAN CREED.*

BY PHILIP SCHAFF, D. D.

We propose in this essay to discuss the name, origin, authority, contents, value, and use of the so-called Athanasian Symbol, which, next to the Apostles' Creed, and the Nicene Creed, is the most generally received Confession of Faith in the Christian church, and presents to us a succinct and clear summary of ancient Catholic theology concerning the fundamental articles of the Holy Trinity and the Person of Christ.

---

* The necessary general information on this subject may be found in Tillemont: Mémoirs pour servir á l'histoire eccléss. (tom. VIII, 677 sqq.); Bingham, Antiquities of the Christian Church (vol. IV, 118 sqq.); J. G. Walch: Introductio in libros ecclesiae Luth. symbolicos (lib. I, cap. 2 de tribus symbolis oecumenicis p. 36 sqq.); and Koellner: Symbolik aller christlichen Confessionen, Theil I. p. 53 sqq. Besides there are a number of special dissertations on the Athanasian Creed, the best of which are the following: G. J. Voss (a Dutch Reformed divine): De tribus symbolis, Amsterd. 1642; Archbishop Usher (Anglican): De symbolis, Lond. 1647; J. H. Heidegger (Swiss Reformed): De symbolo Athana-

For the convenience of the reader, we give first the symbol itself in three parallel columns, in the original Latin, the old English translation of the sixteenth century, as found in the Common Prayer Book of the Church of England, and a revised translation. We italicize those words which we have changed in the revison for reasons of taste, clearness, and closer adherence to the original:

The Latin Original.	*Old Translation.*	*Revised Translation.*
1. Quicunque vult salvus esse, ante omnia opus est, ut teneat catholicam fidem ;	1. Whosoever will be saved : before all things it is necessary that he hold the CatholickFaith;	1. Whosoever will be saved, before all things it is necessary that he hold the Catholic faith ;
2. Quam nisi quisque integram inviolatamque servaverit, absque dubio in æternum peribit.	2. Which Faith except every one do keep whole and undefiled: without doubt he shall perish everlastingly.	2. Which faith except every one do keep whole and undefiled, without doubt he shall perish everlastingly.
3. Fides autem catholica haec est, ut unum Deum in trinitate et trinitatem in unitate veneremur ;	3. And the Catholick Faith is this : That we worship one God in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity.	3. And the Catholic faith is this : that we worship one God in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity.
4. Neque confundentes personas, neque substantiam separantes.	4. Neither confounding the Persons : nor dividing the substance.	4. Neither confounding the persons, nor dividing the substance.
5. Alia est enim persona patris : alia filii : alia spiritus sancti.	5. For there is one Person of the Father, another of the Son, and another of the Holy Ghost.	5. For there is one person of the Father, another of the Son, and another of the Holy Ghost.
6. Sed patris et filii et spiritus sancti una est divinitas : aequalis gloria, coæterna majestas.	6. But the Godhead of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, is all one : the Glory equal, the Majesty coeternal.	6. But the Godhead of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, is all one ; the glory equal, the majesty co-eternal.

---

siano, Zur. 1680 ; E. Tenzel (Lutheran) : Iudicia eruditorum de Symb. Athanas. studiose collecta, Gothae. 1697 ; Montfaucon (Rom. Catholic) : Diatribe in Symbolum Quicunque, in the Benedict. edition of the works of St. Athanasius, Par. 1698, tom. II, 719–735 ; Dan. Waterland (Anglican) : A critical History of the Athanasian Creed, representing the opinions of the Ancients and Moderns concerning it : with an account of the Mss. Verss. and Comments and such other particulars as are of moment for the determining of the Age, and Author, and Value of it, and the Time of its Reception in the Christian churches, Cambridge, 1724 ; 2d ed. 1728, also in Dr. Waterland's Works, ed. by Dr. Mildert, in 6 vols. Oxf. 1843, vol. III, p. 97–270. This is still the most thorough essay on the Athanasian Creed. Also Speroni (Roman Catholic) : De symbolo vulgo S. Athanasii, Patav. 1751 ; Harvey (Anglican) : The History and Theology of the Three Creeds, Lond. 1856, vol. II, p. 541–695.

The Latin Original.	*Old Translation.*	*Revised Translation.*
7. Qualis pater, talis filius, talis spiritus sanctus.	7. Such as the Father is, such is the Son, and such is the Holy Ghost.	7. Such as is the Father, such also is the Son, and such the Holy Ghost.
8. Increatus pater: increatus filius: increatus spiritus sanctus.	8. The Father *uncreate*, the Son *uncreate*: and the Holy Ghost *uncreate*.	8. The Father uncreated, the Son uncreated, and the Holy Ghost uncreated.
9. Immensus pater: immensus filius: immensus spiritus sanctus.	9. The Father *incomprehensible*, the Son *incomprehensible*: and the Holy Ghost *incomprehensible*.*	9. The Father unlimited, the Son unlimited, and the Holy Ghost unlimited.
10. Aeternus pater: aeternus filius: aeternus spiritus sanctus.	10. The Father eternal, the Son eternal: and the Holy Ghost eternal.	10. The Father eternal, the Son eternal, and the Holy Ghost eternal.
11. Et tamen non tres aeterni; sed unus aeternus.	11. And yet *they are* not three eternals: but one eternal.	11. And yet not three eternals, but one eternal.
12. Sicut non tres increati: nec tres immensi: sed unus increatus et unus immensus.	12. As also there are not three *incomprehensibles*, nor three uncreated: but one uncreated, and one *incomprehensible*.	12. As also, not three uncreated, nor three unlimited; but one uncreated, and one unlimited.
13. Similiter omnipotens pater: omnipotens filius: omnipotens spiritus sanctus.	13. So likewise the Father is Almighty, the Son Almighty: and the Holy Ghost Almighty.	13. So likewise the Father is almighty, the Son almighty, and the Holy Ghost almighty.
14. Et tamen non tres omnipotentes; sed unus omnipotens.	14. And yet *they are* not three Almighties, but one Almighty.	14. And yet not three almighties, but one almighty.
15. Ita deus pater: deus filius: deus spiritus sanctus.	15. So the Father is God, the Son is God: and the Holy Ghost is God.	15. So the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God.
16. Et tamen non tres dii; sed unus est Deus.	16. And yet they are not three Gods, but one God.	16. And yet not three Gods, but one God.
17. Ita dominus pater: dominus filius: dominus spiritus sanctus.	17. So likewise the Father is Lord, the Son Lord: and the Holy Ghost Lord.	17. So likewise the Father is Lord, the Son Lord, and the Holy Ghost Lord.
18. Et tamen non tres domini: sed unus Dominus.	18. And yet not three Lords, but one Lord.	18. And yet not three Lords, but one Lord.
19. Quia sicut singu-	19. For like as we	19. For like as we

* *Incomprehensible* is a false translation, unless it be taken in the unusual sense, not to be comprehended within any bounds. The Anglican translator of 1548 perhaps followed a Greek copy, which renders *immensus* by ἀκατάληπτος. But other Greek copies read ἄπειρος or ἄμετρος instead. The Latin *immensus* means what cannot be circumscribed or limited by any boundaries, what is illocal, omnipresent.

Original Latin.	*Old Translation.*	*Revised Translation.*
latim unamquamque personam Deum ac Dominum confiteri, christiana veritate compellimur :	are compelled by the Christian verity : to acknowledge *every* Person by himself to be God and Lord.	are compelled by the Christian verity, to acknowledge each person, by himself to be God and Lord ;
20. Ita tres deos, aut tres dominos dicere, catholica religione prohibemur.	20. So are we forbidden by the Catholick Religion : to say, There *be* three Gods, or three Lords.	20. So are we forbidden by the Catholic religion to say : There are three Gods or three Lords.
21. Pater a nullo est factus, nec creatus ; nec genitus.	21. The Father is made of none : neither created, nor begotten.	21. The Father is made of none, neither created nor begotten.
22. Filius a patre solo est : non factus ; nec creatus ; sed genitus.	22. The Son is of the Father alone ; not made, nor created, but begotten.	22. The Son is of the Father alone, not made, nor created, but begotten.
23. Spiritus sanctus a patre et filio : non factus ; nec creatus ; nec genitus, sed procedens.	23. The Holy Ghost is of the Father and of the Son ; neither made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding.	23. The Holy Ghost is of the Father and of the Son, neither made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding.
24. Unus ergo pater ; non tres patres : unus filius, non tres filii : unus spiritus sanctus, non tres spiritus sancti.	24. So there is one Father, not three Fathers ; one Son, not three Sons ; one Holy Ghost, not three Holy Ghosts.	24. So there is one Father, not three Fathers ; one Son, not three Sons ; one Holy Ghost, not three Holy Ghosts.
25. Et in hac trinitate nihil prius ; aut posterius : nihil majus ; aut minus.	25. And in this Trinity *none is afore, or after other : none is* greater, *or* less *than another ;*	25. And in this Trinity there is no before, nor after ; no greater nor less.
26. Sed totae tres personae coæternae sibi sunt et coæquales.	26. But the whole three Persons are coeternal *together ;* and coequal.	26. But the whole three persons are coeternal, and co-equal.
27. Ita, ut per omnia, sicut jam supra dictum est, et trinitas in unitate : et unitas in trinitate venerenda sit.	27. So that in all things, as aforesaid : the Unity in Trinity, and the Trinity in Unity, is to be worshipped.	27. So that in all things, as aforesaid : the Unity in Trinity, and the Trinity in Unity is to be worshipped.
28. Qui vult ergo salvus esse, ita de trinitate sentiat.	28. He therefore that will be saved: must thus think of the Trinity.	28. He therefore that will be saved, must thus think of the Trinity.
29. Sed necessarium est ad aeternam salutem, ut incarnationem quoque domini nostri Jesu Christi fideliter credat.	29. Furthermore it is necessary to everlasting salvation : that he also believe *rightly* the Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ.	29. Furthermore, it is necessary to everlasting salvation, that we also believe truly the Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ.
30. Est ergo fides recta, ut credamus et con-	30. For the right Faith is, that we believe	30. For the right faith is, that we believe

Original Latin.	*Old Translation.*	*Revised Translation.*
fiteamur, quod dominus noster Jesus Christus Dei filius, deus et homo	and confess: that our Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is God and Man;	and confess, that our Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is God and man.
31. Deus ex substantia patris, ante secula genitus, et homo ex substantia matris, in seculo natus.	31. God, of the Substance of the Father, begottten before the worlds: and Man, of the Substance of his Mother, born in the world.	31. God, of the substance of the Father, begotten before the worlds; and man, of the substance of his mother, born in the world.
32. Perfectus deus: perfectus homo, ex anima rationali et humana carne subsistens.	32. Perfect God and perfect Man; of a reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting;	32. Perfect God, and perfect man, of a reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting;
33. Aequalis patri secundum divinitatem: minor patri secundum humanitatem.	33. Equal to the Father, *as touching* his Godhead; and inferior to the Father *as touching* his Manhood.	33. Equal to the Father, according to His Godhead, and inferior to the Father, according to His manhood.
34. Qui licet Deus sit et homo; non duo tamen, sed unus est Christus.	34. Who although he be God and Man; yet he is not two, but one Christ;	34. Who although he be God and man, yet he is not two, but one Christ;
35. Unus autem, non conversione divinitatis in carnem; sed assumptione humanitatis in Deum.	35. One; not by conversion of the Godhead into flesh: but by *taking* of the Manhood into God;	35. One, not by conversion of the Godhead into flesh, but by assumption of the manhood into God;
36. Unus omnino, non confusione substantiae; sed unitate personae.	36. One altogether; not by confusion of Substance: but by unity of Person.	36. One altogether, not by confusion of substance, but by unity of person.
37. Nam sicut anima rationalis et caro unus est homo; ita deus et homo unus est Christus.	37. For as the reasonable soul and flesh is one man: so God and Man is one Christ;	37. For as the reasonable soul and flesh is one man; so God and man is one Christ.
38. Qui passus est pro nostra salute: descendit ad inferos: tertia die resurrexit a mortuis.	38. Who suffered for our salvation: descended into *hell*: rose again the third day from the dead.	38. Who suffered for our salvation, descended into hades, rose again the third day from the dead.
39. Ascendit ad coelos: sedet ad dexteram dei patris omnipotentis.	39. He ascended into heaven, He sitteth on the right hand of the *Father God* Almighty.	39. He ascended into heaven, He sitteth at the right hand of God the Father Almighty.
40. Inde venturus est judicare vivos et mortuos.	40. From *whence* He shall come to judge the quick and the dead.	40. From thence He shall come to judge the quick and the dead.
41. Ad cuius adventum omnes homines resurgere habent cum corporibus suis;	41. At whose coming all men *shall* rise again with their bodies,	41. At whose coming all men must rise again with their bodies;

Original Latin.	*Old Translation.*	*Revised Translation.*
42. Et reddituri sunt de factis propriis rationem.	42. And shall give account for their own works.	42. And shall give account for their own works.
43. Et qui bona egerunt, ibunt in vitam eternam ; qui vero mala, in ignem aeternum.	43. And they that have done good shall go into life everlasting : and they that have done evil, into everlasting fire.	43. And they that have done good shall go into life everlasting, and they that have done evil, into everlasting fire.
44. Haec est fides catholica, quam nisi quisque fideliter firmiterque crediderit, salvus esse non poterit.	44. This is the Catholik Faith : which except a man believe *faithfully*, he cannot be saved.	44. This is the Catholic faith, which except a man believe truly and firmly, he cannot be saved.

NAME.

The third ecumenical or universal Creed of the Christian church bears a double name.

It is sometimes called the Symbolum Quicunque or simply the Quicunque* from its beginning in Latin : *Quicunque vult salvus esse*, Whosoever will be saved.

But more generally it goes by the name of the Athanasian Creed,† from the supposed authorship of St. Athanasius, or its agreement with his theology. This makes it necessary to say a few words on this distinguished father.

Athanasius was the leading champion of the orthodox doctrine on the divinity of Christ, and the Holy Trinity in the Nicene age. He was born towards the close of the third century, at Alexandria, the capital of Egypt. His youth fell in that remarkable transition period of the Christian church from oppression and persecution to victory and power in the Roman Empire. He made his first appearance on the stage of history at the first general Council, convened by Constantine the Great at the city of Nice in 325, for the purpose of settling the Arian controversy, i. e., the question, whether Christ be strictly divine or not ; whether he be the eternal Son of the Father and

* First used by Hincmar, archbishop of Rheims, about A. D. 852, who calls it also "Sermonem Athanasii de fide, cuius initium est : Quicunque vult salvus esse."

† It first bears this name in the oldest complete manuscript copy extant, called "Cod. Usserius secundus," ascribed to the year 703. It has the title : "Fides Sancti Athanasii Alexandrini."

equal in substance or essence with him (ὁμοούσιος), or whether he be a creature of God, though made before the world, and consequently of a different substance (ἑτεροούσιος). Although at that time merely an archdeacon and secretary of the bishop Alexander of Alexandria, Athanasius occupied by his talents and zeal the most prominent place in that Council among the defenders of the strict divinity of our Saviour against the Arians who denied it, and materially aided the triumph of the orthodox view, as embodied and symbolically fixed in what has since been called the Nicene Creed. Soon afterwards he became the successor of Alexander in the first episcopal see of Egypt. From this time on, during the long continued Arian and Semi-Arian conflicts which soon followed the temporary settlement at the Nicene synod, he stood forth as the acknowledged leader of the Nicene or orthodox party, beloved by his friends, feared by his enemies, admired and respected by all. He devoted his whole life, with unwavering consistency in prosperity and adversity, at home and in exile, to the defence of the true Godhead of Christ. This was the one great idea of his mind, the ruling passion of his heart, the all-absorbing object of his will. For this he suffered five times deposition and exile. For this he was willing at any time to shed his blood. He was a man of one idea, indeed, but an idea which he firmly and justly believed to be absolutely fundamental to the Christian system and the salvation of the world. To the violence and intrigues of the imperial court, to the passions and fanaticism of heretical parties, he uniformly opposed the overwhelming force of a commanding genius and a holy life. One Athanasius against the whole world! Although he died several years before the final settlement of this great controversy by the second oecumenical council, held at Constantinople in 381, the triumph of the orthodox view must, under God, be mainly attributed to him.

Anathasius was unquestionably the greatest man of his age, and one of the purest and noblest in the history of the church. He is justly called the Great, and the Father of Orthodoxy.

Even Gibbon, with all his strong prejudices against the

faith of Athanasius and the Christian religion, has pronounced an eloquent eulogy on him in the XXI chapter of his celebrated work. "We have seldom," says this deistic historian, "an opportunity of observing, either in active or speculative life, what effect may be produced, or what obstacles may be surmounted, by the force of a single mind when it is inflexibly applied to the pursuit of a single object. The immortal name of Athanasius will never be separated from the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity, to whose defence he consecrated every moment and every faculty of his being. Educated in the family of Alexander, he had vigorously opposed the early progress of the Arian heresy: he exercised the important functions of secretary under the aged prelate; and the fathers of the Nicene council beheld with surprise and respect the rising virtues of the young deacon. In a time of public danger, the dull claims of age and rank are sometimes superseded; and within five months after his return from Nice, the deacon Athanasius was seated on the archepiscopal throne of Egypt. He filled that eminent station above forty-six years; and his long administration was spent in a perpetual combat against the powers of Arianism. Five times was Athanasius expelled from his throne; twenty years he passed as an exile or a fugitive; and almost every province of the Roman Empire was successively witness to his merits and his sufferings in the cause of the Homoousion, which he considered as the sole pleasure and business, as the duty and as the glory of his life. Amidst the storms of persecution, the archbishop of Alexandria was patient of labor, jealous of fame, careless of safety; and although his mind was tainted by the contagion of fanaticism, Athanasius displayed a superiority of character and abilities which would have qualified him far better than the degenerate sons of Constantine for the government of a great monarchy. . . . The archbishop of Alexandria was capable of distinguishing how far he might boldly command, and where he must dexterously insinuate; how long he might contend with power, and when he must withdraw from persecution; and while he directed the thunders of the church against

heresy, he could assume, in the bosom of his own party, the flexible and indulgent temper of a prudent leader. The election of Athanasius has not escaped the reproach of irregularity and precipitation; but the propriety of his behavior conciliated the affections both of the clergy and of the people. The Alexandrians were impatient to rise in arms for the defence of an eloquent and liberal pastor. In his distress he always derived support, or at least consolation, from the faithful attachment of his parochial clergy; and the hundred bishops of Egypt adhered, with unshaken zeal, to the cause of Athanasius. In the modest equipage which pride and policy would affect, he frequently performed the episcopal visitation of his provinces, from the mouth of the Nile to the confines of Aethiopia; familiarly conversing with the meanest of the populace, and humbly saluting the saints and hermits of the desert. Nor was it only in ecclesiastical assemblies, among men whose education and manners were similar to his own, that Athanasius displayed the ascendency of his genius. He appeared with easy and respectful firmness in the courts of princes; and in the various turns of his prosperous and adverse fortune he never lost the confidence of his friends or the esteem of his enemies."

ORIGIN.

But is Athanasius really the author of the creed which has so long been identified with his distinguished name? This question must be decided in the negative, as much so as the question of the strictly apostolic origin of the first ecumenical creed. And yet in both cases there is a certain propriety in the name, if we leave out of view the form of words and actual composition, and look merely to the contents and their essential agreement with the faith and teaching of the supposed authors.

It is probable that the designation which cannot be traced beyond the eighth century, was first given to this document with the view simply to characterize its doctrinal tone, as the

expression of the faith of Athanasius,* (hence the oldest titles: *fides Athanasii*," "*fides Catholica*"), and not to indicate the, literal authorship for the purpose of clothing it at once with the authority of a great and universally revered name. At all events there is no room here for a wilful, pious fraud. An innocent mistake explains the matter sufficiently, especially in an uncritical age. The real author of this trinitarian creed being unknown, it was naturally traced, first by way of mere conjecture and supposition, to the great representative of the received doctrine of the Holy Trinity, whose very name was identified with orthodoxy as regards this particular article. For the terms Athanasian, homoousian, Nicene, orthodox, are used synonymously in the history of the Arian and Semi-Arian controversies of the Nicene Age. This conjecture was, however, by no means generally received at first. Several manuscript copies of the Creed give either no name at all,† or ascribe it to a different author, Anastasius.‡ We find doubts yet as late as the twelfth century.§ But after this time the belief in the Athanasian origin became general, and prevailed, without examination, down towards the middle of the seventeenth century,‖ when Gerhard John Vossius, a Dutch Reformed divine, first made it the subject of a critical dissertation in 1642, and turned the current. Since that time it is universally given up by historians and critics, not only by Protestants, as Vossius, Heidegger, Usher, Jeremy Taylor, Pearson, Cave, Bingham, Cudworth, Fabricius, Waterland, Buddeus, Walch,

---

* This was the view of Weber, Lib. symb. p. 17 : "Ab Athanasio nomen habet, non quod ab illo viro vere scriptum sit, sed quod cum sententia Athanasii maxime conveniat." See Kœllner, l. c., p. 55.

† Codd. Uss. 1, Treves. Ambrosian., Colb. 1, Regius, Benet C. 2. Benet C. 3. Cotton 3, Cambridge, St. Jam. 2. Comp. Waterland, p. 24, and Kollner, p. 72.

‡ So the German MSS. Waterland, however, supposes that this is a mere orthographical mistake for Arthanasius.

§ In 1138 by Otho in the words : " Athanasius a *quibusdam* dicitur edidisse ; and in 1190 by Beleth in the words : " Quod ab Athan. P. A. compositum est : *plerique cum Anastasium fuisse falso arbitrantur.*" See Montfaucon, Diatr. etc., in Opp. Athan. II, 722.

‖ The last distinguished defendants were the Roman Catholic divines, Baronius (Annal. ad ann. 340 num. 11), Bona (De divina Psalmodia 1663, who rests his faith on Baronius), and Bellarminus.

Schroeckh, Neander, Gieseler, Köllner, but also by Roman Catholics, as Petavius (1644), Quesnel (1675), Natalis Alexander (1676), Dupin (1687), Pagi (1688), Tillemont (1695), Montfaucon (1698), Muratori (1698), Speroni, (1751), and even pope Benedict XIV.

The arguments against the authorship of Athanasius are so strong indeed that it is impossible to resist them. Köllner enumerates nineteen. We will mention only the principal ones.

1. Athanasius himself never mentions this symbol in any of his works, and had no occasion to compose it, being satisfied with the Nicene Creed, and bent upon explaining and maintaining it against every opposition. Yea, he says distinctly, in one passage,* that the Nicene Creed was sufficient, and that no other profession of faith should be issued.

2. It is not found in any of the older manuscripts of the works of Athanasius, and those which have it, either deny it to him, or express a doubt as to his authorship.†

3. It is not mentioned by any cotemporary of Athanasius, nor his biographers and eulogists,‡ nor by any of the fathers and councils of the fourth and fifth centuries, although during the all-absorbing trinitarian and christological controversies, they had frequent occasion to allude to this important document if it existed, and although they frequently appeal to the authority of Athanasius and mention his other writings. Under these circumstances, the silence is absolutely conclusive against

---

* Ep. ad Antioch. tom. I. p. 772.Comp. Kœllner, p. 73. and Walch, l. c. p. 149.

† Scultetus, in Medulla Patrum, part 2, de Athan. c. 40, says: "In nullo codice extat quos ego quidem vidi, inter Athanasii opera. In uno legitur; sed auctoris nomine suppresso." Speroni, l. c. (quoted by Kœllner, p. 72) says more distinctly: "At multi codd. Mss. sunt, qui non modo non habent hoc symbolum, quamquam opera omnia comprehendant Athanasii; sed negant omnino his verbis: *Symbolum vulgo Athanasii, Symbolum quod non est Athanasii, Symbolum perperam Athanasio tributum.*"

‡ The only allusion which former writers have been able to find, is a passage of Gregorius Nazianz., in his laudatory oration on Athanasius, where he speaks of him as having confessed (ὁμολογήσας) the Godhead and essence of the three Persons τὴν τριῶν θεότητα καὶ οὐσίαν). But it is now universally conceded that this does not refer to a particular creed at all, or if so, to one of the two other confessions still extant, in which he likewise speaks of the Godhead and essence of the three Persons.

the very existence of the Athanasian Creed at the time, unless we choose to suppose that it was concealed for nearly three hundred years, and then suddenly turned up in the sixth or seventh century, which would imply an almost miraculous preservation.

4. The symbol under consideration was evidently first written in the Latin language, and seems to have been unknown among the Greeks before the eleventh century. There are but few Greek manuscript copies extant,* and they differ so much that they unmistakably point to several and rather unskilled translators. Now, it is very improbable that Athanasius, even if he knew Latin sufficiently to write so well, should have composed such an important document in a foreign tongue, instead of his own vernacular Greek, which was then the prevailing language of the church, and used even by the early Western fathers, as Clement of Rome, Irenaeus of Gaul, and Hippolytus of Rome. The report, that Athanasius composed it during his exile at Treves, about 340, and submitted it to pope Julius of Rome, in proof of his orthodoxy against the charge of heresy, or that he wrote it at Rome, and that it remained concealed there for a long time, is utterly worthless, since it is not even mentioned before the twelfth century (1130), and is evidently one of the many falsehoods which were manufactured in the middle age for the supposed benefit of the absolute papacy. No Roman divine of any weight, since Baronius and Bellarmin, has dared to give it credit.

5. To these external arguments, though mostly of a negative and indirect character, must be added the internal evidence of the Creed itself, which alone is conclusive. For while it omits the favorite expressions of Athanasius, especially the term *homoousios*, on which the whole Arian controversy turned, it contains the later Latin addition *et filio*, concerning the pro-

* Four according to Montfaucon, eight according to Waterland. The former asserts that none of them was written before 1300. "Nullum vidimus *Graecum* huius symboli codicem, qui trecentorum sit annorum; nec antiquum alium a quopiam visum fuisse novimus." Diatribe de Symb. Quicunque in Opp. Athan. II, p. 727.

cession of the Holy Ghost,* which the Greek Church never admitted, and generally goes beyond the Athanasian theology and the Nicaeno-Constantinopolitan Creed, not only in the Trinity, but still more in the Christology. We fully admit that he had already substantially the same faith, but by no means the same logical consciousness or scientific comprehension of it, as is here implied.† He nowhere in his writings speaks so clearly and definitely of the personality and divinity of the Holy Spirit, and as to the two natures of Christ, he even uses expressions which in a *later* age would have been justly liable to a Monophysite or Eutychian construction,‡ while the Creed which bears his name, is as clear and distinct on this subject as the council of Chalcedon.

But the more difficult question now arises, who is the real author of this remarkable production? Here is a wide field for critical conjecture. Quite a number of persons have been proposed with more or less plausibility, but without sufficient evidence in any case, viz.: Vigilius, bishop of Tapsus in Africa, about 484;§ Vincentius Lirinensis, about

---

* V. 23: Spiritus Sanctus a Patre *et Filio*, non factus, nec creatus, nec genitus, sed procedens.

† This is honestly admitted even by his learned Benedictine editor, Montfaucon. l. c. p. 723: "Licet enim una eademque semper fuerit ea de re Ecclesiae doctrina, nondum tamen hae formulae in ecclesia receptae vel in confesso erant." He asserts an entire difference of style between the Symbolum Quicunque and the genuine Athanasian writings.

‡ Especially in one passage De incarnatione Verbi (Opp. ed Montfanc. tom. III. p. 1), where he says: "We profess also that there is one Son of God who is God according to the Spirit, and Son of man according to the flesh; not two natures, the one to be worshipped, the other not, but one nature of the God Logos which became incarnate (*ἀλλὰ μίαν φύσιν τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου σεσαρκωμένην*) and is to be worshipped together with his flesh in one worship." This, and similar passages of Hilary, and even Pope Julius I, have given great trouble to such Roman divines who deny all development and change in the doctrine of their Church. Comp. Gieseler, Kirchengeschichte I, 2, § 88. p. 133 seq. We should not forget, however, that Athanasius, and even the original Nicene Creed (in its damnatory clause, which was afterwards omitted) frequently use *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις* (*substantia* and *persona* synonomously, and that the two terms were not clearly distinguished till the latter part of the fourth century.

§ By Paschas. Quesnel, Diss. xiv. ad Opera Leonis M. p. 384 sqq., Natalis Alexander, Pagi, Dupin, Tillemont (doubtful), Heidegger, Cave, Bingham, Oudin. So also Neander, in his posthumous work on Doctrine History, edited by Jacobi, Vol. I, p. 323, where he says that this Symbol was made most probably in the fifth century in the North African Church by Vigilius Tapsensis during

434 ;* Venantius Fortunatus, bishop of Poitiers, about 570 ;† Hilarius Arelatensis, about 429 ;‡ Hilarius Pictaviensis, about 354 ; Victricius, confessor and bishop of Rouen, 401 ;§ Eusebius Vercellensis, 354 ; pope Anastasius I., 398 ; Athanasius, bishop of Speier, in Germany, 642. Others assign the symbol indefinitely to some Gallican divine,‖ or to Spanish origin ;¶ others less indefinitely to an unknown Latin father ;** while still others leave the authorship entirely doubtful.††

---

the renewal of the Arian controversy under the rule of the Vandals. The principal argument for this view is taken from the similarity of thought and style and the occurrence of the passage : "Deus Pater, Deus Filius, Deus Spiritus S. ; Dominus Pater, Dominus Filius, Dominus Spiritus S. ; Omnipotens Pater, Omnipotens Filius, Omnipotens Spiritus S." But similar passages are already found in Augustine's work De Trinitate. Vigilius is supposed by some to be the author of the twelve books De Trinitate, which go under the name of Athanasius, and also of the Dialogues between Athanasius, Arius, and Sabellius (in the 8th vol. of the Bibliotheca Maxima Patrum.)

* By Jos. Anthelmi, on the ground especially of some resemblance between the Symbol. Athan. and the Commonitorium of Vincentius.

† By Muratori. Venantius Fortunatus was the first commentator, rather than author of this Creed. Waterland justly raises the objection to the view of Muratori : " Who can imagine Venantius Fortunatus to have been so vain as, after commenting on the Lord's Prayer and the Apostles' Creed, to fall to commenting on a composition of his own ?"

‡ By Waterland, ch. VII and VIII. He tries to prove that there is nothing in the Athan. Creed but what might have been said and had been said by Catholic writers before the time of Nestorius ; but that the Creed wants many of those particular and critical expressions of the Nestorian age, especially the designation of Mary as the *mother of God*, and that, consequently, it was composed before the Ephesian Council in 431, which condemned Nestorius. But his arguments for Hilary as the author are vague and inconclusive. They are as follows : 1. Hilary was made bishop of Gaul about 429. 2. He was a man of learning and elegant style. 3. He wrote a few small but fine tracts, and an exposition of the Creed. 4. He was a great admirer of Augustine. 5. He was well acquainted with Vincentius Lirinensis, having been first abbot of Lerin. 6. The style of the few of his writings corresponds well with the vigorous, sententious style of the Athanasian Creed. But these reasons are more than counterbalanced by the consideration : 1. That if Hilary composed this Creed at the time of his elevation to the episcopate in 429 or 430, it must have become known, as he lived till 449, the acknowledged head of the Gallican hierarchy, and the prominent champion of Gallican independence of the jurisdiction of Rome in the famous controversy with Leo I, who had so much to do with the settlement of the christological controversy at the Council of Chalcedon ; 2. The Creed of a prelate who was excommunicated by the pope for insubordination to the holy see, and charged with diabolical pride, could not have obtained such currency and authority throughout the Catholic church, including Rome, except on the ground of the complete obscurity of its origin, which is extremely unlikely in this case, for the reason already mentioned.

§ By Harvey : "The Hist, and Theol. of the three Creeds," vol. II. p. 583 f., but without any solid argument. ‖ So Pithoeus, Vossius, Montfaucon, Kœllner.

¶ Gieseler. ** Pearson, and Fabricius.

†† Patavius, Taylor, Cudworth, Tentzel, Tillemont, Clarke, Buddeus, Walch.

This very diversity of opinion shows that we do not know the real author. Even the arguments in favor of the claims of Vigilius Tapsensis, and of Hilarius Arelatensis, which are the most plausible, prove only the possibility, not even the probability of his authorship.

The case seems to us almost parallel with that of the Apostles' Creed, and in a less degree also with that of the Nicene Creed, and we are surprised that none of the numerous writers on this subject, as far as we can see, has directed attention to this fact.

The Apostles' Creed, it is now universally admitted, cannot be traced to the Apostles,* nor to any particular author, age or country, but must be regarded as the production of the ancient Catholic Church. Its living root and substance goes back, indeed, to the Apostolic age, to the baptismal formula (Matth. xxviii : 19), and the confession of Peter (Matth. xvi : 16). But its present form is the result of a gradual and imperceptible growth which can be traced through the various and yet essentially identical rules of faith or baptismal Creeds of the second and third centuries, as found in the writings of Justin Martyr, Irenæus, Origen, Tertullian, and Cyprian, and which attained its maturity towards the end of the third, or at all events at the beginning of the fourth century, before the Council of Nice, in 325, the Nicene Creed being an expansion and more explicit definition of the Apostles' Creed.†

As to the origin of the Nicene, or rather Nicaeno-Constanti-

---

* As was done first by the presbyter. Rufinus of Aquileja, about 400, in his Exposition of the Creed. He represents it as the joint production of the twelve Apostles before leaving Jerusalem, each contributing one article , and thus explains the word *σύμβολον*, taking it in the sense of *συμβολή*, *collatio*, while in fact it means sign, distinctive mark, form of confession. This tradition became soon current in the fifth century, and obtained to the fifteenth, when Laurentius Valla, and subsequently Erasmus undermined it.

† On the particulars of the origin, history and character of the Apostles' Creed, we must refer to the following treatises : Rufinus : Expositio in Symbolum Apostolicum (in the works of Hieronymus). Augustinus : De Fide et Symb. Heidegger : De Symb. Apost. Gisb. Voëtius : De. Symb. Apost. Herm. Witsius : Exersitationes sacrae in Symbolum quod apostolorum dicitur. J. Pearson : Exposition of the Creed. P. King : The History of the Apostles' Creed. Koellner : Symbolik aller Christl. Confessionen, vol. I, p. 6 sqq. J. W. Nevin, The Apostles' Creed, three articles in the Mercersburg Review for 1849.

nopolitan Creed, we can speak more definitely. We know the precise time of its composition : it was formed at Nice in 325, and completed at Constantinople in 381, with the exception of the clause *filioque*, which is a later addition of the Latin church and became a bone of contention between it and the Greek church. We can go further and say that the formula proposed by Eusebius of Caesarea at Nicæa, was, in all probability, made the basis of the first draft. But this was shaped into a far more definite, anti-Arian character, especially by the insertion of the famous predicate of the Son : *homoousios*, or *consubstantialis, co-equal, of one substance* with the Father, which Eusebius wished to avoid in the interest of peace. Half a century afterwards the Constantinopolitan Council made an important addition concerning the Holy Ghost, called forth by the intervening doctrinal controversies, and omitted the concluding anathema. Thus even this symbol, though less popular than the Apostolicum, can by no means be traced to any individual author, but must be regarded as the joint product of the Nicene age or of the first two ecumenical Synods.*

We may illustrate the formation of the Nicene Creed by alluding to the official reports and acts of our ecclesiastical and political assemblies. Important matters are generally first referred to a committee of three, five, or more persons, with a responsible chairman. He draws up a report, submits it to the other members of the committee for approval, rejection, or revision, which may result in a radical reconstruction. Then it is brought up before the general body for action, and there it again undergoes, in many cases, a variety of changes before it is finally adopted. At all events, if adopted, it ceases to be the work of an individual, or even a committee, and becomes the property of the whole body, clothed with all the weight and authority which it may possess.

Now, as the Apostles' Creed is the work of the ante-Nicene

* The origin and history of the Nicene Creed is more fully discussed by Vossius, Usher, Bingham, Heidegger, Walther, Baier, Blanchini, Suicer, Walch, Kœllner, and others. See the literature in Walch : Introductio in libros symbolicos, p. 121 sqq., and in Kœllner, Symbolik, etc., I, p. 6, and p. 28.

age, and the Nicene Creed the work of the Nicene age, so the Athanasian Creed may justly be called the work of the post-Nicene age, or of the Catholic church from the close of the fourth to the middle of the fifth century. Its germ as to substance may indeed be traced back to Athanasius, and so far it may still go under his name, but it is more directly derived from the later development of the doctrine of the Trinity in the Latin church, especially the school of Augustine, who first clearly taught the doctrine of the double procession of the Holy Spirit. Several passages are taken word for word from Augustine's work *De Trinitate*, which was not completed before 415. Ambrose, also, Vincentius Lirinensis, and Vigilius of Tapsus, furnish parallel passages. It presupposes not only the Arian, Semi-Arian, Apollinarian, but probably also the Nestorian and Eutychian controversies, and the first four general councils, none of which alludes to it, although such allusion, if the work existed already, could hardly have been avoided. Its composition, therefore, must be placed probably after the year 451, when the Council of Chalcedon settled that very doctrine of the two natures in Christ's person, which is so distinctly expressed in this Creed. At all events, we cannot well date it beyond the time of the third general council at Ephesus in 431. The absence of the term *Mater Dei, theotokos*, proves no more its priority to that council, than the absence of the term *consubstantialis, homoousios* proves its composition before the council of Nice.

On the other hand the Creed under consideration cannot be carried down to a much later period, since it contains no allusion to the later Monophysite controversies, which gave rise to the fifth general council at Constantinople in 553, and still less to the Monothelite controversy concerning the two *wills* of Christ, which commenced in 633, and was finally settled by the sixth general Council in 680. We assign it, therefore, to the second half of the fifth century, or the beginning of the sixth.* About 570, Venantius Fortunatus, bishop of Poi-

*I cannot agree with Dr. Gieseler (Kirchengeschichte II, § 12. p. 109, note 7, fourth ed.) who thinks that the Athanasianum cannot be traced beyond the

tiers, wrote a commentary on the Creed, which implies its public use at the time.

The *place* of composition cannot be decided with any degree of certainty. It may have been written in North Africa, the country of Augustine, or in Spain, but more probably in Gaul, where it first spread and found favor, and where Augustine's writings exerted great influence in the fifth and sixth centuries.

This view of the case is sustained by the manner in which the Athanasian Creed comes to notice. It appears not in full at once, but gradually as it were. We meet first single words and passages of it in Ambrose, and especially in Augustine, in several writers of the fifth and sixth centuries, as Vincentius Lirinensis of Gaul (about 430), Vigilius Tapsensis, of Africa (484),* Avitus Viennensis, of Gaul (500),† Cæsarius Arelatensis, of Gaul (520),‡ Venantius Fortunatus, of Gaul (570),§ and also in acts of Councils, especially the Councils of Toledo in Spain, of the seventh century.‖ Then we have it in full in

---

eighth century, and who regards all the earlier allusions to it uncertain. He inclines to the opinion that it originated in Spain, where the conflict between the Athanasian and the Arian party continued longer than in any other country. But the majority of critics assign it to an earlier period, and to Gaul.

* Compare the passage already referred to.

† Who uses the terms *nec factus, nec creatus, nec genitus*, of the Holy Ghost.

‡ In a sermon which found its way among those of St Augustine (Opera, tom. V. p. 399.) but which the Benedictine editors of Augustine, also Oudin, Waterland, and Kœllner, (l. c. p. 60) ascribe to Cæsarius of Arles (503–543). There occurs the first clear allusion which sounds like a direct quotation from the Athanasianum, as Gieseler admits, who, however, doubts the authorship of Cæsarius. It reads thus (we italicize the words corresponding to the symbol): "Rogo et admoneo vos, Fratres carissimi, ut *Quicunque vult salvus esse, Fidem* rectam et *Catholicam* discat, *firmiter teneat inviolatamque conservet. —Deus Pater, Deus Filius, Deus et Spiritus Sanctus:* sed *tamen non tres Dii*, sed *unus Deus. Qualis Pater, talis Filius, talis et Spiritus Sanctus.* Attamen credat unusquisque fidelis, quod *Filius aequalis est Patri secundum divinitatem, et minor est Patre secundum humanitatem* carnis, quam de nostro assumpsit."

§ Who is supposed by Muratori, Waterland, and Kœllner to be the author of the *Expositio fidei catholicae*, which assumes already the general reception of the Symbolum Quicunque, and defends the *filioque*. For this reason Gieseler denies said Expositio to Fortunatus, but without being able to assign it to any other source. The brief *Expositio* of Venantius is published by Muratori, in the second tome of his *Anecdota*, and more correctly by Waterland, in an Appendix to his essay on the Athan. Creed (Works, vol. III. p. 237–268).

‖ Conc, Tolet. IV. (anno 633) cap. 1. Conc. Tolet. VI. (a. 638) c. 1. Conc. Tolet XI. (a. 675) praef., and C. T. XIV. (a. 684) c. 8. The close relation between these councils and several passages of the Athanasianum is undeniable,

a number of Latin manuscript copies, the precise age of which, however, it is impossible, in most cases, to fix with any degree of certainty. Waterland gives a full account of them in the fourth chapter of his treatise. The oldest, which is now lost, is assigned to the year 600,* the next to 660,† the third to 700,‡ the fourth to 703,§ etc. The last mentioned is the first copy which ascribes the symbol to Athanasius, though in a somewhat equivocal way, by calling it the "*Faith* of Saint Athanasius." There is also a famous manuscript of Charlemagne, at the end of the Gallican Psalter, written in letters of gold, and presented by Charlemagne to Pope Adrian I, A. D. 772. It is deposited in the library of Vienna, and bears the title: *Fides sancti Athanasii episcopi Alexandrini.*

If this view of the gradual composition of this Creed be correct, the *Symbolum Quicunque* is less individual and more catholic in its very origin, than any other confession of Christendom, with the only exception of the Apostles' and the Nicene Creed. This fact does not weaken, but rather strengthen its authority as a confession of faith. If Athanasius were an inspired apostle, then the case would be very different. But as all the teachers of the church, since the apostles, are fallible men, their writings carry no more weight and authority with them than their merits justify, and the church has given them by its own consent. The validity and value of the

---

and the question is merely, whether the councils quote from the symbol without naming it, as most writers suppose, or whether the Symbol borrowed from the councils, as Gieseler (l. c. p. 110) thinks.

* It is called *Codex Usser. I.* Archbishop Ussher saw it in a Psalterium Latino-Gallicum of the Bibliotheca Cottoniana, and assigned it "tam ex antiquo picturae genere, tum ex literarum forma grandiuscula" to the age of Gregory I. (590-604). But it has since disappeared.

† The manuscript of Treves on the borders of Gaul and Germany.

‡ Ms. Ambros. in the Ambrosian library at Milan.

§ Cod. Usser. II (Cotton. I.) in a copy of the Gallican Psalter of King Aethelstan. Usser says of it, De Symb. p. 8: "Psalterium illud anno aerae nostrae Christianae 703, longe ante Aethalstani regnantis tempora, ex regulis Kalendario in libri initio subjunctis scriptum fuisse deprehendi." Waterland (l. c. ch. IV.) remarks: "The Psalter, wherein this Creed is, is the Gallican Psalter, not the Roman; the title is: *Fides Sancti Athanasii Alexandrini.*" This is the oldest manuscript of any we have extant (—Cod. Uss. I. being lost—) ascribing this Creed to Athanasius.

Athanasian Creed can in no case be made to rest on the authority of any individual, however great and good, and the more it is separated from individual authorship, the better for its catholic and churchly character.

RECEPTION AND AUTHORITY.

As soon as the Athanasian Symbol clearly appears in history, we find it in high esteem, and quietly assuming its position among the authoritative doctrinal and liturgical standards of the *Latin* church, without the sanction of a general council, but on account of its own intrinsic merit. It was first introduced in France about 550, then in Spain 630, in Germany 800, in England 880, in Italy 880, in Rome 930.* The Roman church in this point did not lead, but follow public opinion. She was always more desirous of imposing her own faith and rites upon other churches, than of adopting any from them. The Creed was frequently commented upon,† embodied in copies of the Psalter and Breviary, ordered to be committed to memory by the priests, and introduced into the weekly or even daily worship.‡

In the Greek church the Athanasian Creed, when it first became known, after the tenth century, met with opposition, especially on accout of the Latin doctrine of the procession of the Spirit *from the Son*, as well as from the Father.§ Subse-

---

*See Waterland l. c. ch. VI., and Kœllner p. 85.

† By Venantius Fortunatus, Hincmar, Bruno of Würzburg, Peter Abælard, St. Hildegard, Alexander ab Hales, John Wycliffe, and others. See an account of the older commentators in Waterland's essay, ch. III. (Works, vol. III. p. 134 sqq.)

‡ Hatto, bishop of Basle, A. D. 820: "Ut Fides S. Athanasii a sacerdotibus discatur et ex corde, die Dominico, ad Primam recitetur." A more explicit testimony for the liturgical use of this Creed in the French and English churches, is furnished by Abbo of Fleury about 997 (quoted by Kœllner, p. 65). Of later usage Bona (Tract. de divina Psalmodia, p. 803) says: "Illud symbolum olim, teste Honorio, quotidie est decantatum, jam vero diebus Dominicis in totius coetus frequentia recitatur, ut sanctae fidei confessio ea die apertius celebretur."

§ Some Greek divines denied that Athanasius ever wrote it; others maintained that he was drunk when he composed it; still others that the Latins corrupted his Creed by the insertion of the *et filio*. The last is also asserted in the Confessio Metrophanis Critopuli. Comp. Kimmel's Monumenta Fidei Ecclesiae Orient., P. II. p. 23. For an account of the different Greek translations and manuscripts, see Waterland. ch. V.

quently it was likewise introduced, but less extensively than in the Latin church, and with some alterations, and with the omission of the *et filio*, *καὶ ἐκ τοῦ υἱοῦ*, (corresponding to the *filioque* in the Latin versions of the Nicaeno-Constantinopolitan Symbol).*

From the Latin church the Athanasian Creed, together with the other two ecumenical Creeds, passed over into the orthodox Protestant churches, and was either separately and expressly acknowledged, or substantially incorporated into their doctrinal or devotional standards.

The Lutheran church received it among its symbolical books. Luther appreciated it highly, and was disposed to regard it as the most important and glorious production since the days of the Apostles.† The Augsburg Confession substantially repeats its doctrine of the Trinity, and of Christ's person, without naming it.‡ The Form of Concord distinctly recognizes it as Scriptural, true and authoritative.§ Hence it is found in all the editions of the "Book of Concord" as the third symbol of the Lutheran Confession.

The Reformed church of England gave it a place in the *Common Prayer Book*, and ordered it to be sung or said alternately by the minister and people, standing, in the morning service on several festival days, viz.: Christmas, the Epiphany, St. Matthias, Easter, Ascension, Whitsunday, John the Baptist, St. James, St. Bartholomew, St. Matthew, St. Simon and St. Jude, St. Andrew, and on Trinity Sunday. In all these days it takes the place of the Apostles' Creed. Several of the most eminent divines of the Anglican church, as arch-

* Bingham: "Presenter Graeci eo utuntur nonnullis additamentis aucto et aliquantum mutato."

† "Es ist also gefasset," he says, "dass ich nicht weiss, ob seit der Apostel Zeit in der Kirche des Neuen Testaments etwas Wichtigeres and Herrlicheres geschrieben sei." Comp. Luth. Opp. Hal. VI. 2313 sqq.

‡ Art. I. and Art. III. (p. 9 and 10, ed. Hase).

§ Epit. p. 571, and more fully in the Solida Declar. p. 632 (ed. Hase): "Amplectimur etiam tria illa Catholica et generalia summae auctoritatis Symbola, Apostolicum, videlicet, Nicænum, et Athanasii. Haec enim agnoscimus esse breves quidem, sed easdem maxime pias, atque in verbo Dei solide fundatas, praeclaras Confessiones fidei, quibus omnes haereses, quae iis temporibus Ecclesias Christi perturbarunt, perspicue et solide refutantur."

bishop Usher, bishop Pearson, and especially Dr. Waterland, the learned champion of the orthodox doctrine of the Holy Trinity against the high Arianism of Dr. Samuel Clarke, have commented on it and defended its contents. Even R. Baxter embraced it "as the best explication of the Trinity," provided, however, that "the damnatory sentences be excepted, or modestly expounded."*

The Reformed churches of the Continent have not given the Athanasian Symbol that direct formal sanction and prominence, as the Lutheran and the Anglican.† But they unanimously profess, in their symbolical books, the same doctrine of the Trinity and the Incarnation; reject the errors of the Arians, Semi-Arians, Nestorians, Eutychians and Monothelites, and thus acknowledge in fact, if not always in form, the authority of the ancient ecumenical Creeds, in due subjection, of course, to the supreme authority of the Holy Scriptures. The Second Helvetic Confession, drawn up by Bullinger in the name of the Swiss churches in 1566, and approved by them, endorses, in very strong and unmistakeable terms, the doctrine of the first four general councils and of the Athanasian Symbol.‡ Dr. David Pareus, the pupil and friend of Ursinus, and editor of his Commentary on the Heidelberg Catechism, wrote a special exposition of the Athanasian Creed,

---

* As quoted by Waterland (works, vol. III. p. 251).

† Dr. Ebrard, on the contrary, thinks that the Reformed church makes in some respects even more account of the ecumenical Creeds than the Lutheran (Christl. Dogmatik, vol. II., p. 89 and 90). This may be true as to the doctrine itself, but not as to the formal recognition of these Creeds. Dr. Ebrard has overlooked the distinct recognition in the passage just quoted, in the preceding note, from the Lutheran Form of Concord, and the somewhat disrespectful manner in which Calvin at least (De vera ecclesiae Reformatione) speaks of the Symb. Nicaenum as a "carmen cantillando magis aptum, quam confessionis formula."

‡ Cap. XI. (p. 487 in Niemeyer's Collectio Confess. in Eccl. Reform. public.): "Quaecunque de Incarnationis Domini nostri Jesu Christi mysterio definita sunt ex Scripturis sanctis, et comprehensa symbolis ac sententiis quatuor primarum et praestantissimarum Synodorum celebratarum *Niceae, Constantinopoli, Ephesi et Chalcedone, una cum beati Athanasii Symbolo*, et omnibus his similibus symbolis, credimus corde sincero et ore libero ingenue profitemur, condemnantes omnia his contraria. Atque ad hunc modum retinemus inviolatam sive integram fidem Christianam, orthodoxam atque catholicam: scientes symbolis praedictis nihil contineri, quod non sit conforme verbo Dei, et prorsus faciat ad sinceram fidei explicationem."

which, however, I have never seen.* Henry Heidegger of Zurich, in a special dissertation quoted above, defends the doctrine of the Creed against the objections of Dudithius and other Anti-Trinitarians, and concludes with a running comment upon the whole.

So far the faith in the doctrines of our symbol was unshaken in the church, and was shared in common by the Greeks, (if we leave out of view their dissent from the *filioque*), Romans, and Protestants. The Socinians alone differed from it, and prepared the way for a still greater dissent. During the seventeenth century the origin of the Athanasian Creed was first made the subject of critical investigation by Continental and Anglican divines, and resulted in the almost unanimous rejection of the ancient tradition as to its authorship. This had the effect to weaken its authority as a primitive symbol, without undermining the faith in its contents. But when the skeptical and rationalistic flood of the eighteenth century swept away from a large portion of the church the orthodox faith in the Holy Trinity, and the Incarnation of the Son of God, this Creed was almost forgotten, and figured only in church histories among the many idle fabrications of a superstitious and intolerant age.

The reviving faith of the nineteenth century led to a gradual return to the ancient Confessions, first of the period of the Reformation, and then also to those of the primitive church. And although the Athanasian Creed is still comparatively neglected, and even passed by in silence by eminent writers † on the very doctrines it so ably and clearly sets forth, it begins again to attract attention more and more, and to be

---

*Symbolum Athanasii, notis breviter declaratum. Heidelb. 1618 (as Walch has it, l. c. p. 156), or 1619 (according to Kœllner, p. 87. Probably the one gives the date of the preface, the other the date of publication.) Waterland (p. 251) refers to an edition of 1634.

† Dr. Baur, in his learned and eminently scholarly, though unsound, work on the history of the Holy Trinity and the Incarnation of God, alludes to this Creed only *en passant* in a foot note, Vol. II. p. 33, and p. 168. But what is more surprising still is, that Dr. Dorner, in his invaluable Christological work, should not even mention it, so far as we can see, from a cursory glance over both volumes and the index.

appreciated in its true worth without being unduly overestimated as in times past. Dr. Kling, an Evangelical divine of Würtemberg, claims for it a permanent significance in the Christian church, which will never give up its dogmatic substance.* Dr. Ebrard, one of the leading representatives of the modern German Reformed school of theology, makes still greater account of it in his "Christian Dogmatics."† He represents it as the completion of the ancient Catholic theology and christology, and asserts that it has been most fully taken up and best understood by the symbols and early divines of the Reformed communion.

As to America, I am not aware that the Athanasian Creed has ever been made the subject of serious discussion.‡ The Episcopal church, at its separate organization after the revolutionary war, threw it out of its Liturgy, together with the Nicene Creed (the latter, however, was subsequently restored at the instance of the English bishops). But this omission must be traced to the prevalence of the latitudinarian spirit of the eighteenth century, which proposed, in the General Convention held at Philadelphia in 1785, a number of other omissions and changes in the Liturgy, the Thirty Nine Articles, and even in the Apostles' Creed.§ If the Epsicopal church were to be reorganized now, as it was in 1784, the Athanasian Creed, as well as the Nicene, would probably keep its place in the Liturgy, and many of its ministers would gladly see it restored. The Lutherans of the United States are still bound to this Creed as far as they respect at all the Book of Concord. The Presbyterians and Congregationalists never, as far as I know, acknowledged it in form, but their standards

---

* Art. in Herzog's Encyclopaedia vol. I, p. 577.

† Vol. I. § 138 p. 185 sq., u. vol II., § 377, p. 89 sq.

‡ Dr. Shedd gives a brief notice of it in the last book of his History of Christian Doctrine, vol. II., p. 439. He correctly says, that it embodies the Trinitarianism of the School of Augustine and Hilary, and the results of the Ephesian and Chalcedonian councils respecting the Person of Christ.

§ Comp. on this subject bishop White's Memoirs of the Prot. Episc. Ch. in the U. S. of A. Phil., 1820, p. 102 sqq. and 488 sqq, and the "Proposed Book," i. e., the provisional Liturgy of that church as revised by the Convention of 1785. Many of the alterations, especially also the omission of the Nicene Creed,

teach substantially the same doctrine. The Dutch Reformed church has it as an appendix to its Liturgy, although it is probably never used there in public service. The new Liturgy of the German Reformed church, 1857, which is as yet, however, merely of a provisional character, received it, together with the two older ecumenical Creeds, among the Primitive Forms, and recommends its use on the last communion in the ecclesiastical year. This is a step in advance of the other Protestant communions of the country, and just the reverse of the negative action of the Episcopal church in 1785; but, as compared with the original position and doctrinal standards of the churches of the Reformation, Lutheran, Anglican and Reformed, it is certainly no innovation, but a return rather to old usage under a modified, and we may say simplified and restricted form as to its actual use in public service. Whether the Athanasianum will retain its place at the final revision of this liturgy, remains to be seen. The more closely it is examined, the less objectionable will it appear to those who cherish a strong and hearty belief in the ancient Christian doctrine of the Holy Trinity and the incarnation of the Son of God.

CHARACTER AND CONTENTS.

Let us now examine the theology of the Athanasian symbol, the nature of which must determine its value and use in the Christian church.*

The third ecumenical Creed is an epitome of ancient Catholic theology, and sets forth, in clear logical statement, the orthodox faith concerning the fundamental articles of the triune God and the divine-human Saviour, without attempting to explain these unfathomable mysteries. It embodies the permanent results of the trinitarian and christological controversies

---

and the article on the descent into hades in the Apostles' Creed, were subsequently given up, on the remonstrance of the English bishops, who refused ordination, except on condition of the restoration of that article, and of the Nicene Creed.

* On the theology of the Creed, which we regard as the most important part of the subject, Walch and Kœllner are altogether superficial and unsatisfactory. Waterland gives a brief, Harvey (vol. II., p. 585–695) gives a more extended commentary on it.

which agitated, with uncommon violence, the Nicene and post-Nicene age, and were decided successively by the four general Synods held at Nicæa in 325, at Constantinople in 381, at Ephesus in 431, and at Chalcedon in 451.

For all practical purposes we may say the Apostles' Creed was sufficient, and it is so to this day, as a guide for catechetical instruction of the young, and as a confession at baptism and communion. In this respect it can never be superseded or improved. Its very simplicity gives it a decided preference for popular catechetical and liturgical use over the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds, and every subsequent confession of faith. But theologically and scientifically considered, it is defective, inasmuch as it does not clearly and unmistakeably teach the Godhead of Christ and of the Holy Ghost in the full sense in which the church intended it from the beginning.

Hence it was found necessary to define it more fully at the councils of Nicæa and Constantinople, in opposition to the Arian and Semi-Arian hypothesis which acknowledged Christ to have existed before the world and to be divine in some sense, but denied his equality with the Father, and which made the Holy Ghost the first creature of the Son, or a mere power and influence of the Godhead. The Nicene Creed calls Jesus Christ not simply the "only begotten Son our Lord," as the Apostles' Creed does, but the "only begotten Son of God; begotten of the Father before all worlds, God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God; begotten, not made; of one substance (*homoousios*) with the Father, by whom all things were made." This is certainly an advance, not in faith, we may say, for this was the same in the beginning, but in knowledge and in expression.

But the theology of the church could not stop here. The Nicene Creed, even in the more explicit form which it received at the Synod of Costantinople in 381, teaches, indeed, the true Godhead of Christ beyond the possibility of mistake, but it gives by no means yet a complete view of the holy Trinity. For in the first place, like the Apostles' Creed, it speaks of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost separately, with-

out bringing out their oneness of substance, their mutual relations and distinctive personal properties, so as to exclude every possible form of tritheism on the one hand and subordinationism on the other. Secondly, it is especially defective in the doctrine of the Holy Ghost, which did not come into full view at all during the Arian controversy. In the third place it is entirely silent on the exact relation which holds between the divine and human nature of Christ, which was brought out only during the succeeding Nestorian and Eutychian controversies.

In all these respects, and especially in the last, the Athanasian symbol is a decided advance upon its two predecessors. It naturally divides itself into two parts. Each part is introduced by a prologue on the necessity and importance of holding the true faith as afterwards taught, and the whole concludes with an epilogue to the same effect. The first, and larger part, from v. 3–27,* teaches the true doctrine of the Trinity; the second, from v. 26–44, the doctrine of the incarnation, or the proper constitution of Christ's person.

1. The doctrine of the Holy Trinity, or the theology, in the strict sense of the term.

The Holy Trinity is the sacred symbol and type of the Christian religion, as distinct from the abstract monotheism of Judaism, Mohammedanism, and deism on the one hand, and from the dualism and polytheism of the various forms of paganism on the other. It comprehends all the truths and all the blessings of the revelation or self-communication of God for the salvation of men. Hence it is expressed in the baptismal formula, and confessed in the Apostles' Creed at the very entrance into the Christian church in the sacrament of baptism (Matth. xxviii. 19), and made the all-comprehending and concluding benediction by the apostle (2 Cor. xiii.: 14). It stands thus at the

* The division in verses differs somewhat, although the succession is the same in all manuscripts and editions. The Book of Concord makes 42 verses, Weber 43. The best critical edition of the text is said to be that of Waterland. But the Latin codices, of which Montfaucon compared 12, Waterland 24, present a very small number of lectiones variantes, while the Greek copies, though less numerous, (8), differ more materially.

beginning and at the end of Christian worship, and controls it throughout. But it is not simply in the two express passages alluded to, that the Bible teaches the holy trinity, nor in all the far more numerous passages which prove the Godhead of Christ or of the Holy Ghost, and which can only be reconciled with the fundamental idea of the Divine unity on the assumption of a trinity of persons in this unity of substance. We may say the doctrine runs through the entire Scriptures from beginning to end in the form of living facts, or in the exhibition of the revelation of the one only true and living God as Father, Son and Holy Ghost in the work of the creation, redemption and sanctification of the world. We need not be surprised, therefore, that this article stands out so prominently in the faith, worship and theology of the early church, and gave rise to a long succession of doctrinal controversies. In this article again the divinity of Christ, as the incarnate God and Saviour of the race, formed naturally the central interest and fills the greater portion of the ancient Creeds, since it is the starting point of the Christian consciousness, determines the true idea of God, and was the main object of attack on the part of the ancient heresies, both of Jewish and heathen origin.

The Holy Trinity is a mystery which transcends our present power of comprehension, and will furnish food for sacred meditation and praise throughout the countless ages of eternity. Nevertheless, as faith, though superrational and supernatural, is never irrational and unnatural, the subject matter of this article of faith can and ought to be clearly known and stated.

This is done with admirable clearness, precision, brevity, and completeness in the Athanasian Creed. It betrays a mind which had evidently mastered the entire subject and fully appropriated it to the intellect as well as to the heart. It not only rejects *Unitarianism* or *Monarchianism*, which either as Patripassianism, or as Ebionism, denies the Trinity altogether, but it avoids, also, with singular care and discrimination, the three erroneous forms in which the Trinity may be held and has been held at different times before and since. It excludes,

in the first place, *Sabellianism* or *Modalism*, which teaches only a nominal distinction in the Godhead, or at best, merely a trinity of revelation, not of essence, and thus falls back at last upon Unitarianism, or abstract Monotheism ; secondly, *Tritheism*, which teaches three divine beings, and thus runs into polytheism ; and thirdly, *Subordinationism*, which subordinates the Son to the Father, and the Holy Ghost to both, as partaking in part only, as it were, or to a limited extent, of the divine essence, or dignity. These errors are not expressly mentioned, but necessarily denied by the positive statement of the opposite view.

The Symbol teaches the Unity in Trinity and the Trinity in Unity, neither dividing the substance, nor confounding the persons.*

1. *The Unity* of the Godhead as to being, substance or essence: "The Godhead of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, is all one, the glory equal, the majesty co-equal. . . There are not three eternals, but one eternal. . . not three uncreated, nor three unlimited ; but one uncreated, and one unlimited ; . . not three almighties, but one almighty ; . . not three Gods, but one God ; . . not three Lords, but one Lord. . . We are forbidden by the Catholic religion to say : There are three Gods, or three Lords."

2. The *Trinity* of persons, or hypostases. These terms, it is true, must be taken in a peculiar sense, if applied to God. For in human relations three persons constitute three different beings. Yet there is no other term equally expressive. The Trinity is in the first place immanent and essential, a distinction in God himself, independent of, and prior to, his manifestation in the world. It is a living relationship and process in God, the vitality, so to say, of infinite intelligence and infinite love. God was from everlasting Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and will remain forever Father, Son, and Holy

* V. 3 and 4. In v. 27, there is an unimportant difference of reading as to the order. The textus receptus, as found in the Book of Concord, reads, *trinitas in unitate et unitas in trinitate*, while Waterland reverses the order, *unitas in trinitate et trinitas in unitate*. The latter is the order in the old English version and n the revision.

Ghost as certainly as he is supreme wisdom and supreme love. This Trinity of constitution reflects and manifests itself in the economical Trinity, or Trinity of revelation,* that is the threefold divine work of creation, salvation, and sanctification. "There is one person of the Father, another of the Son, and another of the Holy Ghost. . . The Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God. . . Each person by himself is God and Lord."

3. The internal *relation* of the three persons or their distinctive properties which, however, do not in the least interfere with the strict unity of substance. The Father is himself not made, nor created, nor begotten, but eternally *begetting* the Son; the Son is not made, nor created, but eternally *begotten* of the substance of the Father; the Holy Ghost is not made, nor created, but eternally *proceeding* from the Father and the Son.† It is true, in this last point there is a difference of opinion between the Greek and the Latin church, the former denying the procession from the Son as a later innovation and corruption. But the equality of the Son and the Father in its full sense necessarily requires the *filioque*. Here the Athanasianum follows the Latin view as brought out especially by St. Augustine,‡ and embodied also in the later clause to the Nicene Creed.

This same doctrine of the Trinity, including the *filioque*, was unanimously professed by the Reformers, reasserted in oppo-

---

* We employ here a terminology which is much later, but the distinction itself between an essential or immanent Trinity, and an economical or transeunt Trinity enters unquestionably into the ancient Creeds and is implied already in the doctrine of the *eternal* generation of the Son, or the *eternal* Sonship of Christ.

† Or to express it in nouns according to a later terminology, to the Father belongs negatively the *innascibilitas* or *ἀγεννησία*, positively the *generatio activa* Filii and *spiratio activa*, (*πνοη*) Spiritus Sancti: to the Son belongs the *filiatio* or *generatio* (*γεννησία*) *passiva*, and *spiratio activa* Spiritus S.; to the Holy Ghost the *processio* (*ἐκπόρευσις*) and *spiratio passiva*.

‡ Com. Augustin, de Trinit. IV. 20: "Nec possumus dicere, quod Spiritus S *et a Filio* non procedat; neque enim frustra idem Spiritus *et* Patris *et* Filii Spiritus dicitur. Nec video, quid aliud significare voluerit, quum sufflans in faciem discipulorum ait: Accipite Spiritum S. Neque enim flatus ille corporeus substantia Spiritus S. fuit, sed demonstratio per congruam significationem, non tantum a Patre, sed *et a Filio* procedere Spiritum."

sition to the Socinians, and incorporated into the doctrinal standards of the Evangelical churches. Hase says that the view of the Athanasian symbol "was received *without change* into the symbolical books of the Lutheran church, and defended as the most sacred mystery of orthodox Christendom against every kind of opposition."* The Reformed church, in some of its standards, is even more full and clear on the subject than the Lutheran.† Let us hear the four Reformed symbols which are most extensively used and enjoy the greatest authority, the second Helvetic Confession, the Heidelberg Catechism, the Thirty-nine Articles, and the Westminster Confession.

The larger Helvetic Confession not only expressly endorses the ancient symbols, including the Athanasianum, as we have observed already, but also, in its exposition of the Trinity, is so clear and explicit as to leave no room for doubt whatever.‡ "We believe and teach that God is one as to essence and nature (unum esse essentia vel natura), self-subsisting and self-sufficient for all things, invisible, incorporeal, immense, eternal, the creator of all things visible as well as invisible, the highest good. . . Nevertheless, we believe and teach that this same infinite God one and undivided (unum et undivisum) is inseparably and without confusion distinct in persons (personis inseparabiliter et inconfuse esse distinctum) as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, so that the Father from eternity begat the Son (ab aeterno Filium generaverit), that the Son was begotten by an ineffable generation (Filius generatione ineffabili genitus sit), and that the Holy Ghost eternally proceeds from both, and is to be adored with both (Spiritus S. vero procedat ab utroque, idque ab aeterno, cum utroque adorandus); so that there are not three Gods, but three persons consubstantial, co-eternal and co-equal, distinct as to hypostases, and in order

* Hutterus Redivivus, oder Dogmatik der Evang. Luth. Kirche, p. 171 of the 8th ed. Comp. his quotations from the Augsb. Conf., the Apology, and the old Lutheran divines, on the subsequent pages. Also Hase's Evang. Dogmatik, p. 515, 4th ed.: "Die hergebrachte Lehre ging ohne alle Durchbildung in die evang. Kirche ueber, theils durch Reception des Athanasianum, theils durch Wiederholung seines Grundgedankens, wie seiner praktischen Anwendung."

† Comp. Ebrard l. c. I. p. 186 sqq. ‡ Cap. 3, p. 470 ed. Niemeyer.

(or dignity) one preceding the other, yet without any inequality (nulla tamen inaequalitate)." Then the Confession quotes several Scripture passages in support of this doctrine, and condemns not only the Jews and Mohammedans and all who blaspheme "sacrosanctam et adorandam hanc Trinitatem," but also those heretics who deny or pervert it, as the Monarchians, Patripassians, Sabellians, Arians, Macedonians, and the like.

The Heidelberg Catechism, necessarily more brief, but sufficient for its purpose, says, in the 25th Question: "Since there is but one divine essence, why speakest thou of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost? Because God has so revealed himself in his word, that these three distinct persons are the only true and eternal God."

The Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England recognize the Athanasian Creed,* and teach in the very first article, which is retained unchanged in the Episcopal Church of the United States: "There is but one living and true God. . . . And in unity of this Godhead there be three persons, of one substance, power, and eternity; the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost." The Church of England has given the Athanasian Creed a permanent place in her Book of Common Prayer, and in her public worship.

The Westminster Confession, which is held by the Congregational and Presbyterian bodies of England, Scotland, and the United States, approaches more closely to the phraseology and letter of the Athanasian Creed:† "In the unity of the Godhead

* Art. VIII "of the Three Creeds," in the original articles as they still obtain in England. The Episcopal Church of the United States has not only removed the Athanasian symbol from the liturgical service, but also stricken out its name from said article in the revision of 1801, retaining, however, the Nicene and Apostles' Creeds, and also Art. I and II unaltered, which teach the same doctrine on the Trinity and the Incarnation.

† Chapt. II, § 3. Comp. the Larger Catech. Quest. VIII–XI.

The Westminster standards are hardly ever noticed by German writers, not even by Ebrard and Schweizer, in their works on Reformed Dogmatics, while they refer to every other symbol, the Scotch Confession among the rest, which was superseded by the far more full and accurate Westminster Confession and Catechisms. It is characteristic that Niemeyer, in his Collection of all the Reformed symbols, originally omitted the Westminster standards entirely, but furnished them afterwards in an Appendix, with the excuse that he was unable before to find a single copy of them any where (quod ne unum quidem confes-

there be three persons of one substance, power, and eternity, God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost. The Father is of none, neither begotten, nor proceeding; the Son is eternally begotten of the Father; the Holy Ghost eternally proceeding from the Father and the Son."

Similar quotations might easily be multiplied, but it is not necessary, since the orthodoxy of the Protestant Evangelical churches on this article has never been seriously questioned, not even by Roman Catholic controversialists.

II. The doctrine of the INCARNATION, or the CHRISTOLOGY.

The doctrine of Christ is substantially contained in the confession of Peter, that Jesus of Nazareth is the Christ, *i. e.* the promised Messiah, the Son of the living God, or in the declaration of John: The word became flesh; or in the word of Paul: God manifest in the flesh. The church has ever believed in the mystery of the incarnation or the abiding union of the divine and the human in the person of Christ, as the central truth of our holy religion and the foundation of all our hopes. Christ must be both the Son of God and the Son of man in the fullest sense of the term, if he really is what he claims to be, the Mediator between God and man, and the Saviour of the world. To deny either his divinity, or his humanity, to reduce him either to a mere man, however great and good, or to resolve him into a Gnostic phantom and spectral idea, is a radical heresy, and overthrows the Christian salvation. Hence the uncompromising hostility of the ancient church against Ebionism on the one hand, and Gnosticism on the other. But the exclusion of these two extreme errors is not sufficient. It may be admitted that Christ is both God and man, and yet the *relation* of the divine and human in him be so conceived as seriously to affect either their difference or their unity.

---

sionis Westmonasteriensis sive Puritanae exemplar usquam reperire potueram). And yet the Westminster Assembly, next to the Synod of Dort, was the most important Protestant Synod ever held since the Reformation, and its doctrinal standards contain the best expressions of the Calvinistic system of theology, and are more extensively used in England, Scotland, and the United States, than any other symbolical book of Protestantism.

The difference may be made so great, as virtually to result in two persons, or the unity may be so pressed, as to teach but one nature. The former is the Nestorian, the latter the Eutychian or Monophysite error. The one allows merely a mechanical and external relation between the divine and human nature in Christ, and substitutes the idea of an indwelling of the former in the latter or of a moral fellowship for the idea of an incarnation. The other assumes a total absorption of the human nature into the divine in the act of the incarnation, so that Christ ceases to be man, and cannot be our model for imitation. In both cases the truth of the incarnation and its result, the redemption and reconciliation of man with God, are seriously endangered and virtually annihilated. Nestorianism falls back at last upon an Ebionite Christology, while Eutychianism ends logically in Gnosticism and Pantheism.

Here now the Athanasian Creed, in the second part, steers with equally sound instinct and discrimination between the Nestorian and Eutychian heresies, as it steered in the doctrine of the Trinity between Tritheism and Unitarianism. It teaches that Christ is perfect God and perfect man, equal to the Father as to his divine nature, equal to man as to his human nature, sin only excepted, and yet one and the same Christ, not by confusion of substance, but by unity of person,* not by conversion of the Godhead into flesh, but by assumption of the manhood into God.

It is interesting to compare with it the confession of the Council of Chalcedon in 451, which rejected the Eutychian heresy, and gave at the same time an exposition of the orthodox doctrine in these words:

"Following the holy fathers, we all teach and confess unanimously one and the same Son our Lord Jesus Christ, perfect in Godhead, and perfect in manhood; truly God, and at the same time truly man, of a reasonable soul and human body; of the same substance with the Father as to

* Unus omnino, non confusione substantiae, sed unitate personae, v. 36. This sounds like a direct denial of the Eutychian theory, and seems to point to a period after the fourth general Council in 451. But the same view was substantially advanced before Eutyches, and opposed in similar forms as in this passage. Comp. Waterland, l. c. p. 104 sqq, and Koellner, p. 89 sq.

his Godhead, and of the same substance at the same time with us as to his manhood; in all things like unto us, except sin; eternally begotten of the Father according to his Godhead, but in the last days, for our sake and for our salvation, born of the Virgin Mary, the mother of God (*τῆς θεοτόκου*), according to his manhood; one and the same Christ (*ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν* X.), Son, Lord, Only-begotten, who is known in two natures * without mixture and change,† without division and separation,‡ so that the difference of the natures is by no means abolished by the union, but rather the peculiarity of each nature is saved, and they are united into one person and one hypostasis, § not divided or torn into two persons, but one and the same Son, and Only-Begotten, and God Logos, our Lord Jesus Christ: as the prophets from on high and the Lord Jesus Christ himself have taught us, and the faith of the fathers has handed down to us."

The statement of the Athanasian Creed is more simple and condensed and omits the term "mother of God," which is not to be regretted,‖ but it is equally, if not more clear and explicit.¶ It also illustrates the relation of the two natures in Christ by the union of soul and body in man. It then enumerates, like the Apostles' Creed, the leading facts in the life of our Saviour to his return in glory, and concludes with the doctrine of the last judgment, where the good shall receive everlasting life and the wicked everlasting damnation.

---

* *ἐν δύο φύσεσι*, in duabus naturis, as all Latin copies read, instead of the other reading, *ἐκ δύο φύσεων*, which might be understood in a Eutychian or Monophysite sense.

† *ἀσυγχύτως, ἀτρέπτως*—against Eutychianism.

‡ *ἀδιαιρέτως, ἀχωρίστως*—against Nestorianism.

§ *εἰς ἓν πρόσωπον καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν.*

‖ It must be admitted that the term *θεοτόκος*, so obnoxious to the Nestorians, has a good sense, and follows with logical necessity from the orthodox view of the Incarnation. It is moreover properly qualified by the addition "according to his manhood." But it is equally certain that it is one-sided (*χριστοτόκος* and *θεανθρωποτόκος* would be more complete); that it was not used by the apostles and ante-Nicene fathers, nor by St. Augustine; that it is liable to be grossly misunderstood by the illiterate; that it has been greatly abused and made the basis of an excessive, yea idolatrous worship of the Blessed Virgin in the Greek and Roman churches. We prefer the Scriptural term, "Mother of our Lord," Luke i. 43.

¶ Waterland inferred from the omission of the term *Mater Dei*. *θεοτοκος*, which was the watchword of orthodoxy in its war against Nestorianism as the term *ὁμοούσιος* in the Arian conflict, that the Creed was composed before the condemnation of Nestorius in 431. But in this case we would expect some reference to it in the Councils of Ephesus 431, and of Chalcedon 451, or immediately afterwards. Such an excellent summary of orthodoxy could not well be long hidden from the churches, especially if it proceeded from such a distinguished prelate as Hilary of Arles, to whom Waterland ascribes it, though without good reason.

The Christology of the Athanasian Creed has likewise passed over, without any material change into the symbolical books of the Lutheran and Reformed churches. Leaving out of view the Lutheran doctrine, we shall confine ourselves again to the four leading confessions of the Reformed communion.

The Heidelberg Catechism teaches,* that Christ as a Mediator and Deliverer must be *very man*, and perfectly righteous, because the justice of God requires that the same human nature which has sinned, should likewise make satisfaction for sin, and one who is himself a sinner, cannot satisfy for others; and that he must be at the same time *in one person very God*, that he might by the power of his Godhead sustain, in his human nature, the burden of God's wrath, and might obtain for us and restore to us righteousness and life.

The second Helvetic Confession,† after teaching distinctly the eternal generation of the Son and the strict equality with the Father, goes on as follows: "The same eternal Son of the eternal God, we believe and teach, has become the Son of man of the seed of Abraham and David, without the cohabitation of man, as Ebion said, being conceived in the purest manner, by the Holy Ghost and born of the Virgin Mary, according to the evangelical history." Then after rejecting the Gnostic and Appollinarian view of the humanity of Christ, it continues: "We acknowledge in one and the same Christ our Lord two natures, the divine and the human, and these we hold to be so connected that they are not absorbed, or confused, or mixed, but united or conjoined in one person, without destroying the permanent properties of the natures; so that we worship one Lord Christ, not two, who is very God, of one substance with the Father, according to his divine nature, and very man, of one substance with us men, according to his human nature, sin only excepted. Therefore we abominate the Nestorian dogma which makes two out of one Christ, and dissolves the unity of person; so also we utterly execrate

* Quest. XV–XVIII. Comp. Qu. XXIX–XL.

† Cap. XI: De Jesu Christo vero Deo et homine, unico mundi Salvatore, p. 483 sq. ed. Niemeyer.

the folly of Eutyches, the Monophysites, and Monothelites who expunge the property of the human nature."

The Thirty-nine Articles of the Anglican Communion teach:* "The Son, which is the word of the Father, begotten from everlasting of the Father, the very and eternal God, and of one substance with the Father, took man's nature in the womb of the blessed Virgin, of her substance: so that two whole and perfect natures, that is to say, the Godhead and manhood, were joined together in one person, never to be divided, whereof is one Christ, very God, and very man," etc.

The Westminster Confession is equally clear and distinct on this subject.† "The Son of God, the second person in the Trinity, being very and eternal God, of one substance and equal with the Father, did, when the fullness of time was come, take upon him man's nature with all the essential properties and common infirmities thereof, yet without sin, being conceived by the Holy Ghost, in the womb of the Virgin Mary, of her substance: so that two whole, perfect, and distinct natures, the Godhead and the manhood, were inseparably joined together in one person, without conversion, composition, or confusion. Which person is very God and very man, yet one Christ, the only Mediator between God and man."

The Shorter Catechism of Westminster gives one of the briefest and best statements of the orthodox doctrine of Christ's Person in these words: "The only Redeemer of God's elect is the Lord Jesus Christ, who being the eternal Son of God became man, and so was and continues to be *God and man in two distinct natures and one person* forever." "This statement," as is justly observed by Dr. W. Cunningham, the late principal of New College of the Free Church in Scotland, "manifestly embodies the sum and substance of the decrees of the third and fourth ecumenical councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon in the fifth century, and cannot be explained and defended without a knowledge of those Scriptural

---

* Art. II. † Chapt. VIII, § 2.

grounds applicable to the subject on which the decisions of these councils were professedly based."*

It is perfectly plain, then, that the theology and christology of the Athanasian symbol is to this day the public doctrine of the Protestant Evangelical as well as the Roman Catholic Churches. To recognize and acknowledge it in form is perfectly consistent with orthodox Protestantism. To reject it altogether, is at the same time to reject the corresponding articles of all our leading confessions of faith.

The only real difficulty in the way is the *damnatory* clause in the prologue and epilogue of the Athanasian Creed, which makes the eternal salvation dependent upon the reception of this faith in the Holy Trinity and the Incarnation. This is the great objection to this symbol even in the eyes of many who otherwise altogether agree with its contents. No doubt the objection would be serious and valid, if the damnatory clause referred to the *form* as well as to the *substance* of faith, and required us to condemn any particular *persons*, especially all those who held loose any unsatisfactory philosophical views on the Holy Trinity, as was the case even with most of the ante-Nicene fathers, not to speak of such men as Milton, Newton, Watts, Schleiermacher, Neander, Bushnell, and many other distinguished divines in the later ages of the Christian church. But this is a false interpretation of the clause. The more it is examined and understood in its proper sense, the less objectionable will it appear.

For in the first place, if faith is at all saving, the rejection of faith must be condemning. The assertion of truth is necessarily also the negation of error. There is no avoiding the conclusion. "He that believeth," says the highest authority, "and is baptized, shall be saved; but he that believeth not, shall be damned."† "He that believeth on him, is not condemned: but he that believeth not, is condemned already because he hath not believed in the name of the only begotten Son of God."‡

---

* Historical Theology. Edinburgh, 1854. Vol. I. p. 310.

† Mark xvi: 16 ‡ John iii. 18. Comp. v. 24; vi. 40 and 47.

Secondly, the energy and earnestness of faith in its negative as well as positive expression, must not be confounded with intolerance and uncharitableness. The question is here not of persons at all, but simply of truth and error. We are bound as Christians to love the sinner and heretic, and to labor for his conversion, while we should abhor and condemn his sin and error.

Thirdly, the Protestant symbols, both Lutheran and Reformed, do substantially the same thing which is found so objectionable in the Athanasian Creed. The Augsburg Confession, the Articles of Smalkald, the Form of Concord, the Helvetic, Gallic, Belgic, Scotch, and other Confessions, expressly condemn, in the strongest terms, such as *damnamus*, *abominamur*, *detestamur*, *execramur*, the trinitarian and christological heresies of the Gnostics, Docetists, Ebionites, Apollinarians, Nestorians, Eutychians, Monothelites, Servetians, Socinians, and others.

Finally, in all these cases salvation and condemnation is not made to depend upon the acceptance or rejection of the logical form of statement or any particular degree of knowledge of these mysteries, but only upon the presence or absence of faith in the doctrinal substance or the great truth contained in the statement. The form of expression is simply the outer hull to guard the kernel of truth against misapprehension and perversion. The strength and nourishment lies in the kernel, not in the hull. It is the truth alone, as apprehended by faith, which can save, and can save a child and a barbarian as well as the ripest and profoundest scholar. But what is the central truth, the main object of saving Christian faith? It is undoubtedly the one only true and living God, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, who made us, who redeemed us, and who sanctifies us, and the one Lord Jesus Christ, very God and very man, the only Saviour. This is the faith taught in the Protestant confessions, as well as in the three ancient Creeds; this faith is necessary for salvation, while its wilful rejection must exclude from it; this faith will remain the same to the end of time, however much its philosophical apprehension and

logical expression may change and improve with the progressive march of theological science.*

VALUE AND USE.

With this explanation of the damnatory clause we should think that no strong believer in the Trinity and the incarnation of the Son of God, as the fundamental doctrines of the holy Scriptures, can justly deny the Athanasian Creed a great and permanent value. Besides the formal recognition of it in the second Helvetic Confession and other symbolical books of the Reformed Church, it has long had a place in full in the Anglican and the Dutch Liturgies. It has also quite recently been embodied in the new hymn book and liturgy of the Reformed Church of Elberfeld, which is perhaps more strictly Reformed than any other congregation in Germany and Switzerland. This work, published in 1853, in addition to the Psalms and two hundred and forty-three well selected choice hymns, accompanied with the tunes, contains the Heidelberg Catechism, a number of prayers and short liturgical services, the three ancient Creeds, and also the doctrinal decisions of the councils of Ephesus A. D. 431, and of Chalcedon A. D. 451.

It is not intended, of course, to place these Creeds on a par with the holy Scriptures in a Romanizing sense, or to weaken in the least the fundamental Protestant principle concerning the rule of faith. The authority of the word of God is absolute, that of the Confessions of the church is relative only and conditioned by their agreement with it; the former is, strictly

* Dr. Kling in his short article on the Athanasian Creed, in Herzog's Encyclopædia, takes the same view of the offensive clause: "Das Vorurtheil," he says, "wird schwinden in dem Maasse, als man sich darüber verständigen wird, dass es [the Athan. S.] uns nur angeht hinsichtlich seines *wesentlichen dogmatischen Gehaltes*, das heisst, insofern als es die Einheit der Gottheit in der dreifachen persönlichen Unterschiedenheit und umgekehrt, und die vollkommene Gottheit und vollkommene Menschheit des Einen untheilbaren Christus als unvermengt, unverwandelt und ungeschieden feststellt." . . . "Darin liegt seine bleibende Bedeutung, und nie wird sich die christliche Kirche diesen Gehalt und unser Symbolum, insofern es denselben in sich trägt, nehmen lassen, wie auch immer die positive theologische Vermittlung desselben sich ändern und vervollkommnen mag."

speaking, the only rule of faith, the *norma normans fidei*, the latter are only exponents of the true sense of the Bible and safeguards of sound doctrine, the *norma normata doctrinae*.

Among these Confessions of faith the three symbols of the ancient church have always held, and should continue to hold, the highest place, because they are nearest the apostolic fountain; they really contain the fundamental articles of the Christian faith in the shortest and simplest form; they are ecumenical or universal, being received by all the branches of orthodox Christendom, and they form a link of union between the church of the present with the church of the past, up to the age of the confessors, martyrs and immediate disciples of the apostles. The most sacred associations of many centuries cluster around them; they are fraught with the piety, faith, hope, joy and spiritual experience of God's people of all generations and tongues. Why should the Athanasian Creed be banished from its former time-honored position, since it is only the legitimate completion of the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds, embodies, as we have seen, the purest results of the theology of the first five centuries, and gives the clearest and fullest expression to the church's faith in the triune God and the divine-human Saviour of the world—a faith so earnestly and emphatically reconfessed, as with one voice, by all the symbols of Evangelical Christendom.

In addition to their doctrinal value the ancient Creeds have also from time immemorial been used for liturgical purposes. Here a proper distinction must be made.

The Apostles' Creed stands decidedly first on account of its simplicity for all practical and popular use. It alone, as already intimated, is properly adapted for catechetical instruction, for baptism and confirmation, and should also be more frequently confessed than any other in the regular service of the Lord's day, as the solemn utterance of the common congregation and a united act of worship, like singing and prayer.

The Nicene Creed, being already more artificially constructed and rising somewhat in its terminology above the ordinary popular comprehension, should be confined to communion or

festival seasons, where it may take the place of the Apostles' Creed.

The Athanasian Symbol, finally, being still more theological and scientific in tone and expression, is scarcely appropriate for liturgical use at all, except perhaps on special occasions, or, as has been proposed, once a year on Trinity Sunday. It is is intended more for the clergy than for the people. The frequent use of it in the mediæval Latin church, and in the Church of England, is to be attributed in part to the former scarcity of hymns, now so happily supplied by our rich treasures of sacred poetry, and can, therefore, not be taken as a precedent.

The most solemn and impressive form of professing the Creeds in public worship is the chanting by the choir, either alone or in connection with the whole congregation properly trained for responsive liturgical worship.

Art. V.—THE POLITICAL CRISIS.

BY GEORGE L. PRENTISS, D. D., New York City.

In closing an article on the Political Situation, in the April number of this Review, we expressed our fervent hope "that Congress and the President might soon come to see eye to eye, and agree upon a joint policy which should be, like the wisdom from above, first pure, then peaceable, full of mercy and good fruits, without partiality, and without hypocrisy."

We need not say how grievously this hope has been disappointed. The differences, which six months ago seemed not incapable of being reconciled, have since widened into an impassable chasm. The Executive and Legislative departments of the Government are arrayed against each other in open and determined conflict. Both have appealed to the country and already the popular verdict has begun to utter itself. The nation is in the midst of a political crisis as momentous as any

it has ever known. We propose to take a brief survey of the contest, and of the issues involved in it.

In our previous article we traced the President's policy down to the veto of the Civil Rights Bill. His message returning that bill left but little ground of hope that he would approve of any plan of restoration, which the wisdom of the National Legislature might devise. Everything, indeed, indicated that his mind was fully set in him to have his own way, in total disregard of the law-making power; and that his own way was to admit the States lately in insurrection to all their old rights and privileges, and to increased power in the Government, *without any further conditions or guarantees whatever.* He declared them (with the exception of Texas) to be already reconstructed, and as completely entitled to representation in either house of Congress as New York or Ohio. He had said, it is true, that they must present themselves "*in an attitude of loyalty*" as well as "in the persons of loyal representatives." But as he evidently considered himself the sole judge of the first qualification, and loudly proclaimed their loyalty to be unimpeachable,* it only remained for Congress to look into the second. But here, again, there was an irreconcileable difference between the two branches of the Government. The word "loyal" was used by the President in a peculiar sense. He meant by it, as is now perfectly clear, anybody who, having been amnestied, or pardoned, professed approval of his "policy;" and this executive test Mayor Monroe, of New Orleans, or one of his "Thugs," could stand quite as well as Gov. Parsons and Gov. Orr. The Congressional test of a "loyal representative," on the other hand, was his ability to take the oath of office prescribed by the Constitution and the law of the land.† This oath, both in its letter and spirit, is in utter

* "They (the late rebel States) are one and all in an attitude of loyalty towards the Government, and of sworn allegiance to the Constitution of the United States. In no one of them is there the slightest indication of resistance to this authority, or the slightest protest against its just and binding obligation. This condition of renewed loyalty has been officially recognized by solemn proclamation of the Executive department."—*Address of the Philadelphia Johnson Convention.*

† The oath is as follows: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I have never

antagonism to the policy of Mr. Johnson. Probably not half-a-dozen of all the claimants of seats from the South can take it without committing perjury; and yet not a single one of these claimants but is an enthusiastic supporter of the President; nor is there any reason to think that a single one of them all is regarded by him as disqualified to sit in the halls of National Legislation. How, then, can any loyal man be surprised that the breach between Congress and the Executive was not healed? It could have been healed only by the former consenting to abandon the whole question of reconstruction to the discretion of Mr. Johnson, to abdicate to this end its functions as the supreme law-making power of the Nation, and to admit to seats on its floor men whose hearts and lips were still envenomed with disloyalty, provided only they brought in their hands the pardon, and praised the "policy," of the Executive! Some have alleged, we are aware, that if Congress, early in the session, had decided upon the plan ultimately adopted, the President would, probably, have given it his approval; for he had again and again expressed himself as in favor of every one of its principles. We cannot concur

---

voluntarily borne arms against the United States since I have been a citizen thereof; that I have voluntarily given no aid, countenance, counsel, or encouragement to persons engaged in armed hostility thereto; that I have neither sought nor accepted, nor attempted to exercise the functions of any office whatever, under any authority or pretended authority in hostility to the United States; that I have not yielded a voluntary support to any pretended government, authority, power, or Constitution within the United States, hostile or inimical thereto. And I do further swear (or affirm) that, to the best of my knowledge and ability, I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States, against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion, and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, so help me God."

"And why (it may be asked) did not Congress admit the few claimants who *could* honestly take this oath?" We reply, because it would have been a virtual abandonment of the vital point in dispute; it would have been giving up to the enemy the key to the whole position. Congress maintained the ground that no insurrectionary State was entitled to representation in either house of the National Legislature, until, as a State, it gave adequate guarantees that it had abandoned the principles of the rebellion, and would henceforth abide by the amended Constitution, the Union, and the obligations of honor and justice contracted by the nation in putting down the rebellion. So long as such guarantees were not given, Congress would have stultified itself in admitting any man, however loyal; and so Horace Maynard, Senator Fowler, and Col. Stokes, the tried loyalists claiming seats from Tennessee, frankly acknowledged.

in this opinion. We are constrained to believe that Mr. Johnson had already made up his mind not to agree with Congress, except on the condition of its first yielding to him all the vital points in controversy. If there were no other evidence of this, his speeches, and those of his Secretary of State, during their late electioneering tour to the grave of Douglas, leave no doubt on the subject. Whatever may have been thought before, we are at a loss to understand how anybody, after reading these extraordinary effusions, can suppose for a moment that the dilatory action of Congress, or the "white-washing" epithet of Mr. Sumner, or even the sarcasms of that extremely "radical" but sturdy and whole-souled old patriot, Thaddeus Stevens, led Mr. Johnson to abandon the loyal cause. Is it not, alas! too plain that he had deserted it already in his heart; and that these things so offended him, because they helped to betray the fearful secret to the watchful eye of the country?

We are not disposed, therefore, to censure Congress for having delayed so long to decide upon a plan of reconstruction. This delay was highly salutary and needful. The task was one of the most difficult ever assigned to a legislative body. And for three months after Congress met, the country was far from being in the mood to break with the President and stand up in solid phalanx for its loyal Senators and Representatives. Thousands of patriotic and thoughtful citizens, who in July last were in full sympathy with Congress, in December, 1865, or even in February, 1866—at least before the 22d of that month—would have taken sides with the Executive; of this no other proof is needed than the memorable Cooper Institute meeting on the evening of Washington's birthday. So the final rupture came, probably, at the best time; neither too soon nor too late. It came just when public sentiment was ripe for the great issue. Instead of blaming Congress for not sooner agreeing upon a policy, we rather praise it for its wise delay. The policy was thus made far more perfect, and popular opinion was prepared to give it a much heartier and more intelligent support. However desir-

able it might have been to hasten the work of restoration, it was vastly more desirable that the work should be done well than done quickly. It is a thousand times better that the States lately in rebellion should be admitted in the right way one or two years hence, than that they should be admitted at once, or should have been admitted last winter, in a way dangerous to the future peace and safety of the country, or inconsistent with national honor and justice. And it seems to us that the future peace and safety of the Union, and not less the claims of honor and justice, are admirably provided for by the plan of settlement finally adopted by Congress. This plan is contained in a joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution. It is as follows:

JOINT RESOLUTION PROPOSING AN AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of both Houses concurring), that the following article be proposed to the Legislatures of the several States as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which, when ratified by three-fourths of said Legislatures, shall be valid as part of the Constitution, namely:

ARTICLE XIV.—SECTION 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

SEC. 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States, according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of Electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

SEC. 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President or Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State Legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States,

shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid and comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.

Sec. 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection and rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations or claims, shall be held illegal and void.

Sec. 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this Article.

This amendment speaks for itself and requires no interpreter. It is well entitled to the place in our American *Magna Charta*, which we trust it will soon occupy beside the great Amendment proposed by the Thirty-Eighth Congress.* The more it is pondered, the more will it commend itself to the reason and conscience of the Nation as an eminently wise, just, and magnanimous basis for the settlement of the questions arising out of the rebellion. It is, surely, the very embodiment of national leniency and moderation, containing nothing vindictive, nothing harsh, even. Indeed, the only plausible ground of complaint against it is its extreme mildness. Where do the records of history afford another instance of a great and high-spirited nation dealing with a conquered rebellion, which had assailed and almost destroyed its life, on terms so considerate and merciful? Let us for a moment examine these terms. Let us look at this ultimatum of Congressional "Radicalism."

Section 1 defines American citizenship, asserting this high privilege for the 4,000,000 of freedmen, and places it everywhere, without respect of persons, under the benignant and august protection of the National Government. It is nothing else than a practical enforcement of the principles of the Declaration of Independence. When once part of the Constitution, the true measure of the civil rights of every

* Article XIII.—Sec. 1.—Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

Sec. 2.—Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

American freeman, whatever his race or color, will be the supreme law of the land—the great law of our Republican Liberty—and not the mere good pleasure of South Carolina, Louisiana, or any other State, whether in the North or South.

Section 2 changes the basis of representation in Congress, and in the Electoral College, in accordance with the results of the war. Without this change the South would actually gain nine or ten members, while the North would lose ten. By this change the three-fifths rule ceases to operate, and the South, instead of gaining ten votes in consequence of rebellion, loses fourteen; so that the practical effect would be a difference of some *thirty-four* votes in Congress and in the Electoral College in favor of the North. And this is perfectly fair and just. The South can at any time turn the balance in its own favor by giving the elective franchise to its colored citizens. But so long as it refuses to do this; so long as it withholds the ballot from these four millions of its population on account of their color, it has no right to vote for them or to claim that it represents them. This section, we repeat, is most just and reasonable, and the North will insist upon it at all hazards. It certainly needs no argument to show that the vote of a late rebel in South Carolina, or Alabama, ought not to equal the vote of two loyal citizens of Maine or Iowa.

Section 3 provides that those who have added perjury to treason, in turning against the Union and adhering to its enemies, the leaders of the rebellion, shall be ineligible to any State or Federal office, until absolved by the people through a two-thirds vote of their Representatives in Congress. And this provision, it will be observed, not only puts a righteous stigma upon perjury and treason in the past, but holds out a solemn warning to all who in the future may be tempted to commit these crimes. Like the section following, it is intended to be a permanent law of the land, looking before and after. How entirely it harmonizes with the views of Mr. Johnson, as expressed in his speech "*defining* (to use his own language) *the grounds on which he accepted*" the Baltimore nomination, and in his various addresses on assuming the Ex-

ecutive reins, it is needless to remark; although, to be sure, it falls very far short of the large scope and pitiless severity of his doctrine. If any one is disposed to question this statement, let him read the section again and then compare it with the following utterances of the President:

"Treason against the Government is the highest crime that can be committed, and those engaged in it should suffer all its penalties." "They must not only be punished, but their social power must be destroyed." "I say that the traitor has ceased to be a citizen, and in joining the rebellion, has become a public enemy. He forfeited the right to vote with loyal men when he renounced his citizenship, and sought to destroy our Government." "After making treason odious, every Union man should be remunerated out of the pockets of those who have inflicted this great suffering on the country." "Their leaders must feel the power of the Government. Treason must be made odious, and traitors must be punished and impoverished; their great plantations must be seized, and divided into small farms, and sold to honest, industrious men." "Why all this carnage and devastation? It was that treason might be put down, and traitors punished. Therefore, I say that traitors should take a back seat in the work of restoration. If there be but five thousand men in Tennessee loyal to the Constitution, loyal to freedom, loyal to justice, these true and faithful men should control the work of reorganization and reformation absolutely."

Section 4 affirms the validity of the National debt, and the illegality of all rebel debts and obligations, or claims for the loss or emancipation of slaves. We regard this section as of immeasurable importance. The repudiation of the rebel debt, it will be remembered, was one of the conditions of restoration laid down by the President himself. But that repudiation, even had it been made part of its new Constitution by every Southern State, would afford no sort of security to the country. It can itself be repudiated the moment the States are re-admitted. Moreover, it says nothing about claims for the loss or emancipation of slaves; *nor does the Platform of Mr. Johnson's Philadelphia Convention.* Should the South be restored without further conditions, we entertain no doubt that a formidable combination would at once be organized to bring about the assumption of the rebel debt, and the payment of claims for the loss or emancipation of slaves, to say nothing of pensions for the Confederate soldiers. It has ever been to us a matter of unfeigned astonishment that the monied capital of the North, so vitally interested in the public

credit and national securities, should not have shown more alarm on this point. In our opinion the peril from this source can hardly be overestimated; and we see no adequate protection against it, except in an amendment to the Constitution. The South once restored, with a large increase of political power, would be a solid unit in favor of demanding compensation for its slaves, if not the assumption of its war debt; and with the aid of Northern allies hungering for place, who can be sure it would not succeed? Such a combination as we have mentioned, with so immense a prize in view, could well afford to offer a million of dollars, if need be, for a vote; and it is fearful to think what might, yea, what probably would be the effect of such colossal bribery! We should see a "Ring," whose vast magnitude, power, and turpitude, would utterly dwarf and put to shame even that which has so long preyed upon the property and morals of New York.

Section 5 authorizes Congress to enforce the foregoing provisions by appropriate legislation. Brief as it is, this section contains an ample supply of Constitutional power to destroy the last vestige of the rebellion, to maintain the public faith and credit, to protect Southern loyalty, whether of blacks or whites, and in due time to establish impartial freedom, order, and equal justice throughout the Union.

Such is the plan of restoration devised by the patient, far-seeing, and patriotic wisdom of the National Legislature. The Amendment has been ratified already by New Hampshire, Connecticut, Tennessee, New Jersey and Oregon. We cannot doubt that it will be ratified by all the other Northern States, and by a sufficient number of Southern States to make it valid as part of the Constitution. Nor do we doubt that it will confer imperishable honor upon its much-abused and calumniated authors—the faithful, fearless senators and representatives of the Thirty-ninth Congress. Compared with the insane policy of Mr. Johnson, it appears to us as the fine gold of sober, prudent, and high-toned American statesmanship—such statesmanship as sat in council in the renowned convention of 1787.

We are aware that some who acknowledge the Amendment

to be essentially just and reasonable, still deny the right of the National Legislature to make its ratification a condition precedent to the admission of the late rebel States to representation in Congress. They are willing it should be urged upon the acceptance of the South, but only in the way of "moral agitation." This is the ground taken by Rev. Henry Ward Beecher in the deplorable letter which shot such a pang of grief through the hearts of millions of his old friends, and made so jubilant the hearts of millions of his old defamers. It is the ground taken by other honored citizens, whose purity of motive and sincere devotion to their country are unquestionable. But we cannot for a moment admit its validity. We yield nothing to these eminent men in our desire for a speedy and complete restoration of the Union. Nor are we willing to concede that our faith in the New Era, or in the beneficent and reconciling power of American and Christian ideas, is less strong than theirs. But this is not a mere question of "moral agitation;" no more than was that of the adoption of the other great amendment abolishing slavery. Like that, it is pre-eminently a question of wise and practical statesmanship. It concerns not merely desirable things, but things absolutely vital to national honor, security and justice. Such, at least, is the deliberate conviction of myriads of the most thoughtful, sober-minded, and conscientious patriots in the land. Such is the solemn conviction of the overwhelming majority of the men and women, who sustained the country through the war, both at home and in the field. Nor have they the least misgiving as to the constitutional power, or the perfect historical and moral right of the American people, through their senators and representatives in Congress assembled, to require assent to the righteous provisions of the proposed amendment on the part of the late revolted States, as a condition precedent to their sharing again in the National Legislation and Government. No theory denying this power and right appears to them tenable; neither that which asserts the Nation to be pledged to the late rebel States by its public decla-

rations during the war;* nor that of the transcendental and impeccable character of the States as States. This last doctrine, especially, as it is preached in support of Mr. Johnson's policy, they find it hard patiently to endure; the doctrine, we mean, that the Southern States could do no wrong and impair no right, or privilege, by the treason of the people and governments which constituted them States; that they could not go out of the Union, and never were out, either in law, or in fact; and that, therefore, they were fully entitled to representation in Congress, not only the instant the war ceased, but *all through the rebellion*—as fully entitled as Massachusetts or Illinois—and that to deny them this representation *until they give to the Nation proper guarantees of the loyalty of the people and governments which constitute them States, as also of its own future peace and safety*—is an act utterly unconstitutional, oppressive, and destructive of the Government.† The over-

* On this point we think many have been misled by the language of the oft-cited resolution on the object of the war, passed by the two houses of Congress in July, 1861, just after the battle of Bull Run. This resolution was a manifesto to the insurgent States, and was intended especially to allay their fears for the institution of Slavery. It embodied, no doubt, the loyal sentiment of the country at the time. But it seems to us that a most inordinate importance has been attached to it. It was passed by a Congress chosen before the war. It was no *law*. It did not bind the Executive, who never signed it, nor did it bind the next Congress chosen in the midst of the war and with exclusive reference to the new issues. When President Lincoln issued his Proclamation of Emancipation, the act was bitterly denounced as a violation of the letter and spirit of this Crittenden resolution; it was "overthrowing or interfering with the rights and established institutions of those States." But Mr. Lincoln did not consider that he was violating any pledge which bound either him or the Nation. The same charge was brought against the 38th Congress, for proposing the amendment abolishing slavery; it was an attempt to "overthrow an established institution, and impair the dignity, equality and rights" of the Southern States. But that noble Congress did not admit the charge to be just; nor did the loyal States who ratified that Great Amendment; nor did President Johnson, when he required the rebellious States to ratify it also. The Crittenden Resolution had no legal or constitutional force when it was passed; and it certainly has none now. Still, we see no real inconsistency between a vote for that resolution and a vote for the Constitutional Amendment. The object of the latter is simply to secure the great object of the war as declared by the former, and to fulfill the pledges given by the Nation in its successful prosecution.

† "It seems to us in the exercise of the calmest and most candid judgment we can bring to the subject, that such a claim, so inferred, involves as fatal an overthrow of the authority of the Constitution, and as complete a destruction of the Government and Union, as that which was sought to be effected by the States and people in armed insurrection against them both."—*Address of Mr. Johnson's Philadelphia Convention.*

whelming majority of those who sustained the country through the war, we repeat it, regard this doctrine as a monstrous sophism, repugnant alike to political reason, to fundamental principles of moral and social order, and to sound common sense. And their opinion of it seems to us entirely correct.

No fine-spun metaphysical theory of State rights, or of the Constitution, can serve as a just and proper basis for the settlement of such novel, momentous, and eminently practical questions as have sprung out of the Slaveholders' rebellion. The founders of the Republic never anticipated the occasion for such a settlement; just as little as they anticipated the breaking out, in 1861, of such a stupendous civil war; and they made special provisions for the one as little as for the other. In conducting the war to a successful issue, the Nation was compelled to adapt itself to the unparalleled exigency by creating, both on land and water, its own military precedents; and it has the right to do a like thing in securing the fruits of its incomparable victory. When the Constitution and its own experience cast no sure light upon its "dim and perilous way," it must seek light elsewhere. Following its own Heaven-inspired instincts, and taking counsel at the oracles of Eternal Truth, why should it not create new political precedents in the interest of republican freedom, humanity and justice? Has it not already done so in devising and adopting the great Amendment? Nor have we any fear that such a course will lead it astray from the paths of a wise and genuine conservatism, or of Christian mercy and magnanimity. The loyal heart of the Nation is still disposed, as it has ever been, to the largest possible exercise of mercy and magnanimity towards those lately in arms against its life, that is consistent with the claims of public order, righteousness and good faith. It is afraid to exercise even the blessed quality of mercy at the expense of these sacred principles. And we believe the time is coming when even the South will fully understand this; when she will be willing to acknowledge that the great heart of the Nation, like the heart of its martyred President, was governed in its policy of restoration by no sen-

timent inconsistent "with malice toward none, with charity to all."

We have thus taken a brief view of the political crisis through which the country is passing; and what we have said might, for the most part, have been written as well before the adjournment of Congress as now. But since that date, public events have occurred of the gravest import, and bearing directly upon our subject. The nation has been in the midst of a severe moral, as well as political crisis. Its patience, its self-command, and its holiest convictions, have been tried and tested as hardly ever before. It has seen the boundless patronage of the Executive prostituted to the work of intimidating and corrupting popular opinion with open and shameless effrontery. Unscrupulous and ambitious, or disappointed, politicians, some of them veterans of half a century in the arts of party intrigue, and whose very names have become odious to the moral sense of the nation, have been seen conspiring together to thwart the righteous will of the people, and to betray the cause of Loyalty and Freedom into the hands of its worst foes. Deeds of savage butchery have been perpetrated at mid-day, in one of the chief cities of the Union, and in the sight of the Flag of our country, which find no parallel this side of the Sepoy massacres in the dark places of Oriental heathendom; and, to crown the horror, the Chief Magistrate of the Republic stands in such relations to them, both before and after, as to have impelled sober-minded, Christian citizens to turn deliberately to the Constitution and ponder, for the first time, the meaning of those "OTHER *high crimes and misdemeanors*" on impeachment for and conviction of which "THE PRESIDENT . . . . SHALL BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE." (ART. II. Sect. 4.)

And, as if this were not enough, the ear of the nation has been assailed, week after week, by denunciations of its Supreme Legislature as a usurping, disunion body "hanging upon the verge of the Government," and by dark threats of a rival Congress to be made up of late rebels and their allies from

"the other end of the line," as also of another civil war, to be carried on—not on Southern—but on Northern soil. Nor have such threats and denunciations been uttered by reckless politicians alone; they have been scattered broadcast over the land, like so many fire-brands, arrows and death, by the lips of the Executive himself! Is it strange that these things have filled the public mind with the deepest excitement and alarm? Is it strange that they have pressed, like an incubus, upon all loyal hearts, keeping thoughtful men and women awake at midnight? Is it strange that, in view of them, the tide of popular sentiment is running with such resistless might in the direction indicated by the Vermont and Maine elections?

It is not our purpose to discuss the New Orleans riot. The end of that dreadful story is not yet. The American people are still reading it; and they require no interpreter and no argument to explain to them its meaning, or to tell them who are the responsible and guilty authors of it. They have studied and compared the President's dispatches and every other dispatch, whether in its mutilated or unmutilated form; they have read Mr. Johnson's apology for the massacre in his speech at St. Louis; they have pondered Gen. Baird's report, and will ponder every word of the Report of the Military Commission when it sees the light. If any further evidence is needed, they will demand that it be taken the moment Congress shall assemble. And we are very much mistaken if they do not also demand in due time, and in a voice not to be trifled with, that in some way the crime should be punished and the matchless infamy of it washed off from the American name. In dismissing the subject, we content ourselves with putting on record a single extract from one of Gen. Sheridan's dispatches to Gen. Grant; simply begging our readers to compare the closing recommendation respecting Mayor Monroe with the dispatch, signed five or six weeks later by that Head Centre of the "Thugs," as still Mayor of New Orleans, lauding the President and his "policy," and supplicating him to return from St. Louis to the seat of Government by way of Louisiana:

"The more information I obtain of the affair of the 30th in this city, the more revolting it becomes. *It was no riot. It was an absolute massacre by the police, which was not excelled in murderous cruelty by that of Fort Pillow. It was a* MURDER *which the Mayor and Police of the city perpetrated without the shadow of a necessity.*

"Furthermore, *I believe it was premeditated*, and every indication points to this. I recommend the removal of this bad man."

In passing from the New Orleans massacre to the Convention which met in Philadelphia on the 14th of August, we have no thought of casting wanton reproach upon that body. We shall not question that many of its members were actuated by honest and patriotic motives. Some of them are known to the whole country for their high personal worth, their eminence in public service, and their varied attainments; some of them, also, like the accomplished temporary chairman, Gen. Dix, for their honorable record during the war. We have no disposition to speak of such men otherwise than with respect. But the Philadelphia Convention did not originate with such men; they were not its managers; nor is their character any fair exponent of its real intent and purposes. Their aim was very different from the ultimate aim of the Washington and New York politicians, whose old, cunning brains and expert hands contrived and manipulated it; and some of them are, probably, already finding this out. The Convention was imposing in numbers and marked by extraordinary enthusiasm for Mr. Johnson and his "policy," for itself and for the triumphs it was going to win; it seemed to excite no enthusiasm, however, among the loyal and great-hearted people of Philadelphia. Its chief authors evidently thought "the order of exercises" a master-piece of adroit management; the country, on the other hand, was inclined to regard the whole thing, from the "arm-in-arm" farce at the opening to the closing scene in the White House at Washington, as a huge political blunder. What, for example, could be less fitted to win the public confidence and admiration than the frantic manœuvres to keep out Mr. Vallandigham, Mr. Fernando Wood, and a Mr. Dean? Our noble Board of Health did not struggle with a more anxious and persistent zeal to keep the Asiatic cholera out of New

York. And yet the entire country knew very well, that if all the members of the Convention, who sympathized with the principles represented so faithfully by these gentlemen, had been required to leave it, the whole concern would have suffered an instant collapse; scarcely a Southern delegate would have remained, and the places of the larger portion of the Northern delegates would also have become vacant. It was beyond measure absurd to imagine that the clear and single eye of the American people could be deceived by such a bungling political trick. And then, what could be more unwise than to convert the Convention from an arena of honest public conference and discussion into a ridiculous dumb-show, by muzzling the lips of all the delegates, except the handful to whom special parts had been assigned? The Address and Resolutions, although posterity will not, probably, consider them quite equal to the immortal work of the Convention of 1787, or even as a "Second Declaration of Independence," (President Johnson to the contrary notwithstanding), are yet written with skill and ability, as was to be expected from their author; and in spite of much fatal error and sophistry, they assert also many most important truths; but was it exactly kind and "magnanimous" to require the delegates from the late rebel confederacy to give their solemn assent and applause to doctrines, statements and pledges, which their hearts, if not their consciences, must have utterly refused to endorse?* Was not this imposing "degrading conditions upon our Southern brethren?" So it was regarded by the leading organs of public opinion at the South; and accordingly, with a

* As e. g. the following Resolutions of the Platform:

8. "While we regard as utterly invalid and never to be assumed, or made of binding force, any obligation incurred or undertaken in making war against the United States, we hold the debt of the Nation to be sacred and inviolable, and we proclaim our purpose in discharging this, as in performing all other National obligations, to maintain unimpaired and unimpeached the honor and the faith of the Republic.

9 "It is the duty of the National Government to recognize the services of the Federal soldiers and sailors in the contest just closed by meeting promptly all their just and rightful claims for the services they have rendered the Nation, and by extending to those of them who have survived, and to the widows and orphans of those who have fallen, most generous and considerate care."

promptitude and frankness that did honor to their manhood, they repudiated with disdain the action of their delegates in committing the Southern people to such a creed and such sentiments. Had we space, it would be easy to cite pages of the most explicit testimony to this effect. Still, in spite of all these things, it must be admitted that the Philadelphia Convention was planned with no little skill, availed itself of every advantage thrown in its way by the cross-currents of public opinion, and for a time appeared to those, who looked merely at the surface, as not unlikely to succeed. But there were insuperable obstacles in the way of its success, and sagacious observers saw it to be so from the outset. It was essentially a movement in utter hostility to the loyal cause—an attempt to gratify personal ambitions and revenges by precipitating the process of National restoration on principles in direct conflict with the very ideas which had led the country in triumph through the war; and instead of being deceived, the people at a glance saw through the whole scheme, and were only kindled by it to fiery indignation. That is the rock upon which the Johnson-Seward movement was doomed to be wrecked and go to pieces. And this catastrophe was hastened and rendered doubly sure, by the light which the New Orleans murders cast upon the baleful tendency of the Executive policy; as also by the startling revelation which the stumping pilgrimage to the grave of Douglas afforded of the political temper and discretion of its authors.

Of this melancholy, we had almost said hideous, spectacle upon which the nation was compelled to gaze for two long weeks, we shall allow ourselves to say but very little; it pains us deeply to have to say a word. But silence in this case would be disloyalty to the Christian character of the country, and to the moral dignity and honor of the Presidential office. Government is ordained of God; and if those who are entrusted with its exalted and awful functions by the free suffrage of their fellow-citizens, publicly descend from their high position to the level of the vulgar wrangler, the incendiary demagogue, the boastful and railing egotist, or the clown

and postprandial jester, they merit and should receive the sternest rebuke; for they desecrate a divine institution, as well as bring disgrace upon the cause of republican liberty. The American people have never before been called to bow the head so low in shame and sorrow for the conduct of their Chief Magistrate; we trust they will never be called to do it again. One such humiliation ought to be enough for all time. It is a sad thing to say, that the most charitable construction which can be put upon the conduct and language of both actors in this shocking exhibition, is to suppose them not to have been always sober, or in their right mind. How otherwise *could* they so forget themselves, or attribute such political and moral idiocy to the Christian people of the North, as to have ventured to address them in such a style; still more to expect, by such language, to change their honest and profound convictions respecting great questions of public duty and policy? We lament beyond measure the effect of this evil example in arousing the angry passions and intensifying the bitterness of party strife. Is it not one office of our Chief Magistrate and Ministers of State to illustrate by word as well as deed, in the presence of the people as well as in the cabinet, the dignity, self-possession, moderation, and high-toned courtesy, which belong to the idea of a Christian Republic? And we cannot be sufficiently thankful that in the midst of even the repulsive scenes upon which we have animadverted, there appeared—most unwillingly, we doubt not—two illustrious servants of the country—its greatest soldier and its greatest sailor—who well fulfilled this grand office. How expressive the very silence of Grant and Farragut, in contrast with the miserable noise and confusion that surrounded them!

We have written these things with heartfelt regret and sorrow; for they concern men who have heretofore rendered eminent services to their country, and to the cause of liberty. We gladly leave a subject so ungrateful, and pass on to say a word of the other Philadelphia Convention, which met on the 3d of September.

The records of this remarkable gathering are before the country, and we need not go into details respecting it. The Northern people listened eagerly to its voice, have calmly pondered its statements, and will, in due time, make their own response to its pathetic and manly appeal. It was an assemblage as impressive as it was unique in American history. Its story sounded like a chapter from the old martyrologies of Christian faith and liberty, while its addresses and resolutions carried one back to the Declaration of Independence, and the "times that tried men's souls." How different in all respects from the Confederate portion of the Convention that preceded it! That was largely composed of Southerners, who had done their utmost to tear to tatters the Flag of our Country; this, of Southerners who had suffered shame and loss for their unfaltering allegiance to that glorious flag. The one represented chiefly the old slave-holding aristocracy and wealth of the South; the other represented its poor, plain people, its "mean whites," and its four millions of negroes. The former uttered what had been prepared for it by the calculating politicians who called and "run" it, and was allowed to utter nothing else; the latter was, at all events, a council of unmuzzled freemen, each speaking what was in his heart. The one deemed it a great achievement to have kept out Mr. Vallandigham and Mr. Fernando Wood; the other had a colored man among its delegates, was proud to welcome Frederick Douglas to its floor, and listened with delight to his manly and powerful eloquence. Andrew Johnson had the unbounded admiration of the one, Abraham Lincoln seemed to be enshrined in the grateful love and veneration of the other; and while the former adjourned to meet again in the White House, and there offer incense to its idol, the latter adjourned to meet again around the grave where repose the mortal remains of our martyred President. There was not in all the South a man still cherishing the spirit of the rebellion, who did not rejoice greatly in the August Convention, how much soever he may have scorned the thought of being bound by its pledges, or of assenting to its doctrines; nor was there in all the South such a man, who did not regard

the September Convention with mingled contempt, hatred and fear. Are all these strange contrasts accidental? or do they not rather express deep affinities, and fundamental principles of political right and wrong?

There was only one point of serious difference among the members of the September Convention, viz., the question of impartial or negro suffrage; and even on that point the difference related rather to the time and mode than to the principle itself. Most of the delegates from the border States were unwilling to assert the principle at once, and put it into the platform; while most of the delegates from the "unreconstructed States" were not only ready to assert the principle and put it into the platform, but they maintained that their political salvation and that of the whole South which they represented—the Union men during the war, the poor whites, and the colored population—absolutely depended upon its bold assertion and early realization. And certainly no candid person can read their argument and statements in support of this opinion, without feeling their overwhelming force. Without approving of everything that was said, we believe the effect of the Convention will be to enlighten the public mind on this momentous question, to remove prejudice, and so to hasten the day when the mere color of his skin shall debar no American citizen from the right and privilege of the ballot-box. That day is sure to come. The logic of our democratic institutions, the inexorable logic of events, and the calm reason and justice of the nation will combine to bring it to pass without fail. And why should anybody be afraid of that day? Even President Johnson fully acknowledges the principle and the wisdom of putting it in practice, in his dispatch to Provisional Governor Sharkey, of Mississippi, dated August 15, 1865, in which, referring to the State Convention, he says: "If you could extend the elective franchise to all persons of color who can read the Constitution of the United States in English, and write their names, and to all persons of color who own real estate valued at not less than two hundred and fifty dollars, and pay taxes thereon, you would completely disarm the adversary

and set an example the other States will follow. *This you can do with perfect safety.*" And if it could be done in Mississippi "with perfect safety" in August, 1865, when the war was hardly over, it certainly could be done now "with perfect safety" in every Southern State, and (alas! that it needs to be added) in every Northern State which is still enthralled to the cruel prejudices begotten of slavery and *caste.*

Let this question of impartial suffrage and the political rights of the colored citizen be settled in accordance with the fundamental principles of American society; and then—the Constitutional Amendment having been adopted, and enforced by appropriate legislation—we cannot doubt that peace and prosperity would soon prevail throughout all our borders, and that all classes and conditions and races of men among us would rejoice together in the blessings of a new era of Christian light and liberty. In the enjoyment of such blessings the bitter memories of the war would gradually fade away, the antipathies and rivalries of North and South would cease, and the whole nation, revering the merciful hand of God in the past, even in the bloody conflicts of the battle-field, would march forward on the line of its great destiny with exultant hope, trusting still to the guidance of that merciful and almighty Hand. A consummation so devoutly to be wished will not, indeed, come of mere legislation, however wise and beneficient; all the agencies of Christian faith and philanthropy, untiring prayers, every form of pious labor and self-sacrifice, the pulpit, the press, the church, the school, innumerable men, women and children even, who love Christ and His cause, must be added to complete and crown the glorious work. These heaven-born agencies are already busy with their part of the divine task. Let Christian patriotism and statesmanship do their part also, both at the ballot-box and in the council chamber; let political and religious wisdom and zeal thus conspire together; and who can refuse to believe that God, even our fathers' God, will be merciful unto us, and bless us, and make His face to shine upon us, as never before; or that the end thereof will be peace and assurance forever? Then shall come to pass in this great Re-

public the prophetic words, written thousands of years ago among the hills of Palestine : In righteousness shalt thou be established ; thou shalt be far from oppression ; for thou shalt not fear ; and from terror, for it shall not come near thee. Thou shalt know that I, the Lord, am thy Saviour and thy Redeemer, the mighty One of Jacob. For brass I will bring gold, and for iron I will bring silver, and for wood brass, and for stones iron. I will also make thine officers peace and thine exactors righteousness ; violence shall no more be heard in thy land, wasting and destruction within thy borders ; but thou shalt call thy walls Salvation, and thy gates Praise.

Art. VI.—DIVINE REVELATION.

Translated from the German of Dr. Richard Rothe, by J. W. Nevin, D. D., Lancaster, Pa.

That no theory of the Holy Scriptures can be constructed without a positively settled conception, in the first place, of *Revelation*, and that bibliology, consequently, must begin its work here, may be considered as at present, beyond question. With our older Protestant theology, indeed, it was otherwise. The thought of a divine revelation was for its view covered almost entirely by that of the Bible ; they were treated as at once identical. Even after theologians had begun to distinguish them, the distinction was maintained only in the abstract ; concretely, they were still blended together as before. The Bible was for them now, it is true, only the *revelatio divina mediata ;* but this alone had any interest for them, and that between it and revelation proper, there could be anything more than a mere formal difference, entered not into their thought. Proceeding always from the notion that divine revelation consists in the supernatural communication of religious *doctrine* to men, they thought of it at once as holding in the divine gift of the Holy Scriptures, from which we now draw this doctrine. For under the *revelatio divina immediata*

or *primitiva*, was comprehended to their mind simply the illumination originally imparted to the prophets and apostles by the Holy Ghost, and this they made to be that the Holy Ghost "*prophetis et apostolis conceptus rerum et verborum de dogmatibus fidei et moribus suggessit.*" Aside from this view of the supernatural origin of the Holy Scriptures, these older theologians show no clear, distinct apprehension whatever, of what we are to understand by divine revelation. And just here it is that the new theology of our time has taken up its work. The accomplishment of a complete distinction between divine revelation and the Bible, is one of the weightiest among the enduring acquisitions for which we owe it our thanks.

The old theology, too, it is true, had much to make of the conception of divine revelation in its own way; but all under another aspect, agreeably to its notion of religion as having its principle or first starting point in knowledge. The problem for it in this view was not, how revelation stands relative to the Bible, but this rather, how the religious knowledge which is imparted to us by revelation, stands related to what we may know without it. With regard to this it brought out to good purpose the distinction between natural and supernatural religion, and was especially successful in setting forth the relation of reason to revelation; cutting up by the roots the wretched confusion we still meet with on the subject, by insisting on the thought that the reason of man is only on the way here to full actualization, and that we have no right to confound it in such view with our common empirical consciousness and thinking. This needs regeneration, not only that it may be purified, but also that it may be raised to higher quality and tone. Reason is, indeed, a great thing, if only we had it in actual possession! But there, alas, is the difficulty. Rationality is our common human endowment, but it has never come to complete actualization in us except in one only case. The power of thinking is not itself the fact of absolutely right thinking; just as little as the power of will is the fact of freedom or of willing rightly. The old theology thus had no quarrel necessarily with rationalism, so far as this kept itself to

the proper sense of its own name; it held revelation to be above and beyond reason as men have it now, in only relative and defective form, but in full harmony with it, at the same time in its absolute character. With all this, however, it must be confessed, that the subject labored under much confusion. There was a want of power with the theology in question to master practically here the details of its own general thesis. The ground of this may easily be understood. It lay in the lame conception of revelation, strictly so called, with which the system had to help itself. Religion being supposed wrongly to start in the form of knowledge, divine revelation was thought of almost exclusively as the communication of complete doctrinal statements for the understanding, and this, moreover, in an immediate inward manner by mechanical infusion. Such a conception necessarily involves the whole subject in embarrassment. Human reason is thrust aside by it altogether; revelation is shorn of its natural life; the view of the world from the standpoint of religious faith becomes supernatural, narrow, stiff, and pedantic. In one word, a divine revelation, *thus* apprehended, is no longer compatible with an actual human history.

Such a revelation, however, bears no resemblance to the true and actual one which is offered to our view through the Bible. This is exhibited to us as a series (continuously connected) of extraordinary *historical facts* and *institutions*, to which are joined there with specific practical application, the supernatural illumination of prophets in various ways, as visions, and as interior converse with the Spirit of God, not so much for the communication of new religious doctrine, as in order to point the way beforehand to other coming historical events.

We may assume now as universally acknowledged, what has been so convincingly brought into view by Nitzsch, that God's work of *revelation* is only a particular form of his work of *redemption*, that in which redemption necessarily begins, and which looks to this throughout as its whole object and scope. Revelation, from the beginning, not only heralds the

advent of redemption, but makes room for it as a historical possibility. We may assume farther, that the essence of divine revelation consists in a supernaturally God-wrought purification, as well as invigoration of the sense of God in man, (God-consciousness) which by reason of sin (both individual and general) he is no longer able, from the outward and inward date of mere nature, to exercise in a right and sure way. This does not imply that such revelation embraces all that God has done, or is still doing, toward the work of human redemption. On the contrary, his agency in this direction must be considered as extending from the beginning to the history of the race in all its parts. Only so much we affirm, that this universal divine pedagogy has looked in particular to the restoration of a true sense of God (renovated God-consciousness) within the range exclusively of the covenant religion, and consequently has only here attained to the character of *revelation*. All history confirms this. For much as the life of the nations holding mythical sway have contributed to social and political culture, it is notorious that to *religious* culture, the clearing and vivifying of the sense of God, it has, in fact, contributed nothing whatever.

Revelation looks, then, to the purifying and strengthening of the sense of God in man. To this, and to this alone; so much we asseverate, on the threshhold of our inquiry. Revelation is, by its very conception, God-revelation; God, in revealing, reveals *Himself;* God, and God only, is the object which the divine revelation reveals, God and nothing else. What of new knowledge it brings us, is exclusively the knowledge of God; as regards other objects, much as we may desire it, it gives us no information whatever. That is directly. Indirectly it sheds its illumination over the whole world. For by bringing forth the sun of a true sense, or consciousness of God in our firmament, it irradiates the entire sphere of our existence with the full light of day, so that we may see and know all things different from what they must appear to our otherwise relatively benighted view. But this right knowledge of things again is not put as it were ready made into

our hands; the objects of it are only set in the clear light of day, where they may be rightly perceived and observed; while the task of observation and study is still thrown upon ourselves, and is carried forward here with toilsome difficulty, through many errors and mistakes, and with what must be counted as in the end but partial and fragmentary success at the best. God leads us by his revelation into *all* truth; not so, however, as to promulgate for us supernaturally an all-embracing system of knowledge, but by causing his own true *image* to shine forth above our horizon, as the day-spring from on high, in whose beams we may learn to comprehend all things. Revelation is not a science of astronomy for men; but a disclosing of the starry heavens to their view, from which they may form a science of astronomy for themselves.

But now comes the question, how God works this cleansing and strengthening of the God-consciousness in man? and it is here especially that the old notion of revelation needs radical amendment. It makes the relation between man and God in the case, to be altogether mechanical; which is precisely what we need above all things to guard against in our construction of the doctrine. According to the old view, God reveals to man *without any co-operation* on man's part. God infuses his revelation into the human soul; which in the reception of it is purely passive; God working upon it by an outward act simply of his own omnipotence, and mirroring into its consciousness magically a complex of images which are for it not only new, but positively foreign and strange. Were this actually the case, the revelation could not be said to come really to the man, much less into him; it could not be his property. For into our personal life, by an unalterable law of our being, nothing can enter, which is not brought to pass by our own co-operation and in union with our own freedom. What is to be ours in this way must come to us through the medium of our intelligence and will. As a singly outward process moreover, in the view stated, revelation must preclude all development of the religious consciousness in man, for which indeed there would be in such case no occasion or

need. If there is at all, then, a revealing agency of God, an agency of God by which he opens himself to human consciousness, it can never be *magical;* it must be conceived of necessarily as mediated for man, that is, as involving the intervention of the personal functions of man, and as being conditioned by the working of these as a co-operating factor in all that is brought to pass. In one word, divine revelation, supernatural though it be in the fullest sense of the term, is not conceivable except as mediated through human thinking. Only so can it correspond with the nature of man; only so can it correspond with the form in which revealed religion is presented to us in the Bible. This is characteristically distinguished from all other religions, in being essentially *moral* or free in its constitution, in being the result (mediately) of personal action on the part of man. It passes *through* the free intelligence of man, and is thus brought to pass by it as the proper product of his personality. This it is emphatically, which makes it to be truly human and truly spiritual, in one word, the only true religion, in full diametrical opposition to the magical character of all heathen religions; for in the world of spirit, the magical precisely is the non-personal, or what comes not through the intervention of man's spiritual nature.

If then the sense of God in man, what we call his natural God-consciousness, darkened and weakened as it has come to be through sin, is to be purified and strengthened (the immediate object of all divine revelation) it must be in a way conformable to the laws of his personal or human life. In other words, the proposed new quality of this consciousness must be the result of an operation on the part of God that works *through the powers of the human soul itself acting in a natural way.* In this view, what is proposed cannot be reached by a direct act, breaking in upon the moral constitution of the soul in an abrupt, magical manner; the end must be reached circuitously, as it were, by an agency that approaches the man first on the outside, so as to set his interior life in action as from within itself, in a way answerable strictly to its standing psychological organization.

This outside movement must present itself in a form transcending the established order of things in the natural world. The facts of the natural world proclaim the existence of God; but they are not sufficient to rouse the human soul, torpid through sin, to a proper susceptibility for the apprehension of his presence and glory as thus made known. They need therefore to be *reinforced*, we may say, by new phenomena, in such manner that they may be fitted to reflect the idea of God into the soul with full truth and sure evidence. Divine revelation begins then in the exhibition of such new outward data; which, as transcending the ordinary course of nature, are of course supernatural or strictly miraculous. These phenomena, whether as events in nature or events in history, are made to offer themselves within the horizon of human observation, under a character and form that make it possible for the right idea of God to be derived from them with clear evidence in full conformity with the established laws of the soul. For this purpose they must be so constituted, that they can be explained only through the idea of God, as being plainly not referable to any causality in the world, but in the fullest sense supernatural; and then they must image the idea of God truly and correctly. This requires that they should appear under both the characters already noted in conjunction; in other words, that they should be at once events in nature and events in history. For the imaging of a *right* idea of God in the human consciousness demands first of all a just view of what we call his character, embracing particularly his moral attributes: but these can be exhibited only in the form of divine action directed toward some end, which as such can have place in history alone, and never in nature simply as such. Then again, however, there can be no history otherwise than on the ground or basis of nature, and consequently a miraculous working of God in history must involve his miraculous working also in nature. The object before us can be reached thus only through both forms of outward operation: in such sort, however, that the events in nature shall be subordinated to the events in history, and this theologically (the first in

order to the second), according to the relation of nature to history in general. What we have to postulate here, then, is a supernatural history including expressly events in nature. Supernatural history, we say; not just single supernatural occurrences in history. For what is of historical nature is ever part of a consecutive movement, and never an isolated occurrence; and it is only through their practical concatenation indeed, that facts can at all become historical, and the exponents in particular of moral motives and personal character.

This is the first side of revelation. God intervenes, with supernatural, clearly evident, historical self-demonstration (working personally from a higher sphere than that of our common human life) in the natural course of history, in such a way as to force his presence on the sin-clouded human sense, engaging its attention, awakening its consideration, and so making room for its coming to a right apprehension of his character. Examples of such divine intervention abound in the Old Testament. For distinction's sake, we will call what has thus been described the *Manifestation* of God.

The conception of divine revelation, however, is only half met by what is thus presented to our view. To this outward objective side of the case must be joined, as its necessary compliment, an inward, subjective side, which we will call *Inspiration*. If the outward manifestation is to reach its proposed end, it must be understood, and understood rightly. Without this it would be only a passing meteor, that could not enter with any real, abiding effect into the course of history, as the idea of the world's redemption requires. The awakening of the God-consciousness in man depends not simply upon the strength of the impression made upon him, which might be provided for by the manifestation alone, but also upon the right character of the impression. God, in his revelation, seeks to make evident, not only that he is, but also who he is; the first, indeed, not being possible in full without the last, since every wrong apprehension here leads necessarily to some doubt in regard to the reality of its object. *Can* sinful man, however, in himself considered, rightly understand the mani-

festation of God when offered to his view? The Christian must deny this on the ground of his own religious experience; and the nature of the case also shows it to be impossible. The personality of man in general, and with this in particular, the organ of knowledge in him, his knowing faculty, has been corrupted through sin, and his diseased eye is not able to take in anything correctly, and so of course, then, not the divine manifestation as we have it now under notice. If this is to be *rightly* understood, therefore, God must accompany his outward exhibition of himself with an inward and so far *immediate* influence upon the consciousness of him to whom the revelation is addressed, by which this shall take right direction in regard to it, and so be led into the right and true knowledge of God, according to the measure of the particular manifestation. The case calls for inward enlightening from God, the direct producing of knowledge in man for the right understanding of what is exhibited in the form of outward supernatural fact; and this, as we have said, we call inspiration. It is an influence immediately from God upon the action of the soul, which yet is not magical; for by the nature of the case it is conditioned by the peculiar religious sensibility to which the soul has been roused in view of the divine manifestation, according to natural psychological law; an inward state, which of itself makes it peculiarly susceptible for such inworking of God, and which, moreover, unavoidably binds it to the one express purpose of decyphering the sense of the mysterious supernatural occasion immediately before it. God inspires, as Nitzsch says well, through his manifestation. This, as it is the occasion of the inspiration, governs it also with absolute control. The inspiration has for its sole end the intelligible solution of what is contained in the manifestation. They go hand in hand together, and cannot fall asunder; each requiring the other as its natural and necessary complement. The manifestation without the inspiration would be a dumb portent; the inspiration without the manifestation, a fantastic *ignis fatuus*. They authenticate each other, by their mutual, complete correspondence. The true conception of revelation involves both

in indissoluble union, the manifestation as its outward and objective side, the inspiration as its inward and subjective.

Inspiration assumes different forms, according as the supernatural knowledge it imparts is procured either under individual, or under universal character, is matter of feeling, or matter of thought, according as the person inspired is either seer or prophet. In the first case, it completes itself as vision. In the second case, God touches the keys of the human soul in such wise that, out of the general mass of its thoughts and conceptions, some are so brought together as to originate in the consciousness an essentially new thought, which the man knows he has not himself produced, has not brought to pass genetically through any voluntary management of his own thinking, although he may be able afterwards to think it over again, and thus preserve what he has found. We have a very distinct analogy with this in all so called genial conception. There is, as we say, an inspiration of genius, in which the ordinary workings of the mind are transcended altogether by apperceptions that seem to flow in upon it from a higher world. Something of this sort, indeed, all superior minds recognize, as having place, more or less, in their best thoughts. They can understand Fr. Perthes, when he confesses that "a great deal more had come to him in his life suddenly, without effort of his own, than all he had ever been able to acquire by reflection and study." There are bright, rare moments, as Baader tells us, in which a truth bursts like a new star upon our spiritual vision, strange and yet familiar; our own and yet not our own, but, as it were, a heavenly presence brought into us from abroad, kindling our whole existence suddenly into the light and glow of unwonted life. To such moments, he adds, we owe all that is true, and great, and beautiful, in the world of human thought and action. There is a divinity within us that brings all to pass, independently of our ordinary, self-wrought efforts; our province in the case is simply to give utterance to its inspiration, to echo forth its mysterious sense. In this, however, we are active organs, and not blind instruments merely; the force that moves us is, after all, not

impulsion from without, but impulsion from within. The inspiration which is upon us brings with it at the same time the greatest freedom in the use of our own powers. There is an analogy, we say, between such genial or poetical experience as we meet with it in our common life (the soul especially of all æsthetic or creative art), and divine inspiration in its proper theological sense; and it is possible to make use of the fact plausibly against the whole idea of a strictly supernatural afflatus of God's Spirit in this way. Schleiermacher, we know, lays great stress on the difficulty of distinguishing clearly between specific revelation and what the soul is thus inspired to apprehend in a natural manner. But this difficulty holds in truth, only when divine inspiration is thought of as being by itself alone the entire fact of revelation, without any regard to the connection in which it always stands necessarily with a given divine manifestation. This, as we have seen, rules and controls the case throughout. The true theopneusty, of which we now speak, differs at once from all analogous experiences, just by the fact that it is bound expressly to such objective manifestation both causally and teleologically; that is, in such a way that this is the occasion of it historically, and at the same time furnishes the whole problem whose sense it is required to solve.

Both manifestation and inspiration, as we have seen, are historically conditioned. This implies historical limitation or circumscription; and this, again, a gradual development or growth in the divine revelation. It takes its course historically through a series of progressive stages. For God must accommodate the supernatural facts with which he makes himself known, in every case, to the conditions of intelligence that are at hand in the sphere to which he addresses himself; he cannot put forward historical data that must be unintelligible in such sphere, through want of the necessary prerequisitions for their being understood. And so as regards inspiration, the other side of the process; it can take place only so far as it finds in the person inspired the single elements, through whose immediate combination by God's Spirit those thoughts are

called forth which constitute the proper understanding of the manifestation. Yet it is not necessary that this understanding should be at once commensurate at all points with what is contained in the manifestation; right as far it goes, it may still be incomplete. For the manifestation is intended to enter as an abiding fact within the horizon of humanity, by means of historical tradition; in which case, if only there be a right beginning with the understanding of it, the way may be opened in course of time, even through its own historical effects, for the evolution more and more of the conditions required for understanding also what was still incomprehensible in it at the first; and in this view, therefore, it need not be planned exclusively for the first moment of its occurrence, but may be adjusted at the same time to the whole course of things flowing from it afterwards in the way of history. Thus we find it to have been ordered actually in the conduct of divine revelation, as we are made acquainted with it in the Bible. The inspiration of the Old Testament prophets, while it set forth rightly the sense of God's manifestations as far as it went, is still represented to us (Comp. Pet. i. 10–12) as not coming up to it at all in full. Only where revelation becomes fully complete, as we have it in our Lord Jesus Christ, is all room for any disproportion of this sort brought wholly to an end.

In Christ, as the God-man, manifestation and inspiration are absolutely coincident, each being in itself absolutely complete. As he is the full manifestation of God, so is this fully open at once also to his consciousness and knowledge; his inspiration is one with himself. In this view it becomes more than mere inspiration; it is the fullness of the Godhead dwelling in him bodily, real oneness with God. In both respects he stands alone, and embodies in himself singly the whole New Testament revelation. He alone, in his person and life, constitutes the entire manifestation by which God here makes himself known; and he is the *complete* manifestation of God just by this, that in him one individual human life in the rounded unity of all its parts, mirrors forth the divine presence. Answerably to this, he alone understands also what is comprehended in his per-

son. His inspiration in this view, involving as it does identity with God dwelling in him, is altogether his own. He makes God known to the world by making himself known. For the New Testament revelation, there is beyond him no inspiration adequate to interpret authentically the divine manifestation here—which is Christ himself. The inspiration of the apostles themselves was not sufficient for this. They stood above all others in their specific relation to Christ; but even they could not take into themselves the full meaning of his person; they were able to understand and interpret him approximatively only, in the measure of their ability severally to reproduce and report faithfully his own testimony concerning himself.

As now described, revelation is plainly *supernatural*; that is, it is not the product singly of powers belonging to the natural order of the world. This does not mean, however, that it has nothing to do with the order of nature, for just the reverse of this must always be strenuously maintained; but it is to be considered supernatural, inasmuch as it comes of the natural order only so far as this is wrought upon by a causality which transcends all its own proper forces and powers, and which is thus shown to be immediately divine. In such view, it involves no contradiction in our idea of revelation that it is found to require also with equal necessity on the other hand, the predicate *natural*. So much is implied at once by the fact of its entering the world in the form of history, for historical and natural are kindred terms; what is comprehended in history must be comprehended at the same time in the real life of the world, as a course of events joined together in a natural way. But revelation is more than mere matter of history in this general view; it aims also to become an active, universal force in history, laying hold of the movement, and seeking to carry all in its own direction and course. But thus to create history, it must, beyond all question, take nature upon itself, and be inwardly joined to it in its own sphere of existence. Only in this way can it lay hold of the world, become at home in it, enter as a power of real development

into its life, and master fully its historical factors and forces, so as to transfuse into them, as Twesten says, its own substance. Such being the case, it follows that nothing can authenticate itself as revelation which appears in the midst of history under a solitary abstract character; which is not comprehended organically in the great historical movement of divine revelation regarded as a whole. Natural and supernatural show themselves inwardly blended together in fact, through the whole world of revelation, as it is presented to our view in the Bible; and with this corresponds in full the nature of the idea itself, as it has now been the subject of our consideration. It must be both supernatural and natural, at once from beyond the world, and yet at the same time from within the world, in order that it may be either a possibility or a reality.

Here especially our older theology is found to be sorely at fault. In laying stress on the supernatural character of revelation, it fell into the error of making it unnatural; a sort of Gnostic phantom playing itself off in the midst of nature, without ever coming to any real union with it in fact; a sort of visionary presence in the world, claiming to belong to it, and yet holding itself aloof from it, always in the nimbus of an unearthly existence exclusively its own. The theology in question had no sense whatever, we may say, for the now familiar and generally accepted view, according to which revelation is regarded as being historical and divinely dramatic, a progressive movement on the part of God in the organism of human history, designed to make itself felt as an efficient force in the universal life of the world. What was thought of always in the case, was only the new light which divine revelation was imagined to bring with it immediately in its primary organs and witnesses, the knowledge that was supposed to be infused into these directly by God's Spirit; this being taken for the whole process, which reduced itself thus to a mere abstract inspiration, without the needful basis of an outward objective manifestation. The main object of revelation, however, is not simply the lighting up of new truths in this way

in the mind of a prophet; it is rather to bring the objective facts in which it starts (illuminated by progressive inspiration) within the range of permanent human vision, so that they may come to be part and parcel of the world's abiding consciousness through all subsequent time, God manifests himself in certain grand demonstrations of his presence, evidently transcending the whole order of nature, and bringing into view some new element of his being, some previously unknown side of his character; these stand forth as single events or data in history, and have at once their startling significance; but they are designed for far more than any such momentary effect. Their full signification is for gradual, progressive apprehension; and for this purpose they must take their place as fixed lights in the firmament of human consciousness, that they may be continually in sight, and thus work their meaning more and more into the world's general life. In this way revelation enters as a co-efficient into the whole process of human knowledge and culture, beyond the range itself of its perceived and acknowledged presence. It shines upon the world, and makes itself felt historically in its moral constitution, even where the world owns it not, and sees not in it any revelation whatever.

Art. VII.—THEOLOGICAL AND LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

GERMANY.

The recent war in Germany has kept back the publication of works of a real solid class in philosophy and theology; but it has given the professors more leisure for pursuing their investigations, while it has not sensibly interfered with the university lectures. At Berlin, Semisch takes the place of Niedner, and has begun his lectures under encouraging auspices. Twesten, though advanced in years, is still as fresh and genial as ever; his work on Dogmatics will probably have to be completed from his Lectures. Hengstenberg contends as valiantly as ever against the enemies of church and state (according to his theories of the nature and relations of the two). Dorner is just completing the residue of the last sheets of his History of Protestant Theology, to be published in the new Encyclopœdia projected at Munich. His course on Dogmatics at the university deservedly attracts a large audience; it is very thoroughly elaborated. In philosophy there is but little to be noted. The Hegelian periodical, *Der Gedanke*, is discontinued. Its editor, Professor Michelet, has just published two volumes on Ethics (Das Natur-

recht) written in the sense of the Extreme Hegelian school; politically he favors the institutions of the United States. This work is also intended in part as an offset to Prof. Trendelenburg's volume on the same subject. The latter is still lecturing with his accustomed clearness and force.

At Halle, Julius Müller is still able to continue his lectures, though he speaks with more constraint than formerly. This summer he has been lecturing on the Gospel of John and on Practical Theology; on the latter subject he recommends the work of Nitzsch as the most important. Dr. Tholuck, too, in spite of constant bodily ailments, is unremitting in his duties at the University; he has not failed in a single lecture for thirty years, though he has not, during all this time, known what it was to be entirely well. He is lecturing on the Corinthians, and on Ethics. Riehm, who has been recently added to the corps of editors of the *Studien und Kritiken*, is attracting large classes to his lectures on the Old Testament. The sudden death of Hupfeld is a great loss to the University. His library of about 8,000 volumes is offered for sale; it is very full in all that pertains to the oriental languages.

Leipsick has now a strong theological Faculty, embracing the names of Kalnis, Tischendorf, Lechler, Luthardt and Brückner. Tischendorf lectures only once a week; but he is hard at work on his new edition of the Greek New Testament. He is to edit the Codex Vaticanus—a great honor for a Protestant, attained by his undeniable preëminence in this department. He has also just completed a new and enlarged edition of his little work on the time when the Four Gospels were writen, which has had such great and deserved success. In the Preface, he speaks out boldly and plainly about the negative criticism. Kahnis is an admirable lecturer—clear, sharp, and decided. The flurry occasioned by the publication of the first volume of his Dogmatics has subsided. The second volume of his Dogmatics is a condensed and pregnant History of Doctrines. Luthardt is also an able lecturer, and gaining steadily in influence. In philosophy, Drobisch defends Herbart's system, while Weisse maintains his independent position.

The new edition (partly posthumous) of Niedner's Church History (one vol.) is about two-thirds re-written: the rest is taken chiefly from sheets which were printed for the use of Niedner's students.

Jacobi has nearly ready for the press the second volume of his Compendium of Church History. The printing of the German edition of the second volume of Dr. Schaff's Church History, is going on in Germany simultaneously with the printing of the English edition in New York.

A new edition, 3 vols., the translation of Dante by King John of Saxony (Philalethes) has just been brought out in good style. This translation is considered the best in the German language; the notes show marks of extensive and exact rendition, even on theological subjects. King John, though somewhat shorn of his political significance by the recent Prussian successes, and though he is the Roman Catholic ruler of a Protestant people, is universally beloved and esteemed. His attainments in philology, the sciences, and theology, are very remarkable. He takes the deepest interest in the Saxon University of Leipsick, and fosters all its departments as liberally as possible.

Weberweg's History of Philosophy is regarded in Germany as the best compendium on that subject; two volumes, on the ancient and mediæval systems, have appeared, and the third is promised soon.

The German Quarterly for English Theological Investigations and Criticisms, edited by Dr. Heidenheim, and published by Perthes at Gotha

contains many valuable papers, and notices of both English and German works. It is published at irregular intervals. In the fifth part, Dr. Keim gives an account of an ancient Christian legend, which throws some light upon the Diocletian persecutions, showing that they began earlier than is generally assumed. H. Grossley discusses the locality of Mt. Sinai; O. Stehlin, in a paper entitled Comparative and Productive Systematizing in Theology, discourses chiefly on Christ's Estate of Humiliation. Other essays are Dr. A. Müller on the Ahasuerus of Esther; Dr. F. Müller on the Armenian MSS. in Vienna; Dr. Heidenheim on a Codex of the Prophets in the British Museum, and a translation of a remarkable Dream of the Priest Abischa, "a Samaritan Prophet." In parts six and seven, we have translations from Dean Stanley's Oriental Church; Muralt of St. Petersburg, on the Firkowitsch collection of Hebrew MSS. in St. Petersburg—the largest in Europe, and the Sinaitic Codex; a translation by Dr. Heidenheim of Ab Gelugal's Prayer from the Samaritan liturgy, with the text; an account of Abu l' Fatal's Samaritan Chronicle with the Arabic text, by R. Payne Smith; translations of Syriac Hymns, with the text, by Dr. Zingerle; the Epistle of Jude, from the Vatican Ms., a fac simile, by Dr. Heidenheim, here published for the first time; an essay by the same, on the Synagoga Magna of 70 (120) Elders; and criticisms on the works of Colenso, Wordsworth, Pusey, Stanley, Davidson and others. The eighth part, dated Dec. 28, 1865, contains an essay by E. Graf, on Titus Silvanus (Acts xv. 22); Heidenheim on the text of Proverbs, the Litany of Markas, with the Coptic text, etc.; R. Payne Smith on the Samaritan Chronicle, with the Syriac text, and criticism of books, among which Dr. Thomson's, The Land and the Book, is well spoken of.

The Firkowitsch collection of MSS. spoken of above is very remarkable; it was made in the Crimea, where Caraitie Jews have been settled for many centuries. Prof. Chowlson says that all other libraries do not contain a tenth part of the literature here collected in 272 Caraite MSS., besides 523 Rabbinical works and 250 other writings. The MSS. of the Hebrew Bible elsewhere found, do not reach beyond the 10th century; the Firkowitsch collection has 47 Synagogue rolls of the Pentateuch, dated 489, 639, 764, 781, 789, 798, 805, 847, 909, 920, 939, besides 77 other codices and 23 versions. A notice in one of these says, that in 957, the Jews in the Crimea first received the vowels and consonants from Jerusalem. Several MSS. from Persia show a different system of vocalism and accentuation. The 272 Caraite Mss. also elucidate, more fully than before the history of the Jews from the sixth to the tenth century; the Caraites were the Protestants of Judaism.

Zeitschrift f. d. historische Theologie. Part II. 1866. This periodical has passed, since Niedner's death, into the hands of Dr. Kahnis of Leipsic, who will probably give to it a new impulse. The first article, by Dr. Goldhorn, is an elaborate examination of the question respecting a work ascribed to Abelard *De Unitate et Trinitate*, and its relation to Abelard's works, entitled *Introductio* and *Theologia Christiana*. Dr. Goldhorn's conclusions, in which he deviates from current views (*e. g.* Cousin and Jourdain, in their edition of Abelard, 2 vols. Paris, 1849–59) are, that the *Theologia*, now called *Introductio*, was written in the last part of Abelard's life; and that the treatise entitled *Theologia Christiana* is an older work, which made the basis of the above *Introductio*, and is probably the same as the work *De Unitate et Trinitate*, for which Abelard was condemned at Soissons A. D. 1121. The second article, by Hachfeld, gives for the first time in print, the *Swabian Confession* of 1574, which

proceeded and was the basis of the *Formula Concordiae*; it is a valuable addition to symbolical literature. The third article, by Dr. Henke, gives extracts from the Letters of Balthasar Schuppius, a sharp satirist and earnest Christian, in the first half of the 17th century, the Spenser of his times, whose memory has, within a few years, been revived by the biographical sketches of Vial (1857), and Oelze (1862).

Zeitschrift f. Wissenschaftliche Theologie. 1866. Erstes Heft. The editor, Prof. A Hilgenfeld, opens the number with an essay on Christianity and Modern Culture, to show the need of their reconciliation, referring especially to recent speculations of Rothe and Strauss. The character of the reconciliation which he advocates, may be inferred from the fact, that he thinks that even Strauss's positions may be included in the compact. Hilgenfeld also defends anew his position, that the Gospel of Mark comes properly between Matthew and Luke. He compares the present opinions about Mark to the three views about Universalo in the middle ages: viz., Universalia anteres, in rebus, and post rebus: so some hold that Mark is *before* Matthew and Luke, others *after*, and others between (in). Lipsius continues his investigations upon the Shepherd of Hermas and Montanism in Rome. The other articles are short and chiefly controversial.

The number of theological students in the Prussian Protestant Universities, 1865–6, winter semester, was 1,008 (18 more than in 1865); the Catholics number 667 (48 more than in 1865). All the students numbered 6,077, with 559 Professors and teachers.

A table of German publications for the year 1864, shows this result: In theology, 1,411 books; belles-lettres, 935: jurisprudence, 870; education, 696; history, 671; natural history, 517; medicine, 491; classics, 402; art, 385; mechanics, 359, etc.

Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie. 1866. First Part, vol. XI. Rösch on the Year of the Birth of Jesus—he puts it with Scaliger at the end of February or the beginning of March in the year 2 before our era. Dr. Planck of Göttingen, contributes an able essay on the Gods, and the Belief in Gods of the Ancient Germans, after Tacitus' Germania. Cropp on the Monastic Life in its Religious and Ethical Motives. Palmer, the Peculiar Character of the Evangelical Theology in Würtemberg. Laurent on the Epistle to Philemon; holding (1) that it was sent to Laodicea, but is not the Epistle to the Laodiceans; and (2) that the Epistle to the Ephesians was also first sent to Laodicea.

Zeitschrift für lutherische Theologie. 2. 1866. Klostermann, Homiletic Interpretation of Phil. ii. 5–13. David Frich, The Religious movement in the Ecclesiastical district of Kautokeino in Finland. C. R. von Bahder, The Universal Priesthood of Christians in its Relation to the Ministerial Office. Karl Heyder, The Relation of Göthe to Spinoza.

An important work in reference to the history of the Reformation in Spain and the doings of the Spanish Inquisition has been written by Dr. C. A. Wilkins, pastor of the Reformed Church in Vienna, on the Life, Writings and Fate of Fray Luis de Leon. Luis published on Job, 1580, the Canticles, 1572, Les Nombres de Christo, 1583, etc.

Studien und Kritiken. 3. 1866. Steitz, The New Testament View of the Power of the Keys: Diestel, The Bible and Natural Science in the Period of Orthodoxy; Matthias, The Olive Tree in Romans; Marcker on Gal. ii. 6; Weiss on Schleiermacher's Life of Jesus; Gaab, Jung-Stilling and his Times.

Bibliothica Historica.—Under this title, Mr. Brockhaus, of Leipzig, has recently issued a voluminous catalogue, compiled only as Germans know

how. It is entitled "Verzeichniss einer Sammlung von Werken aus dem gebiete der Geschichte und deren. Hülfswissenschaften Vorräthig auf dem lager von F. A. Brockhaus' sortiment und Antiquarian in Leipzig;" and is one of the most complete historical catalogues ever issued. It is arranged under countries, with numerous sub-divisions. Thus of England, we first have General History, then Early History, followed by that of James I. to Charles II., James II., and William III.; then from George I. downwards. The next divisions are Geography and Travels, and lastly, Scotland and Ireland. The collection of works relating to Germany is, as may be expected, very large, but that of such countries as South America and Australia is really surprising. It contains nearly 400 pages, and enumerates no fewer than 8,663 different works—all with prices.—*The Bookseller.*

FRANCE.

A new volume of Madame Swetchine's Letters has just been published, edited by the Count de Falloux. Her journals and letters are in some respects the most remarkable of any recently published in the Catholic literature of France. They breathe a spirit of deep Christian faith and love, and a firm trust in God's providence and grace. She died in 1857. During her long residence in Paris (her husband was a Russian General) she was in constant intercourse with the leading literary, as well as theological writers. The best French critics, as Sainte Beuve, assign her a very high rank as a thinker and writer.

The Committee of the French Society of Emancipation has addressed letters to the Queen of Spain, and to the Emperor of Brazil, urging these monarchs to abolish slavery in their dominions. These appeals are subscribed by such names as the Duke and the Prince de Broglie, Guizot, Count Montalembert, Laboulaye, Cochin, Henri, Martin, De Pressensé, and others. The one addressed to the Emperor of Brazil begins with a reference to our own example: "At the moment that the Republic of the United States, victorious in a long and deadly war, has given liberty to four millions of slaves, at the moment when Spain seems about ready to yield to the voice of humanity, and of justice, we venture to address to your Majesty an ardent appeal in behalf of the slaves of your empire."

The Commentaries on Exodus and Leviticus, by Prof. Alexander de Mestral, published at Lausanne, in 1864–5, are favorably noticed in the *Archives du Christianisme.* Though popular and practical they show an acquaintance with the best recent exegetical works of Germany; the style is vigorous and clear.

The second part of Guizot's apologetic work is entitled *Meditations on the present state of Christianity.* It has been received with much favor, and is exerting a good influence, in opposition to Renan and other writers of the negative school. Renan's volume on the *Apostles* is generally regarded as altogether inferior to his former work; it has not even produced a momentary "sensation." His criticism is so negligent and arbitrary that it carries no conviction with it. In scientific value it is far below the German works that traverse the same field.

The second and third volumes of Laboulaye's History of the United States have just appeared. The second contains the history of the Revolution; the third is devoted to an account of the formation, and an exposition of the principles, of our Constitution. The work is made up of the lectures which the author has been delivering for several years, and which were so numerously attended and so highly applauded. It contains a defense of our republican institutions, with allusions to the coun-

ter European systems. It appears, too, at a time when the public is better prepared to hear the truth about us than ever before. The author is a firm friend of our country, and has of late been specially gratified by the tribute sent him from the New York Fair for the Sanitary Commission, consisting of a superb album, filled with the portraits of American statesmen, generals, and scientific and literary persons.

The second edition of Michel Nicolas' *Religious Doctrines of the Jews* has just appeared, with a new preface, in which the author speaks of the relations of the doctrines of Jesus to the antecedent Jewish system. His theory is, that the teachings of Christ are but the completion and the higher form of Judaism; and that in the second century Christianity was essentially modified by Greek and oriental elements.

Bulletin Théologique, 1864, 1865. This valuable supplement to the Revue Chrétienne, containing theological essays, has hitherto been published quarterly, but it will henceforth be published every two months. In the numbers for 1864 and 1865 are the following articles: C. Malan, on the Divine Authority of the Bible, and on the Life of the Human Soul or the Life of Faith. Hugenholz, on Conscience in its religious relations, two articles. E. de Pressensé, on Theological movements in France, in 1863 and 1864; on the Origin of the Synoptists, and on Philo and the Essenes—the last article is extracted from his forthcoming Life of Jesus. F. Litchenberger, an account of the Theological Literature in Germany, 1863, 1864. Bleek, on the Gospel of John, translated. Tischendorf, When were our Gospels written? translated. F. Bonifas, The Humanity of Jesus Christ, as represented by John. Th. Rivier, The Day of the Death of Jesus. Ch. Byse, a Review of Nicolas' Critical Studies on the Old and New Testaments. R. Hollard, on Schleiermacher's Life of Jesus. R. Ashton, on English Theology. E. Arnaud, on Human Nature according to St. Paul, etc., defending the division into body, soul, and spirit. F. Godet, Prof. in Neuchâtel, on the Modern Interpretation of the Apocalypse—contending that the reference of the number 666 to Nero is incorrect. L. Thomas, an interesting criticism of the divisions in the Theological Encyclopedia, proposing the following schemes: 1. Apologetics; 2. Historical Theology—Bible and Church History, etc.; 3. Systematic Theology, including Dogmatics, Ethics, Polemics, and Speculative Theology; 4. Practical Theology.

Le Recensement de Quirinius en Judée, par Henri Lutteroth. Paris, 1865. pp. 134. To relieve the difficulty about the taxing under Cyrenius (Luke ii. 2), M. Lutteroth proposes to put i. 80 to ii. 5 in a paragraph by itself, to make "the shewing to Israel" (i. 80), to mean a first presentation of the child, according to Jewish custom, at Jerusalem, about his 12th year, and that to coincide with the time of the taxing (in ii. 2); and so to translate ii. 6, or to make it refer to a previous period to which the evangelist then goes back, viz. "There, too, they were, at the time, when," etc. This way of meeting the chronological difficulty is certainly ingenious and novel. Other chapters discuss the chronology of the Gospels in the light of this interpretation; the Roman taxings under Augustus; and the part ascribed to Tertullian to Sentius Saturninus in the enrollment in Judea.

M. Viennet, one of the Academicians, and ninety years of age, is about to publish a History of the Papacy, from the time of Innocent III. on which he is said to have been at work for fifty years. It was printed six years ago, but laid aside. The Pope's Encyclical against Freemasonry has led to its publication, the author being Grand Master of the Scottish Rite of Freemasonry in France.

Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne. Jan.—March, 1866. Saulcy's Journey to the Holy Land; Bonnetty, the Religion of the Romans in relation to the Jews, continued; Jules Oppert on Aryanism; Renan's Aegyptology; Judge Grivcan on Fenelon's *Maximes des Saint*; Bonnetty on Marco Polo; Tanglor's History of Mount Athos, with Plates, etc.

HOLLAND AND BELGIUM.

Professor I. H. Scholten, of Leyden, has published a work on the Gospel of John, written in the sense of the latest German negative criticism. He puts the time of its composition at about A. D. 140. Scholten is the author of the most comprehensive Dutch work on systematic theology of this century; but its positions are adverse to those of the Reformed Confessions.

Bernhard ter Haar, Professor of Theology at Utrecht, has published ten lectures against Renan's Life of Jesus, whi h have also been translated into German.

S. F. W. Rooda Von Eysinga, the Self Revelation of God in the Human Spirit. 8vo. Leyden.

The Tyler Theological Society of Haarlem offer a prize of 400 guilders for the best essay on the Essenes, and the same amount for the best critical estimate of Baur's works.

The Hague Society has given to Dr. H. Viskemann a prize for the best work upon Slavery. It is published at Leydon.

The *Nord* of Brussels says: "The appearance of the *Catholique* has been the signal, or rather the manifestation, of a great schism in the clerical party. This new and fiery organ of absolute Ultramontanism has accused the greater part of the journals of the Right, and a vast number of Catholics, of betraying their cause in admitting a sort of tacit compromise between the present age and the prescriptions of the Papal Bull published a few months back."

The Hague Society for the Defense of the Faith has assigned the following subjects for prizes: The Punishment of Death; Dualism and Monism, in relation to Man's Body and Soul; the Permanent Worth of Christianity; the Omnipresence of God, in relation to the Conflict between the Transcendence and the Immanence of God.

ITALY.

The most remarkable and complete work that has yet appeared on the Catacombs of Rome is that of the Chevalier Jean Baptiste de Rossi, the first volume of which (price 64½ francs) has been published at Rome, by order of Pius IX., under the title, *Rome Souterraine et Chrétienne.* It gives a complete account of the history and exploration of those remains of primitive Christianity, and it is hailed by the Roman Catholics as an ally to their cause.

According to the report of Baron Natoli, Minister of Education, there are in Italy 52 seminaries for the education of priests; 208 mixed schools, under control of the priesthood, with 13,000 scholars; 279 lyceums and gymnasia under the supervision of the State. The government is insisting upon a suspension of the 208 mixed schools. The Report contains a severe criticism upon their present management and course of study. Under the old system, out of a population of 22,000,000 about 17,000,000 were said to be illiterate. There are now in the kingdom 1,910 priests who are professors or schoolmasters; in the 19 universities 241 of the professors are priests. The total income of the churches has been 68,529,422 francs, of which the bishops and canons received 36,912,722

francs, the monasteries and nunneries 16,216,552. The income of parish priests has been about 500 francs; the government has paid a subsidy to them of 2,226,431 francs. A new bill reduces the incomes of archbishops, and bishops, and canons. There are 219 bishopries in Italy.

It is said that the "Emancipation Society" in Southern Italy has formed 24 auxiliaries for the several Italian provinces. Its members at present consist of 971 priests, 852 laymen, and 340 honorary members; 1823 persons in all. Among the 971 priests are 102 *curés*, and 40 high dignitaries of the Church. Among the laymen are three ex-Ministers of the Kingdom of Italy, 36 deputies, and 11 senators. Among their objects are: To bring about an œcumenical council for the reform of the Catholic Church; Liturgy in the national language, and free circulation of the Bible; abolition of forced celibacy; admission of full and entire liberty of conscience.

SCANDINAVIA.

G. L. Plitt gives an account of the Latest Swedish Translation of the New Testament in the fourth part of the *Journal for Lutheran Theology*, 1865. The first version was made by the Chancellor Lorenz Anderson, in 1526, on the basis of Lutter's German version. Archbishop Lorenz Peterson improved this, and also, aided by Gustavas Vasa, in 1541, published the Old Testament. This is called the Gustavian version, in honor of the King. He also published an improved version of the New Testament in 1550. There the matter stood, until, in 1773, a Royal Commission was appointed to revise the whole. Specimens of these versions were issued from 1776 to 1793; but it was rather a paraphrase than a translation, and the style was too much modernized. Bishop Tingstadius tried to amend this in his edition of 1816. A new commission was named in 1841; it published specimens in 1853, and in 1861 the whole New Testament, at Upsala. An account of their principles and proceedings is given in a work of A. E. Knös, *Am Revision of Svenska Bibelversattningen*, etc., pp. 113, Upsala, 1861. The old version is made the basis. The results of modern criticisms of the text are prudently used.

The University of Christiania, Norway, was founded by Frederick VI., in 1811. It now has 45 professors and teachers, and about 500 students.

Mr. Thompson, keeper of the Royal Museums of Copenhagen, is deceased. He wrote largely on archaeological subjects, and was the founder of the Scandinavian Archaeological Society.

The *Journal of Sacred Literature* for April contains an account of Protestantism in Scandinavia, from a Roman Catholic writer, chiefly devoted to the philosophy of Prof. C. J. Boström, of Upsala, who published Theory of Government, 1859; an account of his system. 1859; *Remarks on the Doctrine of Hell*, 1864, 2d ed., etc. He has been opposed by Prof. O. F. Myrberg, Dean Beckman, and others. He is accused of denying the doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation, and of advocating an absolute idealism in philosophy. He has been Professor at Upsala since 1840. Prof. Myrberg is editor of a journal, *The Witness* (Vittnet), devoted to the defense of Christianity. It has been published since 1864.

Sechzehn erzählende Dichtungen von A. Petofi. Aus dem Ungrischen übersetzt von K. M. Kertbeny. Prag: Steinhauser. London, Williams & Norgate. Alexander Petöfi is one of the most extraordinary examples of what it is in the power of genius to effect. He was the son of a butcher, and, which was worse, of an impoverished butcher. His early days were sufficiently unpromising; he would learn nothing at school, and ran away to become successively an errand-boy, a soldier, an unsuc-

cessful actor, and a vagabond. But he had contrived to pick up one or two modern languages, and already felt himself a poet. Receiving some encouragement from a newspaper, he set out to walk from Debreczin to Pesth in the middle of winter, with three shillings in his pocket, his manuscripts between his skin and his shirt, and a huge cudgel in his hand. Arrived, he introduced himself to the reigning poet, Vörösmarty, who listened with exemplary patience while the wild-looking young man declaimed his verses, and, when he had finished, calmly observed, "You are the only lyrical poet that Hungary has ever had, myself not excepted. We must take care of you"—an incident which Petöfi's biographer is probably quite correct in pronouncing unique in literary history. From that hour Petöfi's fortune was made; his intellect, his attainments, his poetical faculty developed with astounding rapidity, and his productiveness surpassed everything—at least on the part of a real poet—that the world had seen since the days of Shelley and Byron. He became a journalist and politician, espoused the popular cause with all the vehemence of his nature, and, when the civil war broke out, served as aide-de-camp to Bem, by whom he was highly esteemed. At the battle of Schässburg, where Bem himself only escaped by plunging into a bog, Petöfi disappeared altogether. No doubt exists that he was killed, but the body was never found, and literally no trace of him remained except the poems which have eclipsed the past and revolutionized the future of Hungarian literature. The secret of this extraordinary success lay chiefly in the intensely national character of Petöfi's poetry. The nation had had many good poets before him, but, as Vörösmarty perhaps intended to imply, they were not *Hungarian* poets in anything but their language. They had formed themselves on foreign models, and a nation inferior to none in spirit and self-respect felt a secret humiliation at being solely represented by them. Petöfi did not, then, enrich a previously existing literature; he called a new one into life, and achieved in his own department the same independence for his countrymen which it is their darling aim to realize in politics. This will sufficiently account for their enthusiastic appreciation of his writings, which, with every allowance for the imperfections of translation, must still appear somewhat extravagant in the eyes of dispassionate foreigners. Much of his poetry resembles the inferior productions of Byron—energetic in expression, but poor in feeling and commonplace in thought. Often, again, he is like Burns; and here, indeed, he stands on his own ground, and appears to have been to Hungary what the Ayrshire ploughman was to Scotland. He will be indebted for much of his European renown to the translator of this volume, though unfortunately M. Kertbeny wants the *curiosa felicitas*, the vivifying touch which makes all the difference between poetry and prose.—*Saturday Review.*

SWITZERLAND.

A. L. Herminjard has collected and published (Geneva, 1866) the first volume of an important work, *Correspondence of the Reformers in the French-speaking Countries*. It is to be published in ten annual volumes; the first is devoted to the years 1512–1516. These letters have been collected with great diligence, and will add materially to our knowledge of the Reformation.

Two large chests have recently been found in the neighborhood of Geneva, containing the sermons and correspondence of the younger Turrettive (John Alphonso) from 1690 to 1740. There are letters from all parts of Europe.

There are now in Geneva 4,000 French refugees, and many Italians, many of them fugitives from debts and justice. There are also 5,000 Germans there. The conservative-liberal party still maintains its ground, though the radical Fazy is very active. Ernest Nairlle's lectures on Ethics are thronged. M. Conlin is the most popular preacher, drawing 4 to 5,000 to St. Peter's Cathedral.

ENGLAND.

The British and Foreign Evangelical Review. No. LVI. April, 1866. The Ecumenical Councils, by Dr. P. Schaff, of New York. Kurtz and A. Stewart on Sacrifices. The Church and the French Revolution, on the basis of De Pressensé's work. Political Economy and the Christian Ministry. Horace Mann. Literature of the Sabbath Question. Geology; its Progress and Limits as a Science. Archbishop Sunesen—the Danish theologian of the 13th century. The Sensational Philosophy—a review of Mill by Calderwood.

The British Quarterly Review, April. Anglicanism and Romanism—on Pusey, Manning, etc. Praed and his works. Bradshaw. Club Life in London. Peter the Great. The Reformed Church of France—an excellent account of its present state. The Rinderpest of Great Britain.

The Journal of Sacred Literature. April. Mill and the Inductive Origin of First Principles. The Site of Sodom and Gomorrah. The Historical Character of the Gospels, by Rev. C. A. Row. Scripture on the Intermediate State. Eusebius of Cæsarea or the Star, in the Syriac Text, by Dr. Wm. Wright. Exegesis of Difficult Texts. Protestantism in Scandinavia. Inspiration and Revelation. Correspondence. Reviews, etc.

The ratio of the supply of ministers to the Church of England is decreasing in proportion to the population. The population of England and Wales increases 240,000 per annum. This would require 200 clergy; the vacancies by death (about 25 to 1,000) are 442 per year. In 1865 there were 539 deacons ordained, 103 less than are needed. The population of England and Wales is 20,209,671; the whole number of clergy is 17,667. In the London Diocese there is one clergyman to 3,590; in Manchester Diocese, one to 2,794; in Hereford 1 to 458. From 1834 to 1843, 5,350 deacons were ordained; from 1844 to 1853, 6,656; from 1854 to 1863, only 6,009. The number ordained in 1855 was 120 below the average from 1844 to 1853.

Liturgischen Gewänder des Mittelalters. London: Nutt. A translation of the Syriac poems of Ephraem Syrus is one of the most valuable contributions recently made to the history of the early Church. Much cannot indeed be said for the poetical spirit of these compositions, which, with every allowance for the imperfections of translation, must be pronounced cumbrous and tedious; didactic, homilistic, controversial, anything rather than poetical. They are, however, most valuable as illustrations of primeval doctrines and practices, and more particularly as showing the general atmosphere of feeling and opinion which prevailed in the author's time among Oriental Christians. The most spirited and interesting are the hortatory and deprecatory hymns composed while the city of Nisibis, where the author lived, was besieged by the Persians. From various allusions, aided by the narrative, of Ammianus Marcellinus, we can almost follow the progress of the campaign from one day to another, and the picture of the prevalent alarm is lively in the extreme. Other pieces deplore the obstinate heathenism of the neighboring city of Carrhæ; others are levelled at Arians and other nonconformists of the pe-

riod. The date of all these pieces can be determined with tolerable certainty, but this is not the case with the numerous and singular poems on Death, many of which are couched in the form of a dialogue between Death and the Devil. The execution is grotesque, but the conception suggests curious reminiscences of Milton. The editor's prolegomena and annotations are models of brevity and clearness. Being apparently a Roman Catholic, he keeps a watchful eye upon his author, and is always at hand to explain away anything savoring of heresy. It is almost superfluous to add that this treasure has been derived from the unrivaled Syriac collections of the British Museum, and that the editor acknowledges himself greatly indebted to the custodian, Dr. Wright.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

The *Literary Churchman*, London, in a notice of Kirk's Charles the Bold, which it highly praises, says: "America has produced almost a school of historical writers, who, just as England is falling away from her ancient ideas of the dignity of history and making Clio speak like a housemaid or a comic actress, have treated her with all her wonted majesty, and bring her forward in all her unforced dignity of simplicity and truth, as knowing well what grave events that passed among the mighty dead deserve to be spoken of seriously." It finds in Kirk's work "only one Americanism," viz.: using *unloosen* in the sense of *loosen*, and not of *bind*. But the critic is here mistaken. Johnson gives this sense, though he says it is barbarous, as "the particle prefixed implies negation." But here Johnson too is wrong, for the word is from the Anglo-Saxon *unlesan*, as *loose* is from *lesan*, and the prefix *un* is merely intensive. (See Worcester's Dictionary.)

The *Historical Magazine* says that "Joseph L. Chester, Esq., now residing at London, England, has been making a complete copy of the Matriculation Registers of Oxford University, from 1564 to 1750, permission having been afforded him. It will consist of more than one hundred thousand entries—name, parentage, residence, age, etc., and will be invaluable, as such a list never will be printed. He has already identified members of the early New-England families, and, among other things, has settled the ancestry of the famous Anne Hutchinson.

Dr. J. Austin Allibone has at last completed his "Critical Dictionary of English Literature," and the second volume will soon be placad before the public. The *Philadelphia Press* gives some statistics about this valuable work. It was projected in 1850, and the author commenced preparing it for the press in 1853. The first volume (A to J), of over 1,000 pages imperial octavo, was published in December, 1858. The manuscript of the whole work, fairly copied for the press, fills 19,044 large foolscap pages. Twenty-two months were required to write up the letter S, and about as many more for the letter W. The catalogue of authors includes 700 Smiths, 90 of whom are Johns. Altogether, there are 30,000 biographical and literary notices, and there are 40 indexes of subjects. The entire mass of manuscript was copied by Mrs. Allibone.

The History of Bernard du Guesclin and his Epoch, by Mr. Jamieson of S. C., which was finished at Charleston in the midst of our late conflict, has had the unusual honor of being translated and published in Paris, by order of the French Minister of War, Marshal Randon. It is edited by M. Baissac, who make corrections in some points of detail, and adds maps *e. g.* of the battles of Poictiers and Pontvalain. The

French critics speak of its "vast erudition," and of "the impartiality of the author's, military and political judgments."

Dr. Walker, of Cambridge, has prepared a memoir of President Quincy, at the request of the Massachusetts Historical Society.

Dr. Happer, a missionary of the (O. S.) Presbyterian Church in China, has translated the Westminster Confession into the Chinese; it is in the press.

Rev. S. R. Brown, American Missionary in Japan, has completed the translation of Matthew's Gospel in Japanese.

Dr. Adger is preparing for the press several volumes of the works of the late Dr. Thornwell.

MEXICO AND SOUTH AMERICA.

Manual de Odriozola, Historical Documents of Peru in its Colonial Epoch to its Independence; 3 vols. Lima, 1863–64, J. Bautista Valeri, The Divinity of Jesus Christ; an analytic Refutation of the Life of Jesus, by Renan, pp. 310. Lima. 1864.

D. Francisco Pimentel's Descriptive and Comparative View of the Indigenous Languages of Mexico, published at Mexico, 1862, is the most important and able work on that subject. The author is said to be a man of rare learning. The Mexican Geographical Society appointed a commission on this work, and gave to it a prize. Its price is about $5.

The Empress Carlotta has written a pamphlet on "Mexico from a Providential Point of View."

Dr. Andres Bullo died at Santiago, Oct. 15. He was one of the most celebrated of Chilian authors. His works are upon legislation, philosophy, philology, and the natural sciences.

J. M. Pereira da Sitra Historia da Fundacao do Imperio Brazileiro. Tomo i.–iv. Paris.

The Protestant congregations are increasing in South America, from the German emigration and other sources. In Brazil, at Santa Isabel, are 413 evangelical Christians; in Rio de Janeiro, 3,000; in Santo Pedro, 1,200; in New Freiburg, 1,000; in Donna Francisco, 1,200. In Rio Grande do Sul province, are said to be 250,000 Protestants not provided with religious services. Under Dr. Borchard, in the Sao Leopoldo province, there are 2,000; in Monte Video, is a congregation of 200; in Uruguay, 660 Waldenses; in Buenos Ayres, there are 3,000. In the La Plata States are also many Germans.—*Neue Evang. Kirchenzeitung.*

ART. VIII.—NOTES ON RECENT BOOKS.

Discourses on Redemption as Revealed at "Sundry Times and in Divers Manners," designed both as Biblical Expositions for the People, and Hints to Theological Students. By REV. STUART ROBINSON. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1866. Dr. Robinson has made himself notorious during our civil strife for his disloyalty. His attacks upon the North, and upon the action of the General Assembly (O. S.) sustaining the North, have been persistent and rancorous. He was also the chief offender in the matter of the Louisville Presbytery, which occupied so much of the time of that Assembly at its last meeting. Exiled from the country he fulminated his thunders from the neighboring province of Canada, where (at Toronto) he delivered these discourses.

Still, we would not use these facts to the prejudice of this volume, which bears internal evidence of having been prepared in peaceful times, and embodies the results of real scholarship and patient labor. The au-

thor has given no little time and attention to this form of Bible teaching, and has succeeded in it in a remarkable degree. He has chosen such topics for discussion, and so arranged the volume as to secure a logical development of the gospel in the order of its communication.

The Introductory discourses are on The Diversity in Unity of Revelation, and on The Inspiration of the Scriptures. The main part of the work is divided into six sections, viz.: Redemption as revealed in the Theophanies—Redemption as revealed through the Spirit of Christ in the Prophets—as taught by Jesus the Incarnate Word—as preached by the Apostles under the dispensation of the Spirit—and as proclaimed by Jesus the Ascended. Each section is subdivided, and the topics appropriate to it are discussed in separate discourses, numbering some twenty in all. In the Appendix the author discusses several topics related to the discourses, especially The Place of the Church in the Scheme of Redemption, the Ordinances of Public Worship, and its Relation to the Civil Government, more elaborately and fully than was allowable in the limits of a discourse.

The execution of the work is able and learned. The cardinal doctrines of the Christian system are set forth with clearness of statement, and defended with vigor of thought and logic. The author is familiar with the current phases of error and unbelief, and deals them some heavy blows. The volume abounds with apt illustrations and striking appeals. We commend it especially to theological students, and the younger portion of the ministry, as a suggestive and useful work.

History of Julius Cæsar. Vol. II. The War in Gaul. New York: Harper & Brother. 1866. We have space for little more than the announcement of the second volume of this imperial history. The literary and mechanical execution of the present volume is in all respects equal to that of the former. While the recent war in Europe has lessened somewhat the eagerness of the public to know the personal views of Napoleon and stript him of much of his former political significance, still, in a literary point of view, this history deserves and will command unusual attention, and its completion will be looked for with interest. In this volume the author traces the career of the eminent Roman from his appointment to the government of Gaul to the crossing of the Rubicon, —a very important period of his life.

Homes Without Hands. Being a description of animals classed according to their principle of construction. By Rev. J. G. Wood. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1866. This work on natural history by an English author, already favorably known, embodies a fund of information, both interesting and valuable, to the general as well as the scientific reader.

The arrangement of the author is strictly scientific. He describes 1. Those animals that burrow in the ground, being the simplest and most natural form of habitation. 2. Those that suspend their homes in the air. 3. Those that construct their domicils of mud, stones, sticks, etc. 4. Those that make their homes beneath the surface of the water. 5. Those that live socially in communities. 6. Those that are parasitic upon animals or plants. 7. Those that build on branches.

The author gives the fruits of extensive and pains-taking scientific research; and much of it is curious and wonderful. The illustrations are numerous and of a very superior character. Such works as this and the "Harmonies of Nature, or the Unity of Creation," by Dr. Hartwig, published by Appleton & Co., furnish reading as intensely interesting as a novel, and at the same time elevating and instructive. The Publishers have spared no pains in making the book attractive to the eye.

THEOLOGY LIBRARY
CLAREMONT, CALIF.
47800